



RoutledgeCurzon

JAPANESE ARMY STRAGGLERS AND MEMORIES OF THE WAR IN JAPAN, 1950–1975

Beatrice Trefalt

Also available as a printed book
see title verso for ISBN details

Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975

This book comprehensively charts the discovery and repatriation between 1950 and 1975, of so-called ‘stragglers’ – Japanese soldiers who had remained in hiding overseas, unwilling to believe the war was over – still fighting the Second World War on the edges of former battlefields in South-East Asia and the Pacific. It explores their return to Japan and their impact on the Japanese people, revealing changing attitudes to war veterans and war casualties’ families, as well as the ambivalence of memories of the war.

Beatrice Trefalt lectures in East Asian History in the School of Liberal Arts, University of Newcastle, New South Wales.

RoutledgeCurzon Studies in the Modern History of Asia

1 The Police in Occupation Japan

Control, corruption and resistance to reform

Christopher Aldous

2 Chinese Workers

A new history

Jackie Sheehan

3 The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia

Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya

4 The Australia–Japan Political Alignment 1952 to the present

Alan Rix

5 Japan and Singapore in the World Economy

Japan's economic advance into Singapore, 1870–1965

Shimizu Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi

6 The Triads as Business

Yiu Kong Chu

7 Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism

A-chin Hsiau

8 Religion and Nationalism in India

The case of the Punjab

Harnik Deol

9 Japanese Industrialisation

Historical and cultural perspectives

Ian Inkster

10 War and Nationalism in China 1925–1945

Hans J. van de Ven

11 Hong Kong in Transition

One country, two systems

edited by Robert Ash, Peter Ferdinand, Brian Book and Robin Porter

12 Japan's Postwar Economic Recovery and Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1948–1962

Noriko Yokoi

13 Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975

Beatrice Trefalt

Japanese Army Stragglers and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975

Beatrice Trefalt



RoutledgeCurzon

Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2003
by RoutledgeCurzon
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by RoutledgeCurzon
29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001

RoutledgeCurzon is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004.

© 2003 Beatrice Trefalt

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-48047-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-33754-9 (Adobe eReader Format)
ISBN 0-415-31218-3 (Print Edition)

For Evi and Hans-Peter Trefalt

Contents

<i>List of illustrations</i>	viii
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	ix
<i>Notes on the text</i>	xi
Introduction	1
1 The shared past: mobilisation for war	13
2 Creating stragglers: demobilisation, 1945–1950	24
3 ‘Five years on mice and potatoes’: exotic stragglers, 1950–1952	49
4 ‘Living spirits of the war dead’, 1954–1956	69
5 ‘But they are not gorillas’, 1959–1960	88
6 The past in the present: Yokoi Shōichi returns from Guam, 1972	111
7 ‘In the jungle, the war was still going on’: Kozuka Kinshichi, Onoda Hirō and the last of Lubang, 1972–1974	136
8 Nakamura Teruo: the last straggler and the issue of imperialism	160
Conclusion	179
<i>Appendix: number and provenance of repatriates to Japan, 1945–1995</i>	191
<i>Notes</i>	194
<i>Bibliography</i>	220
<i>Index</i>	236

Illustrations

Figures

5.1	Cartoon by Katō Yoshirō, <i>Mainichi shimbun</i> , 22 February 1959	101
5.2	Cartoon by Nasu Ryōsuke, <i>Mainichi shimbun</i> , 1 March 1959	102
6.1	<i>Shūkan sankei</i> , title page and advertisement, 26 February 1972	114
6.2	Cartoon by Iwamoto Kyūsoku, <i>Shūkan yomiuri</i> , 12 February 1972	130
6.3	Cartoon by Akiyoshi Kaoru, <i>Yomiuri shimbun</i> , 27 January 1972	132
7.1	Cartoon by Satō Sanpei, <i>Asahi shimbun</i> , 23 October 1972	144
7.2	Yazaki Corporation advertisements, <i>Bungei shunjū</i> , May 1974	148
7.3	Cartoon by Katō Yoshirō, <i>Shūkan asahi</i> , 22 March 1974	151
8.1	Artist's impression of 'Nakamura City', <i>Sandee mainichi</i> , 19 January 1975	162

Tables

2.1	Distribution of Japanese Army personnel in August 1945	26
2.2	Distribution of Japanese Navy personnel in August 1945	26
6.1	Opinion poll published by <i>Sankei shimbun</i> , 1 February 1972	131

Acknowledgements

My greatest debt of gratitude goes to Dr Sandra Wilson, who supervised the doctoral thesis on which this book is based and continues to be an indispensable mentor. Without her encouragement I would not have embarked on this project, and without her expertise, advice, support, good humour and endless patience I would not have been able to complete it.

Stephen Large, Michael Weiner and Kerry Smith provided useful comments and encouragement at a crucial juncture of this project, and I am grateful for their help. I have also benefited from the help of numerous institutions and individuals. The Australian government supported the research in its early stages with a postgraduate award, and the Japanese government provided me with the opportunity and funding to conduct extended research in Japan. I am grateful to Professor Banno Junji and staff at Tokyo University for providing advice and affiliation during my stay in Japan, and to Professor Yoshida Yutaka at Hitotsubashi for his generous help. I would also like to thank the Australian War Memorial and its staff for providing me with a scholarship in the early days of this project, and for opening my eyes to issues of memory and commemoration.

I would like to thank, for their permission to reprint cartoons, the artists Iwamoto Kyūsoku, Katō Yoshirō and Satō Sanpei and the estates of Akiyoshi Kaoru and Nasu Ryōsuke. I also thank Tōyō Yūsen and *Shūkan sankei* for letting me reprint a title page and an advertisement in Chapter 6, the Yazaki Corporation for permission to reproduce the advertisements in Chapter 7, and the *Mainichi shimbun* for permission to reproduce the drawing in Chapter 8. I am particularly grateful to Nakayama Tsunenori at the *Asahi shimbun* for his generous help in locating copyright holders.

There is not enough space here to acknowledge individually the many people whose encouragement and assistance at various stages made the completion of the project possible. I am thankful to the staff and my fellow students in the History Department at La Trobe University (Melbourne) and the School of Asian Studies at Murdoch University (Perth) for providing inspiring and supportive study environments. I am also grateful to my colleagues and students in the School of Liberal Arts at the University of Newcastle. The members of the Japanese Studies Association of Australia and of the Australia–Japan Research Project at the Australian War Memorial have been generous with comments and

x *Acknowledgements*

suggestions. Thank you also to the staff at the Australian National Library in Canberra and at the National Diet Library in Tokyo.

Finally, I wish to thank friends in Melbourne, Tokyo, Perth and Newcastle, and my family and friends in Switzerland, for their unfailing support and encouragement.

Notes on the text

Japanese names are given in accordance with national custom, with the surname first, except in the cases of authors writing in English who choose to reverse the order. Macrons have not been used in the case of well-known place names such as Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka and Hokkaido.

Introduction

Much is remembered about the past, and more is forgotten. Debate about what must be remembered – and what can be forgotten – is an integral part of all societies. Nowhere has this been more obvious than in Japan, where the place of the Second World War in post-war public consciousness continues to provoke disputes regarding exactly what must not be forgotten. The war was a traumatic event of such proportions that forgetting might have been a preferable option. The process of forgetting was aided by the slow disappearance of tangible reminders of the war in the years following Japan's defeat. Blackened ruins were removed and cities rebuilt; industries produced consumer goods rather than munitions; and a new generation was born and raised to enjoy peace and prosperity. Demobilised soldiers merged back more or less indistinguishably into the population, and eventually even maimed and begging veterans, reminders of the costs of Japan's ill-fated war, disappeared from the streets. Yet even in the early years of the twenty-first century – over fifty years after the war's end – war-related issues are continually present in the nation's media.

Though the war's legacies are a matter of contest in post-war Japan, one might have thought that the boundary marking the end of the hostilities, at least, would be undisputed. The date of the surrender, 15 August 1945, has become a symbolic watershed in the popular consciousness, separating a nation committed to war from one committed to peace, and representing the cathartic moment when the Japanese people were released from the past and embarked on a new future. The return home of millions of demobilised soldiers in the first two years after the war seemed to underline the finality of what had occurred. No one who witnessed the return of such an enormous number of former soldiers could possibly have guessed that some still remained in hiding in the jungles surrounding Pacific and South-East Asian battlefields, and that it would take until 1975 for the last soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army to come home.

Ultimately, the date 15 August 1945 denotes only the formal end of Japan's war in China and the Pacific. In many places, fighting continued well after that day, running into civil wars and wars of independence in various Asian countries. For many Japanese soldiers overseas the day of their country's surrender came and went without notice. On some of the fiercer battle fronts, many troops of the Japanese Imperial Army did not find out about the surrender for days or weeks

2 Introduction

after it had been declared. Some soldiers became embroiled in the civil conflict that followed Japanese defeat in Indonesia, Indochina and China. The end of one war merged with the beginning of another, delaying demobilisation and repatriation for months, in some cases for decades. Thousands of those who surrendered to the Soviet Union in Manchuria and North Korea became prisoners of war and were shipped to camps in Siberia. Many died there, and those who lived to be repatriated returned gradually throughout the 1950s.

This book focuses on the reception in Japan of a much smaller group of soldiers.¹ These individuals missed the end of the war altogether: fear, shame and disbelief, either singly or in combination, caused them to hide on the periphery of battlefields and on the edge of survival for years and sometimes decades. They tried for as long as possible to evade capture and surrender. It is likely that many such ‘stragglers’ died there whose remains will never be found, but some did survive to be repatriated to Japan. Stragglers came home, either singly or in groups, over a period of thirty years after the end of the war. Between 1950 and 1960 more than fifty were repatriated from New Guinea, Indonesia, the Philippines and the islands of Saipan, Guam and Anatahan in the mid-Pacific. Then, in 1972, Yokoi Shōichi was found hiding in the jungle of Guam and Kozuka Kinshichi was shot dead by Filipino police on the island of Lubang. Early in 1974 Lubang yielded its most famous straggler, Onoda Hirō, and at the end of that same year, Taiwanese-born Nakamura Teruo was found on the Indonesian island of Morotai. Reactions in Japan to the stragglers’ return varied, but by the 1970s these men were causing such a sensation that they became instant celebrities.

Some stragglers hid in groups after the end of hostilities, but others did so alone. Some had an inkling the war was over, and others did not. Some did not want to surrender, while others were scared to do so. Although these men’s experiences and methods of survival differed, they had two important features in common. First, during their period in hiding they had had little or no contact with the outside world. They were thus mostly unaware of developments in the post-war world and within Japan. The stragglers were ‘preserved’, as it were, as wartime figures: they dressed in makeshift uniforms, spoke a stilted military language, and often carried the same guns with which they had been issued as servicemen. Most strikingly, they explained their decision to hide using discursive parameters that had little relevance to the post-war period. They often cited the shame of capture or surrender, or stressed the importance of loyalty to ideals that had long since been abandoned by the population as a whole. They voiced their fears of being killed by the enemy – an enemy which by then had been Japan’s close ally for years; or of being court-martialled for desertion by their own army – an army which by the 1970s had been defunct for nearly three decades. The more years that passed between the end of the war and their repatriation, the more prominent became the consciousness at home of a ‘time warp’ separating the stragglers and the rest of the Japanese nation. The second common feature of the stragglers is that they had been presumed dead in Japan. The slightest suspicion that these soldiers might still be alive had not been

entertained, except perhaps by some family members and a few veterans. The conviction on the part of such people that their relative or comrade was still alive no doubt occasioned pity at the time, and was probably dismissed as the product of insurmountable grief. Because they were not expected to come home, the stragglers' return was a complete shock to the Japanese public.

These two factors defined the stragglers' reception in Japan: they were unexpected reminders of the war, tangible relics of the wartime period; and they burst into Japanese national consciousness at the least predictable moment. The further the distance between the war and the Japan of their return, the more shocking for those at home was the reappearance of these 'living relics' of the wartime period, and the more detailed the examination of their significance.

This book examines the return of stragglers, in the period between 1950, when the first group was repatriated from New Guinea, and 1975, when the last one was repatriated to his home in Taiwan. Within that period Japan not only recovered from the war but also became one of the world's biggest economic powers. Importantly, that time also witnessed the coming of age of a generation of people who had no personal experience of the war and had grown up in circumstances very different from those of their elders. By the early 1970s the awareness of a generation gap in terms of world views and priorities was starting to confirm existing public unease about the quality and durability of Japan's post-war achievements, and nowhere was this gap more in evidence than in attitudes to the Second World War. The thirty-year period between the defeat and 1975 witnessed the negotiation, among successive generations, of contrasting understandings of the war's significance, and of appropriate ways to remember it.

By 1975 the generation that had not experienced the war had come to share the forum of public debate with those who had lived through it. In that sense, the three decades separating the defeat and the coming of age of the new post-war generation represent the formative stage for the development of collective, and increasingly impersonal, memories of the war. Nevertheless, despite the constant renegotiation of the war and of its meaning, the relationship of post-war Japan to its past became more, not less, problematic at this time. The significance of the conflict remains a recurring topic of discussion and dispute both within the country and overseas, as is evident every year on the anniversary of Japan's surrender. This book examines the transformation of the Second World War into history in Japan through the lens of the stragglers' return. Their existence demanded higher and higher levels of explanation as time went on, and their return provides a series of snapshots capturing the state of public memory of the war at various stages of development.

In the post-war era a variety of catalysts provoked a re-examination of the wartime past, but the return of stragglers is a particularly valuable one for a number of reasons. First, their stories became more and more sensational as the war receded into the past, and their impact on post-war consciousness increased accordingly. Second, while their post-war lives undeniably had been unusual, their pre-war and wartime experience had not, and that section of the population which had lived through the war was able to relate to it. More often than not, returning

4 Introduction

stragglers prompted personal memories among many of those who witnessed their reappearance. Third, the stragglers had not had a ‘post-war’ life as such: ‘stuck’ in the wartime period throughout their exile, they remained very much affected by wartime attitudes. Their strong association with the military is important because it differentiated them from the many other civilians and soldiers whose repatriation had been delayed after the war’s end, such as those who returned from China, the Soviet Union and North Korea throughout the 1950s. The delayed return of those people could be attributed to factors beyond their control, such as the political realities of the Cold War or bureaucratic mishaps. Japanese soldiers who fought in the wars of independence in Vietnam or Indonesia had known that the war was over, even though they had been reluctant or unable, for a number of reasons, to come home.

The stragglers, in contrast, had been only partly victims of circumstance. They were more clearly victims of their training as soldiers and sailors of the Imperial Army and Navy, which had strongly discouraged surrender and provided no contingency plans for either retreat or defeat. In that sense, the return of stragglers made a public focus on the wartime period unavoidable. Finally, these people were a stark reminder of Japan’s aggressive past. They thought of themselves as soldiers. Their decision to hide was explained in terms strongly informed by their training in the wartime military forces, and they were found on the edges of Japan’s wartime expansion. They were the victims not of a catastrophic event unconnected with that expansion but of circumstances directly connected with Japanese militarism. Indeed, debates about their identity and the meaning of their experience were complex primarily because of their strong link with the defunct Imperial Army. It is the relationship between the stragglers, the rest of the population and the formulation of an acceptable version of the past that is central to this book.

The stragglers’ stories are endlessly fascinating and have been the focus of a number of publications: memoirs written by the individuals themselves or their families, or narratives written by journalists who covered their ‘rescue’.² They also attracted attention in the West: in 1960, journalist E.J. Kahn delighted in making fun of their ‘bizarre’ stories in *The Stragglers*, while in 1974 French reporters wrote sensational accounts of the rescue of Onoda and those of previous stragglers.³ All these are enlightening on the circumstances of the stragglers’ discoveries, but they concentrate mostly on the stragglers’ survival rather than examining the way their return affected post-war Japan. Moreover, they do not attempt any comparative analysis of the reception of the various returning stragglers over time; most memoirs, in fact, contain little or no reference to earlier cases.

Only one book, Wakaichi Kōji’s *Saigo no senshisha: rikugun ittōhei Kozuka Kinshichi* (The Last War Dead: Private First-class Kozuka Kinshichi) provides a critical examination of the stragglers’ impact on their homeland. It is, however, limited to an examination of the searches for the stragglers on Lubang, and the author’s prime motivation is to discuss the fate of Kozuka Kinshichi, killed there in 1972. Wakaichi does not provide a sustained analysis of the return of other

stragglers, though he makes important reflections on the reaction to the return home of Onoda in 1974.⁴ More recently, Yoshikuni Igarashi has written a biographical essay on Yokoi, with a number of interesting reflections on his impact in 1972.⁵

The stragglers' stories are as varied as the individuals they describe. But while the stragglers themselves are an important part of this book, the focus here is firmly on the reactions to their return in post-war Japan and the negotiation of the discursive frameworks surrounding the war, as public memory, in the first thirty years after the defeat. The stragglers had different reasons for hiding, different methods of survival, and came from a number of physical locations, but they certainly emerged from the same place in time: the wartime period. And post-war reactions to stragglers changed over the years not because of the differences between stragglers but because the setting of these reactions, post-war Japan itself, was changing. By the time the last straggler was discovered, close to half the population had actually been born after the war. Stragglers elicited different reactions over time among the Japanese public because the place of the war in Japan's past and its present had continued to alter after 1945. The stragglers' return provides us with the means of tracing this change: it sheds light on the shifting perceptions of national identity and of post-war Japan's connection with history.

The issue of Japan's relationship with its past is one that has preoccupied scholars and commentators particularly since 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of the nation's wartime surrender. The parameters of these discussions are sufficiently familiar to warrant only a short summary here: they centre on the nation's perceived 'war amnesia', which continues to provoke tensions within Japanese society, and on Japan's relationships with its neighbours.⁶ In Australia, where memories of the war against Japan centre chiefly on the atrocities experienced by prisoners of war at the hands of the Japanese, whether at Changi Prison in Singapore, on the Burma-Thailand Railway or at Sandakan in Borneo, Japan is inextricably linked with the Second World War.⁷ This is also the case with other nations that experienced, either directly or indirectly, the consequences of Japan's wartime aggression in Asia.⁸ In the wake of the fiftieth anniversary of the surrender in 1995, all the unresolved issues relating to Japan's war received attention: the lack of an official apology for the country's actions at that time, the plight of the 'comfort women', issues relating to the treatment of the war in Japanese school textbooks, the status of the Yasukuni Shrine, where the war dead are enshrined, the debates over the Rape of Nanking, the legacies of the war both within and outside of Japan, the prominent place of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the Japanese national consciousness, the extent of the Shōwa Emperor's war guilt, new information regarding war atrocities and the infamous biological experiments conducted by the Army's Unit 731, and more; all are topics that have been well covered in the spate of writing on the issue.⁹

Yet despite the amount of interest in the ways the Second World War still impinges on contemporary Japan, very little has been said about the Japanese

6 Introduction

military personnel of the period and their difficult integration into post-war society. Indeed, the commemoration and acknowledgement of the sacrifices made by those who fought, and died, in Japan's war of aggression have been addressed so far only as a polemical issue. War memory is, of course, intimately related to public ceremony and other forms of commemoration of those who have died in past battles. The public commemoration of fallen soldiers has proved problematic in post-war Japan, as is reflected in the debates surrounding the apparent illegality of state funding for Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine and official visits to the Shrine by members of the post-war government. I have discussed issues of commemoration in detail elsewhere, and will return to this issue in this book.¹⁰ The perceived lack of a satisfactory form of public commemoration reflects and contributes to the ambiguous position of soldiers in the post-war period.

Veterans themselves feel bitterly – as Nitta Mitsuko has shown in her study of veterans' associations – about the failure of the post-war nation to acknowledge its debt to them and their fallen comrades. They complain that many in Japan understand and refer to the deaths of their comrades, which could so easily have been their own, as 'private deaths' (*shishi*) or, even worse, 'useless deaths' (*muda shi*).¹¹ Those who participated directly and actively in the war effort can only be remembered with difficulty in a nation that not only lost the war but where common agreement as to the nature and extent of wartime aggression is beyond reach. If soldiers were as much victims of the 'militarists' as the rest of the population, then they fought and died for something that was wrong and mistaken. On the other hand, it is difficult to acknowledge an active role for Japan's soldiers, who after all failed to win the war, without confronting Japan's history of aggression. Those who lost a loved one at the front have thus been left with little consolation.¹²

The process of commemoration is central to the recent polemics of war remembrance in Japan, but it is often overshadowed by bitter arguments regarding war atrocities. For example, cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori, a member of the right-wing revisionist Liberal Education League, is infamous for questioning the veracity of accounts of the Nanking Massacre and of the forced enrolment of Asian women to serve as prostitutes in Imperial Army 'comfort stations'. His manga *Sensōron*, first published in 1997, while immensely popular, also attracted criticism and denunciation for its strident condemnation of 'dark' or 'masochistic' views of history, including as they do references to atrocities committed by Japanese troops as well as questions regarding the motives for Japanese territorial aggression in the 1930s and 1940s. But Kobayashi's anger over a particular portrayal of history apparently also derives from his perceived inability to give thanks in public for the sacrifices of the veterans and war dead. In his manga he depicts the deep gulf that separates those who lived through the war from those who were born later and are not interested in their experiences. This inability to acknowledge the sacrifices of an earlier generation is, he claims, responsible for what he views as the contemporary decadence of Japanese society, which is plagued by vanity, selfishness, corruption, crime, drug

use, prostitution and so on.¹³ Other members of the Liberal Education League see it as their mission to eradicate the ‘history of shame’ they believe is being taught in high schools and replace it with a history that students can be proud of.¹⁴ Such a history would undoubtedly also raise the fallen soldiers out of the commemorative limbo against which many continue to fight, particularly those, represented by the Association of Bereaved Families (*zen Nippon izokukai*) who lost a relative at the front lines in the Second World War.

The polemic surrounding such issues often obscures the more basic implications of post-war Japan’s difficulties with the commemoration of those who died in China, South-East Asia and the Pacific. The writer and critic Katō Norihiro provoked a great deal of debate in 1997 when he argued that it was only after recognition of its own aggressive past, through the commemoration of its fallen soldiers, that Japan could begin the process of recognising the victims of that aggression in neighbouring countries.¹⁵ Others, such as Yūi Daizaburō, disagree, pointing out that the commemoration of Japanese war dead supports discrimination against non-Japanese victims of the war.¹⁶ While Katō and Yūi seem to agree that there is a link between publicly mourning Japanese soldiers and publicly acknowledging and mourning the death of the Asian victims of Japanese aggression, they fundamentally disagree on the sequence in which these deaths should be commemorated. For Katō, the commemoration of Japanese soldiers must come first, being a prerequisite for understanding the suffering of Asian people. For Yūi, Japanese soldiers cannot be mourned without first acknowledging other Asian victims of the war. It is clear that the integration of the Japanese Second World War soldier into national representations of the past is highly problematic.

Much of the scholarship on Japan’s war legacies focuses on those victims of the war who suffered discrimination at the hands of the post-war governments: as A-bomb victims; as Korean and Chinese forced labourers; as the victims of atrocities, including rape and sexual slavery; or as the disenfranchised colonial subjects of the Japanese empire.¹⁷ There is no doubt that it is extremely important to investigate, and engage with, issues pertaining to non-Japanese victims of the war, particularly in the face of current revisionist trends in Japan. In such a climate, the task of historians – to find, record and analyse the best possible evidence regarding the events of the past – assumes a renewed importance, and it is crucial to examine how the victims of Japan’s wartime aggression have attempted, and mostly failed, to have their voices heard and their experiences included in mainstream Japanese understandings of national and regional history. In fact, despite the outpouring of writings on war issues, it remains the conviction of many observers that Japan’s war record as a whole is largely forgotten in mainstream public discourses relating to society, politics and the past. Arguably, not only is Japan’s wartime aggression mostly forgotten in public discourse, but so is the willing participation of the great majority of the population in the war effort. This is recast as participation under duress or as the result of a form of brainwashing, turning the Japanese population into the unwitting victims of their wartime government.

8 *Introduction*

If non-Japanese victims of the war have been forgotten in Japan, and if the Japanese people themselves have been positioned as victims in discourses that blame the wartime military for Japan's aggressive stance towards East and South-East Asia, then it seems worth considering how the nexus between aggression and the Japanese population itself has been negotiated. How have Japan's own war dead and veterans, so closely linked to the wartime military effort and to the experience of a substantial part of the male population, been integrated into wider discourses about the war? Victimhood is only one part of an equation that must also include aggression: and yet the impact of the war on the bulk of Japan's male population, either as soldiers or as veterans, has received comparatively little attention. While the role of civilians as victims and/or perpetrators has been studied notably in feminist analyses of women's participation in the war effort,¹⁸ little has been written about Japanese men, even though a sizeable proportion of them fought in the war. A handful of books consider Japanese prisoners of war in Australia and New Zealand,¹⁹ but in English only Kazuko Tsurumi has provided a detailed analysis of the conditions under which Japanese soldiers were trained and the way they adapted to post-war life.²⁰ Despite the large number of Japanese memoirs, the place of the ordinary soldier in that nation's collective memories of the war has not been subjected to analysis. Indeed, Imperial Army combatants have generally been studied only if they happened to be non-Japanese and thus fell into the more readily available category of victim.²¹ Yet, if our understanding of Japan's role as a chief protagonist in the war is to be complete, it must include the experiences of the soldiers of the Imperial forces as well as those of its victims. Our understanding of memories of the war in post-war Japan can only be partial if the ambiguous place of soldiers and veterans in the post-war period remains unexplored.

It is precisely here that an examination of the stragglers' return is so illuminating. Consideration of the reception of stragglers allows us to explore the changing significance of the wartime soldier and of his perceived commitment to his duty to the nation and to the ethics of the military. The return of stragglers repeatedly forced the Japanese population into a confrontation with concepts that could be integrated into 'victim consciousness' only with difficulty, as will be shown here. The straggler's significance thus became increasingly ambiguous, and by the 1970s this ambiguity had become sufficiently disturbing to induce a self-confessed public state of 'panic' or 'shock' at the appearance of yet another former soldier, as later chapters will show. While it is true that the stragglers themselves formed only a minuscule proportion of the population, they represented something much greater: a nation that had been defeated, and a particular manifestation of that 'nation' which had been discredited and forgotten. They represented all soldiers and all those who had believed in the war effort. They represented both the veterans and those who, unlike themselves, had never come home from the war. They prompted a personal remembrance on the part of all those who had lived through the war, and they also elicited reflection on the place of that war in the present and the transmission of its meaning to future generations.

In the past few years, other scholars have begun to explore the origins and development of Japan's problematic relationship with its recent past. Yoshida Yutaka, Yoshikuni Igarashi and James Orr have made especially significant contributions towards charting changing representations of the war in post-war Japan. In *Nihonjin no sensōkan: rekishi no naka no henyō* (Japanese Attitudes to the War: Changes Throughout History), Yoshida pays particular attention to the origins of attitudes to the war in the Occupation period, when a coalition of Japanese elites and Allied Occupation officials reached a compromise on matters relating to war guilt, for political reasons. This compromise made unnecessary further exploration of those issues or any atonement for guilt, thus promoting post-war 'amnesia' on the war.²²

Yoshikuni Igarashi, in his recent *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945–1970*, also points to the Occupation as a crucial period in the development of post-war attitudes to the war. He argues that this period witnessed the creation of a 'foundational narrative' of the United States–Japan relationship which established the basic discursive framework for memories of the war in the post-war period. This discursive framework not only excluded Asian countries from Japanese memories, but also locked the country into the role of passive victim. As a result no framework existed for the expression of traumatic memories beyond these parameters, leaving an unresolvable tension in Japan's post-war culture between the desires to include and exclude memories of the war in personal and national identities.²³ James Orr, in *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan*, analyses 'victim consciousness' as a dominant framework for memories of the war in the post-war period. He reveals its presence in a variety of settings including literature, film and debate about education and politics.²⁴

It is thus generally agreed that public understandings of the war's significance were shaped in the Occupation period, remained Japan-centric throughout the post-war era, and failed to include critical explorations of Japan's aggressive past and the issue of war guilt, based as this was on 'victim consciousness'. In broad terms, the evidence presented in this book supports such interpretations. But the focus here on stragglers, who were so clearly symbolic of Japan's militaristic past, also reveals the ways in which such Japan-centric and victim-defined understandings of the past could be – and were – contested and renegotiated. Furthermore, it traces the ebb and flow of 'victim consciousness' as a central discursive framework, qualifying the often-assumed linearity in its development between its birth in the Occupation and its dominance in the 1970s.

This book is strongly informed by the idea that some 'memories' are held collectively and transcend those of individuals. Research into 'collective memory' has shown that such a form of memory is crucial in giving a community its identity and indispensable in infusing its present with meaning.²⁵ Institutional or academic history does not own the past, nor does it have a monopoly on the way the past is represented, as the case of Japan so vividly exemplifies. The recent spate of writing on the way societies remember past events has shown that public memorials, traditions of storytelling, museums,

10 *Introduction*

schools and tourist ventures each have a place in reconstructing the past for the benefit either of entire societies or particular subgroups, and thus in promoting a form of memory that transcends the individual and the private.²⁶ This collective memory is, as often as not, at odds with the interpretations of the past offered by historians. It is also, as often as not, internally contradictory. It undergoes a constant process of negotiation and renegotiation, particularly as generations come of age and replace one another, bringing with them different understandings of the present that demand different meanings from the past. Collective memories are thus fluid and constantly challenged, in a negotiation aiming at an ultimately impossible uniformity. When the event remembered is as wide-ranging and as traumatic as the Second World War, different national groups and generations aim to mould the image of the collective past into a shape that will include or validate their own experience. As Alistair Thomson and others have shown, collective memories integrate individuals with their society as well as providing a language for their articulation.²⁷ Memory, at the collective as well as the individual level, is influenced as much by the present as by the past, a point that will be illustrated throughout this book.

Collective memory refers, then, to interpretations or representations of the past that are shared by a substantial group of people. While this group could be defined by nationality, culture, age, experience or religion, in the twentieth century the definition of a ‘national’ past assumed paramount importance. Furthermore, particular collective representations of the past coexist, more or less peacefully, with other representations of it, such as academic interpretations in the form of history writing. In Japan, stragglers certainly provoked a number of struggles over ownership of the past, as we will see, and their return helps us identify, with varying degrees of clarity, the nature of the groups that competed in the attempt to formulate an acceptable, shared understanding of the truth about the past in the thirty years that followed the Second World War.

While studies of collective memory have often been based on the recollections of individuals, the concern here is not with oral histories but with the way the past is represented and negotiated within the public – mostly national – sphere.²⁸ According to Ann Waswo, at this broader, national level, collective memory represents:

the attitudes and views of the majority of ordinary members of the public, what is ‘taken for granted’ as true about the past. Although this memory may well be rooted in the personal experience of some members of the public, it is also influenced – and transmitted from generation to generation – by lessons in school, the ceremonies of national life and national identity, the mass media, films, fiction and politics.²⁹

A sense of the past, then, strongly informs the construction of national identity. As Benedict Anderson has shown, the nation can be defined as an ‘imagined community’: that is, a group based on constructed boundaries rather than

'natural' ones, where citizens 'imagine' themselves to share much in common with a large number of other people they will never meet.³⁰ With the return of the stragglers, this sense of community and 'sense of the past' is revealed with a rare clarity. While a conception of 'collective memory' at the national level would be problematic in a number of instances, it makes a great deal of sense where the Second World War is concerned. Not only was the war carried out as a national project calling for new levels of patriotic loyalty, but the 'nation' was also inextricably bound up with representations of the war in the post-war period. Stragglers, reminding the public of other veterans and war dead but also all those who had participated in the war, had above all a *national* significance, raising questions not about, for example, Wakayama Prefecture or Yamanashi but the Japanese national community as a whole.

'What is taken for granted about the past' is disseminated, as we have seen, through a variety of media. Scholars have traced collective memory by examining the forms in which it surfaces, not only in museums and memorials but also in literature, textbooks and film. As Igarashi has recently so well demonstrated, the ceremonies of public life – such as the hosting of the Olympics in Tokyo in 1964 – can also have much to say about how the past is remembered. Here, reactions to stragglers are elucidated in the main through the 'public voice' of newspapers and magazines. Such publications inform, and are informed by, overarching discursive frameworks regarding the past. Indeed, the notion that the media play a major role in the negotiation of 'truth' and 'memory' in modern societies has been well established.³¹ In the case of the stragglers' return, the popular press provides a reliable and constant source not only of 'what was taken for granted' in explanations for their existence and their significance in the post-war period, but also of dissenting views. Letters to the editor, opinion pieces, and interviews with 'ordinary members of the public' add personal voices to the debates.

The use of the print media as a central source of information raises a number of issues. If, for example, the stragglers' impact increased dramatically during the period in question, a small part at least of the reason for this must lie with the changing nature of these media. During Japan's economic 'miracle' not only did newspapers become more sizeable and magazines more numerous, but both types of publication moved from mostly factual reporting to a more analytical style. Yet, as will be shown here, relative silence on the subject of stragglers in the early 1950s was due less to the paper shortage that had restricted the size of the press in the war's aftermath, than to the fact that these individuals were of relatively minor importance compared to the thousands still believed to be imprisoned in China and the USSR. Similarly, it would be unwise to ascribe the same voice and agenda to all publications: not only do newspapers and magazines rarely express themselves apolitically, but they also rarely agree on the meaning of particular events. Indeed, the stragglers' return did, on a number of occasions, reveal particular agendas in sections of the public media, as the following chapters will show. Finally, the print media is only one of the many ways in which communication takes place within any society. For example, the

12 *Introduction*

years under consideration here span the period in which television emerged in Japan as a tool of mass communication and information. By the time of the last stragglers' return in the 1970s, these people were being discussed on television as much as in the newspapers. Even so, television was not a medium of information as consistently available as the print media.³² Moreover, the people of Japan are well known to consume more printed matter per head of population than most nations in the world.³³ Those involved in the production of newspapers and magazines – journalists and editors, but also their readers – thus had innumerable occasions to reveal ‘what was taken for granted about the past’ in their reactions to stragglers.

The use of print media as a historical source presents its own challenges and yet is also too rich a source not to explore. This book is therefore partly an attempt to engage critically with this question of methodology, and to explore reflectively the usefulness of such publications in a historical enquiry such as this. By the same token, extensive use has also been made here of other forms of communication, such as literature (both fiction and non-fiction), government records, biographies and personal memoirs.

We begin by setting the framework for the return of stragglers in two chapters, the first giving a short summary of pre-war and wartime mobilisation and the second concentrating on post-war demobilisation. The chapters that follow examine the stragglers' return in chronological order. In Chapter 3 we examine the return of the earliest ones from New Guinea, Anatahan, Guam and Saipan in 1951 and 1952. Chapter 4 traces the shift in reactions to stragglers from Indonesia and the Philippines in the midst of the boom in war memoirs of 1955–1956. Chapter 5 considers the searches for stragglers on Lubang in 1959 and the return of the ‘last soldiers of the Imperial Army’ in 1960, and traces the transformation of the straggler from hero into victim. Chapter 6 explores the return of the most celebrated of the stragglers, Yokoi Shōichi, in 1972 and discusses the ‘panic’ occasioned by his return. Chapter 7 shows how interest in the death on Lubang of Kozuka Kinshichi that same year was quickly replaced by interest in the surrender of Onoda Hirō, which eventually took place two years later, accompanied by a media frenzy of incomparable proportions. The final chapter discusses the impact on the Japanese population of the return in 1975 of the last and least-known straggler, Nakamura Teruo, to his native Taiwan.

1 The shared past

Mobilisation for war

The stragglers who returned home years after the war had ended were not entirely alien to their compatriots. They did, after all, share a significant body of experience with an admittedly diminishing though still substantial element of the post-war population. This shared experience influenced the plethora of reactions that greeted the stragglers' repatriation, both consciously and unconsciously. The significance attributed both to the stragglers themselves, and to their much-delayed return to Japanese society was critically conditioned by public memory of the pre-war and wartime years as well as the actual social and ideological context of that period. In fact, one of the recurring leitmotivs of the reaction to the very last stragglers, who returned in the 1970s, was the articulation of a feeling of disjunction between the attitudes of that generation which had 'experienced' the war – and was thus able to identify with the stragglers to a degree – and the one that had not. It is therefore important to start off by outlining the common attitudes and mental habits that informed both the stragglers themselves and that section of the post-war Japanese population that had lived through the war.

The notion that there were significant continuities between pre-war, wartime and post-war Japan is one that is often ignored because of the pervasive 'rewind, erase and restart' symbolism associated with the labels 'pre-war', 'wartime' and 'post-war' themselves. Such labels generally define pre-war and wartime Japan as dark and evil and the post-war nation as democratic, cheerful and generally harmless. They present the 1945 defeat as a watershed, downplaying the possibility of continuities between these periods. Carol Gluck and others have shown that this watershed is as artificial as the labels themselves.¹ Yamanouchi Yasushi and others have also located the origins of a number of post-war trends in the mobilisation efforts of the pre-war and wartime periods.² Reactions to the stragglers' return also underline the persistence of wartime attitudes well into the post-war era.

Although physical mobilisation was an important aspect of the pre-war and wartime periods, the emphasis here is on mental or spiritual mobilisation. An examination of the ethics and socialisation processes of the Japanese Imperial Army, in particular, provides us with incomplete but nevertheless illuminating reasons why some of its soldiers remained in hiding for so long. An understanding of spiritual mobilisation provides not only an appreciation of a

crucial element of the basis for the stragglers' existence but also a reference point for the media's increasingly conscious post-war examination, imagination and explanation of these individuals' experiences. After all, spiritual mobilisation for war was not just the province of soldiers: Japan's entire pre-war and wartime population was exposed to the Army's ethos on a regular basis, both through education and a number of organisations such as the Reservists' Associations (*Zaigo gunjinkai*) and the National Defence Women's Association (*Kokubō fujinkai*). As a number of studies have shown, schools and the local branches of national organisations were important channels for the communication of militarist values from at least the early 1930s onwards.³ Spiritual mobilisation was accordingly not limited to those who had actually been recruited into the Army or to the time citizens actually served in the Army.

This is a vital clue to the impact of stragglers on post-war society. Anyone aged about fifty-five in 1974 would have been reaching adulthood just around the start of Japan's 1937 invasion of China. Anyone around or over that age would have been exposed to the kind of associations mentioned above, and anyone over forty would have attended school just before or during the war. Thus even in 1975, when the last straggler returned, a sizeable part of the population would have been able to relate his experience to their own to some extent. Moreover, the stragglers' military training was one that many of their male contemporaries had also encountered. The connection between stragglers and the post-war population, therefore, had a concrete basis in the commonality of their pre-war and wartime experiences.

Any nation engaging in total warfare attempts to enlist the full cooperation of its citizens. In order to do so, it needs to give a reasonable explanation of why the conflict is taking place. Those going to the front, and those obliged to watch them go, will do so only if they feel their nation's safety, future or glory is threatened or can be augmented, or if failure to cooperate leads to threats of ostracism or retribution. War propaganda turns any interests – economic or otherwise – into ideals of freedom or justice, ideals more likely to spur the population on to fight for the nation. Japan's war in China and the Pacific was no exception, and was naturally portrayed in self-justifying terms. The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, declared in August 1940, would 'liberate [China and Asia] from dependency on Europe and America';⁴ 'carry out the mission of a united Asia leading a regenerated China' and 'establish a new peaceful order in Asia'.⁵ This new order was to be based on a supposed commonality of culture and spirituality among Asian countries, including Japan. Western encroachments in any part of Asia, on the other hand, were seen as potential encroachments on Japan's own security. In particular, American interests in China, and the oil and scrap-iron embargo imposed on Japan in July 1940 as a result of its advance into French Indochina, were portrayed in official statements and media comments as threats to Japanese interests. Propaganda portrayed the war against China, beginning in July 1937, as one necessary for national survival, and that against the United States, beginning in December 1941, as one of self-defence which would liberate Asia from Western colonialism.⁶

The mythical past on which Japan's 'mission' was officially based was actually a construct of modern nationalism and dated from the Meiji period.⁷ This construct became ever more elaborate to emphasise the uniqueness of Japanese culture and include a duty to reform the world, or at least Japan's region. Japan's war against the West and against Asia thus took on the proportions of a holy war: the nation was contributing 'to the construction of a just world peace', and this was 'the ideal and mission ordained by Heaven for the Japanese race'.⁸ The country's wartime propaganda depicted it as a nation spiritually superior to all others and divinely ordained. In 1940, industrialist and party leader Nakajima Chikuhei described the Japanese as 'the sole superior race in the world', whose 'sacred duty' as the 'leading race' was 'to lead and enlighten the inferior ones'.⁹

Propaganda in wartime does not usually contemplate defeat, and in this Japanese propaganda was no exception. The idea that the gods had ordained Japan's victory made it difficult, if not impossible, to voice publicly the possibility that the country might lose the war. The idea that Japan was invincible was further reinforced by the fact that the nation had won its two other major modern wars, namely the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. The *Japan Times and Advertiser*'s editorial on 15 December 1942 stated: 'Japan has never lost a war in her history, and she will surely win the one which she is fighting, for not only is her cause absolutely just, but she is protected by the hallowed spirit of the Imperial Ancestors'.¹⁰

At the forefront of Japan's divine mission stood the figure of the Emperor himself: according to myth, a descendant of the gods and thus divine. A central figure in wartime ideology, he was infallible, sacred, the symbolic father of the entire population, and as such he was due obedience, respect and absolute loyalty. He was also the supreme commander of the Army and Navy, and this fact is of special significance when considering his role in post-war history. In fact, the Shōwa Emperor's position as a wartime leader – the significance of which is widely debated amongst historians – provoked a number of attacks on his person in the post-war period.¹¹ The activist Okuzaki Kenzō, for example, described in Hara Kazuo's documentary film *Yukiyukite shingun*, represents an extreme example of such condemnation. In 1969 his attacks on the Emperor with slingshot and pachinko balls earned him nearly three years in jail.¹² Public condemnation of the Emperor as a war criminal has continued since his death in 1989, both within Japan and overseas.

It is difficult to judge accurately the extent to which ordinary Japanese subjects sincerely believed the myths regarding the Emperor or Japan's divine origins. At any rate, there was no authorised alternative to the official world view. While such labels as 'fascist' or 'totalitarian' may not strictly be applied to 1930s Japan without an extensive redefinition of the terms, it is fair to say that this was a society in which freedom of speech was limited, and measures of thought control and repression were influential. Although dissenters certainly existed, thought police, censorship, education and propaganda all contributed to the high level of conformity to be found within the population in support of the

government's aims and policies of expansion throughout Asia and war against the Western powers. As Elise Tipton has shown, the infamous Tokkō (Special Higher Police) can be likened to other contemporary forces, such as the Gestapo of Nazi Germany, in that it exhibited 'similar terroristic behaviour, centralised control, secret modes of operation, and perhaps most dreaded of all, preoccupation with political re-education or thought control'.¹³

Nevertheless, the similarities end there. The Japanese thought-control police, according to Shillony, never attained the amount of power held by their counterparts in Germany or Russia, and political prisoners numbered only around 2,500 people at the end of the war.¹⁴ This could suggest either that most people paid lip service to the official ideology or that the indoctrination measures in place in schools, the Army and elsewhere were successful. Nor are these scenarios mutually exclusive. The diary of the prominent liberal intellectual Kiyosawa Kiyoshi reveals both his utter contempt for the jingoism of some of his contemporaries and the extent of his self-censorship. The threat from the Tokkō is certainly palpable in his diary, but there are no instances of any actual interference in his activities on their part. Kiyosawa did not make his contempt public, nor did he openly challenge the government. In any case he was a patriot, and the war had his support even with the despised propaganda machine.¹⁵ But this is only one testimony amongst countless others, all witness to the variety of attitudes found in wartime Japan, which ranged from ultranationalist fanaticism to outright resistance, though the latter was certainly rare.¹⁶ In fact, according to Tipton, the Tokkō did not reach the status of its European counterparts precisely because the challenge facing it was not as great.¹⁷ In other words, opposition to government policies was generally absent or muted, except for the left-wing groups which had been the prime target of internal laws regulating protest since their inception and had been effectively destroyed by the mid-1930s.

Restrictions on freedom of speech had been present in Japan since the beginning of the Meiji era. A censorship system was in place for newspapers and other publications, providing 'the central pillar' of pre-war thought control.¹⁸ Laws limiting freedom of assembly and the organisation of political groups were first instituted in 1890. The Peace Preservation Law of 1925, while aimed primarily at Communists, tightened governmental control over the population even further by imposing restrictions on all meetings or discussions even if they did not involve revolutionary activities as such. The law against *lèse-majesté* forbade criticism of the Emperor and the Imperial family. Well-known historian and activist Ienaga Saburō states that internal security laws left an intellectual vacuum in which the population, knowing no alternative, 'automatically came to support the government position'.¹⁹ Whether the situation was as simple as that is a matter for discussion. According to Sandra Wilson, to an important extent, 'the relative uniformity of opinion [in the early 1930s] was the product not of fear and repression but of a general consensus on major political and foreign policy issues'.²⁰ This relative uniformity continued through the wartime years and – as we saw above – deviations tended to be

recorded, if at all, in secret, as in the case of Kiyosawa Kiyoshi's diary. This relative uniformity of opinion in pre-war and wartime Japan must be kept in mind when considering how stragglers were construed in the post-war years.

An important tool of socialisation was the education system, in a country where the majority of the population had attended primary school by the 1930s.²¹ Textbooks were under the control of the Ministry of Education, and Emperor-worship was part of the curriculum. The Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) was read in every school and laid down the civic duties of students, including that of males to fight for the nation in time of war. Significantly, this Imperial Rescript on Education was not dissimilar in its precepts from the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (1882), which laid down the duties of those who joined the armed forces. While textbooks did not become uniformly jingoistic and nationalistic until the mid-1930s, there were militaristic elements in earlier school textbooks. Harold Wray has shown that school textbooks tended towards jingoism and nationalism in times of international crisis, such as at the time of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) and certainly from 1936 onwards.²² Although liberal trends coexisted with militaristic ones in textbooks produced during the first quarter of the century, civic duty was a point strongly emphasised throughout the pre-war education system. Military training for boys, for example, was introduced into the curriculum in 1925.²³ Through the education system, mobilisation into service for the nation was extended, to a greater or lesser degree, to the entire population. In that sense, the stragglers' background as soldiers did not differ radically from that of other Japanese who had passed through the pre-war education system, even if the latter had not actually served in the military forces.

The organisation of the population into various national groups and associations, from the early years of the twentieth century, also had a bearing on the relative consensus on, and support for, government policies. Richard Smethurst has shown that there were a number of organisations, in place for as long as three decades before the war, which attempted to instil patriotism and mobilise popular support for the Army. He states that it was in the rural sector, which comprised roughly half the population at the beginning of the war, that the Army was most successful in inculcating nationalism and militaristic values.²⁴ National organisations such as the Imperial Military Reserve Association, the Greater Japan Youth Association and the Greater Japan National Defence Women's Association had sub-branches in every locality, and their meetings were well attended, according to Smethurst, especially within the rural framework where cooperatives and hierarchical associations were customary.²⁵ Yet such associations were not limited to rural areas: the urban-based Aikoku Fujinkai (Patriotic Women's Association), which admittedly never attained the membership levels of its later rival the National Defence Women's Association, was nevertheless instrumental in disseminating support for Japan's Army amongst certain sections of urban society from the late Meiji period onwards.²⁶

The high membership rate of such associations indicates that a large part of the pre-war population was regularly exposed to patriotic and nationalistic

ideas, particularly since the Army saw in them the potential for mobilisation. Sandra Wilson has shown that the Army rapidly appropriated the National Defence Women's Organisation (formed in 1932 without the patronage of the Army or the government) because military leaders saw in it the potential for a wide-scale mobilisation of women.²⁷ While the women in this organisation supported soldiers in a variety of ways, such as by organising farewell parties or sending parcels to the front, it cannot be assumed that all the women joined such associations with patriotic ideals in mind. Certainly other aspects, such as the desire to get out of the home, did play a part.²⁸ The basis in tradition of rural associations like the Reservists, in that they reflected older, more established patterns of village cooperation, also suggests that their high membership rates were not necessarily due to a desire to participate in national or international affairs; local concerns, and customary cooperative groupings, were important factors.

Furthermore, as Sheldon Garon has shown, it would be wrong to assume that the cooperation of women's groups with the government in its task of mobilisation was an aberration of the 1930s and 1940s and one solely connected with the need for mobilisation in wartime. By the 1920s women's associations were already linked to the state and helping to mobilise the population for peacetime goals.²⁹ Kenneth Pyle has shown that during the late Meiji and Taishō periods the national government had made a conscious attempt to foster a sense of nationalism and homogeneity and avoid as far as possible any disruption to the fabric of Japanese society.³⁰ Further campaigns with the same aims had followed in the 1920s and 1930s. As Kerry Smith has recently demonstrated, the rural revitalisation movement, aiming to overcome the depression which crippled the rural economy in the 1930s, mobilised the population in the service of national, if not military, goals.³¹ Thus, while the high rate of participation in Army-controlled associations does not automatically indicate that the military's attempts to inculcate its values in the population were a success, it is important to note that involvement in government-sponsored associations had become a relatively well-established part of public life by the 1930s.

Such associations undeniably forged important links between the Army and society as a whole. The return of stragglers in the post-war period therefore raised issues that resonated with a large section of the population. While not everyone had consistently and wholeheartedly accepted the Army's ethos, the vast majority of Japanese had been at least exposed to it and were familiar with the discourses surrounding military training. Men in rural areas in particular were in contact with the Army's ethos for much of their lives. On leaving school, where as we have seen, the teaching included varying degrees of militaristic content, many young men joined the Seinen kunrenjo (Young Men's Training Institutes) set up by the Army in 1926 to prepare those aged between sixteen and twenty for military service.³² Liable for military service at twenty, they then joined the Reservists' Association where they remained until the age of forty. Rural men formed the main membership of the Reservists' Associations, which performed such duties as organising drills for Young Men's Associations

(seinendan), providing labour for families with a member on active duty, conducting funerals for the war dead and lecturing on the military ethos.³³ Some men were therefore in direct contact with Army views from the age of around sixteen to that of forty. The effect of such training was not to be erased immediately on 15 August 1945, and those aged forty in that year were after all only seventy-five by the time the last straggler returned.

Moreover, the Army saw it as its right and duty to contribute to propaganda aimed at the general population. In 1932 a government bureau that included members of the Army and Navy Ministries was established for the purpose of strengthening propaganda.³⁴ The Army also used the monthly publication *Ie no hikari* (Light of the Home), widely read in rural areas, to promote its ideals.³⁵ Mitchell describes how the Army and Navy Information Divisions held conferences at least once a month after 1941 with news editors, who were told 'what not to write about and what to print instead'.³⁶ Thus it is clear that an actual experience of soldiering was not a prerequisite for familiarity with the attitudes shown by stragglers in the post-war period.

As the sense of international crisis deepened and full-scale war with China began, the Japanese government's attempts to mobilise the population for the war effort intensified with a 'National Spiritual Mobilisation' movement starting in 1937. A legal framework for its application was adopted in the Diet in March 1938, and by 11 September 1940 the government, in the words of Thomas Havens, had begun 'a gigantic piece of social engineering to prepare everybody for a concentrated war build-up'.³⁷ Residential districts were organised into Neighbourhood Associations which, it was hoped, would promote the acceptance of government policies, facilitate the 'moral training and spiritual unity' of the people, and control their economic life.³⁸ Furthermore, as the enemy approached the mainland in the last year of the war, the Army promoted participation in, and took command of, volunteer corps formed of men under sixty-five and women under forty-five whose purpose was to contribute to the defence of the mainland. This is only one of a number of instances where the Army supplemented its troops with civilians.³⁹ It had also employed civilians from the early 1930s onwards, for example by promoting migration to strategic border areas in Manchuria where it was hoped the presence of Japanese settlers would act as a deterrent against incursions by Chinese guerrillas and others.⁴⁰

Military discourses were thus by no means limited to soldiers alone but widely propagated amongst the Japanese population. Undeniably, however, those who became soldiers received an especially concentrated dose of military ethics. According to Tsurumi Kazuko, the Army was very successful in socialising its men: 'Isolation from the ordinary world and the destruction of privacy [the prerequisites of indoctrination] were the initial steps of Army socialisation'.⁴¹ This process was often reinforced with beatings and humiliation, until the men 'ceased to act voluntarily and, instead, acted out of fear and terror'.⁴² Soldiers were forced to memorise their code books, and punished if they attempted to formulate their own interpretations of the contents. Difficulty in grasping the concepts was compounded by the formality of the language in which they were

expressed. According to Tsurumi, the ‘halo of sanctity around the words of the Imperial dicta’ expanded because soldiers were not able to question what they were told, and because their understanding of what they were repeating was so vague.⁴³

Most Japanese soldiers had no realistic choice but to accept the Army’s ethos or to remain silent. Open deviation in interpretations of aims and objectives is presumably frowned upon in every army and not just that of Imperial Japan. Those individuals who in their own minds might have questioned or rejected the tenets of Army ideology were unable to do so publicly without fear of severe reprisal. Tsurumi, who sees a strong link between education and the ability to be critical, points out that the majority of recruits were from rural backgrounds and had only completed elementary school, and that such recruits would have been even less likely to question what they had been taught.⁴⁴ The Army barracks, then, where those who would later become stragglers and their comrades trained together as soldiers, forcefully promoted a certain uniformity of mentality. One former student soldier thinks that the psychological humiliations and beatings were designed to rob the recruits of their personalities: the men were deprived of both the time and the energy to think.⁴⁵

There are two aspects of the Japanese Army ethos that warrant further description: namely, the idea that Japanese soldiers could not surrender, and the centrality of the Emperor in military discourses. These two aspects were central to the mindset of the stragglers, but, importantly, they were also widely understood among the general population, since the Army was able, to a certain extent, to inculcate its ethos beyond the confines of the military barracks through the channels described above. As these two elements were central to post-war public discourse on the return of stragglers, it is worth considering them in some detail here.

The idea of the impossibility of surrender for Japanese soldiers was not, contrary to what was hammered into the heads of recruits, a practice stemming from the mists of time. The supposedly ancient code of *Bushidō* (the code of the warrior or samurai) was generally held up as the model on which the spirit of the modern Japanese Army was based. This code emphasised loyalty to one’s lord and instructed that failure to win a battle, or being captured, should be followed by suicide. The samurai class had never comprised more than a very small percentage of the population (about six per cent) before its abolition in the 1870s, and the modern Japanese Army had been based, at its inception, on a Prussian model. Nevertheless, it is more than likely that the discourse of *Bushidō* is the origin of the Japanese Army’s concept of the ignominy of surrender.

It was only with the revision of the military codes in 1908, however, that withdrawing, surrendering or letting oneself be captured actually became a criminal act.⁴⁶ During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, both sides held prisoners of war. Russian prisoners were treated well in Japan, and Japanese prisoners were not court-martialled on their return, although many were ostracised. Yet it seems that, by 1932 at least, being captured was considered

a disgrace worthy of suicide. A certain Major Kuga, who had been taken, unconscious, by the Chinese during the Shanghai Incident of that year, killed himself in a gesture of atonement immediately upon his release. He became a national hero and was widely held up as an example of true patriotism and correct behaviour.⁴⁷ The idea, prevalent in the 1940s, that it was a great disgrace to become a prisoner of war was thus fairly of recent origin, but an unavoidable part of military training and an idea widely disseminated amongst the population.

Surrender, withdrawal, or capture were not options, ideologically speaking at least, for the Japanese soldier. Whereas in Western armies there is little stigma attached to being, or having been, a prisoner of war, the Japanese soldier had to win or fight to the death according to the official ideology. If he failed to do so, suicide was his only permitted course of action. The Field Service Code of 15 January 1941 instructed:

Meet the expectations of your family and home community by making effort upon effort, always mindful of the honour of your name. If alive, do not suffer the disgrace of becoming a prisoner; in death, do not leave behind a name soiled by misdeeds.⁴⁸

The shame of failure was great, and that of being captured even greater. Soldiers on the battlefield were told that they should always keep one hand grenade for their suicide in case they should be unable to continue fighting and in danger of being captured by the enemy. That this indoctrination was successful is perhaps demonstrated by the very small proportion of Japanese soldiers taken prisoner during the Second World War compared to the number of those who died in battle. There were instances of surrendering Japanese soldiers being killed by Allied troops, but, according to Dower, most fought to the death or committed suicide.⁴⁹ It is testimony to how well these aspects of military training were remembered that references to the Field Service Code and the ‘shame of being captured’ abounded in public discourses surrounding stragglers, particularly in the 1970s. The ‘shame of being captured’ was specifically upheld as an explanation of the stragglers’ motivations for remaining in hiding.

Furthermore, there are indications that the Japanese government fully expected its soldiers to adhere to the ‘No surrender’ instructions as it made no provision for the possibility that the men might be captured. The families of prisoners of war were simply told they were dead. Most of those who were taken prisoners, on the other hand, did not think they would ever be able to return home: a report compiled by the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service, a body attached to the Allied General Headquarters for the South-West Pacific, shows that out of all Japanese prisoners of war in the region in 1944 seventy-six per cent expected either to be put to death or to receive some form of punishment if they returned home.⁵⁰ As we will see in the next chapter, such ideas also informed those responsible for the tally of soldiers ‘missing in action’ during the repatriation of demobilized troops immediately after the war: the ready

assumption that such missing soldiers must have died was part of the reason why the stragglers' return was so unexpected.

The stragglers' return also raised the complicated issue of the continuing reign in post-war Japan of the Emperor, for whom, symbolically at least, Japanese soldiers had given their lives during the war and for whom, symbolically, the stragglers had remained in hiding after the war ended. The Emperor had occupied a central place in the Army's ethos as well as in propaganda directed at the general population. According to the constitution, he was supreme commander of the armed forces. In theory at least, he was at the top of the Army hierarchy and ostensibly gave the orders. While there has been much debate in historical writing on the Emperor's *actual* capacity to govern the Army, official propaganda allowed no discussion as to whether he was indeed the supreme commander. Soldiers were told that dying for the Emperor (which could be translated as dying for the nation, the Emperor being the symbol of the nation) was a great honour. Failing to die in a battle won by the enemy amounted to a show of disloyalty to their sovereign. Propaganda emphasised the supposedly personal nature of the relationship between soldiers and the Emperor: for example, troops were told that their cigarette rations were a present from him.⁵¹ In the spring of 1932, during the Sino-Japanese conflict in Manchuria, the Empress donated artificial limbs and eyes to the Army and Navy, sent parcels to soldiers and visited injured servicemen in hospital; she also visited the Yasukuni Shrine, the national monument to those who had died in battle.⁵²

The kind of training imposed on the soldiers was not, however, limited to them alone. In Japan, as in other countries in a state of total war, women, schoolchildren and those deemed unfit for military service were recruited to work in factories and in agriculture to maintain the economy. As the enemy approached the mainland, the task of defending the homeland was no longer solely incumbent on the armed forces. Civilians were urged to join volunteer corps to help defend the nation against enemy invasion. The women of the Neighbourhood Associations mentioned earlier were trained to wield bamboo spears, with which supposedly to confront well-armed American troops.⁵³ It is here that it becomes apparent that the Army's idea of 'No surrender' also had consequences for civilians. In Havens' words, 'the cabinet expected the volunteers to be home-front equivalents of the Kamikaze pilots, who went into battle with meagre weapons fully prepared to die'.⁵⁴ For civilians also, then, death was portrayed as a more desirable option than surrender.

The vocabulary relating to ideas of sacrifice and death for the nation was in fact often the same for soldiers and civilians, and in those parts of Japanese territory that were invaded by the Allies after mid-1942, there was little, in the end, to separate the military from the rest of the Japanese population. In July 1944, when Saipan was about to fall to the Allied forces, hundreds of Japanese families died by their own hand rather than surrender.⁵⁵ During the famously bloody battle for Okinawa, ninety-five thousand civilians died by enemy fire or at the hands of the Japanese Army, or committed suicide.⁵⁶ The term *gyokusai* (crushing of jewels), which euphemistically referred to soldiers fighting to death

in desperate and hopeless battles, was also applied at the time to mass civilian deaths. Since the war, however, civilian and military deaths have been differentiated: civilian ones have been termed ‘group suicides’ (*shūdan jiketsu*), implying that death for all members of the group was voluntary and that it was a private choice rather than one encouraged by the doctrines of the state. This is in itself a matter open to debate. According to Kinjō Shigeaki, a survivor of the Okinawa campaign:

During the war there was no phrase *shūdan jiketsu*. There was *gyokusai*, however, a grandiose militaristic euphemism, signifying the ‘crushing of jewels’, meaning people giving up their lives joyfully for their country rather than succumbing to the enemy or falling into their hands.⁵⁷

During the war, there was little official differentiation between the deaths of soldiers and those of civilians. The fact that many such suicides did occur on Saipan and Okinawa suggests that the Japanese population accepted the military ethos to a great degree. The Japanese government’s surrender before an actual invasion of the mainland may have prevented mass suicides from occurring among civilians in Japan proper. Thus the ethos which was at the core of the stragglers’ behaviour had arguably been shared to a greater or lesser degree by the general population, not only by those who were actually recruited into the Army.

Thus social organisations, wartime propaganda and the Army’s official ethos all contributed to a shared national world view and experience in Japan during the Second World War: the mobilisation of spiritual and mental resources was by no means limited to the military. The degree of conjunction, then, between the soldiers’ and the general population’s experience of the war illuminates and conditions the kind of reaction that the stragglers’ return brought forth. The straggler was not an ‘unknown quantity’ for those who had lived through the war, nor did he elicit much puzzlement, at least for the first decade or so after the defeat. What he did elicit, as we will see, was a mixture of pride and mourning, of nostalgia and horror, as well as a desire to remember and yet to forget. Such ambivalent reactions, as we will see in the next chapter, had their origins in the years of the Occupation.

2 Creating stragglers

Demobilisation, 1945–1950

The early post-war era is as crucial as the pre-war and wartime periods to an understanding of the stragglers' very existence and of discourses on the war and the nature of post-war Japan provoked by their return. First, though the years between 1945 and 1950 saw the bulk of Japanese soldiers and civilians overseas repatriated, the mechanics of repatriation put in place immediately after the defeat reveal a limited ability, both in administrative and ideological terms, to recognise the possible existence of stragglers and take steps to find and bring them home. By omission, then, it was the process of repatriation itself which created stragglers, and which demands examination for that reason. Second, the ambivalence shown towards demobilised and returning soldiers fostered during this period continued to affect attitudes to stragglers in the early 1950s. Reactions to the former 'heroes' of the nation combined hostility – caused by the poverty and uncertainty of the immediate post-war years as well as the propaganda efforts of General Headquarters – and older, more persistent habits of respect and admiration towards the military. Finally, also crucial for our understanding of post-war attitudes to stragglers are those Occupation policies which had a long-term impact on the way the war was afterwards remembered. Here I will limit my discussion to those legacies of the Occupation that had particular implications for commemoration of the war dead, for the separation of religion and state, and for the political and ideological position of the Emperor throughout the post-war period.

The first part of this chapter focuses on the bureaucratic apparatus responsible for the repatriation of Japan's military forces from overseas. Although this apparatus went through several modifications and name changes in its early incarnation, it was known in the period in which most of the stragglers returned as the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare (*Hikiage engo kyoku*) and operated mostly under the aegis of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The Bureau's origins and concerns are briefly described here, since it was responsible, throughout the period considered in this book, for the rescue and repatriation of stragglers and therefore appears regularly in subsequent chapters. Today the Bureau is known as *Shakai engo kyoku* (Social Welfare Bureau) and continues to deal with veterans' affairs and repatriations, now mostly from China.

Stragglers existed partly because the Bureau, in its early post-war form at least, failed to recognise the possibility of their existence and to take steps to find them.

Yet it would be wrong to accuse the bureaucrats in charge of repatriation of wilful or deliberate obtuseness. There were numerous and often insurmountable obstacles to an exact reckoning of the numbers of the living, the missing and the dead among the soldiers of the Imperial Army. The magnitude of the task of repatriation that confronted Japan in 1945 cannot be overestimated, and the eventual stragglers themselves represented only a very small proportion of the total number involved. Immediately after the war, more than six million Japanese overseas were awaiting repatriation. Roughly half of these were military personnel; the other half consisted of pre-war emigrants to Korea or Manchuria, and civilians employed in the administration of Japanese-occupied territories. According to Wakatsuki Yasuo the influx of repatriates increased the population of Japan by eight per cent between 1945 and 1948, creating what he refers to as the biggest mass migration in the nation's history and one of the biggest concentrated population movements in the history of the world.¹ The sixty-five or so known stragglers who fell through the net of repatriation thus constitute only a minuscule proportion of a project of enormous administrative and logistical complexity.

Japanese citizens, particularly demobilised soldiers, were awaiting repatriation from a widespread area, reflecting the amount of territory occupied by their country after its rapid advance southwards in late 1941 to early 1942. To the north and west it held, apart from Korea and Manchuria, an extensive part of China where the greater part of the Japanese Imperial Army was stationed and fought from 1937 onwards. To the south-west it held part or the whole of the countries then known as Burma, Siam, Indochina, Malaya and Singapore. To the south and south-east, apart from its colony of Taiwan, Japan held the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, New Guinea and New Britain. In addition it also held many islands in the central Pacific: the Solomon Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands, the Marianas and the Bonin Islands (including Iwo Jima). In the north-east there were troops stationed on part of the Aleutians. Even though Japanese-held territory was reduced considerably with the Allied advance from 1942 onwards, the nation's soldiers remained scattered over a wide area.

According to the calculations of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, at the time when the Emperor announced to his subjects that the war was over, there were 5,470,000 soldiers on active duty in the Imperial Army. Of those, 3,085,000 were overseas. The Navy had 2,241,000 troops in total, with close to 450,000 overseas.² Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the distribution of military personnel in August 1945 according to the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare. These tables include some 244,000 Koreans and 207,000 Taiwanese conscripted for the Japanese war effort either as soldiers or labourers. After 15 August 1945 they were repatriated directly to their place of origin by the new administration in each of the former Japanese territories.³

The repatriation process was further complicated by the fact that different administrative bodies were made responsible for the repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians. In the post-surrender takeover of Japanese-occupied territories, the Allied nations divided among themselves the burden of peacekeeping and of the repatriation of Japanese citizens. The zone to the south

Table 2.1 Distribution of Japanese Army personnel in August 1945.

<i>Location</i>	<i>Number</i>
Japanese mainland	2,388,000
Kurile Islands, Sakhalin	88,000
Taiwan, South-West Islands	169,000
Korean Peninsula	294,000
Former Manchukuo	664,000
China (including Hong Kong)	1,056,000
Southern Region (and mid-Pacific)	744,000
Rabaul region	70,000
Total	5,473,000

Source: *Engo gojūnen shi*, pp. 10–11.

Table 2.2 Distribution of Japanese Navy personnel in August 1945.

<i>Location</i>	<i>Number</i>
Japanese mainland	1,972,000
Kurile Islands, Sakhalin	3,000
South-West Islands	12,000
Korean Peninsula	42,000
Taiwan	63,000
China (including Hong Kong)	71,000
Mid-Pacific Islands region	59,000
Philippines region	30,000
Indochina, Malaya region	61,000
Southern region (Java, Celebes, Moluccas, Borneo)	52,000
South-East region (New Guinea, Bismarck Islands, Solomon Islands)	56,000
Total	2,421,000

Source: *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 17.

of the thirty-eighth parallel became the combined responsibility of the United States, Britain, Australia and China. The United States supervised the repatriation of Japanese soldiers stationed in the Philippines, southern Korea, the Pacific Islands and Okinawa. Britain oversaw that from Siam, Burma, the Andaman Islands, Nicobar, Malaya, Singapore, French Indochina below the sixteenth parallel and the Dutch colonies. Australia had responsibility for eastern New Guinea, the Bismarck Islands, the Solomon Islands and Borneo. China was responsible for the Chinese mainland (excluding Manchuria) and also Taiwan and French Indochina above the sixteenth parallel. The area above the thirty-eighth parallel became the responsibility of the USSR, which thus controlled Manchuria,

the Kuriles, Sakhalin and northern Korea. The separation of Japan's former territories, in the wake of the defeat, amongst powers that were already facing one another at the beginning of the Cold War had enormous repercussions for the repatriation of Japanese soldiers. Repatriation from Soviet-controlled areas in particular was to be a very lengthy and difficult process.

The timing of and degree of difficulty in the repatriation of soldiers depended very much on where they came from. For those stationed on the Japanese mainland the order to demobilise came on 25 August 1945, but for overseas troops it was not until 10 September that the Japanese centre of command in each area was ordered to commence preparation for repatriation. The troops, or what was left of them, were concentrated in designated areas while waiting to be shipped home. This was a relatively smooth process only if the troops had retained their original organisational structure and if the area from which they were to be repatriated was more or less peaceful. Such was not the case in China, for example, where preparations for repatriation were to some degree hampered by the clashes between the Nationalist armies of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and the Communist forces of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung). Similar difficulties were encountered in Indonesia, with the beginning of the war of independence from the Netherlands.⁴ Furthermore, in the case of those situated in areas under Soviet jurisdiction, the process of repatriation was both delayed and complicated because the USSR blocked communication between the troops and their Tokyo headquarters and also, from the end of August 1945 onwards, transported Japanese servicemen to Siberia as forced labourers.⁵

Before all these other problems surfaced, however, it was already clear that one of the biggest impediments to rapid repatriation would be Japan's severe lack of shipping. According to Wakatsuki, Japan had only 510,000 tons of shipping left at the end of the war, when it needed roughly 4,000,000 tons to cope with trade under normal circumstances. The Occupation forces rejected a Japanese government plan to assign half of the available shipping to the repatriation effort: if Japan used its ships to rekindle a semblance of economic activity instead, the financial pressure on the Allies for the administration of occupied Japan might be somewhat relieved. The restriction on the use of merchant shipping for repatriation left 35,000 tons of merchant marine, and the 100,000 tons of Navy vessels that had not been destroyed in the war, for use in repatriation.⁶ According to the Allies' calculations at the time, such limited shipping capacity meant that it would take the Japanese government five years to repatriate its surrendered personnel. Since that would place considerable economic and political strain on the countries in which the surrendered personnel were concentrated, the United States government augmented Japan's freight capabilities with some one hundred of its 'Liberty' ships (famous for the speed at which they had been produced during the war) in January 1946. Repatriation thus proceeded at a much faster pace.⁷

Repatriation took place over the following periods: from September 1945 to May 1946 for territories under American control, from May to November 1946

for those under British control and from November 1946 to July 1947 for those under Chinese and Australian control. Roughly 100,000 Japanese were retained as labourers in Burma and Thailand by British forces; they were sent home between March 1947 and January 1948.⁸ Repatriation for those under Soviet control was eventually spread over a number of years, between 1947 and 1956, with individual repatriations continuing to take place well after that period. A recent case of ‘delayed repatriation’ is that of Meguro Toshimasa, who in 1998 visited Japan for the first time in the fifty-three years since his imprisonment as a spy in the Soviet Union in 1945; his release in 1953 had been conditional on his continued residence in that country.⁹ Repatriations from China also occurred throughout the post-war period. The 1990s witnessed the periodic return, as older persons, of those whose desperate parents, fleeing Manchuria at war’s end, had left them as children in the hands of Chinese families and who were now searching for relatives in Japan. And periodically between 1950 and 1974, a Japanese soldier would be found in one of the jungles of the Pacific, apparently unaware that the war had ended.

For its part the Japanese government considered the repatriation of its overseas troops and civilians a matter of the utmost urgency, and the first plans for this were drawn up at a Cabinet meeting on 22 August 1945. On 30 August, an ‘Outline of Urgent Steps in Aid of Japanese Citizens Overseas (Including Sakhalin)’ (*Gaichi (Karafuto o fukumu) oyobi gaikoku iryū bōnin hikiagesha ōkyū engo sochi yōkō*) was decided on at a Vice-Ministers’ Conference, and a more detailed plan for repatriation was approved in a Cabinet Council meeting on 7 September.¹⁰ On 18 October 1945 the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which had been designated responsible for all affairs concerning repatriation and repatriates, began to organise administrative structures to arrange the homecoming of overseas Japanese, as well as the repatriation to their own countries of non-Japanese residents of Japan.¹¹

Regional repatriation centres, which began to function on 24 November 1945, were established first at Maizuru and Shimonoseki on the Japan Sea, and gradually at various other ports. These regional offices were merged into an extra-ministerial office on 21 March 1946 under the title Institute for the Welfare of Repatriates (Hikiage engo in). In the meantime, the former Ministries of the Army and the Navy had become the Demobilisation Ministries Nos. 1 and 2, handling the demobilisation of all service personnel. These ministries were merged with the Institute for the Welfare of Repatriates in May 1948. The product of this merger was the Office for the Welfare of Repatriates (Hikiage engo chō), which handled both civilian and military repatriates. It was renamed the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare (Hikiage engo kyoku) on 1 April 1954, when it was placed back under the aegis of the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The name was shortened to Bureau of Welfare (Engo kyoku) in 1961, and in 1992 changed to the Bureau of Social Welfare (Shakai engo kyoku).¹² Here this administrative unit will be referred to as the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare or simply ‘the Bureau’, regardless of the time frame under discussion. The Bureau produced histories of its own activities: in 1977, under the title *Hikiage to engo*

30-nen no ayumi (Repatriation and Welfare: the Path of the Last Thirty Years), and again in 1997 when it published a summary of its achievements over the previous five decades entitled *Engo gojūnen shi* (History of Fifty Years of Welfare).¹³ The latter is a substantial volume rich in the kind of statistical information that informs the first part of this chapter.

In the early years after the defeat, repatriation proceeded apace. By the end of 1946 more than five million service personnel and civilians had been repatriated; in other words, about eighty per cent of all Japanese overseas had been transported back home in one and a half years. This included the majority of the country's military personnel and civilians in the southern war theatres but almost none from the areas under Soviet control. In 1947 close to 744,000 people were repatriated, with 400,000 of those coming from areas under Soviet control and a further 215,000 from the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria. In 1948 300,000 people were repatriated, again mainly from Soviet-occupied areas, and in 1949 the last great mass repatriation took place, with almost 100,000 people coming back to Japan, 87,000 of whom had been in Soviet-controlled areas. From 1950 until 1958 the yearly number of repatriates averaged about 2,000 people, except for 1953 when 27,205 people were repatriated from China. The vast majority of those repatriated in the 1950s came from either the Soviet Union or China. From 1959 to the present day there have been between one and two hundred repatriates every year, mostly civilian returnees from China or North Korea.¹⁴ (See Appendix.)

From 1945 to the beginning of 1947, then, the Bureau's main function was to administer the return of repatriates. It records its own activities as follows. In its several branches and regional offices, in particular in the ports of Yokohama, Moji, Sensaki, Maizuru, Shimonoseki, Kure, Kagoshima, Uraga and Sasebo, it performed quarantine checks on repatriates and took down personal details. It also supplied the returnees with clothing, washing facilities, meals, accommodation and rail transport to their home towns. Importantly for the returnees, the Bureau was also able to offer information on the bomb damage sustained in various areas of Japan and thus on the likelihood of finding relatives in their home towns. More than ten per cent of repatriates suffered from health problems such as malnutrition, malaria, tuberculosis, beriberi and stomach ailments, and these were treated either in the compound infirmary or in public hospitals depending on the severity of the illness. The Occupation authorities were initially rather concerned about concentrations of former military personnel in limited areas and gave orders that repatriates must be on their way home within twenty-four hours of landing. It proved difficult to conform to these regulations, however, and the average length of stay in a compound of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare actually extended to three or four days.¹⁵

It was in this very busy and complex period that the soldiers who are the focus of this book were simply overlooked. By the Bureau's own admission, investigations of the fate of non-returnees did not take place in earnest or in any concerted fashion until 1950. Nevertheless, from 1947 onwards some preparatory steps were taken in an attempt to account for missing and dead

soldiers. From 1945 to 1947, with large-scale repatriations taking place, the various administrative structures responsible for repatriation (the Bureau itself but also the Demobilisation Ministries) were unable to give satisfactory answers to families looking for a relative: the sheer number of repatriates and the restrictions on lengths of stay in the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare compounds did not allow for any active investigation into the status of non-repatriated soldiers. Between 1948 and 1950 the diminishing number of repatriates, and the ever-louder demands from bereaved families for information, made it increasingly clear that the number of missing was substantial and that it would be necessary to set up investigative procedures to shed light on their whereabouts and have them declared dead where appropriate. At the same time it became obvious that there would be difficulties in the repatriation of those in Soviet-occupied areas. However, there were practical impediments to sustained and detailed investigations, including the instability, poverty and confusion of the years immediately following the defeat. Furthermore, the Occupation forces, at least during their first year, scrutinised all affairs pertaining to the former military, not in order to hamper efforts at repatriation but to undermine the threat of resistance to themselves that might have accompanied the mass repatriation of demobilised soldiers. The Bureau nevertheless took the opportunity of gathering as much information as possible, information that would provide the basis for later investigations. Two surveys, conducted on 1 August 1946 and 1 March 1949 respectively, asked those families who were missing a relative, or who had received a death notice but not been handed the customary white box supposedly containing the soldier's remains, to notify the authorities.¹⁶

In the early 1950s, increased public awareness of the problem of delayed repatriations from China and the USSR prompted the Bureau to focus its activities predominantly on those areas. Investigations into the whereabouts of missing people in other areas were temporarily downplayed. Public agitation on the topic of repatriation resulted in the enactment in 1953 of the Law for Aid to the Families of Non-Repatriated Persons (*Mikikansha rusukazoku nado engo hō*). This law gave the state the responsibility to search for the missing, find their remains and provide information to bereaved families on the place and circumstances of a lost one's death.

In the meantime the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its overseas offices, had undertaken general investigations into the circumstances of Japanese nationals living outside the country. Although this information was not gathered with the specific aim of finding missing soldiers, it would eventually prove useful for that purpose. In 1954, a year after the promulgation of the law regarding non-repatriated persons, a special office within the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare was inaugurated to coordinate the investigation efforts of the representatives of the Foreign Ministry abroad and of the Bureau in Japan, namely the Section for Investigations of Delayed Repatriations (*Mikikan chōsabu*).¹⁷ The creation of this office helped to combine information under the one roof, and marks the beginning of an efficient programme of investigation. By this time, nearly ten years had passed since the end of the war.

This is not to say that absolutely no earlier effort had been made to investigate the fate of the missing. The two national surveys of the families of missing people, mentioned above, were used by the Bureau as a basis for its later investigations. In addition, from 1947 onwards, lists of soldiers' names arranged by battalion were kept in the repatriation ports as well as at prefectoral and local government offices. Repatriates were asked to declare anything they might have heard or seen regarding the fate of those on the list of the missing. Returning soldiers were asked to provide similar information on those missing from their battalions. Thanks to the information gathered from these surveys, the Bureau was able to clarify, mostly reliably, the fate of a great number of those declared missing by their families.

For example, in the case of the Navy, the Bureau records that the survey of August 1946 reported 722,847 missing. Through its investigations the Bureau was eventually able to show that 567,060 of them were in fact alive. The large number of missing in 1946 was probably due to the fact that, so soon after the war, many returnees had not yet located their families and others were still on their way home. The fate of the 155,841 people who remained missing after the 1946 survey had mostly been clarified by the time of the second survey conducted in 1949. According to the Bureau, as of 31 October 1950, out of the remaining 2,331 missing 1,384 had in fact been repatriated and 386 had chosen to remain overseas. The remaining 561 were presumed to have died.¹⁸ In the case of the Army, the number of missing could not be clarified as easily, since so many of them had been transported to Siberia. There was no contact with them apart from occasional rumours about deaths from sickness or other causes. Nevertheless, the Bureau showed a similar propensity to assume that those from whom nothing had been heard must be dead.

In most cases, the Bureau was probably right. It was very likely that the missing soldiers and sailors had died, either during the war or shortly afterwards, separated from their units and thus from anyone who might later reliably report on their death. However, a very small number of those 'presumed dead', both from the Navy and the Army, were alive in 1950 on Guam, on Saipan, in New Guinea, in Indonesia or in the Philippines. Many of these stragglers would die of illness, hunger and accidents in the next few years, but a few of them – the subjects of later chapters – would survive to be repatriated years and even decades after the end of the war.

Even if there had been an inkling amongst Bureau officials that there might be soldiers outside Japan who were unaware that the war had ended, the sheer scale of the task of repatriation would have made it difficult to take any practical steps to find them. As we have just seen, however, the Bureau was quick to presume that missing soldiers had in fact died. Indeed, had the situation been more favourable to early and thorough investigation, it is unlikely that searches would have taken place for stragglers, precisely because of this assumption. The Bureau notes that from the survey of 1946 it learnt that the majority of those whose whereabouts were unclear had died in plane accidents, in the sinking of battleships and in the 'suicide attacks', the so-called *gyokusai* or 'crushing of

jewels' mentioned in the last chapter. Therefore, it adopted in many cases the policy of presuming death where an individual was missing. For example, those who were in battalions reported to have taken part in a 'suicide attack' about whom there had been no further information since that day and who, in addition, had been seen there immediately before the fateful attack, were presumed dead. The date of their death was recorded as the day of the last battle. Those who were sailors or pilots had their death recorded as the day their ship sank or their plane crashed. This method of handling the investigation into soldiers' deaths lasted for one year, between August 1947 and July 1948.¹⁹

There is no doubt that this was a very efficient means of whittling down the number of those who were unaccounted for, and that, in most cases, the assumption that the serviceman in question had died on that particular date would have been correct. But it certainly also explains why most of the stragglers encountered their own memorials and graves on their return. Furthermore, the number of those 'missing' was again reduced considerably in 1959 when the laws regarding family records (*koseki*) were changed, shortening the number of years before which a missing person could legally be declared dead. Overnight, this measure reduced the number of non-repatriated civilians listed as officially missing from 77,000 to 31,000.²⁰

Thus the existence of stragglers can be accounted for partly by the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare's administrative structures and the fact that these structures were informed by the assumption – on the whole justified – that the missing had in fact died long before. That the Bureau had been mistaken in some cases was made clear every time a straggler returned and by the 1970s it was being roundly condemned for its slip-ups. Yet the Bureau did not have sole responsibility for 'misplacing' the stragglers, and condemnation of its procedures should be tempered with a number of other considerations. In fact, many stragglers slipped through the net of repatriation due to circumstances that had already been in place before the defeat. The unreliability of military records, the breakdown in the organisational structure of the Imperial Army towards the end of the war and the nature of the battles for the islands of the South-West Pacific made it very difficult to acknowledge the possibility that some service personnel might be alive and in hiding.

There is no doubt that Army and Navy records of deaths in battle were unreliable. First, they did not take into account the possibility that soldiers might have surrendered and become prisoners of war. Propaganda and ideology in wartime discouraged the accurate reporting of deaths in battle. Within the ethos of the military, with its insistence on sacrifice and death rather than surrender, the possibility that some soldiers might have survived a defeat (either as prisoners or as stragglers) could not be considered officially. It is very likely that, even if in doubt, the Army and Navy would have sent death notices to the families of soldiers, as these notices, according to doctrine, would be a source of great pride. Prisoners of war in particular were routinely declared to have died in battle. It is noteworthy that the vast majority of Japanese prisoners of war, conscious of the shame of surrender, seemingly did not think initially that returning home was a possibility.²¹

Thus a large number of soldiers were presumed dead even before the end of the war. Many of these ‘dead soldiers’ returned to Japan immediately after the defeat, and some much later. Their encounters with their own gravestones must have been a rather destabilizing experience. On 17 February 1956, for example, the *Nippon Times* announced the arrest by the police of one representative of the ‘living dead’, a thirty-six-year-old veteran who had been responsible for a number of robberies over the previous years. The veteran explained that on his return to Japan in late 1945 he had been so shocked to discover that ‘he had died’ in the battle of Guadalcanal in 1942 that he had decided to ‘live like a man who doesn’t live’, which meant, presumably, to embark on a life of crime.²²

Some of the uncertainties regarding soldiers’ whereabouts might have been eliminated quite easily had military records been complete or reliable. This was not the case. According to the Bureau, at least twenty per cent of military records had been destroyed at home either in the Allied bombing of Japan or in other fires.²³ The latter could have included those that raged immediately after the surrender, when a large number of records were purposely destroyed by bureaucrats of the wartime regime. However, another significant problem for investigators was the fact that, as the war wore on and the need for more troops became desperate, soldiers had been drafted at short notice and the necessary paperwork had either not been sent or had been lost on the way to the central ministries. This was particularly the case where the Imperial Army had drafted soldiers in Okinawa or overseas, from the civilian population of the Japanese colonies or occupied territories, especially Manchuria, Korea and the Philippines. With the breakdown of the lines of communication in the latter stages of the war, records of those new draftees often could not be sent to Tokyo. Unless the battalion managed to be repatriated with its own records intact, the existence of those individuals as soldiers had no formal basis. Therefore the investigators had to rely on information brought to them by returned servicemen, and garnered in the very short time that was available between the soldier’s landing and his return home.²⁴

Furthermore, matching individual soldiers with administrative records of personnel was feasible on a large scale only as long as soldiers were repatriated in their original groupings. Fortunately, this was the case for most of those who came back from China or from South-East Asia. Unfortunately, however, it was not the case for those in the regions under Soviet control: there the structure of the Japanese army had been destroyed, officers and soldiers separated, and in the Siberian labour camps many had died of starvation and cold. When soldiers were repatriated from these regions they came back in mixed groups of soldiers and civilians, which made it doubly difficult to record each one accurately. In addition, both in Manchuria and some parts of the southern area such as Vietnam, a number of soldiers disguised their military identities and pretended to have been civilians all along, even upon their return to Japan, fearful perhaps of being accused as war criminals by the Occupation forces or as deserters by their own army.²⁵

The characteristics of certain war zones also made it difficult to retain an organised battalion format. The disintegration of troop structure made it possible for a number of soldiers to fall through the net of round-up operations. It is no accident that most of the stragglers came from Guam, the Philippines, Indonesia and New Guinea. Those areas have particular features that either made round-up operations cursory or precluded the possibility of survivors in the minds of Bureau officials. This in turn apparently obviated the necessity of conducting investigations into the whereabouts of each soldier in that area.

The fighting in the Philippines, Burma and New Guinea was relatively similar in that it had been extremely fierce, with the result that the regimental structure of Japanese troops had broken down to a great extent during retreat. In Burma, for example, the British and Indian Allied forces had managed to push back most of the Japanese troops east of the Sittang River by the end of July 1945, so that these Japanese had been in retreat with enormous casualties by the time of the surrender. As lines of communication had broken down to a large extent, many of the soldiers did not receive the order to surrender at all. Further, scores of them were ill or dying from malnutrition and disease. Many soldiers were making their way south-east in small bands of stragglers long after the surrender. Few of them knew of the surrender since they had lost contact with their regiments long ago.²⁶ The situation was similar in New Guinea and the Philippines. Moreover, Japanese soldiers in South-East Asia were often embroiled in the clashes and armed conflicts that followed the end of the war. This was the case in Burma and Thailand to a degree, and there were also large numbers of Japanese soldiers in the armies of Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam.²⁷ Numerous Japanese soldiers in Indonesia were decorated for their part in that country's war of independence, and some still live there.²⁸

In the Philippines, from the recapture of Leyte by the Allies in December 1944 to the end of the war, the Allied forces pushed the Japanese back into mountainous areas in each island, and contented themselves with occupying strategic areas rather than systematically taking each island in its entirety. By August the number of Japanese soldiers had been considerably reduced, as they had to contend with local guerrillas, a lack of food, and diseases such as beriberi.²⁹ Again, in situations where entire battalions, constantly on the move, had slowly disintegrated through starvation and illness, it was difficult to round up every single soldier in preparation for repatriation. They were sent home in mixed groups rather than in their original battalion format. Those who were not present at the first roll-call following the surrender were assumed to have died of starvation or disease somewhere on the edge of the battlefield, and only rarely were they assumed to be still alive. The situation was similar in New Guinea, with scores of soldiers retreating into the mountainous interior, where they died, in most cases, of disease and starvation, or at the hands of New Guineans. Again, some managed to survive for several years before being found and repatriated, but all of these people had originally belonged to much larger groups.

The number of soldiers on the islands of the Pacific was also difficult to reckon. In the last campaigns of the Pacific many islands, occupied by Japanese

troops but of no prime strategic importance to the Allies, were bypassed in the preparations for an all-out assault on Japan proper.³⁰ The small garrisons on those islands suffered from outbreaks of disease and a lack of food, but the soldiers could be rounded up and repatriated fairly easily – if they stayed put. However, some, desperate for food, attempted to make their way to other islands.³¹ From that point on they disappeared, and it was impossible to find out with certainty whether they were dead or alive.

Furthermore, Allied mop-up operations could not hope to find all remaining Japanese soldiers: the operations themselves were too scanty, and the terrain, often dense jungle, was too difficult. Even on Iwo Jima, fairly deforested by the famously bloody battle which led the American forces to declare it secure in mid-March 1945, mop-up operations were far from straightforward: according to John Toland, American soldiers involved in such operations estimated at the time that there were at least three hundred Japanese soldiers still in hiding on the island. Some were captured while trying to kill American troops in a last suicide mission; others were ‘flushed out’ of their caves with flame-throwers or dynamite. In addition some managed to evade mop-up operations and continued to hide. According to Toland, the last two members of the former Iwo Jima garrison surrendered in 1951.³²

In short, then, the scale of these operations meant that, while it may not have been easy, it was certainly not impossible for Japanese soldiers to hide and remain where they were after the war had ended. Onoda, who stayed on Lubang in the Philippines for almost thirty years, recalls in his memoirs that ‘any semblance of organised warfare’ ended in March 1945. He encountered a clean-up squad a month later and heard of one group of survivors being attacked a month after that. At first there were enemy patrols every day along the ridge of the mountain where he was hiding. He recalls that they stopped coming around the middle of August, but even before that he does not lead us to believe that it was particularly difficult to hide from the enemy.³³

The Imperial Army’s practice of engaging in suicidal battles in extreme conditions was another factor that complicated the reckoning of the number of dead soldiers among those declared missing. This had major consequences mainly on islands such as Guam, Saipan and Iwo Jima, mentioned above. Where almost entire Japanese battalions had been annihilated in such desperate attacks against American troops, it was difficult for the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare to declare with any certainty whether particular soldiers were dead or missing.³⁴ The Bureau relied to a large extent on information supplied by American troops since there were so few Japanese survivors who could help either with the identification of remains or with information regarding the death or escape of missing comrades. As we have seen, the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, in those circumstances, readily assumed that soldiers had died in the suicide assaults rather than considering the possibility that some might have fled and might now be in hiding. Also mentioned in an earlier chapter was the Imperial Army’s official ethos in which flight from the enemy was considered a dishonour of unspeakable proportions. The Bureau of Repatriate Welfare may have

idealistically and conveniently decided that no soldier would have failed to obey these precepts. However, a substantial number of soldiers actually did manage to get away from the battlefield and hide. Many of them died subsequently of disease, but some survived. It should come as no surprise therefore that the Pacific Islands, Guam in particular, yielded a comparatively large number of stragglers over the years, with the last one repatriated in 1972.

Finally, the ethos of the Japanese military was a factor not only in the sense that it allowed the Bureau to make certain assumptions about the deaths of soldiers in battle, but also because it actually prevented a number of stragglers from surrendering and thus being repatriated. Although a number of personal, circumstantial and other factors combined to create a straggler out of a soldier, the strength of the military ethos certainly played a substantial part. If the stragglers did not accept, in their conscious minds at least, that the war was over, it was perhaps because they could not believe that the Imperial Army, and the Japanese nation, had surrendered without fighting to the death. That possibility was contrary to all they had been taught. For example, in his mind and with his comrades when they were alive, Onoda devised complex interpretations of the newspapers and magazines left behind by those who were searching for him. He mostly believed, it seems, that they constituted sophisticated American intelligence material deliberately left in his path to flush him out and let him be captured. If unable to explain them as such, he would think of other possible developments, often very far-fetched, to explain the news material, such as new international alliances. Importantly, however, his interpretations would always allow for the idea that the war was still going on.³⁵ Although the presence of a radio amongst Onoda's belongings made for a great deal of speculation, at the time of his return, about whether he could sincerely have believed that the war was not over, the fact is that Onoda waited to be told formally to surrender by his immediate superior before he accepted repatriation. It was his training, then, that made it difficult for him and his comrades on Lubang to accept the reality of the Japanese defeat. As we will see in later chapters, this attitude created problems for the Bureau from the moment in 1951 when it became aware of the existence of stragglers there, to Onoda's surrender in 1974.

The soldiers' military training further conspired to make them difficult to find through its emphasis on the necessity to fight to the death. If a straggler did have an inkling that the war was over, it was usually the feeling of shame at failure, so carefully nurtured in the army ethos, which kept him in his hiding place. Yokoi Shōichi, who was found on Guam in 1972, had nursed this shame for twenty-eight years. He thought that he should have died along with his comrades in a last-ditch battle for the island, and that the fact he was alive amounted to desertion. Asked in one of his first interviews why he had stayed behind, he said: 'I was afraid ... when I was a kid in Japan I was trained. The spirit of Japan is to die the way the cherry blossoms go: without shame. I was afraid I wouldn't go that way'.³⁶ While the stragglers' own explanation for their long exile might have been, in part, a self-conscious contribution to the creation of their public image at the time of their return, there is no doubt that the nature of their military

training played an important part in their decision to hide from both the enemy and their own side.

Thus a combination of factors conspired to make a reliable tally of soldiers and repatriates after August 1945 difficult if not impossible, a combination which ultimately created a situation whereby some Japanese servicemen were able to hide even from their own government. These factors, as we have seen, included the complexity and sheer size of the repatriation effort; the unreliability of wartime records; the disintegration of the organisational structure of Imperial Army troops; the strategy of ‘island-hopping’ employed by the Allies in the Pacific, in which certain Japanese-occupied islands of no immediate strategic importance were bypassed entirely; and the wish of some of the soldiers themselves to live or die by the ethos of the Imperial Army, together with a readiness on the part of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare to believe that soldiers had died according to that ethos. Although repatriation on an enormous scale took place within a short span of time, the inevitable mistakes that resulted, if minuscule in number in comparison with six million successful repatriations, had significant consequences in later years, as we will see. The unexpected return of soldiers who had been thought dead also left an ongoing sense of uncertainty in the minds of many of those who had lost a family member in the war: they wondered if maybe they, too, would one day witness the return of their lost one. A number of families refused to believe their government’s assertion that their relative was dead and accordingly refused the offer of a pension.³⁷ The uncertainty of each family over the death of their kinsman was exacerbated every time a straggler came back. The link between the stragglers and many families was thus quite an intimate one: the straggler could have been their son, husband, brother or father.

Furthermore, in the case of a great many soldiers the lack of any physical remains contributed to the uncertainty surrounding their deaths. A number of memoirs recount, in heart-wrenching terms, the realisation that the ‘white box’, supposedly the repatriated repository of the mortal remains of one’s relative, was either empty or contained a couple of twigs possibly intended to stimulate the rattle of bones. In the early 1990s, eighty-five-year-old Imai Shike recollected that the lack of information regarding her son’s death meant she had never quite been able to accept it. She said:

I’ve gotten this old, and I don’t know anything anymore, but there were people who came back. I thought my boy might come back, too, so I kept asking around. I behaved like a madwoman.³⁸

In light of that, the post-war work of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare in overseas battlefields acquires new meaning. In tandem with a number of veterans’ organisations, the Bureau has expended a great deal of money and energy in the search for and repatriation of ‘bones’ or soldiers’ remains (the Japanese term is *ikotsu shūshū*, ‘bone-collection’), particularly in the South-West Pacific. It has also erected memorials on battle sites – akin to the post-war work of the

Australian War Graves Commission, for example. The Bureau itself makes a strong link between the return of Yokoi Shōichi in 1972 and renewed activity towards and expenditure on the preparation of missions to search for and repatriate such remains.³⁹ Although it would be difficult, in any national context, to pinpoint or define a sense of ‘closure’ for particularly cataclysmic past events, there is no doubt that uncertainty regarding the truth of notices of war deaths contributed to the difficulty in effecting such closure in post-war Japan.

Repatriates returned home to a society shattered by the impact of the war and the defeat. In the months following the defeat, the media catchphrase was ‘one hundred million people in a state of trauma’ (*ichioku sōkyodatsu*).⁴⁰ After years of hardship and sacrifice, and years of propaganda to the effect that Japan could only win, the sudden news of defeat left people with confused and contradictory feelings: bitterness and sorrow, but also relief and hope. The well-known author Katō Shūichi remembers thinking: ‘it was no longer a world of lies and falsehoods . . . At that time, my heart was filled with hope. I had never felt more optimistic about Japan’s future or more encouraged to rise to the occasion’.⁴¹ Defeat, for many, was shocking because it meant a re-evaluation of everything they had been taught.⁴² Yet while the defeat marks a watershed in many symbolic ways, in practical terms, very little changed: the Japanese people, in the immediate post-war world, were battling with many of the same problems that had afflicted them during the war. Food and housing shortages, disease and unemployment made life very precarious. John Dower has described the many other stresses that were part of life in the early years of the Occupation: homelessness, the dispersal of families, the dislocation of returnees, the rising crime and prostitution rates and the massive gulf between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. The presence of the former enemy, in the form of well-fed, well-housed, well-paid and often patronising Occupation soldiers, provided a sharp contrast to the misery that was the lot of the majority of the Japanese population at that time.⁴³

In the early years of the Occupation, a number of American observers noted that the Japanese did not seem well disposed towards returned soldiers, and interpreted this as a sign that they well understood the degree to which they had been misled by their own wartime government. For example, Jules Henry, a social scientist writing on Japan in 1946, explained that resentment among the Japanese immediately after the war was directed not externally at the victors then occupying the country but internally at their own wartime leaders and, by extension, at former soldiers. The sudden and unexpected surrender, for example, occurring after the population had been told that this was not an option, was a factor in this discontent, he believed. For others, according to Henry, the surrender itself proved the incompetence of the leaders of the wartime government.⁴⁴ Harold G. Noble, writing for the *Saturday Evening Post* in October 1949, entitled his article ‘Japs Hate their Heroes’ and explained that the population’s feeling of betrayal also had an impact on attitudes towards repatriated soldiers. Soldiers, he wrote, had been the purest representation of *Yamato damashii*, the spirit from which, according to wartime propaganda,

Japan derived its superiority. The status of soldiers before and during the war had been elevated by their service for the nation and the Emperor and by their supposed closeness to him as their commander-in-chief. However, just as wartime propaganda was discredited, so now was the status of the soldier.⁴⁵ According to W. F. Warner, also writing in 1949, the Japanese population's attitude to soldiers was ambiguous, containing both traditional respect and admiration for them and contempt for them as part of the army that had betrayed the Japanese people.⁴⁶

There is no doubt that attitudes to soldiers were ambivalent, but negative attitudes towards them were due only partly to their connection, as part of the military machine, with a now discredited wartime government. Other much more prosaic factors explain the lack of welcome on their return. If the same soldiers had been feted and honoured on their departure for the war, they had come back to an environment in which there was very little to celebrate and in which demonstrations of patriotism were not encouraged. The Occupation forces, as we have seen from their insistence on speedily dispatching repatriates back home, felt they had to be on guard against the organisation of resistance, particularly in the months immediately after the defeat. This feeling of distrust was further demonstrated by the ban that was placed, early in the Occupation, on public memorial services for the war dead and on commemoration of the war in general.⁴⁷ The presence of the Occupation forces was thus in itself hardly conducive to celebration of the return of living soldiers.

But there were also other factors for the tensions between returned soldiers and the general population, evident from a number of sources. At the practical level the lack of food, housing and employment made the return of some three million servicemen and a further three million civilians difficult to cope with. Soldiers, even if able to find their families, only meant extra mouths to feed, and for some criminal activity became the only means of survival. An American posted to Japan as part of the American Strategic Bombing Survey, a body that recorded the effects of wartime bombing, Hisashi Kubota wrote in 1946 that banditry and armed robbery were prevalent amongst returned servicemen, who were generally neglected and despised.⁴⁸ The perceived links between returned soldiers and crime were strengthened by the public knowledge that demobilised soldiers were looting military stores and thus stealing the bread, as it were, out of the mouths of the population. For example, a police security report on public rumours and attitudes, collected under the title *Machi no koe* (Voice of the Town), reported complaints at the soldiers' appropriation of material: 'if there are enough goods lying around for them [ex-soldiers] to bring stuff back every day, some of it should be given to those who were bombed out!'⁴⁹ Another person claimed that soldiers, and particularly officers, had a really bad reputation in the neighbourhood because they were bringing food and other goods home by the truckload when others had so little.⁵⁰ Kimura Takuji shows that the soldiers' 'selfish' appropriation of goods that should, it was felt, have gone to those whose belongings had been destroyed in air-raids, contributed greatly to the feeling of distrust and dislike towards them.

A Home Ministry report of 24 September 1945 quoted an unidentified person as saying: ‘the goods that are taken do not belong to soldiers, but to the nation, and it is shameful that the soldiers are helping themselves like this’.⁵¹ As Dower puts it, ‘the Emperor’s loyal soldiers and sailors seemed to have metamorphosed overnight into symbols of the worst sort of egoism and atomisation’.⁵²

The uncontrolled appropriation of military goods occasionally had fatal consequences, especially where munitions were involved, as demonstrated by a succinct account in one of the Reports on Demobilised Soldiers and Public Peace (*Rikugun fukuin chian jōhō*), put out by the Ministry of the Army (shortly to be renamed Demobilisation Ministry No. 1 before being abolished). According to this report, dated 20 September 1945, a returned soldier blew himself up with a hand grenade outside his house, having told his family he was going fishing. The death was ruled accidental: the report stated that there was no evidence that this had been an act of suicide provoked by the shock of losing the war. There was, however, a strong possibility that the deceased had intended to use the grenade to bring in a particularly big haul of fish.⁵³ The report only conveys the bare facts of the affair, but one can hazard a guess that amidst the grieving neighbours there may have been one or two who were rather glad that the accident had taken place just prior to the complete depopulation of their local fishing grounds.

In addition, news also reached home of discipline problems within the Imperial Army. The harshness of military training had not been unknown at home, but the extent of ill feeling among troops towards their superiors and even the Emperor himself may have come as a surprise in the homeland after the defeat. Such ill feeling was strongly expressed amongst prisoners of war in Allied hands before the defeat, but after the war it was expressed much more publicly.⁵⁴ As Dower shows, a newspaper report concerning the post-war murder of an officer by those formerly under his command provoked a spate of letters to the editor from veterans, all complaining of inhumane treatment at the hands of officers and empathising with the murderous soldiers.⁵⁵ There were a number of other examples of resentment towards officers which culminated in lynchings.⁵⁶ The post-war disclosure or confirmation of the inhumane treatment of men by their former officers tainted the whole of the military, and its hierarchy, with a negative colour.

Moreover, with the return of repatriates, the lifting of wartime censorship, and, soon, with the beginning of war crimes trials, a great deal of information was reaching Japan on the true state of affairs at the front. It was a common remark in conversations amongst Japanese prisoners of war recorded by their Allied guards that no one at home could have any conception of the real situation and extreme conditions of the war.⁵⁷ This was in the main true, and as a result the information that reached the homeland was all the more shocking. As Dower has shown, news about the cruelty of the Imperial Army and the many atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers in China and in South-East Asia gave rise to questions concerning all returned soldiers, their actions during the war, and their participation in the barbarous acts which the general population was now

learning about.⁵⁸ Similarly, a directive from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers ordered the publication in all newspapers, on 16 September 1945, of an article centring on the ‘rape’ of Manila in February 1945 entitled ‘Japanese military violence in the Philippines’ (*Hishima Nihonhei no bōjō*), which reportedly had an enormous impact on the population. While in some quarters the news of great cruelty being carried out by Japanese soldiers was not fully believed, in others it provoked much disgust. In a letter published in the *Mainichi shimbun* on 7 October 1945, the mother of a soldier said: ‘Please execute the soldiers who took part in the violence over there [in the Philippines]. Even if it was my son, I could never welcome him back home’.⁵⁹ While this may have been an extreme reaction, it nevertheless underlines the great shock occasioned by the disclosure of Japanese war crimes overseas.

The tensions between returned soldiers and the public are particularly palpable in a security report that describes how, on 22 September 1945, two demobilised soldiers travelling by train were roundly cursed for taking up two extra seats (at a time when travelling was very difficult) with their backpacks: ‘how much longer will you two think you are soldiers . . . you idiots!’.⁶⁰ Returned soldiers also often commented on the cold welcome they encountered on their return, contrasting it sharply with the warmth of their farewell. One soldier in particular said that what struck him the most at the time of his return was the fact that ‘people from my region were looking at me completely differently. Whether I bought a train ticket or asked for a light for my cigarette, I was made to feel like people couldn’t care less about soldiers’.⁶¹ Similarly, a returned soldier wrote to the *Asahi shimbun* in June 1946: ‘not a single person gave me a kind word [when I returned]. Rather, they cast hostile glances my way’.⁶²

The knowledge that many demobilised soldiers were involved in looting and crime, the realisation that there had been abuses of discipline within the military, and the revelations regarding atrocities committed by members of the Imperial Army overseas thus did little to encourage an atmosphere of welcome for returning troops. It is also possible that negative attitudes towards soldiers might occasionally have been provoked by their connection with a now reviled military. Abstract moral and historical judgements on the responsibility of the military for getting Japan into its current predicament were certainly made: rumours picked up on the street by the police provide evidence that many people were pointing the finger at the wartime government and placing the blame for their poverty there.⁶³ Veterans also remember bitterly that the former ‘heroes of the nation’, the suicide pilots (Tokkōtai or Kamikaze), were often called, after the war, ‘special attack degenerates’ or ‘Kamikaze fanatics’,⁶⁴ terms strongly implying that the war and their particular part in it had been irrational.

It is important to note, however, that if soldiers were sometimes held in contempt immediately after the war, these negative attitudes towards soldiers fostered during the early years of the Occupation may have been outlasted by earlier pre-war and wartime attitudes. Wartime attitudes towards prisoners of war provide a case in point. Among the prisoners of war held by Allied troops, for example, seventy-six per cent expected death or some form of

punishment if they returned to Japan after the war.⁶⁵ According to a wartime American interpreter, a common joke circulating amongst prisoners of war before their repatriation went like this:

If a POW [prisoner of war] lived in Tokyo [before the war], he would make his way immediately upon landing to the point in the home islands furthest from Tokyo. In a year he might possibly make a quick trip to Tokyo. In another six months, if there was reason for him to go to Tokyo, he might just possibly go. Perhaps in the course of this business trip, he might drive through his home neighbourhood in a taxi with dark glasses on. If nothing happened he might go through a little slower on the streetcar. Finally, he might hurriedly go by his old home on a bicycle, then on foot. After inquiring around as to the general conditions at home at the corner tobacconist, he might if reports had been favourable, present himself at the door.⁶⁶

The prisoner of war in this joke begins his post-war life well away from his old neighbourhood, obviously not expecting a welcome. His visits there are initially incognito, and he needs to test the waters before each new, and more public, step.

The prisoner of war's expectations, no doubt somewhat exaggerated for the sake of the joke, nevertheless had their basis in many years of pre-war and wartime culture. As we saw in the first chapter, the population shared this culture to a high degree. Otis Cary, a member of the Allied Strategic Bombing Survey, wrote in late 1945 that 'there is little feeling against prisoners of war in Japan', but qualified this by noting that such attitudes might well change once the majority of surrendered soldiers came home.⁶⁷ Certainly, the families of prisoners of war were happy to see their relatives back safe and sound, except perhaps in some cases where the soldier's wife, thinking herself a widow, had remarried; but this is not to say that the welcome was extended as warmly outside the immediate family circle. Asada Teruhiko, for example, had been a prisoner of war at Cowra in New South Wales, a camp infamous for the ill-fated break-out attempt, on 4 August 1944, of 400 out of 2,223 Japanese inmates, in which 234 prisoners died and 108 were wounded. Asada reveals in his memoirs that although his family were overjoyed to have him back (a welcome which came to him as something of a surprise and obviously a great relief), they decided after some discussion to tell the neighbours that he had been hiding in New Guinea, suggesting it was less shameful to have been a straggler than a prisoner of war. Asada adds that 'although there were those who regarded the war dead as having been fools, nevertheless ... [there] lingered a certain amount of contempt for prisoners of war'.⁶⁸ Another former prisoner of war remembered in 1972 that within the ranks of the Association of Guam Veterans, of which he was part, there had been a sharp distinction, lasting well into the 1960s, between those who had surrendered before and those who had surrendered after the end of the battles on Guam.⁶⁹

Wartime attitudes persisted well into the post-war period, and this was not limited to prisoners of war: as subsequent chapters will show, reactions to the

return of stragglers reveal the existence of such continuities into the mid-1970s. The straggler Onoda, for example, who requested surrender orders from his former superior before he agreed to give himself up on Lubang in 1974, was compared favourably on his return with another straggler, Yokoi, who was found on Guam in 1972 having, on his own admission, failed to die in battle, and run away. This suggests that the disrespectful attitudes towards soldiers that were prevalent following the defeat had not completely supplanted older wartime attitudes.

As has been shown above, attitudes to returned troops in the wake of defeat were ambivalent for a number of reasons. The deliberate attempts by the Allied Occupation forces to ‘spiritually demobilise’ the population certainly also played a part. Although the success of these attempts seems to have been patchy, it is undeniable that Japanese memories of the war have been shaped to a considerable degree by the Occupation’s policies, whether these aimed at controlling war remembrance or encompassed wider attempts to influence the Japanese polity as a whole. All the stragglers, ultimately, represented a war from which the Occupation had consciously attempted to separate Japan and its population.

The Allied Occupation had as its brief both to democratise and to demilitarise Japan, in order to eradicate, in the country’s government and in its population, those tendencies that had led it to expand aggressively in Asia and attack the United States by bombing Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Both democratisation and demilitarisation had obvious pragmatic aspects, such as the dismantling of munitions factories; the planned dissolution (later substantially reversed) of the industrial concerns known as *zaibatsu*, alleged to have provided the financial backing for the war effort; and governmental and social reforms such as constitutional, civil rights, election and land reforms. But there were also a number of policies directed more specifically at how the war would be talked about, interpreted and remembered. These policies included a new wave of censorship, education in democracy through schools, radio programmes and other means of public information, and the manipulation of war memorials, monuments and ceremonies of commemoration. In less directed ways, the Allied Occupation also affected war remembrance by its manipulation of the Emperor’s post-war public image.

Efforts to educate the population on the significance of the war, on its origins and its supporters, were many and varied. They included the remodelling of textbooks, for example, an urgent task thwarted by a paper shortage and production problems. The inability to supply schools with new textbooks meant that the old ones were used, with the students themselves at times blacking out those passages smacking of militarism or ultra-nationalism.⁷⁰ The purge from office of those who had been vociferous in their support for the war effort further underlined the fact that new paradigms and new people were now in place. The recent past was also denigrated in regular radio shows such as *Now It Can Be Told*, which deconstructed wartime propaganda.⁷¹ Censorship targeted criticism of the Allies, of their policies, and of the Occupation’s General Headquarters (GHQ), but it also, needless to say, forbade any positive assessment of the

pre-war or wartime periods. The list of statements that could not be published concerning Japan extended from those relating to the pre-war and wartime years ('any propaganda which directly or indirectly defends Japan's conduct of and in the War') to current concerns.⁷² Newspapers were also strongly advised to publish articles describing Japanese war crimes such as the one on the rape of Manila mentioned earlier.

While these policies may have 'changed the minds' of some Japanese people, what they did best was to demonstrate which discourses could now be aired in public. Those who had opposed the war (even secretly) were now allowed, or rather encouraged, to vent their opinions in public, while those who resented the Occupation and regretted the defeat were well advised to keep their opinions to themselves. If these policies did not perhaps affect the *mentalité* of the Japanese people as much as GHQ might have hoped, they certainly showed that a positive or even not a completely negative interpretation of the wartime leadership and of Japan's aggression was 'wrong' and not to be articulated openly.

The trials of those accused of A-class crimes (crimes against peace and humanity) in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials further emphasised the point that there was now a right, and a wrong, way of interpreting the past. That the premises of the trials were and remain problematic is now generally well accepted, and will not be discussed here.⁷³ What is important for our purposes is that the case for the prosecution rested on the assumption that a small number of militarists had conspired to wage war since the Manchurian Incident of 1931. The prosecution case thus exonerated both the population and the Emperor, portraying them as the misguided and passive victims of events engineered from above by a small clique, most of whom were listening to the proceedings from the dock.⁷⁴ According to Dower, most of the defendants declined to challenge the major premise of the trial because it protected the Emperor.⁷⁵ Alone, former wartime prime minister Tōjō Hideki rejected the prosecution's arguments. He argued that Japan's war of expansion had been not the result of an irrational burst of militarism directed by ultra-nationalist fanatics within the government but rather a war of self-defence undertaken in response especially to embargoes threatening Japan's national interests and economic survival. He also argued that the war had been undertaken in accordance with international treaties.⁷⁶ At the beginning of the trial public opinion was against Tōjō, partly because of widespread contempt for his failed suicide attempt at the time of his arrest. Towards 1948 and the end of the trials, however, as Yoshida Yutaka has shown, the Tōjō interpretation of history regained some validity in the popular mind and his 'popularity rating' went up considerably.⁷⁷ But ultimately the case for the prosecution reinforced what the reforms of education, the purge and censorship policies had already done: it showcased an acceptable interpretation of the past.

Over time two aspects of the trials' interpretation of history would come to have a particular significance in the discourses surrounding the stragglers and their return. First, the view that the population had been the unwitting victims of a particular set of individuals termed 'militarists' or, rather that they had

unthinkingly let themselves be led into the war, would by the 1970s provide a framework within which the return of the straggler could be examined. According to that interpretation, the straggler was as much a victim as the rest of the population and served as a reminder of the need for constant self-examination on the part of the Japanese people, not as willing participants in their country's aggression but as the victims of militarists. Second, the exemption from the War Crimes Trials of the Emperor, in whose name the war had been conducted and who had served as its symbolic leader, would contribute in no small degree to the ambivalent public memories of the war in the post-war years.

When the stragglers came back, the same Emperor in whose name they had been sent to the front – and in whose name they had fought, and then hidden – was still on the throne, albeit often uncomfortably.⁷⁸ And his apparent refusal to take more than a cursory interest in their return, dictated though this was by complex diplomatic considerations (as we will see in a later chapter), was conspicuous and required explanation. GHQ's decision to protect the Emperor from indictment thus is another example of the capacity of Occupation policy to affect the commemoration of the war long after the Occupation itself had ended.

Unquestionably, however, it is in the policies directed at the commemoration of fallen soldiers that the Occupation left its most complex legacy for war remembrance. GHQ's Civil Information and Education Section, the unit responsible for religion and monuments amongst other things, was undoubtedly aware that the most obvious place to start, when attempting to shape memories of the war in any country and at any time, is with monuments and memorials to past wars and to fallen soldiers and heroes.⁷⁹ In Japan, the central and best-known such monument was the Shintō shrine that had, since 1869, celebrated all soldiers who had died in the service of the nation and which was given its current name, Yasukuni, in 1879.⁸⁰ Under the Allied Occupation this shrine underwent legal changes that would have far-reaching consequences. For our purposes it is particularly important to consider the commemoration of the war through Yasukuni and other monuments because returning stragglers were often likened to 'living spirits of the war dead' (*ikite ita eirei*), a term implicitly linking them with the dead enshrined at Yasukuni.

Officials of the Civil Information and Education Section regarded all war monuments, and the Yasukuni Shrine especially, as symbols that 'in the past had been subverted by militarists and ultranationalists to provide religious sanction for the program of national aggrandizement'.⁸¹ It thus seemed necessary, particularly in the early years of the Occupation period, to sever the link between the state and religions and prevent any governmental participation in memorial services connected with the war dead. A directive also instructed that such services could not take place in state-owned institutions, which ruled out most buildings capable of accommodating a crowd, including schools and town halls. This rule, needless to say, also assumed the privatisation of memorial shrines, as sponsorship by the state would lend them a national significance, and thus potentially allow the state to make use of them in propaganda. GHQ aimed to prevent the possible use of these monuments to mobilize the population in the

future. That the Yasukuni Shrine had been used for exactly that purpose was clear from its history. Indeed, together with the museum attached to it in 1882, Yasukuni had become a central part of the dissemination of information and propaganda about the military, and of the promotion of national loyalty, since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.⁸²

Lingering American distrust of the Japanese population goes some way to explain the harshness of GHQ policies towards the commemoration of soldiers in the first two years of the Occupation. In June 1946, William Bunce, head of the Civil Information and Education Section, repeated and enforced directives on the complete absence of the state in rituals of commemoration of fallen soldiers. Bunce did so because of his increasing conviction that there existed ‘organised pressure in favour of paying special honours to the war dead, which suggested that certain Japanese were still trying to promote the idea that the military class had made a special contribution to Japan’s welfare’.⁸³

The problem was further compounded by the fact that the shrines commemorating the war dead were of a religious nature. Just as GHQ assumed, rightly, that the Japanese wartime state had subverted the commemoration of dead soldiers in order to mobilise the population for wartime aims, so it recognised that Shintō had been employed by the state to justify its policy of expansion, particularly in legitimising the wartime discourses of national superiority. GHQ sought therefore to separate state and religion through the so-called ‘Shintō Directive’ of 15 December 1945 which prohibited the state funding of religion. According to William P. Woodard, most of the shrines unrelated to war commemoration received the titles of the state-owned land on which they stood immediately after the directive. The shrines commemorating the war dead, however, were of a different ilk; and GHQ’s Civil Information and Education Section deliberated for some time on whether they should be completely eliminated. Eventually the Section came to the decision that such shrines were not inherently militaristic and could thus be preserved as long as they were private, as opposed to state-owned, institutions.⁸⁴

GHQ did not deny that the commemoration of the war dead was a legitimate function of the state, and once it was reassured that pre-war and wartime ideological tendencies would not flare up again, the ban on official participation in commemorative services for the war dead was lifted. On 2 May 1952, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Security Forces in Japan General Matthew Ridgeway himself attended a state-sponsored funeral service for the war dead at which the Emperor was also present.⁸⁵ Yet such commemoration was not permitted any religious overtones. The war dead, previously celebrated both by the state and within a religious context, were now to be remembered either in private religious services or government-sponsored – and completely secular – ceremonies. And so Yasukuni, the nation’s symbol and resting place of those killed in war for more than half a century, lost its meaning. The outrage that has greeted Japanese government leaders’ plans to visit Yasukuni in an official capacity during the past fifty years is testimony to the strength of this legacy of the Occupation forces.⁸⁶ This is not to say that GHQ operated in a vacuum or that no

sections of the population were actively involved in the devising of plans for war commemoration: by 1952, for example, it was the Religions League of Japan – a group that included some Christian organisations – which was most vocal in stressing that there should be no religious overtones to state funerals in keeping with the new constitution.⁸⁷ And in the decades that followed, protest against the reversion of Yasukuni to state control, for instance, came more from within Japan itself than from neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the initial insistence on reform laid down by GHQ incubated this protest and nursed it through its infancy.

The alternative, secular war memorial, erected in Tokyo at Chidorigafuchi on 28 March 1959, has failed to replace Yasukuni as a national symbol for a number of reasons. It was erected partly in response to the demands of the Association of Bereaved Families, whose strong rural membership has made it politically significant for the Liberal Democratic Party, in power for most of the period considered in this book. The Association objected to the private status of Yasukuni because this apparently relieved the state of its duty to commemorate those who had fallen in the nation's defence. In addition, the Chidorigafuchi memorial, modelled on a Western type of 'tomb of the unknown soldier', is meant to provide a symbolic resting place for the unknown victims of the war, including the unidentified victims of air-raids.⁸⁸ The role of Chidorigafuchi, intended as a last resting place for the 'nameless', thus contrasts with that of the Yasukuni Shrine, which lists the name of every Japanese soldier who lost his life in wartime. For many, therefore, the memorial at Chidorigafuchi has failed to replace Yasukuni as the monument that commemorates Japan's war dead.⁸⁹

The complexities surrounding the commemoration of war dead in post-war Japan are important as a basis for understanding the stragglers' return for several reasons. Until their return the stragglers were thought to have died at the front, as explained in the first part of this chapter. They had, until their discovery, been considered as 'fallen soldiers', a group whose commemoration has been problematic throughout most of Japan's post-war history. Their sudden reappearance earned some of them the label of 'living war dead': fallen soldiers who had unexpectedly turned up alive. The ambivalence expressed at the time of their return mirrors the difficulties surrounding the commemoration of the war dead in general. Just as the celebration of soldiers in the traditional form (in the Yasukuni Shrine, and by name) was made problematic by GHQ's fear that it would somehow foster renewed militarism, so the straggler, as we will see, could not be made into a hero, in many people's minds, because that would imply that the horror of the war had been forgotten. Interestingly, however, the discourses that surrounded the stragglers on their return also implied that to celebrate these individuals would be disrespectful to the war dead. According to this view, the silence surrounding the war dead had thus to extend to the stragglers.

We have examined here the immediate post-war years and their importance for the reception of stragglers from three angles. First, the repatriation process allowed a number of stragglers to fall through the net of demobilisation and be wrongly listed among the war dead. Second, returned soldiers were greeted

ambivalently during the years of the Occupation. The difficult conditions of the period and the Occupation propaganda on the Japanese Army fostered a great deal of contempt for returned soldiers, but this was mixed with older, more positive attitudes towards the military. Finally, I have outlined those aspects of the Occupation's policies that have had the greatest impact on the processes of war remembrance and commemoration, particularly the ways in which they would come to affect stragglers. In the next chapter we will consider how these attitudes to soldiers and to war shaped the reception of the earliest stragglers to return.

3 ‘Five years on mice and potatoes’

Exotic stragglers, 1950–1952

In the final two years of the Occupation, Japan witnessed the return of a number of former soldiers who had spent the years since the defeat in hiding and apparently unaware of the end of the war. In the midst of continuing repatriations of the more conventional kind, these were the first soldiers to be consciously defined as ‘different’ from other returnees. But while the stragglers’ return heightened the realisation that the number of missing was still enormous, these individuals themselves did not elicit pity so much as curiosity. They were often portrayed as exotic or strange, and at times as hardly human. The country appeared more concerned with repatriating the remains of the war dead, which suggests that ‘fallen soldiers’ and living, repatriated ones were viewed somewhat differently. The stragglers – mostly called *moto-Nihonhei* ('former Japanese soldiers') but sometimes also *haizanhei* ('defeated soldiers') – were also differentiated from repatriates, both military and civilian, from the Chinese mainland (*hikiagesha*) and the USSR. It was acknowledged that the *hikiagesha*'s difficulties on returning home were due not to their own reluctance to accept that war was over but to forces over which they had no control, such as the civil war in China, or Soviet unwillingness to let Japanese prisoners of war be repatriated. With the pervasive presence in the national consciousness of repatriation issues, the stragglers merely stood out as curiosities.

The early 1950s, while heralding a degree of normalisation and stabilisation in domestic terms, was also a period of growing awareness that the war had left a lot of people unaccounted for. The Occupation was slowly relaxing its policies on the commemoration of war dead, but this helped neither the families of the missing, nor those who had only the government's word – as opposed to tangible proof in the form of remains – that their relatives had died. As we saw in the last chapter, it had already been made sufficiently clear, with the repatriation of former Japanese prisoners of war previously assumed dead, that the government's word in that regard was unreliable. This fact would be underlined every time a straggler came back. By the end of the 1940s the repatriation process had slowed down considerably, and the empty space left by the missing and the dead was more evident.

Popular movements lobbying the authorities both to investigate the fate of the missing and provide their families with financial assistance were publicised and

received increasing support. On 23 July 1951 a National Peace Rally of the Families of the Missing (Kōwa ni uttaeru zenkoku rusu kazoku taikai) was held in Kanda, Tokyo. Speakers demanded that the government explain the processes by which the remains of war dead were located and repatriated and clarify the arrangements for giving pensions or compensation to bereaved families.¹ The plight of war widows, many of whom were having to raise their bereaved children in dire poverty, was the subject of a lengthy piece entitled ‘Raising our child ...’ in the *Sandee mainichi* of February 1952.² The beginning of that year also saw the regular publication of articles on the discovery of remains of the war dead. On 31 January 1952, for example, the *Asahi Shimbun* had on its front page a sizeable photograph of two white skulls in the grassy entrance of a cave in Iwo Jima.³ On 11 February it published an item on the discovery of bones and other remains of war dead at Corregidor in the Philippines.⁴ By the end of the year it would cover, over several days and in great detail, the preparations for the first of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare’s ‘bone-collecting missions’.⁵

There was also increasing concern about the delays that hampered the return of repatriates from the mainland and the conditions in which Japanese war criminals were serving their sentences in Singapore, Manus Island in the Bismarck Sea, Hong Kong or the Philippines. Although the initial flood of repatriates had slowed to a comparative trickle, thousands were still waiting to be taken home from China, the Soviet Union and North Korea. In 1950, 7,500 Japanese came back from areas under Soviet control, and more than 500 from China, Taiwan and Korea. Yet in 1951 and 1952 fewer than ten were repatriated from the USSR and fewer than 300 from China. The Korean War of 1950–1952 also made repatriation from Manchuria and Korea impossible. Moreover, the USSR was neither giving consistent information on the numbers of Japanese citizens still under its control nor cooperating with the Red Cross to allow repatriates to board the ships that came for them.⁶ By 1953, however, repatriations had resumed, with 26,000 Japanese returning from China and 800 from the Soviet Union. Although the movements to have these repatriations speeded up were particularly conspicuous in the mid-1950s, it must be noted that they had been born in the last two years of the Occupation period.

Similarly, movements to have Japanese war criminals repatriated from their prisons in South-East Asia and the Pacific were gathering strength even in the last few months of the Occupation. By February 1952 investigations into the matter by the Diet’s Committee on Judicial Affairs were being widely publicised. The testimony of returned prisoners to this Committee included descriptions of how the 210 men still on Manus were being made to do hard labour, suffered from a lack of food and wished to continue their sentences in Japan.⁷ Similarly, in March 1952 Japanese readers were reassured that the government of the Philippines was favourably disposed towards Japanese wishes to have their prisoners repatriated.⁸ By the end of that month a Japanese photographer was even allowed to take a single photograph of the prisoners from his country housed at New Pilipit Prison in Mutinglupa, Manila, a picture immediately reproduced for the population in one of Japan’s biggest daily newspapers.⁹

The stragglers of the early 1950s, then, came back and contributed to an environment in which the impact of the war was still clearly felt, especially by the families of those who were missing. By now concerns about the repatriation of civilians, war criminals and the bringing home of soldiers' remains were being openly shared.

However, the stragglers themselves received only minimal media attention during this period. They were never seen as important enough to feature on the front pages of newspapers but rather were mentioned as curiosities, generally in very small articles in the back pages among news of crimes, accidents and spectacular suicides. Even though some of them later recalled returning to welcoming crowds of reporters and well-wishers, the degree of interest displayed in these welcomes did not translate into sustained press coverage.¹⁰ Only rarely did the stragglers remain in the news for more than a few days. They warranted reportage in a weekly magazine in only one case throughout this period. Attention was drawn mainly to their exotic diet in exile, their exotic lifestyle or their inability to cope with 'Japan in the present'. Thus their return in the early 1950s did not provide a platform for reflective discussion of the war. That they were remnants of the war was mentioned, but this was not construed as significant enough to demand discussion.

The earliest mention of stragglers in the written media dates from 14 February 1950. On that day the *Mainichi shimbun* reported the return the previous day of eight soldiers, on board a British ship, to the port of Nagoya. These were apparently the surviving members of a battalion that had been decimated by disease and enemy attacks during a retreat from Finshhaven to Madang in New Guinea. In 1944, some hundred kilometres out of Madang, in a mountainous, isolated region, eight hungry and exhausted soldiers had been offered shelter by a tribal village chief after several months of bare survival in the jungle. They lived in the village until September 1949, when local police, informed of their existence by one of the villagers, arrested them. A month later they were taken to the prison for Japanese war criminals on Manus Island and sent back to Japan via Brisbane and Hong Kong together with a group of war prisoners freed from Manus at the end of their sentence.¹¹

The report on these returnees was contained in a relatively small article at the back of the *Mainichi* and in none of the other major newspapers. The most striking aspect of the *Mainichi* article is that it clearly defined the soldiers as exotic and foreign. Accompanied by a photograph of the smiling returnees clad in khaki uniforms donated by the Red Cross (or so we are told in the caption), the piece was framed by headlines that drew more attention to the stragglers' sensational lifestyle than to the fact that they had been missing soldiers: 'Return from a Lonely Jungle Island', 'Five Years on Mice and Potatoes: Tarzan Lifestyle in New Guinea'.¹² Their experience was given a definite foreign quality: the English loanword 'jungle' (*janguru*) was used instead of the Japanese word *mitsurin*, and there is hardly any need to point out the exoticism suggested by the name Tarzan. Indeed, the use of that image implies that the soldiers were hardly Japanese at all. The parallels between the story of Tarzan

and the soldiers' experience were, needless to say, extremely tenuous: these men had been brought up in Japan, not by apes in the jungle. The attention drawn to a bizarre diet of 'mice and potatoes' underlined the exotic, sensational aspect of their experience even further.

The article itself explored these themes, concentrating more than anything on the soldiers' lifestyle in the jungle. Readers were told that the stragglers had built huts out of bamboo and banana and coconut-palm leaves, and that their clothing had consisted of a 'Tarzan-like loincloth'. Their diet of pineapple, sweet potatoes, bananas and fieldmice was also examined in detail, with an emphasis placed on the difficulties arising from a lack of salt, which was of course a vital dietary need in a tropical climate. Both the headlines and the content of the article, then, focused on the stragglers not as fellow citizens, soldiers or the missing sons or husbands of bereaved families, but as mice-eating, half-wild creatures akin to an exotic hero.

This is not to say that the article completely ignored the fact that the eight stragglers were seemingly the sole survivors of an entire detachment and that most of their comrades had died either from malnutrition or malaria. But these were not the aspects of the stragglers' identity that were chosen to frame and highlight the report, nor did the article contain any reflection on the mindset that had led the soldiers to remain in hiding for so long. One of the stragglers was reported to have said: 'it's like a dream. I never thought we'd be able to return', but the implications of this statement were not explored.¹³ Neither did the writer discuss the reactions of the men's families, who were suddenly reunited, five years after the end of the war, with someone they had thought dead. The unexpected return of these individuals might well have contributed to increasing concerns regarding the accuracy of the government's tally of fallen soldiers. Nevertheless, the fact that these soldiers represented an example of the difficulties of tracing those missing in the war was not emphasised at the time of their return. The attention paid to stragglers was based on their 'foreignness' and their exotic appeal rather than on the ways in which their delayed repatriation was representative of a problem confronting a significant part of the population.

This was certainly also the case when another group of them returned in July 1951. They were repatriated, after some difficulty, from Anatahan, a small island roughly fifty kilometres north of Saipan in the Northern Marianas. In subsequent years they achieved a degree of notoriety as their story formed the basis of novels, plays and a 1954 film directed by the famous German director Josef von Sternberg. The fascination exerted by this group even at the time of their return is indicated by the much greater amount of space devoted to Anatahan in the written media compared with the single article dealing with the eight 'mice-eating Tarzans' described above. But if the amount of interest elicited by the two groups of stragglers was quite disparate, the premise on which this interest rested was the same: stragglers were exotic and different. If, in the case of the New Guinea stragglers, it was their 'Tarzan'-like features that made them interesting, in the case of Anatahan it was the description of the island as a hotbed of passion and murder. This was due to the presence amongst the sailors initially stranded

on Anatahan of one woman, Hika Kazuko. Of the eleven men who had died on the island before the others were repatriated, four had, at one time or another, been her ‘husband’. Wonderment at these stragglers’ unusual marital arrangements and speculation regarding the death of a third of the stragglers almost completely eclipsed references to the war itself in the reporting on the Anatahan stragglers.

In Japan, attention was first drawn to this group in March 1950 when Hika was plucked off the island and repatriated back to her native Okinawa. Hika had lived on Anatahan for six years, having moved there with her first husband, who worked for a copra-producing company, in 1944. Other inhabitants of the ten-square-mile island were her husband’s boss and some forty-five indigenous people. When the Allies’ invasion of the region began in June 1944, Hika’s husband went to fetch his sister from a nearby island. He did not return – most probably because the fighting made travel impossible.¹⁴ Shortly after his departure a Japanese Navy ship, on the way to Truk, sank after an Allied attack close to Anatahan and thirty survivors managed to reach the island. At the end of the war American authorities, aware of the stragglers’ presence but finding it impossible to convince them that the war was over, moved the indigenous population to Saipan. The stranded sailors and the two civilians, Hika and her husband’s boss, thus became the entire population of Anatahan. They refused to believe information regarding the war’s end. Over the following six years the American forces on nearby Saipan made sporadic attempts to get them off the island, but they hid every time an American ship approached. They stayed on the island until 1951.

Hika was the first to take advantage of one of the American rescue attempts. While her fellow stragglers were hiding, Hika went out on to the beach and ‘surrendered’ to the Americans. It was with her return, presumably, that the Japanese government and stragglers’ families first became aware of their identities. They had all been listed as killed in action, but, as we saw in a previous chapter, this was not unusual. The families of some of the stragglers attempted without success to persuade the government to set up a rescue operation. On 15 May 1951 the *Mainichi* described their efforts and lack of results, and in a supplementary article eleven days later discussed the need to send a Japanese ship to the rescue bringing letters from the stragglers’ families. According to the *Mainichi*, American attempts would be doomed to failure as an American vessel would be seen as representing the enemy: the stragglers’ trust had to be gained. The *Mainichi*’s speculations were, however, proved wrong as on 23 June the entire group surrendered to an American detachment from Saipan. The stragglers reached Japan on 7 July 1951, and after a debriefing from the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare were sent home.¹⁵

Once the stragglers had returned, any reference to why it had been so difficult to get them to surrender disappeared and references to the war itself were similarly almost non-existent. It was the presence among the group of one woman and the resulting somewhat unusual marital arrangements that came to dominate the reportage on their return. Moreover, the fact that three of Hika’s

five ‘husbands’ had died on Anatahan fuelled endless speculations about the possibility that the remote island was a hotbed of *crimes passionnels*. The headlines framing an interview with Hika reveal, again, the peripheral importance of the war in the story. ‘I had five husbands’; ‘the secrets of Anatahan as told by Ms Hika’; ‘six mysterious deaths one after the other’; ‘superior’s order designated partner’.¹⁶

According to Hika, once her original husband had left she moved in with her husband’s boss, who had remained on the island. On his death she had moved in with another, who also died. She had another two husbands after that: one who died and another whom she left behind when she was rescued. Hika dismissed the suggestion that people had been murdered. She said that of the eleven who had died on the island one had died from illness, four had been washed off rocks while fishing and six had just disappeared. She also maintained that she had wanted to live by herself but that she had been ordered to choose a husband because the group’s leader had worried about her safety as a single woman.¹⁷

The fact that she was unwilling to join in the speculation regarding the death of each of her partners did nothing to stop it; on the contrary, it redoubled after it became apparent that a gun had been found in a crashed B-29 aeroplane on the island. This gun had become the contested possession of two of the stragglers (while the parachutes found in the plane provided her with the fabric to make a dress, readers were also told). However, the rumour that at least some of the deaths had been the result of crimes of passion was strongly denied by a number of other returning stragglers, who maintained that some of their companions had died falling from coconut trees and others of illness. Nobody, they insisted, had died because of Hika.¹⁸

In any case, the mystery allowed some of the other Anatahan stragglers to sell their stories as the ‘true’ account of life on the island. One of the resulting books appeared on the bestseller list early in 1952. Although it purports to establish the ‘true facts’ about life on Anatahan, its rather vehement denial that the tensions which beset the group might have resulted in murder manages to convey to the reader exactly the contrary, and reinforces the image of the island as a place of dark, mysterious secrets. It was translated and published in English in 1954, which indicates the degree of interest in the stragglers beyond Japan even at that early point in time.¹⁹ Its popularity in Japan underlines the appeal of the exotic in the portrayal of the stragglers. As with the New Guinea stragglers the year before, there was a great deal of interest in what might be called the ‘Robinson Crusoe’ aspects of the Anatahan stragglers’ lives, namely what they ate, where they lived and what they wore. There was also praise for their ingenuity in producing coconut alcohol and a samisen (a Japanese stringed instrument) around which they apparently passed nights singing and reminiscing about their home towns.²⁰

While the exoticism of the Anatahan stragglers overrode almost any other aspect of their identity in media reports, they nevertheless undoubtedly represented the large number of ‘missing’ created by the war. Though they did not provoke discussion of the war as such, they did provoke at least minimal

consideration of the difficulties faced by bereaved families in attempting to determine the fate of their missing relatives. This was particularly the case before the Anatahan repatriation had been successfully completed, in the few months before the survivors' surrender, when, with Hika's help, their whereabouts and identities had been established and the stragglers' families were lobbying the government to find a way of getting them off the island and back to Japan. This was also the only time in which the stragglers were presented as people to be pitied: as an article that appeared before their rescue put it, the Anatahan stragglers were living the life of 'insects' on their remote island.²¹ After their repatriation, the *Asahi* described for its readers the 'tragedy' (*higeki*) faced by at least five of the men, who found out on their return that their wives had remarried. The Anatahan stragglers' experience was thus linked, though not explicitly, with that of other returned soldiers and their families.²²

A few weeks later, just as Anatahan was disappearing from the news, another group was apprehended, this time on Guam. As noted earlier, Guam had seen some of the fiercest, most destructive battles in the Pacific and was one of the islands where Japanese troops, believing there was no possibility of surrender, had fought the Americans in desperate, suicidal last stands. There were few prisoners of war and even fewer other survivors. Those who did survive went into hiding. It should not be surprising to learn, therefore, that this place, with its mountainous and densely forested interior, sheltered a number of stragglers – soldiers cut off from other troops in the debacle for the Japanese side, and sometimes the sole survivors of entire battalions. Although the island is by no means vast, the stragglers who emerged from Guam over some twenty-eight years after the war (the last repatriation took place in 1972) were often unaware of the fact that they had shared their hiding place with a number of other soldiers in similar situations.

On 26 September 1951, the American Army, stationed on Guam since the war, caught five Japanese soldiers on the island; another three fled but were captured over the following two days. On 29 September the *Asahi*, quoting an Associated Press report, announced that the last two Japanese there must have surrendered, in a statement that was to be proved wrong at least twice in the years that followed and was doubted even at the time by some members of the American forces on Guam.²³ The Bureau of Repatriate Welfare reported on 9 October that the eight returnees had arrived at Haneda Airport that morning aboard an American military plane. The same press release also announced that the returnees – four soldiers and four civilians attached to the military – would be sent home immediately after being debriefed by the Bureau's Yokohama office.²⁴

The focus of public attention in this case remained, as with earlier stragglers, on the way in which these individuals had kept themselves alive and on their appearance on their return. The *Asahi*, for example, reported that the Guam stragglers had originally survived mostly on breadfruit, the fish they caught at night when they emerged from their hiding place, and the occasional lizard; later, on bread and tinned food scavenged from the garbage dumps of the American Army. Both the *Mainichi* and the *Asahi* commented on how smart the

returnees looked in their borrowed American uniforms, with their tanned faces and newly cut hair. The newspaper remarked somewhat wistfully that because Guam was not only inhabited, but consisted almost entirely of an American Army base, it was not possible for these people to get drunk on alcohol produced from coconuts, unlike the Anatahan stragglers, who had not shared their island with American soldiers and had therefore been able to behave more freely.²⁵ Thus the precariousness of the stragglers' existence on Guam – plagued as they were by illness, hunger and above all, fear – became overshadowed in press reports by a somewhat romantic view of their Pacific island life – a life which, under slightly different circumstances, might perhaps have consisted mainly of carefree drunkenness. Once again, those stragglers who returned in the first two years of the 1950s were presented as exotic creatures rather than left-over soldiers.

This tendency to underscore what was different about the stragglers rather than what they had in common with the rest of the Japanese population is particularly striking in the case of those on Lubang, a small island west of Manila in the Philippines. The Bureau of Repatriate Welfare was first informed of the existence and identity of stragglers there when one of them separated from his comrades and sought help in a nearby village. This was Akatsu Shūichi, repatriated on 28 March 1951 together with war criminals released from New Pilipit Prison in Manila. Akatsu told the Bureau that three other stragglers, Kozuka Kinshichi, Onoda Hirō and Shimada Shōichi, were still on Lubang and convinced that the war was still going on.

The island of Lubang figures prominently in this book because it was the site of a number of dramatic events relating to stragglers. One of Akatsu's former companions, Shimada Shōichi, was shot by Lubang policemen in 1954 and a second, Kozuka Kinshichi, in 1972. Then, in 1974, the most celebrated straggler of all, Onoda Hirō, was repatriated, though not without difficulty. The legendary status achieved by Onoda, moreover, is certainly due in part to the fact he and his comrades had been the subjects of ongoing searches from 1952 onwards. Thus Lubang figured in the Japanese press for long periods, or at least returned at irregular intervals.

The existence of stragglers on Lubang was by no means unknown to the local population. In the thirty-year period between the end of the war and Onoda's surrender, the people of Lubang had their food and belongings stolen, their fields burnt and their cattle killed by the stragglers. As many as thirty Lubang inhabitants lost their lives in encounters with them. Indeed, Akatsu's initial information regarding the existence of stragglers there was confirmed rather dramatically on 12 January 1952 when a detachment of Filipino police, sent to Lubang to investigate a murder attributed to stragglers, managed to locate and corner Kozuka, Onoda and Shimada. This well-armed group resisted arrest, which resulted in a shoot-out that lasted, according to the *Mainichi*, for over an hour and led to the death of one Filipino policeman. Apparently unhurt, the stragglers managed to flee into the jungle. The police commented on the quality of the men's guns and munitions: these particular individuals seemed to be in good shape, said one policeman who compared them with others he had

encountered on the island of Mindoro.²⁶ The Lubang shoot-out marked the beginning of a relatively extensive coverage of the island in the Japanese press which contrasted with the generally cursory treatment of other stragglers. This was one of the few occasions in the early 1950s when reporting on the stragglers in the print media was sustained, and extended to a number of lengthy articles supplemented by photographs. Media interest in the men waned only as the searches dragged on without result, ceasing entirely a month after the shoot-out, once the Filipino police expressed the conviction that the fugitives had somehow crossed from Lubang to Mindoro Island and that the former island was now straggler-free.²⁷

Because it is more extensive, the material on Lubang is particularly informative concerning the portrayal of stragglers. There are many reasons why the Lubang individuals proved so fascinating, not least the fact that their existence came to light in a dramatic shoot-out after which they vanished, seemingly into thin air. Although Lubang is by no means large, not a trace of the men could be found. This contributed a great deal of suspense to the story: the stragglers became the focus of a manhunt. The fact that their identities were known, thanks to Akatsu's information, provided the media with further material, including old photographs of Onoda, Shimada and Kozuka. Yet, as we shall see, this fact did nothing to lend the Lubang stragglers definite personalities as far as the media were concerned. Media attention was also possibly increased by the efforts of the Lubang Society, a group of veterans who had been rounded up in a mop-up operation in 1946 and repatriated. One of the society's aims, according to its president Akao Kōichirō, was to find and repatriate other stragglers.²⁸ In the end the Lubang men's elusiveness prompted a private and well-publicised rescue attempt by a former colonel, Jimbō Nobuhiko, whose daredevil feats over the island were documented by an accompanying special reporter dispatched by the *Mainichi*. The resulting articles provide particularly interesting information concerning perceptions of the stragglers, especially issues surrounding those of their national identity.

The portrayal of the Lubang men was at times tainted with a negativity more explicit than had been the case with the individuals on Guam, Anatahan or New Guinea. The aura of mystery, fear and suspense surrounding Lubang and its jungle – no doubt exploited to the full by the special reporters to add interest to their articles – also helped to confirm the stragglers as unpredictable, dangerous creatures. A special reporter for the *Asahi*, for example, who accompanied a heavily armed search party into the hills of Lubang, described his experience to his readers in terms more appropriate to a hunt for a ferocious wild animal than to a search-and-rescue mission for misguided fellow countrymen. His surroundings were described as misty and gloomy; himself and his fellow search-party members as nervous and jumpy; the jungle as inhospitable and dank; the sounds there as strange and eerie; and the whole experience as unnerving.²⁹ Commonalities of culture and origin between the readers and the stragglers – even, in this case, shared membership of the human race – were not explored; indeed, they were often denied. In other words, these men were not

presented as people either the journalist or his readers at home could possibly identify with.

The ‘foreign’ quality of the stragglers was further highlighted during the much-publicised rescue mission of Jimbō Nobuhiko, a former staff officer in the Davao (Philippines) garrison during the war who, according to Kahn, had been in that country on business at the time of the first shoot-out between the three men and the Lubang police. Kahn further explains that Jimbō was one of the few Japanese who was well regarded there, because he had ‘been instrumental in saving the wartime president of the Philippines, the late Manuel Roxas, from execution at Japanese hands’ during the war.³⁰ Although the origins and funding of his rescue attempt are not very clear, Jimbō does seem to have had some influence in the Philippines, because he was reported to have had the full cooperation of the Philippines Army, including access to aeroplanes, loudspeakers and other straggler-finding equipment.³¹ Whether there were any official connections between Jimbō and the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare is as unclear as the provenance of Jimbō’s funding. In any case, his exploits in the Philippines, flying over Lubang and dropping leaflets announcing the Japanese surrender, received a great deal of media attention in Japan.

Jimbō’s rescue operation highlights interesting, if rather contradictory, notions of national identity in relation to the stragglers. Certainly, the men were regarded as somewhat quixotic, as the following headlines demonstrate: ‘the three Japanese soldiers of Lubang: resisting with one machine-gun; prisoners of a false belief: refusing to comply with advice to surrender’.³² But their identity was also explored specifically through the lens of nationality, as several examples suggest. On 19 February 1952 the *Mainichi* supplemented one of its articles on Jimbō’s rescue efforts with a piece on Alsatian dogs imported from Japan for use in the Philippines Army and highly prized in the fight against the Communist Huk (or Hukbalahap) rebels plaguing the government at that time. Importantly, readers were told, because the dogs had been trained by Japanese prisoners of war incarcerated in the Philippines, they responded only to commands in Japanese.³³ In other words, these dogs did not understand Tagalog. It can only be surmised that it is for that reason that the article, which was placed next to the one on Jimbō’s attempts to get the Lubang stragglers to surrender, bore the headline: ‘Japanese dogs to take part in searches!’³⁴ There is, of course, nothing unusual in having trained dogs take part in rescue operations, but the idea that ‘Japanese’ dogs were needed to find the Japanese stragglers is suggestive. Dogs can hardly be said to have ‘nationality’, which is a purely human invention. Furthermore, it significant that the dogs’ ‘national identity’ was linked to their ability to understand Japanese, which was considered likely to be useful for rounding up Japanese stragglers.

However, the ‘Japaneness’ of the dogs, as explained in this article, contrasted rather sharply with the un-‘Japaneness’ of the stragglers, also marked by language. For example, on 21 February, two days after telling its readership about the ‘Japanese’ Alsatians, the *Mainichi* described Jimbō flying above the island at such a low altitude that the tips of his plane’s wings were nearly touching the

treetops (frightening pigs and horses in the process) and yelling, in a mixture of English and Japanese: ‘Oi, Japanese! I am Jimbō *de aru. Nihon no tsuwamono domo mura e kudare!*’ (This is Jimbō! Japanese soldiers, go down to the villages!)³⁵ That Japanese soldiers had to be addressed in English as well as their own language to be told that the war was over is, again, an indication of the degree to which the soldiers were perceived as ‘aliens’ and their nationality seen as ambiguous. The use of English implies that the stragglers were no longer fully Japanese and no longer fully in command of their language, the signifier of their ‘Japaneseness’. This emphasis on language as a marker of their difference is something that would recur frequently in the reactions to later stragglers. Whether the stragglers spoke a stilted, ‘old-fashioned’ type of Japanese or whether they were unable to speak at all, or if so only hesitatingly, their presumed language problems were a symbol of how far removed they were from the inhabitants of ‘post-war Japan’. Commonalities between the stragglers and the Japanese population were suppressed; the differences, however, were strongly emphasised.

The shared experience of the population and the stragglers as soldiers of the Imperial Army and participants in the war was not explored, and in fact the war hardly intruded at all in reports on the Lubang men. However, these stragglers, like those before them, did provide a reminder of that section of the population that was still desperately awaiting news regarding the fate of its missing relatives. Although the stragglers themselves were presented as somewhat foreign, reporting on their situation prompted an expression of pity for the families of those still missing. This is illustrated, for example, by Jimbō’s self-appointed role as messenger, not just to the Lubang stragglers but also to all possible stragglers still in the Philippines. When he set off for that country on 18 February 1952, Jimbō was carrying numerous messages from the families of missing soldiers which he scattered over the areas where stragglers were believed to be hiding, not just on Lubang but also on Mindoro. The *Mainichi*, devoting an entire article to these letters, provides one of the rare occasions in the early 1950s when a report on stragglers takes an emotional tone. According to the paper, these letters could not fail to bring tears to one’s eyes. Mothers pleaded with sons to come home while they themselves were still alive; wives included photos of children their husbands had never seen. It is only here that the stragglers were referred to as ‘forgotten soldiers’, a term implying passivity on the part of the stragglers, placing the onus of responsibility, for once, firmly on the side of the homeland for forgetting them.³⁶

While the responsibility and guilt implied in the use of this term would become a common theme in the reports on stragglers a decade or two later, it was certainly the exception rather than the norm in the early 1950s, and suggests that such pity was felt only in connection with the families of the missing in Japan rather than with the stragglers themselves. In other words, while the stragglers represented a tragedy that was still affecting a sizeable section of the population, they themselves were only rarely seen as objects of pity; rather, they were portrayed as dangerous, wild and hardly Japanese. The ambivalence of early post-war attitudes to soldiers was thus still very much in evidence.

If the stragglers themselves were not pitied, neither was their impact on Lubang's population assessed. After all, the reason the police and the stragglers had been shooting at each other was because the latter had been responsible for killing at least two local villagers in the previous few weeks; but this aspect of the stragglers' existence was virtually ignored. If there was little sympathy for the three men, there was even less for the people of Lubang. This Japan-centricity would continue to permeate the reports on stragglers to a very great degree in the 1950s, lending support to Yoshida Yutaka's argument that memories of war in that decade were not shaped by an awareness of the rest of Asia or of the impact of the war on its population.³⁷

Furthermore, as the news regarding the Lubang stragglers makes clear, for the Japanese media, the war was not as yet a historical event that demanded explanation or context. Readers were presumed to have the background knowledge necessary to an understanding of the stragglers' existence. The reasons for the stragglers' refusal to surrender, for example, were only very rarely alluded to, as in the headline above where they were described as 'prisoners of false beliefs'. Although their identities were known, there was little probing into the reasons for their inability to accept the surrender, which contrasts greatly with the exploration of the stragglers' characters that took place in the 1970s. Their refusal to surrender did not demand an explanation because the war and the dogma of the former Army were considered to be still very much part of the present. Indeed, it was assumed that the stragglers had continued to act in accordance with their military hierarchy and organisation. The *Asahi*, for example, concluded one of its articles with the comment: 'it is said that one of the Lubang stragglers is an officer, and that under his leadership, discipline is strict and fair', thus reinforcing wartime orthodoxy about the benevolence of officers and the obedience of subordinates.³⁸ The significance of the war apparently did not give rise to discussion in the context of the Lubang shoot-out, even though at that time Japan was engaged in acrimonious negotiations with the Philippines over war reparations.³⁹ No link was made between, on the one hand, the presence of armed and dangerous Japanese soldiers on an island previously occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army, and, on the other hand, the reparations that Japan, as a consequence of this occupation, was now being forced to pay to the government with sovereignty over that island. Nor were these links made, for that matter, in the Philippines: the *Manila Times*, for example, kept the reports on reparations and the reports on stragglers well separated in February 1952.

The Lubang stragglers vanished without trace, prompting the Philippines police to suggest that they might have joined forces with other stragglers on Mindoro. Indeed, shortly after Jimbō's leaflet-dropping mission over Lubang and Mindoro, a report by Mindoro police announced that a note, allegedly posted by stragglers on that island and announcing their imminent surrender, had been found pinned to a tree. According to the *Mainichi*, these stragglers had been convinced to surrender by Jimbō's letter-drop as well as by the announcements he made from his plane.⁴⁰ Either those stragglers changed their minds or the note was a hoax. No stragglers would surrender in the

Philippines until a group of four was coaxed out of the Mindoro jungle some four years later.

This is not to say that news of stragglers dried up completely. Throughout 1952, there were reports and unconfirmed rumours of such soldiers. At the same time as searches were taking place on Lubang, reports from Guam indicated that the American Army was combing the island following sightings of a number of them. Other related reports emerged from the Philippines in February and March: sixteen stragglers had been speared to death by Mangian tribespeople on an island close to Busuanga;⁴¹ eight soldiers had been seen landing on a beach on Mindoro (there was no speculation about their provenance), then moving off into the mountains;⁴² the Philippines Army estimated that more than a hundred stragglers were hiding in various regions of their country.⁴³ Rumours of the possible existence of stragglers hit the newsstands at the same time as returning Japanese veterans of battles for South-East Asian independence alerted the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare and the population to the existence of Japanese soldiers in the nationalist armies of that region. On 6 April, for example, an ex-Imperial Army soldier returned from Indochina, after escaping from Ho Chi Minh's army, to warn that a number of Japanese soldiers had been forced to fight for Ho and were desperately awaiting rescue.⁴⁴ In June, twenty Japanese soldiers returned from Sumatra, where they had been fighting for Indonesian independence alongside Indonesian soldiers. They were followed in September by a returnee from Burma who apparently could not for the life of him remember when it was that he had heard that the war was over.⁴⁵ In the midst of all these news reports, in May 1952, two soldiers were found hiding on Saipan. It may have been wishful thinking that led an officer of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare to state to the *Asahi*, after the two Saipan stragglers were repatriated in June: 'we may as well say that these two are the last of the stragglers'.⁴⁶

The two were arrested by American troops on 18 May 1952. They had been hiding on top of a cliff for eight years. Both had arrived on Saipan with their battalions in 1942, and their families had been notified of their deaths in battle in the Northern Marianas on 18 July 1944.⁴⁷ Saipan is infamous as one of the bloodiest battlegrounds of the Pacific War: Japanese troops were annihilated in the American attack of 15 June 1944, and a great number of Japanese civilians committed suicide. According to the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, out of 45,500 Army and Navy personnel posted on Saipan, 43,000 were killed in battle. A further 12,000 civilians died, bringing the total of Japanese war deaths on Saipan to 55,000.⁴⁸ With a death toll such as this it is hardly surprising that no one thought to question the assumption that missing soldiers must have died in battle or shortly afterwards. In this case, however, two soldiers had survived and slipped through the net of round-up operations. The cliff where they lived for eight years, in an appropriated American tent, was only 150 metres away from a main road: the men thought (rightly, as it turned out) that nobody would expect stragglers to be hiding there and that they would be safe. They were discovered by accident when some villagers, venturing to the top of the cliff to catch bats,

saw them and reported the news to the nearest American military police post. Suffering from malnutrition, the two stragglers were hospitalised on Guam for a month before being repatriated.⁴⁹ They arrived at Haneda Airport on 22 June 1952, some ten years after leaving their homeland.⁵⁰

Media reports on the Saipan stragglers were certainly not as long-lasting as the ones on Lubang, suggesting that successfully repatriated stragglers were not as newsworthy as those who continued to refuse to surrender. As usual, there was more interest in their island lifestyle than in the circumstances that had led them to hide in the first place. Readers were told they had eaten breadfruit and snails; that they had foraged for food only in the dark; that they had not ventured further than two kilometres from their camp; that they prayed nightly for their lives, facing the direction of a local pre-war shrine. It was also mentioned that they had not known that the war was over until their capture, that they had been sure the American soldiers who took charge of them were going to kill them – until they attempted to escape and were not, contrary to their expectations, immediately executed. According to the *Asahi*, they had both felt very keenly the shame of having become prisoners of war and experienced some difficulty in adjusting to a world in which they were safe, especially in the hands of American soldiers.⁵¹

Their difficulties in adjusting to the post-war world were what most strongly defined the Saipan stragglers in media reports. Although it was most probably not the first time (and was certainly not to be the last) that repatriated stragglers experienced difficulty in making the mental adjustment from combat to a peace that had already lasted several years, without warning and within a very short period, it was the first time that the stress experienced by such individuals – in this case resulting in several months' residence in a Tokyo psychiatric ward – had been placed at the forefront of media reports. ‘The surrendered soldiers of Saipan; defeated by mental blow; doubt even words of relatives’, announced the *Asahi* in a headline of 25 June.⁵² The stragglers were in such precarious health that newspapers were denied interviews. Bureau of Repatriate Welfare officials took charge of press conferences and explained that both men were in shock and finding adjustment difficult. They were weak, and one was almost incoherent. Bureau officials and doctors feared for his mental state as he said nothing but ‘Thank you’ every time he was spoken to, refused to believe his relatives were not spies, and refused to take either food or medicine.

In an article on Saipan in late November of 1952, the *Asahi* would again mention the two stragglers, who were still at that time in the hospital’s mental ward. The ‘diagnosis’, according to the *Asahi*, was that ‘the ghost of the Imperial Army’ was ‘still hanging about’.⁵³ At the time of the stragglers’ return, however, there had been little mention of the war, the army or the indoctrination of soldiers, even though the two stragglers’ fragile mental state had been due at least partly to their lasting conviction that they would be killed if found. The Saipan stragglers were, again, distanced from the rest of the population, although this time it was less through an emphasis on that part of their experience that made them exotic than by drawing attention to how difficult it was for them to adapt to post-war society.

The Saipan stragglers were the last of the 1952 repatriates who had learned only recently that the war was over, but there were a number of other instances that year in which the problems of repatriation came to the attention of the readers of major newspapers. On 6 April 1952, for example, one ex-soldier returned from Indochina, where he had married and worked before being drafted into Ho Chi Minh's army. He eventually escaped the army and reached French-occupied territory, where he was put on a ship for Japan. He left without his wife and seven children because, as he explained, he already had a wife in his homeland. He drew the Bureau's attention to the fact that there were a number of Japanese ex-soldiers embroiled in the Vietnamese war of independence, listing the names of those he knew as well as of those who had died fighting in Ho Chi Minh's army. But an *Asahi* article about him referred most prominently to his bigamy ('carrying the weight of having two wives'). It is only in a secondary headline that we find a reference to 'left-behind' Japanese ('ex-military personnel: remaining compatriots pleading for rescue'),⁵⁴ underlining again the sense that the stragglers' newsworthiness derived more from their unusual personal lives than from the fact that they had not come home from the war.

In another example, a group of twenty former soldiers of the Imperial Army returned from Sumatra, Indonesia, in June 1952, with somewhat similar explanations for their delayed repatriation. They had been absorbed by the Indonesian independence army and fought alongside Indonesian soldiers in the war of independence of 1947–1948. They certainly knew Japan had been defeated but were uncertain of what awaited them on their return. One of them stated that many Japanese soldiers fighting for the Indonesians feared being court-martialled or tried as war criminals if they let their whereabouts be known, so that for many it seemed safer to stay in Indonesia. Furthermore, joining the Indonesian Army seemed the only possible option: as another returnee put it, 'either you joined or you starved'. Their families in Japan, however, did not know that these soldiers were alive, as they had been listed as killed in action. And the returnees themselves had not envisaged a return to their homeland because of their fear of being seen as deserters; in other words, because of the indoctrination they had received in the Japanese Imperial Army.⁵⁵

The return of this group provoked little interest compared to the happenings on Lubang a few months earlier. There were, however, photographs and interviews, in which the emphasis was on explanations of why the soldiers had joined the Indonesian independence forces in the first place and how the Indonesians felt about the Japanese. All the returnees maintained that they had been forced to fight for Indonesia because they would otherwise have starved, that they had not dared come home until they were reassured that they would not be punished, and that there were no ill feelings towards the Japanese soldiers either on the part of their Indonesian counterparts or of the Dutch whom they had encountered during their stay.⁵⁶ But even though these repatriates' connection with Japan's lost war, and with wartime indoctrination, was inescapable, press articles exhibited no reflection on or value judgement about such matters.

The reference to the attitudes of Dutch and Indonesians towards the Japanese in the above-mentioned *Asahi* report constitutes a very rare acknowledgement of the fact that the Japanese occupation of East and South-East Asia had had consequences for the local population, even if only for foreign attitudes towards Japan. As we have seen, though attention had originally been drawn to the existence of the Lubang stragglers because they had murdered a villager and then shot at police, the consequences for Lubang of the stragglers' presence there were neither deplored nor even discussed in Japanese media reports. The Japan-centricity of attitudes towards stragglers is paralleled in a range of other reports on war-related issues. For example, a *Mainichi* report on Japanese prisoners in the Philippines described, on 4 March 1952, the lives and feelings of condemned Japanese war criminals held there. Focussing on those who had been drafted as students, the article recorded their feelings of despair and hopelessness and their longing for home and family. While the article did not express any views relating to the release of the prisoners, neither did it comment on the crimes they had committed as soldiers of the Imperial Army.⁵⁷ Indeed, nowhere were the reasons for their incarceration examined in the coverage of the growing movement to have war criminals repatriated to Japan.

As the beginning of this chapter showed, stragglers in the early 1950s came home to an atmosphere of increasing concern with the fate of the missing. While the stragglers exemplified and exacerbated uncertainties regarding the fate of a large number of their fellow Japanese soldiers, they themselves were overwhelmingly portrayed as foreign and exotic. The commonalities between their experiences and those of the rest of the population – such as being 'misled' by the militarists, for example – were not drawn upon. It was as if the stragglers themselves were being kept at arm's length; as if, indeed, traces of the negative attitudes to veterans after the defeat prevented their acceptance as fellow citizens.

In contrast, the question of the repatriation of remains of the war dead and of their commemoration was treated much less ambiguously in the first two years of the 1950s, and was given much more space in media reports. In January 1952, for example, the *Asahi* devoted both part of its front page and almost an entire inside page to the erection of a memorial to the war dead on Iwo Jima and the prayers for their souls conducted there by a Japanese priest.⁵⁸ Another indication of the comparative importance accorded to the remains of war dead is found in a series of articles published by the *Asahi* over eight days from 27 November to 3 December 1952. Entitled 'Eight Islands' (*Yattsu no shima*), the series described the Pacific islands of Guam, Tinian, Saipan, Wake, Iwo Jima, Angaur, Peleliu and Marcus, drawing on the reminiscences of those who had been there during the war, visited since the war or lived there at the time the pieces were written. The introductory paragraph informed readers that the articles had been produced in conjunction with the preparations for departure of a ship taking representatives of the Association of Bereaved Families and the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare on a round trip of some seventy days and 5,700 miles. This mission aimed to collect the scattered remains of Japanese soldiers on these

islands and erect memorials to the dead. The trip was to be organised and funded by the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare as the first of regular forays into former battlefields for the purpose of ‘bone-collecting’.⁵⁹

Unlike the war dead, stragglers were never on the front page in the 1950s. They were hardly ever the subject of more than very brief articles, and never provoked quite the same emotion as fallen soldiers. As Dower observes, ‘one might come to curse repatriated servicemen or treat them with contempt, but the Japanese war dead still cried out for some kind of requiem’.⁶⁰ The war dead, by virtue of their sacrifice and their absence, could be forgiven and commemorated to a degree, but those who came back, even though much later, were far more ambiguous. They could be despised for a number of unconnected and contradictory reasons: perhaps because they had failed to win; perhaps because they had failed to die with their comrades; or indeed perhaps because they had taken part in a ‘wrong’ war. But in the early 1950s this ambiguity was not explored, or at least, as we have seen, not explored within the public sphere. The stragglers were weird, strange, even dangerous; but whatever they were, their relation to the war, the notion of sacrifice, and the war dead was not publicly explored.

There are a number of possible explanations for this silence on the link between the stragglers and the war. The one that first springs to mind is the presence of the Occupation forces. Mentioned in a previous chapter were the censorship policies of the Occupation, which expressly banned any positive representation of the military in the pages of newspapers and magazines. Furthermore, the speed with which the repatriates were sent on to their home towns was evidently motivated less by humanitarian concerns than by the insistence of the Occupation forces that repatriates be demobilised as fast as possible in order to avoid any possible disturbances. While this concern had abated to a considerable degree by 1951, compared to what it had been during the massive influx of repatriates in 1946–1947,⁶¹ it could be argued that the presence of the Occupation forces continued to discourage any sustained focus on stragglers or the reporting of anything but the most harmless aspects of their identity. It is thus arguable that the stragglers’ soldierly qualities were downplayed because of the threat of GHQ censorship, actual or anticipated.

Yet the threat of GHQ censorship cannot fully account for the emphasis on the exotic in the portrayal of stragglers, for several reasons. First, had the stragglers been a particular concern of the Occupation authorities, they might have been dealt with either by the imposition of complete silence on reporting of their return – which did not happen – or by a subversion of the stragglers’ return in order to further the Occupation’s own aims and make use of them to discredit wartime military institutions. The stragglers could conceivably have been held up as examples of the inhumane results of wartime military indoctrination (as they would be in the 1970s).

Second, harsh censorship of news regarding the stragglers would have been inconsistent with the increasing public discussion of the repatriation of war criminals mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. There would have been no reason to prevent discussion of the return of stragglers on the one hand but allow

discussion of the repatriation of war criminals on the other. Finally, the exoticisation of the stragglers cannot be attributed solely to the presence of the Occupation authorities simply because it continued unchanged, as this chapter has shown, after the end of the Occupation. The Saipan stragglers, who returned in June, two months after the end of the Occupation, were not viewed particularly differently from earlier stragglers. The return of Japan's sovereignty on 28 April 1952 was hardly a watershed in this sense; as Yoshida states, the end of the Occupation had only minimal impact on the way the war was remembered.⁶² The tensions of the Cold War, and Japan's new position as an ally of the United States, in many ways played a greater role in pre-empting discussion of the war and the manner in which it was to be remembered. While the return of Japan's sovereignty did coincide with increasing popular demands for the release both of prisoners of war incarcerated in Siberia and China and of war criminals, these popular movements did not suddenly appear in April 1952 but were already well established during the Occupation.⁶³ By 1950 the war criminals imprisoned at Sugamo in Tokyo had already come to be 'openly regarded as victims rather than victimisers'.⁶⁴

Stragglers were also viewed differently from the many others still awaiting repatriation in the early 1950s. The war that was in the public mind was the Korean War, and it was the fate of non-repatriated Japanese on the Chinese mainland and in the USSR that concerned the public. The increasing recognition that the repatriation of Japanese citizens from China and the Soviet Union was not going to be a smooth process helped shape an image of these would-be repatriates as victims. Whereas the existence of stragglers was initially completely unexpected, the existence of non-repatriated citizens in China and the USSR, even if their exact number was not known, had been well documented. The frustrated expectation of the imminent return of the latter group contributed to the growing sense that they should be seen as victims. Furthermore, the reasons for their delayed return could be placed within an increasingly familiar ideological framework, that of the Cold War. The obstruction to their repatriation had not a little to do with the difficulty of conducting talks across the growing chasm separating Communist and non-Communist countries, and by this stage Japan had become firmly aligned with the U.S. in ideology, or at least, in anti-Communism. The prisoners in China and Siberia, therefore, could easily be constructed as victims of the 'bad Communists'.

Stragglers, on the other hand, elicited reactions that were undoubtedly initially affected by the ambivalent attitude towards veterans characteristic of the late 1940s. They were soldiers of the now defunct Imperial Army for whom the war had only just ended, unlike the repatriates from China and the USSR and those held for war crimes. They had been trapped in time, as 'prisoners' of a belief system which in the meantime had been completely discredited. Indeed, one of the 1951 Guam returnees later remembered that he was often rejected for employment in Japan because he was considered a 'loony from the South Seas' (*nanpō boke*).⁶⁵ The symbolism of the soldier 'petrified in time' would be explicitly explored in the 1970s reporting of the return of stragglers, but in the

early 1950s the stragglers were probably considered to represent particularly extreme examples of the attitudes of ‘No surrender’ that had been current in the Imperial Army in wartime. However, while the stragglers could be seen as representative of despised veterans, they were also reminders of the anguish that was the lot of bereaved and waiting families. Again, however, contradictions inherent in reactions to stragglers would fail to be consciously explored until the 1970s. In the early 1950s, attention was focussed not on what stragglers had in common with the rest of the population, but what made them different. Keeping them exotic, portraying them as foreign, ultimately making them ‘other’ allowed ambiguities to go unexamined.

Public reactions to the stragglers between 1950 and 1952 highlight a number of aspects of the state of war memory towards the end of the Occupation. First, as this chapter has shown, the earliest stragglers elicited only a limited amount of attention, and this attention focused overwhelmingly on what made them different from their compatriots. This suggests, certainly, resonances with the ambivalence with which soldiers were regarded more generally during the Occupation period. But it also highlights the comparative importance of issues relating to delayed repatriations and to the status of missing soldiers in Japanese popular consciousness. The stragglers were only a minuscule proportion of a problem that was affecting the thousands of families whose relatives were still missing, and they were newsworthy only because of their exotic diets of mice, snails, fruit and coconut alcohol (if and when possible). These were the aspects of their delayed repatriations that separated them from the thousands who were still missing or whose repatriation was proceeding at a much slower pace than expected. But ultimately, they were only a minor part of the problem, and much more attention was given to the repatriation of remains of the war dead and of Japanese citizens stranded in neighbouring countries. In that sense, the cursory attention given to the stragglers’ return at that time underlines the pervasive presence of war-related legacies in public consciousness.

The same conclusion is also suggested by the absence of any reference to the war in the reports that did appear on stragglers. While reflection on the war itself would become a central aspect of the reportage on the stragglers who emerged twenty years later, in the early 1950s the news of their discovery and return provoked only minimal exploration of the wartime context or of the reasons for these soldiers’ decision, whether conscious or otherwise, to remain in hiding. The war was still close enough – and pervasive enough – in the consciousness of the Japanese population for such explorations to be unnecessary. The past was ‘taken for granted’, and explanations for the stragglers’ existence were not required. While it may have seemed unusual for some soldiers to think that the war had not yet ended, or that they would be killed if they emerged, their state of mind was not completely alien to those who wrote or read about their return, since in the early 1950s most adults and teenagers had experienced wartime mobilisation. While interpretations of the stragglers’ experiences may have differed from person to person (not all might have regarded them as ‘loonies from the South Seas’, for example), the fact that the past was taken for granted at

that time and that its significance, as far as the existence of stragglers was concerned, did not have to be verbalised, meant that conflicting opinions about the reasons for their existence did not surface with their return, as they would twenty years later. However, as the next chapter will show, attitudes towards stragglers would undergo a distinct shift within the next two or three years.

4 ‘Living spirits of the war dead’, 1954–1956

After the repatriation of the Saipan stragglers in 1952, it looked, for a period of nearly two years, as though the Bureau’s assertion that these had been the last would be proved correct. The delays in the repatriation of Japanese citizens from China and the USSR continued to occupy the Association of Bereaved Families, the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare and the mainstream press, but the period between June 1952 and May 1954 was free of the unexpected appearance of Imperial Army stragglers from South-East Asia and the Pacific islands. By the time the straggler problem resurfaced in the spring of 1954, the possibility that some soldiers might still be unaware of the end of the war had disappeared from most minds except of course for those of members of the Kozuka, Onoda and Shimada families, whose sons and brothers had been seen on Lubang in January 1952. The government of the Philippines had rejected applications by the family members for entry visas there in 1953 on the grounds that it was unable to guarantee their safety at a time when Huk rebels were still considered dangerous. As a result there was precious little the families could do on their own about finding the lost soldiers.¹ In the midst of the protracted and complicated negotiations to have citizens repatriated from China and the USSR, the concerns of three families regarding a small island in the Philippines hardly made ripples in the public arena between 1952 and 1954.

The period between 1954 and 1956, however, witnessed the return of a number of stragglers not only to their homeland but to public consciousness as well. On 7 May 1954, one of the Lubang stragglers, Shimada Shōichi, was killed by Lubang police. The stragglers had not, after all, crossed over to Mindoro in 1952 as had been suggested at the time: they had remained on Lubang. The death of Shimada prompted a renewed, but ineffectual, search for Onoda Hirō and Kozuka Kinshichi, the remaining two stragglers. Less than a year later, in April 1955, four stragglers were repatriated from New Guinea, where they had been hiding for a decade. In January 1956, nine returned from the island of Morotai in Indonesia. In December 1956, four more were found on Mindoro in the Philippines.

The return of stragglers in the mid-1950s allows us to observe public reactions to the discovery of soldiers from an army which by that time had been defunct for more than a decade, and to consider, through these reactions, changes in public interpretations of the place of the war and of soldiers of the

Imperial Army. The public portrayal of stragglers and their experiences in the mid-1950s suggests that the stragglers had returned to a particular climate of remembrance in Japan. Many of the themes highlighted by the appearance of stragglers in the first two years of the 1950s were repeated, but there was also a noticeably greater emphasis on these individuals as soldiers, on the formal military hierarchies within the returning groups, on their stilted military language, on their early hopes that the Japanese Army would rescue them as it returned to recapture lost territory, and on their own insistence that they were not deserters. Where, only two years earlier, stragglers had been referred to as *moto-Nihonhei* (former Japanese soldiers), *zansonhei* (surviving soldiers) or, somewhat negatively, *haizanhei* ('defeated soldiers'), by the mid-1950s they were also often being called *ikite ita eirei*, or 'living spirits of the war dead', *eirei* being composed of the Chinese characters for 'hero' and 'ghost', implying respect and encompassing notions of self-sacrifice. Although earlier exotic themes did not disappear entirely in media reports, military themes increased dramatically. At this point however, little in the stragglers' soldierly aspects caused much discomfort, whereas by the 1970s the military significance of the stragglers was to be an uncomfortable reminder of pre-war and wartime militarism. In the mid-1950s the references to the stragglers as soldiers were, in the main, quite positive. This also contrasts with the early part of the decade, when their soldierly aspects had been overshadowed by their 'otherness'. The way the return of the stragglers was received in the mid-1950s, then, suggests that a shift had taken place in public attitudes to the war, and that this shift allowed the inclusion into public discourse of the men's identity as soldiers.

Such changes in reactions to stragglers are crucial because they help to map one of the important developments in the shifting place of the war in the public sphere in the mid-1950s. This period is often referred to as a time of atonement characterised by the growth of pacifist movements, the publication and immense popularity of anti-war novels such as Gomikawa Jumpei's six-volume *Ningen no jōken* (The Human Condition),² and debates among intellectuals on the nature and extent of war guilt. It was in 1956 that the prominent intellectual Tsurumi Shunsuke introduced the term 'fifteen-year war' in order to draw attention to Japan's aggression against China over the period from 1931 to 1945.³ As Yoshida shows, books that decried the war, that questioned the actions or omissions of intellectuals during the conflict, and that exposed the crimes of the Japanese Army and civilians in Manchuria were very popular.⁴ Tōyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi and Fujiwara Akira's *Shōwa shi* (History of the Shōwa Period), a Marxist interpretation of the pre-war and wartime period, became a bestseller on its publication in 1955.⁵ The 1950s, then, can be seen as a period fostering the left-wing pacifist movements that would eventually participate in the clashes surrounding the renewal of the United States–Japan Security Treaty in 1959–1960. Both Yoshikuni Igarashi and James Orr have also drawn attention in recent works to these trends of the 1950s.⁶

While it is certainly the case that the anti-American and anti-war protests of the end of the decade were born during the 1950s, this is not to say that the

decade was completely defined by those movements. Indeed, more attention needs to be given to the multiplicity of views about the war that contended with one another in this period. In fact, the mid-1950s were also a time when the war could be discussed very freely and not always in the spirit of 'atonement' that became characteristic of, for example, the early to mid-1970s. The cultural atmosphere of the mid-1950s was permeated by the war, as the enormous boom in the publication of *senkimonō* (memoirs and stories about the war) indicates. War stories of the mid-1950s, whether fictional or based on personal experience, were also stories of courage, heroism, comradeship and sacrifice, stories that were replicated in the media portrayal of the stragglers' experiences. Positive interpretations specifically of soldiers, their aims and their actions informed a particular climate of war remembrance as much as they were informed by it.

Takahashi Saburō has shown that *senkimonō* became an important part of the publishing industry in the late 1940s.⁷ The prominent novelist Ōka Shōhei's *Furyoki* (Record of a Prisoner) appeared in 1948. *Kike wadatsumi no koe* (Listen to the Voices of the Sea), a collection of writings by students conscripted as soldiers and killed in the war, and Takagi Toshirō's *Imphal*, in which the author condemned military leaders for their irresponsible actions in Burma, which in his view unnecessarily cost the lives of countless soldiers, were all published in 1949.⁸ These accounts appeared at a time, according to Takahashi, when the censorship of the Occupation period made the publication of memoirs condemning the war and war leaders particularly welcome, and much of the material published at this time contained criticism of high-ranking military commanders.⁹ Tsuji Masanobu's *Senkō sanzenri* (3,000 Miles under Water) and *Jūgo tai ichi: Biruma no shitō* (Fifteen against One: Death Battles in Burma) became bestsellers in the early 1950s, and were followed in subsequent years by a number of other accounts of soldiers' wartime experiences.¹⁰ By 1956, the publication of *senkimonō* had reached an unprecedented rate, at roughly seven times, in terms of numbers of books, what it had been only a few years before.¹¹ Not only did particular *senkimonō* become bestsellers but they were also awarded major literary prizes, and the genre widened to include civilian diaries, including memoirs by women as well as those of the battlefield and prisoner-of-war diaries.¹² Yoshida also points out that one of the characteristics of the *senkimonō* was that they were usually written by those who had been lower-ranking officers, and that they exhibited a strong concern for those fighting at the front lines, at the same time as a distrust of higher-ranking officers.¹³ Controversial cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori, writing in 1997, recalls a 1950s childhood dominated by the planes, tanks and heroic war stories of the magazine *Maru* (Circle).¹⁴ Stories by a former fighter pilot, Sakai Saburō, describing heroic dogfights against much better armed and protected American and Australian planes in the skies over New Guinea, made him immensely popular with the reading public in the middle of the decade.¹⁵

The publication and popularity of *senkimonō* are not the only evidence that a fairly positive climate of war remembrance prevailed in the mid-1950s. For example, in an opinion poll undertaken in January and February 1956 by the

Office of the Prime Ministerial Secretary, forty-two per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that the 'military education of the past had produced strong-minded and reliable people', while thirty-seven per cent disagreed and twenty-one per cent replied that they didn't know.¹⁶ This positive attitude to the military also encompassed the subject of the war dead. For example, a letter to the editor published in the *Mainichi shimbun* in December 1956 asked that the proposed Monument to the Unknown War Dead (*mumeisenshi*) – later to become the Chidorigafuchi memorial – be given the name instead of Monument to the Martyrs for the Nation (*junkokusenshi*).¹⁷ It was also the period in which the newly formed Liberal Democratic Party, prompted by the Association of Bereaved Families, began drafting bills aiming to remove those constitutional clauses that prevented state funding and management of the Yasukuni Shrine, which both before and during the war had had the function of publicly commemorating fallen soldiers.¹⁸

The return of stragglers in the mid-1950s thus took place in a period when the men's military identity could be readily integrated into public discourses on the significance of their return. In other words, the links between the stragglers and the war could be explored, albeit not with the same self-consciousness that would permeate reactions to other stragglers' return in the 1970s. Their experience could be linked, if only tentatively, with the idea of sacrifice through the use of the respectful term '*eirei*' (spirits of the war dead). Reactions were not, however, unambiguous: if the stragglers who returned in 1955 and 1956 were viewed positively, the one who died in 1954 at the hands of Filipino police was, in the public sphere at least, given only minimal attention. The lack of public attention paid to Shimada Shōichi's death that year highlights a problematic disjunction between the image of living and dead stragglers, a disjunction that will be examined again in a later chapter with the 1972 death, in very similar circumstances, of Shimada's fellow straggler Kozuka Kinshichi. Before considering the portrayal of stragglers from New Guinea, Morotai and Mindoro in 1955 and 1956, we will explore how Shimada's death brought Lubang back into the public consciousness.

Since Akatsu Yūichi's return in 1951, the families of the Lubang stragglers had known that Shimada, Kozuka and Onoda had survived the war and were hiding in the interior of the island. The families' hopes that their sons and brothers were still alive had been renewed in 1952, when the stragglers survived the shoot-out with the police described earlier. Although, as mentioned before, the families' attempts to gain entry visas into the Philippines to search Lubang had been unsuccessful in 1953, negotiations regarding the visas had resumed in March 1954 with the stabilisation of the domestic situation in the Philippines.¹⁹ It was in the midst of these negotiations that a cable from Manila announced, on 9 May 1954, that a Japanese soldier had been killed by police on Lubang.

According to Onoda's memoirs the incident occurred when the three of them, Shimada Shōichi, Kozuka Kinshichi, and Onoda himself, had been occupied with preparing and drying food in a remote valley. As usual, they were armed. Suddenly, Onoda spotted movement close by. At first, he thought it was a local

villager who, having noticed their drying fruit, was coming to investigate. Onoda shot at the approaching figure twice, and took cover. Kozuka dived under cover as well. For some reason, however, Shimada remained standing in full view of the approaching party. Onoda recalls that he had been acting strangely in the preceding weeks, that he had seemed depressed and had been talking to himself and staring at photographs of his family. Shimada was either too surprised to move or wanted to die. In any case, he remained rooted to the spot. Onoda's shots were returned; one of them struck Shimada in the head, and, in Onoda's account, he died instantly.²⁰ After Shimada was shot, Onoda's explanation of the event was that the intruders must have been part of an American search party attempting to ferret them out, but many years later he realised that they had been Filipino soldiers training on Lubang. In any case, the death of Shimada apparently hit Onoda and Kozuka very hard. Onoda wrote in his memoirs in 1974 that his return to the scene of the shoot-out, two months after his comrade's death, prompted his first tears in the ten years since his arrival on Lubang.²¹

The same depth of emotion or sadness is certainly not evident in the Japanese newspapers of the time. In fact, the lack of media interest in Shimada's death is striking. Concern was immediately transferred to the two remaining stragglers and to the searches that soon began anew on the island of Lubang. Once the dead straggler had been identified, neither Shimada nor his family figured as prominently in the news as Onoda, Kozuka and their families. The ramifications of this Japanese soldier's death, nine years after the end of the war, in a battle on foreign soil, were not explored, at least in the public forum of the newspapers. Shimada's disappearance from the news suggests that living and dead stragglers did not attract the same amount of attention in the Japanese press, which is particularly interesting since, as the rest of this chapter will show, living stragglers were feted on their return in the public arena of the newspapers as much as elsewhere.

That the death of Shimada was not in itself considered particularly newsworthy can be appreciated from the pattern of the dailies' coverage. Although the initial reference in the *Asahi* to the events on Lubang was prefaced by a sizeable headline ('one shot dead, two injured: the former Japanese soldiers of Lubang'), the article itself was only five lines long and informed the reader that according to a report from Manila one soldier had been killed and two others injured and that they had been threatening Lubang villagers in their search for food.²² The article was not on page one but page three and found not at the top of the page but towards the bottom. The *Asahi* did not mention the island of Lubang again until nine days later, on 18 May 1954. On that day it informed the public on page seven that a member of the Japanese Embassy in Manila, Nakashima Shinshi, had departed for Lubang armed with leaflets, cigarettes and other devices aimed at making stragglers surrender, and that it was estimated that eighty soldiers might be hiding on Lubang, an estimate which was probably either the result of a misprint or of poor communications between Manila and Japan, or which was meant to encompass the whole of the Philippines rather than Lubang alone.²³ Again, the article was very small and did not mention Shimada's

death. As for the other daily papers, they did not go into any more detail than the *Asahi* regarding his fate. The *Mainichi*, for example, mentioned the preparations of Bureau of Repatriate Welfare officials and members of the Shimada, Onoda and Kozuka families for a trip to Lubang on 13 and 14 May, but omitted any reference to Shimada's death. The *Mainichi* further elaborated on 18 May that Nakashima, the member of the Manila embassy who was taking cigarettes, leaflets and so on to Lubang, was receiving the cooperation of the Philippines Army with the provision of an aeroplane and armed Filipino escorts.²⁴ The *Yomiuri* was rather silent on the whole matter, but on 19 May reported that there were estimated to be between 400 and 1,000 'defeated soldiers' (*haizanhei*) scattered throughout South-East Asia.²⁵ In other words, Shimada's death for the most part prompted only reports on the preparations that were being made in order to convince the other two Lubang stragglers to surrender.

It took some time to identify the straggler who had been shot. Until early June 1954 the newspapers were still uncertain who had survived. The *Yomiuri*, in an article on the departure for Lubang of members of the stragglers' families, explained on 6 June that Shimada's father would not undertake the trip because he was too old, but that he had seen Kozuka's younger brother and Onoda's older brother off at the airport.²⁶ By 9 June, however, the *Yomiuri*, while not making clear how it had received this information, left readers to infer, in an article on the rescue operations taking place on Lubang, that the two soldiers left alive were known to be Kozuka and Onoda. According to Wakaichi, the dead straggler was identified as Shimada when some journalists got their hands on a photograph of his corpse taken by the Philippines Army shortly after his death. This photo was shown to veterans who had known the stragglers as soldiers on Lubang. Although, according to Wakaichi, Shimada's face had been badly disfigured by the shot that killed him, the veterans identified him very easily. Wakaichi also states that it is not known whether Shimada's family were shown the photo but that it should be assumed that the government used the same method to identify the body.²⁷ The fact that the dead straggler's identity was not known for some time might explain why he was not even referred to by name in the reports on his cremation, which took place on Lubang on 22 May.²⁸ Wakaichi also mentions that after the war Shimada's younger brother had married Shimada's 'widow', but it seems unlikely that this would have made the Shimada family any less eager to have their son repatriated, or less upset by his death on Lubang.²⁹

In any case the focus from the very start was on the two remaining stragglers rather than the one who had died. This is underlined even in the reports on the dead straggler's cremation. On 23 May 1954, for example, both the *Mainichi* and the *Yomiuri* reported that the night before, five Japanese officials from the Embassy in Manila and from the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare and a dozen journalists had attended the cremation of the straggler's body on the beach near the place where he had been shot. The body, which had been buried in the meantime, was exhumed by torchlight and placed on a funeral pyre. The remains were later collected for repatriation back to Japan.³⁰ The photo provided by the

Mainichi clearly shows the funeral pyre, lighting up the Japanese flag that was placed there as part of the ceremony.

The gist of the article, however, was not so much the funeral itself as the hopes held by the journalists and officials in attendance that the Japanese flag and Shimada's funeral pyre would be seen by the remaining stragglers, who would then be convinced to surrender. According to the *Mainichi* article, the prayer that was in everyone's heart was: 'if you [the stragglers] can imagine the feelings of the Japanese who are burning your comrade's body, please come out...'. The report added that the officials and journalists had not had time before their departure for Japan to search the surrounding jungle for traces of Onoda and Kozuka.³¹

For the rest of the coverage on the Lubang situation, the focus would remain firmly on the searches for the remaining stragglers rather than on the significance of Shimada's death. Until the search party returned on 17 June 1954, empty-handed except for the remains of Shimada, articles on Lubang centred on the efforts of Kozuka's and Onoda's brothers, and officials of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, to locate the two elusive stragglers. For example, the *Mainichi* ran a sizeable article describing the reactions to Shimada's death of the local chief of police, who elaborated on the stragglers' dress and demeanour as reported to him by those who had seen them. According to this article the stragglers wore shabby dress but were armed with swords and guns; Shimada had had some ninety bullets in his possession; and it was thought that these stragglers knew that the war was over. The *Mainichi* journalist pleaded, by his own account, with the Filipino soldiers to stop shooting at stragglers as their families were on their way to find them.³² The *Asahi*, on 5 June, transmitted Onoda's brother's conviction that he would be successful in getting him to surrender, and on 9 June presented a substantial article with two photographs, one showing the search party on a beach speaking into a megaphone with a small boat flying the Japanese flag in the background and the other showing members of the search party surrounding a gramophone, allegedly playing old Japanese war songs, and holding a megaphone to it. The accompanying article mentioned that the Philippines government, which was well disposed towards the search party, had provided the stragglers' relatives with an escort of twelve soldiers and eight civilians and that the families were searching 'desperately', refusing to acknowledge the possibility that the two had died, even though the police were of the mind that either one or both of them might have committed suicide.³³ The search for the remaining stragglers, then, was important enough to make the news on a regular basis. Yet neither Shimada's death nor the reactions of his family or community at home received any further attention.

Onoda later admitted that he had heard the messages clearly and carefully read the leaflets left by the searchers, but he also explained in detail in his autobiography why he and Kozuka had been convinced that these were fake messages. In their eyes, the uncanny amount of detail contained these regarding their families, and the fact that the voices calling to them really did sound like those of their relatives, constituted evidence that the Americans were becoming

increasingly cunning in their attempts to flush them out, which indicated that the Japanese Army must have been getting closer.³⁴ No matter how far or how long the search party trudged through the jungle with gramophones and loudspeakers on their backs, it was not likely, in retrospect, that they could have been successful, considering the mindset of the stragglers. Speculation on the likelihood of success was, however, absent from media reports, as was any discussion at all of the significance of the stragglers' presence on the island. Lubang quickly dropped from the news once it became apparent that the men would not be found.

The Japanese press's lack of interest in Shimada's death highlights the ambiguity inherent in public perceptions of soldiers, stragglers and the war dead. Two years before, as the last chapter showed, the question of the repatriation of the remains of the war dead from islands of the Pacific, including Iwo Jima, rated as much, or even more mention than the repatriation of living soldiers. Here, two elusive stragglers, whose very existence was in doubt since some believed them to be dead, attracted more attention than the one whose death – verified – had prompted the search in the first place. Beyond telling readers that a straggler had been cremated on a beach in Lubang, there was only minimal discussion pertaining to Shimada's death and no exploration of its significance. In fact, the death took place at the same time as extensive revisions in Japan of the laws regulating pensions for the families of those killed in the war. The death was obviously related to the kind of problems that would be covered by the new law, since his demise ten years after the war would have produced a legal conundrum where the payment of a pension to his family was concerned. But Shimada was not mentioned when newspapers discussed the legal revisions.³⁵

His identity, in a broad sense, remained ambiguous. He was certainly not described as a Japanese citizen killed overseas by local police, nor was there any discussion of whether those who shot him had been justified in doing so. Although Shimada was obviously a straggler, and was referred to as a soldier (*moto-Nihonhei*), there was no exploration of what prompted him and the others to stay in hiding, shoot at potential captors and refuse, in short, to surrender. And so the definition of Shimada's death, as that of a soldier or that of a misguided civilian, also remained beyond discussion, at least in the public sphere. His identity as a member of the group of the war dead – or as someone who had sacrificed his life for the nation – remained unexplored. It was as ambiguous as that of the earlier stragglers.

Such a lack of clarity about the place of a dead straggler in the experience of post-war Japan also prefigures an ambiguity that would be verbalised only much later, more than fifty years after the end of the war. In 1997, two controversial works by Japanese writers raised the issue of the split identity of Japan's war dead, considered retrospectively. As discussed in the Introduction, Katō Norihiro, in *Haisengoron*, raised the problem of a polarised view of the war dead, in which 'pure' victims could be commemorated but 'impure' dead (war criminals, but also those who had taken part in Japan's war of expansion, even as ordinary soldiers) could not.³⁶ Controversial cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori's

Sensōron, a manga arguing for a more positive view of the war, also raised the issue of the impossibility of publicly commemorating those who had fought in the war.³⁷ The inability or unwillingness to discuss Shimada's death publicly in 1954 may well indicate the presence of this dilemma in embryonic form. Had Shimada died before the end of the war and his remains been repatriated in 1954, he might have been accorded considerable respect. It could be that Shimada forfeited this mark of respect by failing either to be killed in battle or to surrender at the end of the war. The stragglers' failure to surrender was certainly at the basis of much of the ambiguity surrounding them in later years. However, the point on which 1954 differs from the 1970s is that this ambiguity was not explored consciously in public discourse. In 1954, Shimada's death and its ramifications remained unexamined, indicating a deep-seated ambivalence towards those stragglers who had, so to speak, died 'on the job' long after the end of the war. The death of Shimada's fellow straggler, Kozuka Kinshichi, in relatively similar circumstances eighteen years later, in 1972, will allow us to explore this ambivalence again.

Less than a year after Shimada's death, in March 1955, four stragglers were found in New Guinea. For the first time, these men were referred to as 'living spirits of the war dead' (*ikite ita eirei*), and the stories of their survival in New Guinea and their reintegration into post-war Japan attracted a comparatively substantial amount of interest. The first report on the New Guinea stragglers originated from Australia. On 2 March, the *Asahi* printed a translation of an article that had appeared four days before in the *Sydney Sun Herald* describing how this group had come to stay in the mountains of New Guinea for ten years, and centring on the 'leader' of the group, Shimada Kakuo.³⁸ The *Asahi* article echoed the facts that had been established by the *Sydney Sun Herald*, although it did not convey the same tone: the *Sydney Sun Herald*'s title, 'Four "Dead" Japs', was reworked into 'Four Japanese Soldiers Survived in the Jungle'.³⁹ A month later, the weekly *Shūkan asahi* let Shimada tell his own story, in an article entitled: '*Janguru no jū-nen: ikite ita "yonin no eirei"*' ('ten years in the jungle: the four living "spirits of the war dead"'),⁴⁰ of which a summary follows.

Shimada had arrived in Rabaul via Manchuria on the last day of December 1942. In April 1944, during the Japanese retreat towards Dutch New Guinea, Shimada's battalion was ordered to set off on a five-hundred-kilometre march to join with the main force at Hollandia on the central north shore of New Guinea. During an attempt to speed up progress to Hollandia by using a raft, twenty-eight of the original ninety men were drowned in a flooded river. More lives were claimed by malaria, fatigue, hunger and attacks by New Guineans. They were still many miles south-east of their goal, and there were only twenty-one left, by the time the group learnt that the Allies had captured Hollandia. Convinced that it would only be a matter of weeks before Japanese forces recaptured Hollandia, the survivors decided on 17 June 1944 that they would wait it out in the jungle. They survived for some time on rations stolen from enemy stores but were discovered and attacked. Five of them managed to escape and went further into the jungle. There they attempted to become self-sufficient, and cleared some

land. Their efforts met with only limited success, however, and they often resorted to eating wild pigs, lizards, snakes and caterpillars. They carefully rationed the little salt and the bullets that they had taken from the bodies of dead soldiers rotting in the jungle. In 1947, one member of the group died of malaria. Before dying he had begged his comrades to kill him with a hatchet, and they had attempted to cheer him up by telling him that the Japanese Army would arrive very soon.

In June 1951 they were discovered by a New Guinean, and after overcoming initial diffidence on both sides, the stragglers and the villagers kept in regular contact. Although the villagers told them that the United States and Japan were 'friends' and that the Emperor was alive, the stragglers did not grasp the fact that the war was over. Then, in May 1954, the chief of the village came to visit them in their hut. Outside the hut, helmeted Dutchmen were waiting to take them to Hollandia and into custody, and it was there that they realised that the war had ended nearly ten years before. Almost a year later they were flown to Wewak to meet one of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare's 'bone-collecting' ships, which took them home.⁴¹

Many of the earlier features are present in the reportage on the New Guinea stragglers, including, for example, a lack of discussion about the war itself and the reasons that may have prevented these soldiers from accepting the possibility of Japanese defeat earlier. Similarly, the interest in the stragglers' way of life or in the apparent lack of romance between them and the female villagers, in their food, clothing and improvised shaving tackle, echoes earlier reports that had emphasized the 'Robinson Crusoe' aspect of straggler lifestyles.⁴² Indeed, the article by the group's leader Shimada in the weekly *Shūkan asahi* was accompanied by photographs of the stragglers in shorts, a map of New Guinea and also what might have been a file photograph of a New Guinean in full tribal attire, lending a slightly 'travelogue' flavour.⁴³ At the same time, however, these aspects were supplemented by a description of the stragglers' military bearing. Readers were told that the stragglers maintained a military hierarchy within the group, that they regularly trained with their weapons in readiness for combat, that they supported their dying comrade by promising the return of the Japanese Army and by telling tales of heroism and patriotism. It is not unlikely that Shimada became the spokesman for the group because as sergeant-major (*sōchō*) he was the highest-ranking soldier of the four.

A novel aspect of the reportage on these four stragglers is to be found in a follow-up article, published a month and a half after their return, on their adaptation to their homeland. This piece is particularly rich in information because in detailing the daily activities and concerns of the returnees it also provides a glimpse of the stragglers' impact on popular consciousness. On 28 April 1955, under the title 'The Four Soldiers: Three Hospitalised for "Strain"', the *Mainichi* published an article supplemented by photos of the stragglers either reading newspapers or, in the case of one of them, standing next to what is likely to be his own gravestone.⁴⁴ Two of them, Shimada Kakuo and Kojima Mamoru, had been particularly busy, participating in a number of public

meetings, including the Hikiage shinpō taikai (Rally of the Society for the Advancement of Repatriation), which had taken place in Hibiya Park in Tokyo on 21 March 1955. Some five thousand people had attended bearing placards saying 'bring back our missing' and 'find out if they are dead'.⁴⁵ The article further informed readers that some three weeks after their return, when the stragglers had undergone their first hospital health check, it was found that they were suffering from malaria and nutritional problems and that convalescence was required. Kojima and Shimada would have to spend one and two months respectively in hospital. A third straggler, Shimokubo Yoshio, had collapsed in the train on the way home to Miyazaki Prefecture from a meeting at the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare and been hospitalised near his home town. He too was expected to spend two months in hospital.⁴⁶

Not only had Shimada and Kojima participated in movements to speed up repatriation, but they had also assisted the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare with information about the deaths of their comrades and delivered in person mementoes of their dead comrades to their bereaved families. Shimokubo was busy scrupulously answering each of the fifty letters from around Japan that he had received since his return. The letters either congratulated him on making it home or asked him for clues about the fate of missing husbands and sons in New Guinea. Although Shimokubo's parents were most concerned with finding him a wife, Shimokubo was adamant that he should first do his duty to his missing comrades before thinking about himself. He also insisted that the Japan he had returned to was so unfamiliar that he felt the need to 'study society as if he were a first-year student'.⁴⁷ The fourth straggler, Yaegashi Mitsuyoshi, also got many letters, apparently ten a day, either asking him for information about the war in New Guinea or from women proposing marriage. He also received a number of adoption proposals inviting him, at the age of thirty-seven, to join a family and a business at the same time.⁴⁸

The letters sent to the stragglers reveal that many people were touched by the stragglers' stories, found them admirable and took the time to send letters of congratulations and even offer proposals of marriage or adoption. Earlier stragglers probably also received such letters, but it is striking that it was only now, ten years after the end of the war, that a national newspaper such as the *Mainichi* chose to give prominence to such positive attitudes. In other words, while this article confirms for us the existence of positive attitudes towards stragglers, it also confirmed for those who read the article in 1955 that it was publicly acceptable to voice feelings of admiration for the individuals in question. The *Mainichi* itself was tentative in its characterisation of the men as *ikite ita eirei* ('living spirits of the war dead'), enclosing the term within quotation marks, and reported admiration not in the main text of the article but only at 'second hand' by describing the letters sent to them. By leaving space for alternative reactions to the stragglers, the *Mainichi*'s article suggests that this admiration was neither universal nor taken for granted. In any case, the space devoted to the stragglers' connection with the wider public contrasts strongly with the lack of comment on such issues in 1951–1952.

With this article the *Mainichi* thus put a new emphasis on the ties between the stragglers and the general population, both through reports of the exchange of letters as mentioned above and through an interest in the stragglers' integration into Japanese society. That stragglers were often traumatised either physically or mentally and often had to be hospitalised was something that had been mentioned only in the case of the 1952 Saipan stragglers. In 1955, however, the stragglers' hospitalisation was tied in with the amount of work they had been doing on behalf of their dead comrades or in answering the many letters that came to them asking for information. But while the difficulties faced by the stragglers in returning to Japan were emphasised, so too were the personal concerns that had prompted people to write asking them for information, highlighting how some people attempted to make sense of their own experiences through those of the stragglers. In asking these returnees whether they knew a lost husband or son, whether they knew if and how he had died, or simply what it was like to fight in New Guinea, bereaved families attempted to understand and come to terms with the circumstances of their own loss. The stragglers thus became channels to an understanding, or at least to an attempt to understand, what it was that soldiers fighting and dying in New Guinea had gone through. The *Mainichi* article, then, showed how part of the population managed to embrace the stragglers as a link to the past, and so sought the commonalities, rather than the disparities, between their experience and that of other Japanese.

Public reactions to the last two groups of stragglers to appear in the mid-1950s confirm the shift in attitudes illuminated by the return of the New Guinea stragglers in 1955, showing in particular a much greater awareness of the stragglers as soldiers and of their group as ruled by the military hierarchy, and a tendency to refer to them respectfully as 'living spirits of the war dead'. In January 1956, the Japanese press reported that nine stragglers had surrendered to Indonesian troops on Morotai in December 1955. Then, in December 1956, four more were apprehended on Mindoro in the Philippines. In 1956 the number of articles in the print media about these people was still very small compared with the amount of attention that would be given to two stragglers from Guam four years later, and it was certainly minuscule compared with the fascination exerted by the stragglers of the 1970s. But in 1956 the stragglers were interesting enough to become the subject, in two cases, of substantial articles in weekly magazines. Interest in stragglers grew exponentially as the war receded into the past. Whereas in the early 1950s, only Anatahan warranted a longer reportage in the midst of a wave of straggler repatriations, in 1955–1956 each group was described in some detail.

The first mention of the stragglers hiding on Morotai appeared in the *Asahi* on 21 January 1956, in a small article on the lower half of page seven entitled 'Nine Japanese Soldiers Surrender'.⁴⁹ An article had apparently been published in an Indonesian newspaper five days before, describing the surrender of these soldiers to a detachment of the Indonesian Army a month earlier. The *Asahi* article gave their names and prefectures of origin (six of the stragglers were Taiwanese). In February, another two small articles appeared confirming that

the stragglers would shortly be repatriated.⁵⁰ On 26 February 1956 the weekly *Shūkan asahi* ran a two-page article on the returnees entitled ‘Twelfth-year “Battalion Repatriation”: the former Japanese soldiers who were alive on Morotai’, based on what the leader of the Morotai group, Kishi Keishichi, had told the Indonesian press.⁵¹

Kishi, originally from Yamagata Prefecture, had left Tokyo as a soldier in 1944. On the way south he and his comrades had been integrated into newly formed battalions in Taiwan which also included Taiwanese recruits. From Taiwan, Kishi was sent to Indonesia, arriving on Morotai just before the Allies landed in November 1944. A battle began as the Japanese troops were loading a ship, and their supplies were destroyed. The battalion then separated into small groups of a dozen or so in order to look for food. Some groups stayed on the beaches; others entered the jungle and went into the mountains. Kishi’s group went into the jungle on 19 September 1944, which was a mistake as they were unable to find any food. However, they were too far into the jungle to contact their superiors and afraid of enemy presence on the beaches, so they were stuck in the mountains. They succeeded in finding just enough food to stave off starvation, but had no medicine. In 1946, two of the group died of illness, leaving the other nine to survive as best they could. They did not build a hut until 1953, spending the intervening years, in Kishi’s words, ‘living like orang-utans’, scared that they would weaken themselves too much if they diverted energy away from foraging for food.

Although this article contained a reference to the exoticism of the stragglers, such as, for example, a question about the absence of women (which Kishi answered by putting forward a new name for Morotai: ‘Chastity Island’)⁵² or Kishi’s own description of the stragglers as orang-utans, the article did not dwell on the ‘bizarre’ meals that the stragglers had subsisted on, a topic which until then had been a staple of straggler descriptions. Rather, the reports on these stragglers centred on military themes presented in a positive way. Kishi’s position as group leader (which he achieved presumably partly by virtue of his rank as corporal), his apparent benevolence towards those under his charge, and the camaraderie and mutual dependence of the group members were emphasised in a positive manner. For instance, Kishi talked of the necessity, for survival, of friendship between the stragglers, who were referred to in this case as *senyū* (‘war buddies’): according to his account they ate out of a shared mess tin and talked intimately about their home towns and their homesickness.

The stragglers’ identity as ‘misplaced’ soldiers was also emphasised in this *Asahi* article. They were not deserters, according to Kishi, and so they had fully expected rescue by Japanese forces. This theme was taken up again when the eventual meeting of stragglers and Indonesian soldiers was described. The Indonesian soldiers congratulated the stragglers on having survived, insisted that they were neither prisoners of war nor war criminals, gave them cigarettes and clothes, and shook their hands. The stragglers, who did not know that the war was over until they were ‘captured’, also did not know, according to the article, of the ‘great changes that had swept over Asia, of the existence of many newly

rich countries, or of the independence of Indonesia'. The article awarded Kishi numerous accolades for encouraging the other stragglers to stay alive. When they despaired, Kishi would apparently 'cheer them up' by saying: 'the war is still going on. We can't die like dogs. When our army comes and saves us, we'll have to go to another front line'.⁵³ The article concluded by remarking that without Kishi's strength of spirit successful repatriation could not have taken place. The stragglers' military demeanour was evident from the photograph accompanying the article in which the group was lined evenly, five at the front and four at the back. Each individual was standing to attention in exactly the same pose: legs slightly apart, hands at the back, unsmiling, head straight.

The war and the military, then, both figured much more prominently in this account of stragglers than in those of the early 1950s. The description of them as soldiers now overrode their 'Tarzan' identity, which had been, as we have seen, the central theme of descriptions of stragglers a few years before. And Kishi's 'cheerful' admonition to his fellow stragglers that they had to survive in order to die heroically on another front line was seen as evidence of strength of spirit, ultimately responsible for the successful repatriation of the whole 'battalion'. Less than twenty years later, in the early 1970s, Kishi's words would have provoked pity, and condemnation of the kind of military codes and dogmas that had convinced people like him that the Japanese forces would eventually come back, and that it was preferable to hide in the jungle for twelve years rather than run the risk of becoming a prisoner of war. But while such pity was evident in the reactions to stragglers such as Yokoi (1972), Onoda (1974) and Nakamura (1974) in 1956, Kishi's words were presented as heroic. The war was, for once, quite clearly present as an issue, if indirectly. And it was a positive connection, both in the assessment of Kishi's attitude and in the assessment of developments in Asia since the war: the area was now one of prosperous independent nations, greatly changed, we can infer, from the days when they had been European colonies. In other words, readers were left to infer not only that the soldierly characteristics of the stragglers were admirable but that the war itself had resulted in positive outcomes for the countries of Asia.

The subject of former Japanese colonies also came up, albeit only briefly. More than half the group had, after all, been conscripted in Taiwan and left home in an Imperial Army battalion when their native country was a Japanese colony. Asked what their plans were, the Taiwanese stragglers' countenances, according to the *Shūkan asahi*, 'darkened', and some of them expressed a wish to remain in Indonesia and serve in the army there.⁵⁴ Beyond that, however, there was no reflection on the implications of Japanese imperialism for those soldiers. When Nakamura Teruo, the last known straggler, who had originally hidden with Kishi's group, was finally found on Morotai at the end of 1974, his nationality as an indigenous Taiwanese, and Japan's guilt or otherwise as a former colonial master, completely overrode any other considerations of his significance. Yet in 1956, while the war was mentioned in press reports, there was none of the kind of reflection on colonialism that would be present in the 1970s. The 1974 discovery of Nakamura on Morotai provoked a new wave of reporting on the

1956 Taiwanese stragglers' life in Japan, as we will see in the last chapter of this book, highlighting the problem of discrimination between soldiers from Japan and those from the former colonies. However, in 1956 the pre-war and wartime nationality of the stragglers had been only a minor aspect of their portrayal, which centred instead, as we have seen, on the military elements of their identity.

A few months after the return of the Morotai stragglers, yet another group was found, this time on the island of Mindoro in the Philippines. Initially, reports from that country were confusing. On 10 October 1956, the *Asahi* indicated that according to a reliable source some fifty Japanese were living amongst Mangian tribesmen in the mountains on the eastern side of Mindoro, adding that the Philippines government had asked for the assistance of the Japanese authorities in order to convince the stragglers to surrender.⁵⁵ Six days later a further report detailed the negotiations among local officials and the stragglers, the Japanese Embassy and the Philippines Army for a peaceful surrender.⁵⁶ By 31 October it was confirmed that four soldiers, Yamamoto Shigeichi, Iwai Nitarō, Izumida Masaji and Nakano Jūhei, had capitulated on the northern side of Mindoro.⁵⁷ Whether there was indeed a separate fifty-member-strong group of stragglers on the eastern side of Mindoro, quite apart from the group of four who surrendered in the northern part of the island, is not clear. Certainly, rumours concerning Japanese soldiers living amongst Mangian people would continue to circulate well into the 1970s. However, it is also possible that the group of four who did surrender was originally thought to number fifty, in all likelihood because of the very sketchy information on its whereabouts and composition.

The story of the men on Mindoro is not very different from that of other stragglers, except for the fact that they had not lived in complete isolation but had had some contact with Mangian people in the area. Retreating from American troops in January 1945, a small group had become separated from the main battalion and, pursued by American troops, escaped into the mountains. There they had built a hut and begun farming, all the while on the alert for both American mop-up operations and local guerrillas. The group was originally composed of nine men, but five had died of malnutrition and illness between 1952 and 1953. Although relations with neighbouring Mangian villagers were at first strained, by 1954 the stragglers and villagers were on friendly terms, spending time at one another's houses. One of the stragglers had even, reportedly, had a girlfriend in the village.⁵⁸ Eventually their existence became known to the local authorities, possibly because of a flood that forced a number of people to seek shelter in the mountains, where they might have heard rumours about the stragglers (possibly inflating their number to fifty in the process).⁵⁹ In any case, a peaceful surrender was negotiated some time in the second half of October 1956, and the stragglers were taken to Manila on 30 October. They returned to Japan a month later, on 29 November 1956, having spent slightly more than eleven years in the mountains of Mindoro.⁶⁰

As with the Morotai stragglers, the articles that dealt with the Mindoro group strongly emphasised their identity as soldiers. Again, this is not to say that their exotic aspects were entirely ignored: they were, however, downplayed in favour of

a much clearer identification of them as combatants. The assessment of their military qualities, echoing reports on the Morotai stragglers, was by no means as ambiguous as it would become by the time the last stragglers returned in the mid-1970s. For example, both the daily *Asahi* and the weekly *Shūkan sankei* reported that the stragglers had maintained the military hierarchy of their group.⁶¹ The highest-ranking of the stragglers, Yamamoto Shigeichi, had also been their leader and had apparently been addressed throughout the eleven years of exile by his title and an honorific, *chūtaichō-dono* (Company Commander).⁶² Yamamoto was also, it seems, the spokesman for the group, as the highest-ranking straggler from Morotai, Kishi, had been for his group a few months earlier. The *Shūkan sankei* linked the importance of maintaining military hierarchy to the fact that ‘these last Japanese soldiers had been at war for the last eleven years’.⁶³ The *Asahi* also reported that the stragglers had gone through a drill with their weapons twice a week throughout their exile and commented positively on the respectful demeanour of the stragglers, at the time of their return, towards the boxes that supposedly contained the remains of their dead comrades.⁶⁴ The *Shūkan sankei* referred to the returnees themselves as ‘living spirits of the war dead’, this time without quotation marks, and reported that, after they had sung the Japanese national anthem, *Kimigayo*, at the time of their capture, they had been praised as ‘great patriots’ (*rippa na aikokujin*) by the assembled Filipino soldiers.⁶⁵ Overall, then, the stragglers, together with their military demeanour, were portrayed in a positive light, in the same way as the Morotai stragglers had been a few months earlier.

But the *Shūkan sankei* went a step further, adding that:

Pre-war soldiers wanted to die and have their names recorded for eternity. However, the last of the soldiers – Yamamoto, Iwai, Izumida and Nakano – continued to resist, believing that their country could not be defeated, and displayed the real value of Japanese soldiers in surrender. They provide an interesting contrast to the attempted suicide of Tōjō Hideki, the author of the ‘manual for soldiers’ (*senjinkun*) that became the bible (*baiburu*) of the Japanese Army during the Pacific War.⁶⁶

This piece is especially significant because it was the only passage that placed a particular value judgement on the stragglers *in comparison* with what might be regarded as a prime symbol of the wartime years: the infamous booklet distributed to all soldiers that enjoined them to commit suicide ‘rather than suffer the shame of being captured’, and its ‘author’, the wartime prime minister General Tōjō Hideki. Apart from placing the stragglers in a historical context, this assessment also made the stragglers’ otherwise meaningless sacrifice of the last eleven years into something more admirable, and truer to the spirit of Japan’s wartime enterprise, than Tōjō’s failed suicide attempt. That Tōjō’s failed attempt to take his own life made him extremely unpopular in the early days of the Occupation is well known. However, scholars such as Yoshida have also contended that such ‘cool’ feelings towards the former prime minister did not

last, and that Tōjō's subsequent stance in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials brought a resurgence in his popularity.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the *Shūkan sankei* article shows that General Tōjō could still be compared unfavourably with stragglers, even a decade after the war.

Although the *Shūkan sankei*'s negative assessment of Tōjō and the doctrines of the military is apparently an isolated example of such value judgments, it seems to echo the discourse of the Occupation forces on the war as something that had been imposed on generally innocent people by a very small number of high-ranking and, in Tōjō's case (due to the botched suicide attempt), both cowardly and incompetent politicians and military men. The stragglers were in this particular instance considered to be 'better' soldiers than those Tōjō may have wished for, and better indeed than Tōjō himself. Importantly, the *Shūkan sankei*'s assessment of Tōjō also echoes the values and attitudes displayed in a great number of *senkimonos*, which generally lauded common soldiers and criticised high-ranking officers, as was shown at the beginning of this chapter. In any case, it is very clear that public attitudes to soldiers in 1956 had risen a long way from their immediate post-war level.

As mentioned earlier, however, the stragglers' 'exotic' dimension was not to be denied the public just because they were now also portrayed as dogged and disciplined survivors. In particular, Mindoro straggler Iwai's romance with a young woman from the neighbouring village was not ignored, nor were the nights spent drinking homemade banana alcohol, reminiscing, and singing army songs to the accompaniment of ingeniously devised instruments.⁶⁸ The *Asahi* expressed surprise at the stragglers' sartorial neatness on their return, a neatness that was unexpected in people who had been living in the jungle for eleven years, and commented on the stragglers' difficulty in speaking their mother tongue – or at least in speaking it 'normally', that is, without stilted military expressions.⁶⁹ An insistence on the stragglers' 'otherness' thus never disappeared entirely. However, as we have seen in this chapter, it coexisted with other, much more prominent concerns. In the case of those who returned in 1955–1956, stragglers were openly presented as soldiers, and as admirable soldiers at that.

Thus, the reactions to the stragglers from New Guinea, Morotai and Mindoro reflected the kind of discourses that also informed a great many of the *senkimonos*, and point to an atmosphere in which the war itself was not praised, but the soldiers' sacrifice, the benefits of rigorous discipline as advocated by the army, and the dedication and loyalty of straggler group members to one another and their cause were viewed positively and with none of the ambivalence that was to characterise the stragglers' reception in the 1970s. Such a change in attitude cannot be explained by pointing to differences in the organisation or the characteristics of the stragglers themselves: after all, the Anatahan stragglers (1951) never abandoned their military hierarchy, even if this had been the source of much tension. It is also clear that for the stragglers to abandon such a hierarchy would have amounted in their own minds to becoming 'deserters'. The necessity to survive in hiding was predicated on the idea that eventually the Japanese Army would return and that it was a Japanese

soldier's duty to wait for that moment rather than allow himself to be captured by enemy troops.

In that sense the stragglers of the early 1950s were no different from those of the mid-1950s, and the explanation for the difference in the way they were received must be sought in the environment to which they returned. One of the chief bestsellers among *senkimonō*, Itō Kentarō's 1956 *Rengō kantai no saigo* (The Last of the United Fleet), took as its central themes the denigration of high-ranking military leaders and the praise of the innocent, self-sacrificing, patriotic common soldiers, together with a nostalgia for the 'good old days'.⁷⁰ There should thus be nothing surprising in the resurgence of the same themes in the reception of the New Guinea, Mindoro and Morotai stragglers. Such themes were replicated, as we have seen, in an emphasis on the strength of spirit of the 'living spirits of the war dead', the benevolence of the leader of the group towards his men and the apparent comradeship amongst the stragglers. Both the *senkimonō* and the public reactions to the stragglers reflect an attitude towards the war as one in which the common soldier had been innocent but also ready to sacrifice himself for his nation.

This congruence in representations of soldiers in war-related literature and in media reactions to stragglers is important in several ways. First, it shows that newspapers and magazines share in and reinforce more general trends in the development of collective representations of the past. Second, it underlines the development of representations of the past over time. To the exotic and romantic image of the stragglers in the early 1950s had been added the understanding that they were in fact soldiers, and patriotic soldiers at that. But as the silence surrounding Shimada's death in 1954 shows, and the lack of interest in the uncertain future and homelessness of the Taiwanese stragglers found on Morotai in 1956 also shows, this theme was not unambiguous. What was extracted from the stragglers' experience was what was considered relevant to the collective memory of the war. If the media treatment of stragglers ignored the effects of Japan's imperialistic presence in Asia, or the unglamorous and meaningless death of a straggler on Lubang in 1954, it is because those aspects of the war could not yet be contained within the dominant frameworks of the representation of the past.

This is not to say that such dominant frameworks went completely unchallenged. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the 1950s are often seen as a period that fostered anti-war movements and attitudes. But if the decade witnessed the growth of pacifist attitudes among certain sections of the population, particularly students and highly educated professionals, this should not be taken to mean that such attitudes were the only reactions to the war at that time or that the same understandings were shared in popular culture. As has been shown, responses to the return of stragglers in the mid-1950s echo the kind of discourses espoused in the highly popular *senkimonō* and so suggest that, at the popular level at least, memories of the war, and of the character of soldiers, could still have positive dimensions. The contradictions in these memories should reinforce an awareness of the limits of the concept of memory as a homogenous, nationally unified phenomenon.

It is in the nature of collective memory to be fluid and constantly negotiated. As will be shown in the next chapter, reactions to the stragglers in 1959 and 1960 suggest that in a matter of only a few years the climate of remembrance that characterised the mid-1950s disappeared and the problem of stragglers achieved a new and different significance. The shift in the representations of stragglers from the early to the mid-1950s and, as will be shown in the next chapter, the later part of that decade, prompts reflection on the connection between temporal distance and the processes of remembering, and the constant challenges presented to dominant memories. The experiences and concerns of succeeding generations shape and reshape memory, and by the late 1950s those who had been children at the end of the war were becoming adults. They still shared in the production of public discourses with the generation who had lived through the war, but with the change of generations personal memories of the war were gradually evolving into collective ones. Towards the end of the decade the stragglers could be embraced as citizens and compatriots, and concern for their personal welfare came to transcend the political and ideological differences that were otherwise so conspicuous at that time. The stragglers' significance was seen to be 'national'. As we will see in the next chapter, however, they could now be integrated into a public discourse on the war only if they were portrayed as victims.

5 ‘But they are not gorillas’, 1959–1960

As we have seen in previous chapters, reactions to stragglers changed noticeably between the early and mid-1950s, highlighting the fluidity and complexity of public memories of the war in that decade. While the 1950s have often been identified with the development of pacifist ideals,¹ that picture should be complicated by an awareness of the variety of discourses about the past that existed during the decade. In the mid-1950s in particular, the return of stragglers made clear that the experience of soldiers could also be construed in positive terms of sacrifice and patriotism, and that it failed to fit easily within the boundaries of ‘victim consciousness’ or pacifism.

The focus given to the development of pacifist ideals and notions of victimhood in interpretations of the 1950s is due to a great extent to retrospective explorations of the underpinnings of the widespread protests that took place in 1960. These protests centred on opposition to the renewal of Japan’s military alliance with the United States under the terms of the United States–Japan Mutual Security Treaty and to the undemocratic methods used by prime minister Kishi Nobusuke’s Liberal Democratic Party government to ensure the renewed ratification of that treaty. The pacifist movement had been stimulated initially by the defeat of 1945 and later by a growing sense of insecurity in a world divided by the Cold War. The ‘Lucky Dragon Incident’ of 1954, in which a Japanese fishing boat was caught in the radioactive fallout of a nuclear bomb experiment on the Bikini Atoll in the Pacific, had galvanised Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons, further stimulating the rise of pacifist movements. Moreover, hostility to the presence of American troops on Japanese soil had also grown steadily, and fostered a number of disputes surrounding the legality of American bases. The movement against American bases culminated in the much-publicised outcome of the Sunakawa legal case in March 1959, in which the Tokyo District Court ruled that the presence of American military forces on Japanese territory was unconstitutional.

The crisis surrounding the 1960 renewal of the United States–Japan Mutual Security Treaty in itself boosted popular support for pacifist movements. The Security Treaty, first signed in 1951, provided the legal framework for the American defence of Japan and the continued presence there of American troops, and was subject to renegotiation at ten-year intervals. Japan’s post-war

alliance with the United States and the forthcoming revision of the Treaty had initially been an issue of concern for only a relatively small group of activists, but the movement for the revision of the Treaty gathered momentum with the outcome of the Sunakawa case in March 1959. Debate about the United States–Japan alliance became increasingly public over the next few months, and participation in the movement against revision of the Treaty broadened to include student and labour associations.²

By the time the bill for the revision of the Treaty was due to be presented to the Diet in May 1960, the situation was volatile. On 19 May 1960, prime minister Kishi Nobusuke decided to extend a Diet session in order to present the bill to a Diet from which protesting Socialist Party members had been forcibly removed. This sparked massive demonstrations and public unrest, bringing questions of democracy and pacifism to the attention of the entire nation. The extent of the protest made it necessary to cancel a planned visit by the American president Dwight D. Eisenhower and forced Kishi to resign from office on 19 July 1960.³ It was in the midst of this unsettled public atmosphere charged with ideological debates about the meaning of democracy, the interpretation of Japan's Constitution and Japan's position in a world divided by the Cold War, that stragglers once more returned to public consciousness.

In fact, news of stragglers surfaced at exactly the same time as two major events in the Security Treaty crisis. While the Sunakawa case was nearing its conclusion in the spring of 1959, searches were under way in Lubang for Onoda Hirō and Kozuka Kinshichi following the murder, at the end of January, of another Lubang resident. Three days after Kishi had forced the Security Treaty revision bill through the Diet on 19 May 1960, the first of two stragglers was found on Guam. A week later, when Tokyo was still seething with unrest, the two stragglers, again dubbed the 'last soldiers of the Imperial Army', were repatriated. It is important to note, however, that little direct connection was made in public discourse between the existence of stragglers and the ideals of pacifism and democracy that sustained the opposition to the revision of the Security Treaty. Perhaps surprisingly, the stragglers were not explicitly upheld in any attempt to legitimate the anti-war feelings that permeated the period. Although the respective news stories did not intersect, the return of stragglers in the midst of Japan's most serious post-war domestic crisis nevertheless provides an opportunity to examine memories of the war at a time of sharp ideological divisions within the nation's society and political system.

The movements and concerns that underpinned opposition to Kishi and to the renewal of the Security Treaty undoubtedly both reflected and moulded reactions to stragglers in 1959 and in 1960. By the end of the 1950s a discursive shift had taken place; the concerns that had informed reactions to stragglers only a few years before, and that included an interest in their patriotism, their sacrifices and the positive effects of their military training, were no longer visible to the same degree. Public understandings of the stragglers in 1959–1960 were certainly being shaped indirectly by wider concerns surrounding the vulnerable position of Japan in the Cold War. While in the early and mid-1950s pacifist discourses

had not been influential enough to affect public reactions to the return of stragglers, they had by the end of the decade achieved enough dominance to shape, albeit obliquely, the discussion surrounding these individuals.

The stragglers of 1959 and 1960 were overwhelmingly embraced in media reports as citizens, compatriots or brethren. Their repatriation was couched no longer in terms of capture but in those of rescue and even deliverance. They had become victims, fellow citizens in need of help. Their rescue was a problem that transcended party and ideological affiliations though at times it was subverted to convey particular political messages. The task of rescuing them fell to the 'nation' in a way that had never quite been articulated before. This had several implications: the stragglers were no longer, as we shall see, 'gorillas' but were now 'citizens' and 'compatriots'. The focus shifted from differentiation of the stragglers from other Japanese to the question of their integration into post-war Japanese society. The significance of their experience for the idea of the nationhood was now consciously explored; thus the focus of attention shifted from the islands of the Pacific to the stragglers' home towns and families. And, finally, the focus on the stragglers as citizens was correlated with an investigation into the problem of their repatriation at governmental level. The straggler problem, in that sense, 'came home' to Japan and demanded notice to a much greater degree than had previously been the case.

The surge of interest in the stragglers in this period correlates with an increasing distance from the war. Although the significance of the conflict was still a personal matter for a large section of the population, the nation's embrace of the stragglers also indicates that the returning soldiers had meaning at a level that transcended personal memory, which also explains their greater prominence in the media. The men were in the news for weeks at a time; not only daily papers but also weekly magazines devoted several pages to them. And the greater interest in them was due only in small part to the undeniable fact that the Lubang story unfolded especially dramatically in 1959, or that the survival of the Guam stragglers took place against greater odds than those experienced by previous stragglers. The increased attention given to these individuals, more fundamentally, reflects changes taking place within Japan. The stragglers of this period returned to a nation that was negotiating the significance of the last war at a basic level and consciously debating notions of nationhood, national identity and national history.

It is no wonder that the island of Lubang, and Lieutenant Onoda, became such powerful symbols of the Japanese straggler. From the moment Onoda's erstwhile comrade Akatsu Yūichi returned to Japan in June 1951 to his own calculated surrender in 1974, rumours and occasional confirmed reports of the existence of stragglers on Lubang bobbed in and out of the Japanese press. Previous chapters have noted that unsuccessful searches had first taken place on the island in 1952, then, after the shooting of Shimada Shōichi, in May 1954. Furthermore, leaflets urging surrender had been dropped on Lubang while the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare had been conducting a 'bone-collecting mission' in the Philippines from 20 January to 11 March 1958. Although the Bureau's records for that period do

not specifically mention Lubang, in 1959 its head testified before a parliamentary committee of inquiry (discussed later in this chapter) that the island had been on that particular mission's itinerary, even though the unsuccessful searches there in 1954 had failed even to establish whether the stragglers were alive or dead.⁴

Five years, then, had passed since the death of Shimada, when suddenly news reached Japan that stragglers were being held responsible for two recent shooting incidents on Lubang. According to communications from the Philippines, a Lubang woodcutter had been shot and wounded on the afternoon of 27 January 1959. Then, on 2 February, a Filipino labourer was shot and killed.⁵ Onoda himself does not offer much detail on these incidents in his memoirs, but he mentions that, while watching the construction of a road, his companion Kozuka suddenly noticed someone on the ridge above them. In Onoda's words,

I whirled around and fired toward the top of the ridge. There was a cry from that direction, as somebody fell over on the other side of the ridge. We hurried down the hill into the forest.⁶

Onoda's role in the shooting was not known for certain until 1974, but in 1959 the death of the labourer on Lubang meant, as far as the Japanese press was concerned, that the stragglers were alive. If there was any doubt on that score, it was limited to the minds of the most sceptical of bureaucrats. On 4 February 1959, for example, the *Asahi* announced: 'this time, a murder!', spelling out very clearly its conviction that the two stragglers Onoda and Kozuka had shot and killed a Filipino labourer and that they had managed to flee into the jungle afterwards.⁷ The other major dailies echoed the certainty of the *Asahi* regarding the culprits' identity.

The story was to develop even more dramatically a few weeks later. On 13 March a search party, prompted by the murder, and consisting of two staff from the Manila Japanese Embassy and seven Filipino policemen, were checking for traces of the stragglers when shots rang out. The stragglers attacked the search party, injuring one of the policemen. The policemen returned fire, and the stragglers disappeared as fast as they had come. The embassy staff who witnessed the shoot-out were unable to confirm that the attackers were indeed the stragglers since the attackers had stood against the light, but nevertheless the idea that the stragglers were in fact alive was, again, strongly promoted. Headlines announced: 'The Lubang soldiers appear; shoot at the joint rescue mission; flee into jungle when police return fire'.⁸

Over the next two months there were frequent reports on the progress of the search parties. Initial detachments of Filipino policemen were soon joined by members of the stragglers' families and officials of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, but no trace of the Lubang stragglers would be found. Onoda remembers:

Not long after that [i.e. the shooting on the ridge] the large search party of 1959 arrived from Japan to look for us. 'The Americans seem to be starting

another one of their fake rescue operations,’ I said. ‘What a nuisance!’ growled Kozuka. ‘Let’s move somewhere where it’s quiet.’ We shifted to an area toward the south where we could not hear the loudspeakers . . . [E]very time they came near us, we went farther into the jungle.⁹

The searches on Lubang brought no results, not even the certainty that the stragglers were alive. A bullet extracted from the carcass of a water buffalo (another suspicious death attributed to the stragglers) was sent to Tokyo and analysed, but the evidence was not conclusive. It was not of the type used by the Japanese Imperial Army, but the stragglers might have got their hands on other weapons.¹⁰ Members of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, staff of the Japanese Embassy in Manila, Onoda’s older brother Toshio, Kozuka’s younger brother Fukiji and dozens of Filipinos continued searching Lubang for months – without success. On 29 November the search parties, having failed to find any trace of the stragglers dead or alive, left the island.¹¹ On 11 December the Bureau decreed that since there was no concrete evidence of the existence of the Lubang stragglers, it should be assumed that they had died of wounds shortly after the shooting of Shimada in 1954. According to Kahn, it was widely believed that blaming the stragglers for the shootings had been a pretext.¹² The *Shūkan asahi* mournfully announced its last article on Lubang, entitling it ‘they can’t be alive any more’ (*mō ikite wa imai*). The article raised the possibility that the rumours about the stragglers had been based on nothing more than a collage of mistaken assumptions, and hinted that the stragglers might on occasion have proved convenient scapegoats for murders committed by others.¹³ The Bureau’s decision, at the end of 1959, to decree that Onoda and Kozuka had died in 1954 and to ignore any further rumours coming out of Lubang, was to destroy its credibility in the early 1970s, when Kozuka was killed on Lubang and Onoda returned to Japan.

By the end of 1959, nearly a year of fruitless searches had led to a considerable decrease in Japanese public interest in the stragglers. But in February and March, the two months that followed the first reports on the Lubang shootings, that island and the problem of stragglers received an unprecedented amount of attention. The news of the shooting incidents soon fostered a widespread campaign to rescue the stragglers, involving a number of citizens’ groups as well as the state itself. This campaign also clearly redefined the stragglers as compatriots and, importantly, victims, not so much of the wartime state as of the failure of the current Japanese government to do anything to bring them home. The stimulus for this campaign was the threat apparently posed to the stragglers’ lives by the Lubang police and the Philippines Army. It was the *Asahi* that first announced that two detachments of police had been sent to Lubang in response to the murder and that the head of the Philippines national police force had given orders to ‘shoot to kill’ if necessary.¹⁴ The *Asahi* announced three weeks later that the report of the ‘shoot-to-kill’ order had been mistaken and that both the police and Lubang residents were favourably disposed towards finding the stragglers alive and having them repatriated without incident. Even so, the news

of the alleged ‘shoot-to-kill’ order set the tone for the treatment of stragglers in the Japanese media from then on.¹⁵

The Onoda and Kozuka families were also instrumental in generating public interest in the rescue of the stragglers, highlighting the danger faced by Kozuka and Onoda should they happen to be found by trigger-happy soldiers or policemen. Onoda’s father, Tanejirō, later wrote that he was convinced that his son’s rescue was too important to leave in the hands of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare. He soon decided that what was necessary was to whip up public sympathy for the cause of the Lubang stragglers, and sent his wife (Tamae, aged seventy-four) and some of Onoda’s former schoolmates to Tokyo to plead with the public. They set up two enormous banners at the main entrance (Yaesuguchi) of Tokyo Station which read ‘Don’t kill my son’ and ‘Save our friend’, and distributed leaflets.¹⁶ Kahn maintains that the Yaesu entrance of Tokyo station was, for some days, marked by the presence around Onoda’s mother of crowds of sobbing office workers.¹⁷ Certainly, the actions of the Onoda and Kozuka families were widely reported in the media and provoked an unprecedented surge of public sympathy.¹⁸ The theme of ‘deliverance’ rather than ‘capture’ was thus set. Over the next few weeks the movement to rescue the stragglers grew. It also moved very publicly from an individual to a state action, culminating in a resolution adopted in the Diet squarely placing the responsibility for the rescue of the stragglers in the hands of the nation as a whole.

There is ample evidence of the extent of popular and public espousal of the stragglers’ cause in the variety of private and public declarations of support for them in the Japanese newspapers. On 20 February the *Mainichi* reported that Onoda’s mother and childhood friends had petitioned the House of Representatives, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Philippines Embassy in Tokyo.¹⁹ According to the *Asahi*, the latter was presented with a petition for clemency for the stragglers signed by 300,000 people which was sent forthwith to President Carlos P. Garcia.²⁰ Not only were individual Japanese signing petitions, but non-governmental organisations also took part in the campaign. For example, the Osaka Branch of the Lions Club was reported to be in contact with its Manila counterpart and was raising money to send Onoda’s and Kozuka’s mothers over to Lubang, where the sound of their voices would, it was hoped, convince the stragglers to surrender.²¹ The Association of Disabled Veterans (Nihon shōigunjin kai) asked for help with the rescue and safeguard of stragglers from its counterpart in the Philippines, and got a promise of cooperation.²² Support for the stragglers and the actions of the Kozuka and Onoda families was also expressed in the letters that reached the editors of the main daily newspapers. In the *Asahi* on 23 February, for example, a woman deeply moved by descriptions of Onoda’s mother professed her sympathy and demanded that the government take action to prevent the stragglers from being shot.²³ Support extended beyond the shores of Japan: on 5 February, for example, the *Mainichi* reported that a visiting Filipino cleric – a former chaplain in the Philippines Army, and a survivor of the Bataan death march of 1942 – had met Onoda’s brother in Tokyo and promised he would do all within his power to help rescue (*sukuidasu*) the stragglers.²⁴

The extent of public support for the stragglers' cause and the ordeal undergone by their families, as well as the attendant media interest in this support, contrast sharply with the scanty reports on earlier stragglers. In 1950, for example, after the return of the sole woman from Anatahan, the families of the remaining Anatahan stragglers had pleaded with the government to get their relatives off the island and repatriated, but this was hardly mentioned in the press, nor is there any evidence that the Japanese government took any practical steps to get the Anatahan men to surrender at that time. Similarly, when Shimada was shot in 1954 there was little mention of his family's mourning. Yet in 1959 the Lubang stragglers struck a chord with the Japanese public. The resulting 'Save the stragglers' movement was highly instrumental in the redefinition of the stragglers as 'citizens' and 'compatriots', and also very much as 'victims'. A further striking aspect of the reaction to stragglers in 1959 is the very public appropriation by the state of the problem of their rescue. It was the state's discourses emphasising the stragglers' identity as Japanese citizens in need of rescue that were the strongest and loudest of all public pronouncements at this time. The problem of how to rescue the stragglers, along with testimonies from the head of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, the stragglers' families and the former Lubang straggler Akatsu Yūichi, was laid before a special committee of the Diet on 20 February. The committee's deliberations culminated in a resolution that was passed unanimously by the Diet exactly a week later.

The Special Committee on the Repatriation of Citizens Overseas and Aid to Bereaved Families (Kaigai dōbō hikiage oyobi ikazoku engo ni kansuru tokubetsu iinkai) had been meeting at regular intervals, several times a year, since 1949. It considered all questions relating to repatriation of Japanese citizens, including the difficulties faced by those interned in China or the USSR and their families in Japan, but also such matters as the allocation of pensions to the families of non-repatriated citizens, the determination of military salaries for soldiers whose repatriation had been delayed, and medical assistance to those who required hospitalisation after their repatriation. It also considered problems relating to compensation for savings formerly held by Japanese colonists in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria and lost during or after repatriation. The discussions of the committee, then, were wide-ranging: in 1953, for example, it also considered the repatriation of war criminals interned overseas and amnesties for those interned in Japan. Over time the issue of internees in the USSR and China came to form the core of the committee's discussions, although other matters, such as the dispatch of missions to collect remains of the war dead (the bone-collecting missions mentioned in earlier chapters), were also regularly raised. There were also times when particular situations demanded discussion, such as rumours about stragglers, for example, or matters related to the presence after the war of Japanese citizens in Vietnam or other parts of South-East Asia.²⁵

The committee had considered the matter of Lubang briefly in 1952 and in 1954; the matter of the shoot-out on Lubang in 1959 also came within its sphere of interest. But whereas in earlier years little or no public notice had been taken of the committee's deliberations regarding stragglers, in 1959 the government's

embrace of the Lubang stragglers' welfare was highly publicised. It was also strongly articulated as transcending party affiliations. On the one hand, a conscious insistence on the stragglers' transcendence of party politics and ideology provides an indirect indication of the enormous partisan tensions that permeated Japanese politics in the late 1950s. On the other, it indicates the stragglers' new status as national icons.

The committee had met in a session that straddled the New Year in 1958–1959, continuing a discussion of repatriations from China and the USSR, and also considering amendments to the law which declared dead, according to a defined formula, those missing people whose whereabouts could not be ascertained after the end of the war. These amendments also gave the Ministry of Health and Welfare discretionary powers to reverse those judgements: in other words to resurrect, on paper, those who had falsely been declared dead. There were of course a number of implications attendant on these amendments, particularly where pensions for bereaved families were concerned. If, for example, a soldier had been mistakenly declared dead in the accounting carried out during the Occupation but was later proven to be alive, the family would not henceforth be able to claim the pension payable on his death. On the other hand, if a soldier had been listed as missing and nothing had been heard from or about him since the war, then it was now possible, nearly fifteen years after the conflict, to have him officially recorded as dead. This would entitle his family retrospectively to the same pension as those whose relatives' deaths in battle had been proven. Obviously, these amendments also raised the issues of whether the families of those missing would accept the government's judgement that their relatives had died, and whether it was reasonable for the government to expect the waiting families to accept its unilateral judgment as to their deaths.²⁶ Uncannily, it was in the midst of this discussion that the Lubang stragglers reappeared.

On 20 February, a special hearing of the committee took place where the situation on Lubang was discussed in great detail. This hearing included a testimony from the former straggler Akatsu, who had been repatriated from Lubang in 1951, and a detailed report from the head of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, Kawano Shigeo, on the searches that had taken place on Lubang so far. Participants also included, amongst others, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Bō Hideo, one of the parliamentary members for Wakayama, Onoda's home prefecture, who attended the meeting as an observer.

Kawano, for the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, began his report by explaining how the battalions of the Japanese Army stationed on Mindoro and Lubang had been overrun when American troops landed in March 1945, and how operations first conducted on Lubang by the American Army and, then by both armies jointly after the Japanese surrender, successfully rounded up most of those still hiding in the interior. Kawano mentioned Akatsu's return in 1951, Shimada's death in 1954 and the continuing assumption that Onoda and Kozuka must still be alive. He then went on to detail the searches that had taken place on Lubang: the dropping of leaflets over the island in 1952, the difficulties in obtaining

permission from the Philippines authorities to search the island, approval from the Philippines for a search party to visit Lubang for two weeks in 1954, and again the dropping of leaflets over the island during the 1958 bone-collecting expedition. Kawano also testified to the lack of results of these search parties, and insisted there was no proof that could unquestionably attribute the two recent incidents on Lubang to stragglers.²⁷ Akatsu then painted a picture for the committee of the stragglers' life on Lubang and of his own decision to surrender. He described the difficulties of survival: foraging for food, keeping dry in the wet season, preserving bullets and so on. Next, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the committee that, although there was no proof Onoda and Kozuka were alive and had shot anyone, it was necessary to proceed on the assumption that they were alive, partly because this was the assumption that informed the actions of the Philippines authorities. Furthermore, what was most disturbing in the eyes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the allegation that the Philippines army had been given orders to shoot to kill. In the judgment of the Foreign Affairs official, 'such orders would seem beyond comprehension in this day and age,' and the allegations ought not to be taken too seriously.²⁸

The committee members were also given the opportunity to ask questions. A member of the Socialist Party, Akanegakubo Shigemitsu, took the floor first. Were the stragglers persisting (*gambaru*) because they thought the war was still going on, or did they know the war was over but were afraid of being killed if they came out? Akatsu replied that to his mind they must have understood the war was over after the arrival of the 1954 search party but were afraid to come out, expecting retribution for the many murders they had committed on Lubang. Did the stragglers still have ammunition, and, if so, how many rounds, in Akatsu's estimate? Akatsu replied that Onoda and Kozuka probably had ample ammunition; that they looked after their weapons very carefully and were very sparing with bullets. And, although it would indeed be a lot to ask, would Akatsu himself be prepared to take part in a rescue mission? Akatsu replied he was, for which the committee expressed the government's thanks.²⁹ Various other questions were put to Akatsu regarding the size of the island, the frequency with which islanders visited the jungle, the kind of food the stragglers ate and the likelihood of their survival to this point in time, questions which Akatsu answered in considerable detail.

The records of the committee for 20 February demonstrate, through the extensive interest shown in the Lubang stragglers' state of mind, the point that the nature of the stragglers' training as soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army was quite alien to the committee members. Importantly, however, the records also show how the stragglers could be used to make political points. The differing platforms of the Liberal Democratic Party and its main opponent the Socialist Party are clearly visible, even if ultimately there was consensus on the importance of having the stragglers repatriated (the term used for the stragglers was *kata*, a term for 'person' notably implying respect). By far the lengthiest speech, during that session, was that of Yamashita Harue of the Liberal Democratic Party. Yamashita expressed her hope that Onoda and Kozuka were

still alive and berated previous governments for having failed to rescue (*sukuidasu*) the stragglers. Yamashita argued that there must surely be methods of gaining their trust and proposed that the searchers wear ragged clothes and spend time in the jungle in order to resemble the stragglers, thus minimising the chances of frightening or antagonising them. Significantly, Yamashita also insisted that the safe rescue of the stragglers was a matter of 'the greatest importance', 'a humanitarian' gesture, one that demanded every possible effort on the part of the government. And the justification for this went beyond concern for the stragglers' relatives.

This is not just a matter of thinking about friends, or thinking about relatives. In my view, it is crucial that we avoid giving the impression ... that it is well enough for these people's lives to be dealt with lightly when they are needed [by sending them to the front during the war], but that, the moment they are no longer needed, we can just abandon them, and refuse to help them. I also feel strongly that we must avoid making today's Japanese youth think [that this is the government's stance].³⁰

And this was why, according to Yamashita, it was so very important for this committee – but also for the whole government – to apply itself fully to the task of bringing the stragglers (*sono kata*) back safely.

Yamashita further expressed concern that Onoda (Kozuka seems to have disappeared from Yamashita's rhetoric) would be put on trial in the Philippines for the crimes he had committed on Lubang. This was to be avoided at all costs, she argued: compensation to the Philippines would be paid where necessary, but the government should do everything in its power to make sure that Onoda was returned to Japan, where 'the whole of the population would protect him'. The latter concern was answered rather dryly by the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who reminded Yamashita that the stragglers had not yet been found but that, should the situation arise, one could expect the Philippines government to act as it had when stragglers had been found on Mindoro in 1956 and allow for the men's immediate repatriation.³¹

Yamashita's rhetoric was clearly focused on the government's responsibilities towards the stragglers, and was a reflection – perhaps a calculated one – of popular sentiment regarding these individuals. Yamashita was, after all, a representative of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party whose ties with numerous pressure groups, including war veterans' and war victims' groups, are well known. According to Scalapino and Masumi, writing a few years later, groups affiliated to the Liberal Democratic Party included the League of Repatriates from Overseas with three million members, the Japan Veterans' Association with one and a half million and the Association of Bereaved Families, which comprised nearly two million families.³² In view of these links it is hardly surprising that Yamashita's central argument rested on the duty of the state to ensure the safe 'rescue' and repatriation of these stragglers, and hinted at a loss of confidence on the part of its citizens if it did not.

Importantly, however, the other committee members did not dispute Yamashita's argument, even if it was occasionally tempered by the voice of a lone bureaucrat, such as the above-mentioned representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who reminded them that there was no proof the stragglers existed. The points raised by Yamashita reflected, one would assume, party policy and the voice of powerful constituents. Nevertheless, once raised, her proposals were adopted as a matter of course by the others. Although particular points were refined (involving lengthy discussions about the best way to gain the stragglers' trust, or the possibility that they might have been aware of the indictment for war crimes of former prime minister General Tōjō Hideki and other wartime government leaders, and feared the same retribution), nobody on the committee seems to have disagreed with the central thrust of Yamashita's argument. After two hours, and convoluted expressions of gratitude on behalf of Onoda's home prefecture by the member for Wakayama, the meeting of 20 February drew to a close.³³

Five days later, on 25 February 1959, the committee reconvened and unanimously agreed on the importance of drafting a parliamentary resolution on the problem of the Lubang stragglers. After hearing the latest news from the Japanese Embassy in Manila regarding the investigations on Lubang, the committee focused again on the responsibilities of the Japanese government in this affair. The argument that had been put forward by Yamashita five days earlier was reiterated. This time, however, it was the efforts of the Socialist Party members in criticising the government that were most prominent. Ukeda Shinkichi, a member of that Party, agreed that the rescue of the stragglers was a humanitarian matter and one that had international implications, but he also conveyed his indignation regarding the apparent callousness and insensitivity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, who apparently were still not convinced that the stragglers were alive and that special steps should be taken to find them. Ukeda reminded bureaucrats in very emotional tones that it was Japanese people who were under discussion, human beings (as opposed to non-Japanese and animals), and maintained that a warmer and more wholehearted approach to the stragglers' rescue would possibly meet with more success.³⁴

Another member of the Socialist Party took the same bureaucrats to task over the Japanese government's lack of recognition of the suffering endured by the population of Lubang throughout the stragglers' presence on their island. The representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs skilfully attempted to evade the point by saying that the Japanese government could hardly acknowledge the suffering of the people of Lubang if there was no conclusive evidence that this suffering had been caused by stragglers, but this obliqueness was again taken as a sign of the heartlessness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁵ In fact, the committee only rarely raised the fact that the people of Lubang lived in fear of their lives because of the Japanese stragglers, and reference to the question in this case was clearly intended chiefly as ammunition against the way the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had handled the problem. The other committee

members certainly did not dispute the need for the Japanese government to acknowledge in some way the existence of the stragglers' victims in the Philippines, but the discussion soon returned to possible methods of convincing the stragglers to come out.

Although the political point-scoring of the opposing parties shines through the records, it is important to note that this squabbling had no impact on the committee's ability to reach a consensus on what should be done. The committee concluded that the government should draft a resolution containing the points that had been discussed, namely that the safe rescue of these citizens was a concern of the state and that the state should do all in its power to avoid the prosecution of the stragglers by the Philippines government. Just as there were no dissenting voices on the committee, there were to be none when the resolution was passed in the Diet two days later. The evening editions of the major newspapers, on 27 February, all emphasised the non-partisan, unanimous character of the resolution, which read as follows:

It is already fourteen years since the war, and we have been informed that there are a number of fellow citizens surviving in Southeast Asia. This is extremely regrettable from a humanitarian point of view. The government, on this occasion, should again seek the co-operation of the various countries involved, and plan investigations into the whereabouts of those citizens, taking steps, in particular, to ensure the safe repatriation of the two stragglers on Lubang.³⁶

The entire process of reaching this resolution had been extensively reported in the media – again, an indication of the degree of public interest in the matter. The politician Yamashita Harue, in particular, had been interviewed by the press following the committee meeting of 20 February, and her views had been widely reported. The *Mainichi*, for example, quoted Yamashita as saying that the repatriation of stragglers was the responsibility of the state (*kokka*), and that it was shameful that the families of the stragglers had so far carried this responsibility alone; this was an international embarrassment for Japan. Furthermore, the stragglers, once rescued, should be delivered safely into the hands of the Japanese government; they should not be prosecuted for murder in the Philippines. These views were also reiterated by the representative of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare. The newspapers' insistence on the unanimity of the decision suggests a clear appreciation of the divisiveness of other political issues at the time.³⁷

Ultimately, the stragglers transcended party politics because their appeal was so broad. They were, as noted above, no longer referred to primarily as soldiers: they were now 'people' (*kata*) or 'compatriots' (*dōbō*). The question of their surrender had become the question of their rescue, and although this had always been a concern of the state, as mentioned in previous chapters, the public emphasis on the state's responsibility had now become very marked. As was evident in the case of the discussions of the special parliamentary committee,

both the main political parties fully supported the idea that the ‘nation’ had somehow failed so far in not rescuing such citizens, and that it was a matter of the utmost importance both for Japan’s standing overseas and also for the image it projected to its own population at the time. Certainly, neither party was going to risk alienating its electorate by refusing to take part in an issue of such ‘humanitarian’ and emotive import as the rescue of the stragglers. Political parties on opposite sides of the spectrum are generally united on issues that seem to galvanise the whole nation or society, and in this case the rescue of the stragglers presented such an issue. There is no doubt that the politicians who took part in the special committee hearings were responding to the high degree of popular interest in the rescue of the stragglers mentioned earlier in the chapter. Indeed, letters to the editor also reiterated the themes of the stragglers as citizens or compatriots and of their rescue as a pressing duty for the government. On 23 February the *Asahi*, for example, printed two such letters, one from a housewife and the other from a student. The first demanded, ‘as a fellow citizen’ (*onaji kokumin no hitori toshite*), that the government act quickly to save the stragglers, while the second pleaded with the government not to make empty promises but to do everything to rescue the two lost ‘compatriots’ (*dōbō*). Both in public and in parliamentary discourse, the stragglers’ rescue was presented as a humanitarian (*jindōteki*) issue, and one that was the duty of the nation as a whole. The problem of the stragglers had, in other words, finally hit ‘home’.

On the other hand, the question of the war itself, or of dissenting interpretations of its meaning, failed absolutely to intrude on the committee’s discussion of the stragglers, even though the two political parties were often at loggerheads in the wider political arena over related issues. That such broader matters did not intrude on discussions of the stragglers is certainly understandable on one level in that the desperate, dangerous circumstances in which the stragglers were living had to be given higher priority. Few people would deny that their repatriation was a humanitarian matter. Other issues regarding war and commemoration, such as the status of the Yasukuni Shrine, had spawned fundamental disagreements between conservative and progressive parties in the recent past.³⁸ By contrast, the highly publicised consensus on what to do about the stragglers was certainly an indication of the degree to which they were acknowledged to be tugging at the heartstrings of the entire population.

And yet this is not to say that the two main political parties acted from similar motives: as has been shown above, the question of the stragglers could be subverted to reflect the agenda of the different parties. In the case of the Liberal Democratic Party’s Yamashita, the stragglers issue could be turned into an appeal for the nation to repay its debt to those who had sacrificed themselves for the nation at the battlefield. This was certainly the subtext of Yamashita’s discourse on the necessity to rescue them in order to show the ‘youth of Japan’ that the government would not abandon those who fought a war once the need to fight was gone. Similarly, for the Socialist Party an embrace of the stragglers’ cause could be used to expose the alleged heartlessness of the bureaucrats of the government in power, which was, of course, a Liberal Democratic Party government.

The rare unanimity on all substantive issues between the conservative and progressive parties was not viewed without cynicism. Two cartoons clearly illustrate the fact that the motives behind the parties' fervent embrace of the stragglers were questioned, at least in some quarters. The first (see Fig. 5.1) appeared in the evening edition of the *Mainichi* on the day following the committee members' declaration to the press that the repatriation of stragglers was a matter of national importance. The cartoon depicts the stragglers emerging from the jungle in a luxurious horse-drawn carriage. The caption, poking fun at the politicians' competition to seem the most caring about the safe repatriation of the stragglers, reads: 'The soldiers of Lubang: We'd like to see them repatriated in a ceremonial state carriage at least'. On 1 March, the *Mainichi* carried a cartoon (see Fig. 5.2) depicting two politicians, one each from the Socialist and the Liberal Democratic Parties, standing in front of a bush. Out of the bush emerge the astonished faces of the stragglers. Waving Japanese flags, the politicians ask: 'Hey, war buddies, which one of us will you surrender to?'

Apart from the cynicism expressed in such cartoons, however, there seems to have been little dissent in the construction of the stragglers as citizens and of their repatriation as rescue. The question of the stragglers' culpability in shooting at and occasionally killing Lubang residents – the terrorisation of part of the



Figure 5.1 Cartoon by Katō Yoshirō. 'The soldiers of Lubang: We'd like to see them repatriated in a ceremonial state carriage at least'.

Source: *Mainichi shimbun*, evening edition, 22 February 1959.



おい戦友、どちらに投降する？ 那須慶輔

Figure 5.2 Cartoon by Nasu Ryōsuke. ‘Hey, war buddies, which one of us will you surrender to?’

Source: *Mainichi shimbun*, 1 March 1959.

Lubang population in other words – was not raised publicly. In the committee, of course, this had come under review, but only in so far as it affected Japan’s image in the Philippines and as a way of chastising the bureaucrats who had handled the investigations, as we have seen. In public discourse, by contrast, it was the stragglers who had become victims: an irony of enormous proportions considering the circumstances. The point that the portrayal of the stragglers as victims might have been extremely irritating to the people of Lubang was rarely raised. The stragglers were not, this time, referred to as ‘living spirits of the war dead’ as had been those who had returned only three or four years previously. Nevertheless, the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Lubang explicitly warned, in a memorandum addressed to the Special Committee, that in order to secure the goodwill of the people of Lubang and of the Philippines in general, one had to be careful of the treatment given to stragglers at home and to stop ‘making those who surrendered into heroes in Japan’.³⁹ As this warning shows, the possibility that they might be made into heroes was recognised, and considered by some to be undesirable in the interests of cordial relations with the Philippines. There is no evidence, in the public sphere at least, that the stragglers’ terror campaign against the Lubang population was ever construed as any kind of admirable resistance to Japan’s defeat. The stragglers’ crimes on Lubang were not condoned so much as overlooked.

But whereas three or four years earlier the print media had acknowledged the positive soldierly qualities of stragglers and tentatively referred to them as ‘living spirits of the war dead’, in 1959 such labels were not applied to the Lubang stragglers at all, an indication of the growing importance of pacifist ideals in the late 1950s. In a sense, the transformation of the stragglers into

fellow citizens, and into victims, brought them into alignment with the population as a whole; and their experience was one to which the whole population, not only those who had been at the front, could relate. The transformation of the straggler into a fellow citizen, a compatriot, had as a corollary the idea that the straggler's experience was a national experience in relation to the war. But, as Yoneyama has shown, such national experience had during the 1950s been increasingly reworked as the basis of pacifism.⁴⁰ It is an indication of the fluidity of memory and of the contests for dominance among different memories that while the stragglers could be represented as soldiers in the mid-1950s, public discourse had shifted so much by 1959 that they could now be represented only as victims.

A letter to the editor composed by a student gives a good indication of this new discourse:

Although it is often said that this is no longer the 'post-war' period, we Japanese are still recovering from the tragedy of the last war. There are many problems that still need resolution, but we are enjoying peace now. However, two of our fellow countrymen are still living within the tragedy of the war, and at this moment, they are in danger of death. There was a news report stating that they might be shot. We Japanese, and our government, have a duty to save these two people. At this time when the government is not making any of its 'active policies' a reality, it is the duty of the public to promote the cause of their rescue. It is the actual rescue of those two people, rather than the declamation of idealistic slogans, which will decry war, and show a love of peace.⁴¹

This letter reflects the notion of the stragglers as 'compatriots' and the conviction that their rescue was the government's duty. Importantly, however, it portrays their rescue as a gesture demonstrating a 'love of peace'. It is certainly telling that a 'student', and therefore someone who could have experienced the war only as a small child, wrote this letter. On its own, such a letter might have little significance. But as part of a reaction to stragglers that contrasts with an earlier one, less than five years old, where soldiers were soldiers and not so much compatriots; where they were spirits of the war dead, not victims of a civilian government; where the war, as much as it was a tragedy, bred strength of spirit and comradeship, the publication of this letter in a space devoid of positive comments on the war must be seen as a symptom of changes in the discursive framework surrounding that war. The second part of this chapter will support these assertions, by showing that the return from Guam of two stragglers a year later was interpreted very similarly.

In May 1960, Itō Masashi and Minagawa Bunzō were discovered on Guam, where they had hidden, mostly together, for the last sixteen years.⁴² Like other Guam stragglers, they had been separated from their respective battalions after the American invasion of July 1944, and had survived the first mop-up operations amongst ever-dwindling groups of fellow stragglers, the last of whom had died around 1954. (In 1972, Yokoi Shōichi would be found hiding,

ironically, quite close to the spot where Itō and Minagawa were found.) The discovery of a possible straggler was first announced in Japan on 21 May 1960, in the evening edition of the *Asahi shimbun*. According to this report a Japanese man wearing dirty shorts that looked like the remains of a military uniform had been captured by Guam islanders and brought to the American authorities. Furthermore, this man seemed convinced that the war was still going on.⁴³ This was Minagawa, who had been discovered by Guam islanders that morning while out alone looking for crabs in a river on the southern part of Guam. Minagawa tried to escape, but he was weak from malnutrition and easily caught. According to a later report, the two islanders took Minagawa to the main road, hoping to hitch a ride into a nearby town and drop him off at the police station, but because he looked so dirty and unkempt no cars would stop.⁴⁴

The next day, newspapers in Japan announced confirmation from Guam that a soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army had been found. On Guam, Minagawa had difficulty understanding that he was safe. Still attempting to protect his companion, Itō, he insisted that he had neither seen nor talked to anyone in the last sixteen years. Thus, the initial reports reaching Japan mentioned only one straggler.⁴⁵ In the meantime, Minagawa’s comrade Itō Masashi was beginning to wonder what had happened to his friend, and went searching for him. Once Minagawa realized – although it would take some days for him to believe it fully – that he was not going to be killed by his captors and that the war might indeed be over, he helped search for Itō, who was found on 23 May.⁴⁶ The two were housed in the American Navy Hospital before being repatriated on board an American military aeroplane taking them to the US airbase at Tachikawa, near Tokyo, on 28 May, where their families and crowds of journalists welcomed them. Itō’s family immediately took him home to nearby Yamanashi Prefecture by train, while Minagawa and his family spent a night in an inn in Tokyo before going home to the more distant Niigata Prefecture.

The repatriation of Itō and Minagawa elicited a great deal more interest than that of any previous stragglers, although reaction was still muted compared with the frenzy of reportage that would accompany the return of stragglers in the 1970s. The Guam returnees were not front-page news but appeared on the ‘crimes and accidents’ page of the papers, and not at the top of the page either.⁴⁷ While in 1974 the news of Onoda’s return would displace one of the worst plane hijacking incidents ever to have occurred in Japan from its prime position on the first page, Minagawa and Itō were unable to compete with reportage on the violent demonstrations taking place at the same time in protest at Kishi’s revision of the Security Treaty. Nevertheless, the Guam story was of sufficient interest to continue for a few weeks, and the *Asahi*, for one, ran a series in twenty instalments, between 2 and 25 June, entitled ‘Sixteen Years in the Jungle’ (*Janguru no naka no jūrokunen*) where Minagawa and Itō alternately recounted their adventures and their feelings upon returning home.⁴⁸ The story also warranted articles of three to four pages in the biggest weekly current affairs magazines, including the *Shūkan asahi*, the *Shūkan yomiuri*, the *Shūkan sankei*, and the *Sandee mainichi* for the week of 12 June. Though minimal compared to

the 1970s, interest in stragglers in 1960 was noticeably greater than it had been even four or five years before. The lack of reference to Lubang in reportage on the Guam stragglers suggests that this surge of interest was due only in part to the relative proximity of the Lubang problem in the popular mind. Interest in the Guam stragglers was fanned by the same concerns that had made so many people rally behind calls for the rescue of the Lubang stragglers just over a year earlier.

Accordingly, the themes that ran through the reactions to Itō and Minagawa were similar to those that had greeted the news of the Lubang stragglers. The one essential difference was that the latter had not yet been found and repatriated. The physical presence of Itō and Minagawa made the negotiation of their significance and the insistence on their commonalities with the rest of the population slightly more ambiguous compared with the earlier discussion of the absent Lubang stragglers. Their identity as soldiers had to be discussed, and their difference from the rest of the population had to be recognised. The descriptions of the stragglers' gestures or mindsets as unfamiliar or unusual necessarily distanced them from the remainder of the population. As was the case with the Lubang stragglers, however, the Guam returnees were overwhelmingly portrayed as victims. Even so, their victim status did not go uncontested, and alternative understandings of the stragglers' experience were expressed, even if these were rejected in the public arena as 'unprogressive'.

Of the many themes that emerge from coverage of Minagawa and Itō's return, the most telling is the surprise elicited by the discovery of the stragglers' 'humanity', which provides a parallel to the insistence on 'commonality of citizenship' that had informed the news on the Lubang stragglers. This is best illustrated by a comment made in the *Sandee mainichi*, which describes the feelings of the journalists who greeted Itō and Minagawa at Tachikawa airbase. These journalists, feeling a mixture of compassion and curiosity, as we are told, imagined that the stragglers would have 'the faces of primitive men' (*genshijintekina omokage*). But when confronted, finally, with the two stragglers, they were momentarily at a loss as it became clear that 'they had not in the least been living like gorillas' (*karera wa gorira no yō ni ikite ita no de wa keshite nakatta no de aru*).⁴⁹ Elements of the earlier exoticisation of stragglers obviously remained, but the rejection of this exoticisation highlights the perceived necessity to welcome them as fellow citizens: although the stragglers might have been expected to act like wild and dangerous animals, they in fact looked and acted like 'us'. Itō and Minagawa had been provided with suits and haircuts on Guam, and looked distinctively, and indeed surprisingly, 'smart' in the eyes of all reporters. Indeed, as the *Shūkan yomiuri* put it, in the few days between their arrest and their repatriation, and thanks to the ministrations of the American Army on Guam, the stragglers had changed from 'worse-than-beggar fashion' (*kojiki ijō mōdo*) to 'citizen style' (*shimin stairu*).⁵⁰ In other words, they were hardly distinguishable from other 'citizens'.

This is not to say that interest in the 'Robinson Crusoe' lifestyle of stragglers had disappeared entirely. There was certainly a great deal of interest in what they

had eaten, how they had collected water and food, where they had slept and whether they ever quarrelled during the sixteen years of their cohabitation. This was sensational material, after all, and the *Shūkan sankei* was especially detailed in telling its readers that the heads of lizards were bitter but the tails were tasty if eaten raw, that the legs of frogs were edible but the body poisonous, the organs of fresh mice were delicious (*umai*) and so on.⁵¹ Similarly, the stragglers' abilities as tailors, their inventiveness in fabricating a water container out of the inner tube of a tyre, or the use of a lens to light fires, were all described at length. Readers were told that the stragglers had given up smoking the tobacco they stole from fields cultivated by islanders in order to allow their sense of smell to detect the odour of the tobacco smoke or hair oil that would herald the arrival of American soldiers.⁵² These were seen as praiseworthy accomplishments and habits, and they provided interesting reading material. The exotic aspect of the stragglers accordingly continued to take up a great deal of space in any article that dealt with them.

But whereas in the early 1950s there were few comments that went beyond such descriptions of their exotic lifestyle, as the years wore on the 'Robinson Crusoe' aspect of reports on stragglers made room for a much wider commentary, as in this case when it primarily provided the backdrop against which the stragglers' ordinary 'humanity' could be judged. The stragglers' lives had certainly been very primitive, but it was recognised that they themselves were not. And it was 'human qualities' that had allowed the stragglers to survive: friendship, loyalty to each other, spiritual faith, hope, fear, anger or the common sense that they had both apparently gained from growing up on farms. All of these, singly or in combination, were held up as the secret of their survival.⁵³ Gone was the reasoning of only four years earlier when it had been specifically the spirit and comradeship of soldiers, the rigours of military training and the benevolence of officers that had allegedly determined the stragglers' chances of survival. Indeed, the *Shūkan yomiuri* pointed out in 1960 that Itō was very anti-war (a point to which we will return), and that therefore it could not have been his military spirit that kept him alive.⁵⁴ And because the stragglers were human, there was no doubt that they would readjust to life in Japan. For them, it was argued, Guam would recede into the distance very quickly: soon they would be like other repatriates and merge effortlessly with the rest of the population.⁵⁵ That not all repatriates had found this an easy task was not acknowledged; in 1960 there seems to have been widespread confidence in the idea that the stragglers would readjust very easily. When Itō and Minagawa touched down at Tachikawa they were given a lunch voucher, an allowance of ¥10,000 and a train fare and were immediately sent home with their families, even though they were suffering from such physical and mental strain that both of them would eventually require a stay in hospital.⁵⁶

As mentioned earlier, the physical presence in Japan of the Guam stragglers, as opposed to the vanishing act of those on Lubang, made it impossible to avoid the fact that Minagawa and Itō had still, until recently, thought of themselves as soldiers and behaved like them. When a special reporter for the *Asahi* met the

two stragglers on Guam, for example, he was struck by their Imperial Army-style salute and made a point of mentioning it to his readers, starting his article with the question: 'aren't they soldiers, after all?' (*guntai de wa nai no ka?*).⁵⁷ Similarly, at their first interview at Tachikawa airport, Itō's formal insistence that his thanks be transmitted to the person who had interpreted for them in Guam was taken as an indication of the presence of the 'military temperament of long ago' (*mukashi nagara no gunjin kishitsu*).⁵⁸ But these stragglers were not described as 'living spirits of the war dead' (*ikite ita eirei*) as earlier stragglers had been; they were actually 'living soldiers' (*ikite ita heitai*)⁵⁹ or 'surviving Japanese soldiers' (*ikinokori Nihonhei*).⁶⁰ And although their 'humanity' made them familiar, their 'profession' as soldiers was something that distanced them from the rest of the Japanese population. References to the conspicuously old-fashioned and unfamiliar aspects of the stragglers' world views are numerous. That the war had assumed such a degree of distance is also corroborated by the fact that this was the first time since stragglers were first repatriated that the war itself assumed a name in the reports on their return: it was the 'Pacific War' (*Taiheiyō sensō*), no longer just 'the war'.⁶¹ Thus in a sense the war had become 'history', making the stragglers, as soldiers, into 'others' separated from 'us' by both time and mentality. And the gulf that separated the stragglers from the rest of the population in that sense was also understood by Itō and Minagawa, who often commented that their experience was lost on the people at home, that no one at home could ever understand what it had been like – not only the sixteen years of survival, but the last moments of the battle in which most of their comrades had been killed.⁶²

The description of Itō and Minagawa as soldiers, then, on the one hand distanced them from the rest of the population. Simultaneously, however, they were presented as fellow victims of military indoctrination. Although the word 'victim' was not used in 1960 as much as it would be in the 1970s, it was implied that Itō and Minagawa had been made prisoners of the jungle by their training. Their fear of becoming prisoners of war was mentioned regularly as an explanation for their refusal to emerge from the jungle.⁶³ It was also used to explain the paralysing fear they had of being killed right up to the very moment when they left Tachikawa airbase for their return home, and realised that the whole of Japan was not occupied.⁶⁴ Indeed, their military training had been so inhumane, readers were told, that Itō and Minagawa did not even dare to believe that they were really talking to their own families over the telephone while they were hospitalised on Guam. Both would abruptly ask their relatives obscure questions about their past, suspicious of some kind of trickery.⁶⁵ This was taken to confirm what the *Asahi* had already asserted, namely that the stragglers had had the 'military mentality' (*gunjin seishin*) beaten into the very 'marrow of their bones' (*kotsu no zui*).⁶⁶

In short, the military mentality was said to have created people who did not dare to recognise their relatives' voices, who were painfully thin, who had difficulty holding chopsticks, who were emotionally unstable, who were unable to sleep and who encountered great difficulty in ridding themselves of habits

acquired in the jungle. The press, which seems to have camped out in front of Itō’s family farm in Yamanashi Prefecture for days, found it particularly striking that it was on the way back from a visit to his own grave that Itō had suddenly worried about leaving footprints (he had carefully learnt to erase any trace of his presence while hiding on Guam).⁶⁷ In contrast to the comment on stragglers only a few years earlier, military training was not now thought to have produced anything as admirable as strength of spirit and stoicism; it had merely produced pitiful bodies and equally pitiful mental states. The stragglers, in other words, were to be seen as victims of militarism.

Thus by 1960 the stragglers were unlikely to be publicly praised as patriotic or admired for the sacrifices they had made. The press, in the rare instances when Itō and Minagawa were referred to as heroes, almost invariably attributed such statements to American commentators. In an article entitled ‘Guam’s instant stars: the surviving soldiers’ (*Ichiyaku Guamujima no sutaa: ikinokori heitai*), for example, the *Asahi* showed that Itō and Minagawa were extremely popular at the hospital in Guam, where, according to one American officer, they were in danger of becoming spoilt. The same officer apparently thought they ‘did really well’ (*umaku yatta*) surviving for so long in such a wild area and evading the American patrols.⁶⁸ In another article, American soldiers on Guam sang the praises of the stragglers’ tailoring skills.⁶⁹ The *Shūkan sankei*, in a paragraph entitled ‘the American soldiers who see them as heroes’ (*eiyū shisuru Beigunjin*), quoted an American serviceman at Tachikawa airbase as saying: ‘These two are heroes. If this were baseball, they would be home-run kings. If it were football, these guys would be star players.’ The American also mused upon the possibility of giving the stragglers official decorations.⁷⁰ Japanese press commentary did not include such open admiration for the stragglers at first hand, and seemed surprised by its presence amongst former enemies. This suggests that public discursive frameworks on the war current in 1960 did not allow the press to embrace the stragglers directly as heroes.

Indeed, there is evidence that such attitudes might have been publicly dismissed had they originated from within the Japanese population itself. The national press, in that sense, did not always reflect the attitudes of other sections of the population. Enormous crowds greeted the stragglers, particularly in their home towns, suggesting that the Americans were not alone in thinking that the men deserved medals. Although Tachikawa itself, as an American airbase, held to a policy of restricted entry, only allowing the stragglers’ families plus a limited number of journalists to witness their arrival, there were nevertheless between one and two hundred in the welcoming party for Itō and Minagawa, including some American onlookers.⁷¹ The *Asahi* counted seventeen microphones and sixty journalists in front of the stragglers at their first press conference.⁷² The *Asahi* and the *Yomiuri* reckoned the crowds that welcomed Itō at Kōfu station in Yamanashi Prefecture where his family lived to number between 1,500 and 2,000 people, while the *Shūkan yomiuri* retrospectively inflated the number to 10,000, which seems exaggerated, in a report published two weeks later.⁷³ Minagawa, who lived much further away from Tokyo, in Niigata, was met by

similar welcoming parties, but the proximity to the capital of Yamanashi Prefecture probably made it more accessible to journalists on the national dailies.

While it may well be the case that these welcoming crowds gathered together to gaze at national celebrities, there is also evidence that they came to praise them as loyal soldiers. As a photo in the *Shūkan asahi* clearly shows, an enormous banner at Kōfu station proclaimed: 'we are grateful for the patriotism of Sergeant Itō' (*Itō gunsō no aikokushin ni shasuru*).⁷⁴ There were obviously sectors of the population who equated the stragglers' long exile with an expression of patriotism and self-sacrifice for which they should be thanked as soldiers, as the inclusion on the banner of Itō's military rank suggests. These were ideas that had been entertained publicly within newspapers a few years earlier but had now been rejected by the press. The *Yomiuri* attributed the big crowds at Kōfu to curiosity alone, but the *Asahi* commented on the banner praising Itō's patriotism, condemning the attitudes it portrayed as 'old-school'. Itō himself was, according to the *Asahi*, 'perhaps slightly more progressive than that'.⁷⁵

Itō was in fact very vocal about the guilt of the military, which had forced Japan to fight a war it had so obviously been incapable of winning, and also about the way his own beliefs as a soldier had been manipulated. He was often reported as saying that he hated the military, and further commented on his disappointment with his country's failure to conduct its own war crimes trial and indict the Emperor.⁷⁶ Minagawa was less assertive, though he did talk of becoming a Buddhist monk and devoting his life to the memory of his dead comrades.⁷⁷ Interestingly, these condemnations of the wartime regime and Itō's harsh indictment of the Emperor did not provoke any discussion or analysis in the press beyond the *Asahi*'s comment that these were more progressive views than the ones expressed by the banner at Kōfu station. That Itō's views were not disputed in the newspapers suggests that they reflected a paradigm that was accepted or at least familiar in the public arena.

The fact that his condemnation of the military was preferred in at least one newspaper as a more progressive view of the war than the one which drew attention to his perceived 'patriotism' suggests that public discourse on the war in 1960 was informed by 'victim consciousness' (*higaisha ishiki*) to a much greater degree than it had been only four years before. The example of the banner at Kōfu station in 1960 shows that in some sections of the population the views that had shaped the reactions to the mid-1950s stragglers – including a relatively open admiration of their perceived patriotism – were still prevalent. Nevertheless, while the press itself had endorsed these views in the mid-1950s, in 1960 the *Asahi* dismissed such an approach as 'dated'. To be sure, the *Asahi* is only one amongst many newspapers, but the more general portrayal of Itō and Minagawa as victims suggests that this was a shift that had affected public discourses as a whole.

The explanation for the increased dominance of the discourse of 'victim consciousness' is to be found in the increased public adoption of pacifist

discourses, which also underpinned the massive popular movement against the revision of the United States–Japan Mutual Security Treaty and the threat to democracy represented by Kishi's manipulation of the Diet on 19 May 1960. Initially, as Packard has shown, the agitation on the Security Treaty revision issue was due to the activities of a relatively small group. However, by May and June 1960, the movement was gaining support from a much broader section of the population because of the perceived threat to democracy, which had transformed concerns over the Security Treaty into a very volatile domestic issue.⁷⁸ In 1959 and 1960, popular unrest was important in disseminating pacifist discourses and fostering an acceptance of pacifist ideals on a much wider basis than before. In other words, the crisis of 1960 should be seen not only as the long-term result of a general crystallisation of opinion that had been taking place throughout the 1950s but also as a cause of that crystallisation. While pacifist consciousness grew during the 1950s, it did not come to dominate public discourse until the end of the decade, as the shift in reactions to stragglers shows. In that sense, the decade should be considered as a period of fluid memories and interpretations of the war, which were not contained by an exclusive emphasis on 'victim consciousness'.

Fifteen years after the war's end, then, stragglers had come to be seen as fellow victims of the military. At the same time they were also consciously defined as citizens belonging to the same 'nation' as those who welcomed them home. The congruence of the stragglers' victimhood with that of the entire nation suggests a fairly widespread acceptance of 'victim consciousness'. The generation that took part in, or at least witnessed, the upheavals of the Security Treaty crisis in 1960 would be twelve years older by the time the next straggler returned in 1972. By then 'victim-consciousness' would be absolutely central to the perceived significance of the stragglers. But another issue had by then emerged: to the great shock and distress of those who had lived through the war, this new generation's interest in and understanding of the war proved to be minimal at best.

6 The past in the present

Yokoi Shōichi returns from Guam, 1972

On 24 January 1972, at six-thirty in the evening (five-thirty Japan time), in the region of the Talofofo River some sixty-five kilometres south of Aguana on the island of Guam, two local hunters came upon a pale, undernourished man wearing tattered clothing. Clearly terrified by the encounter, he held out his hands in surrender. The two hunters took him down to their village, where he told them his name was Yokoi Shōichi and that he was a sergeant of the Imperial Japanese Army. Later, at the police station, Yokoi further revealed that he had been living near Talofofo for the last twenty-eight years in a cave he had dug out himself and from which he usually emerged only at night.¹ The news hit Japan the next day. The front pages of the evening editions screamed out, in enormous headlines, what had been awaiting confirmation in the morning edition: a Japanese soldier had been found on Guam, twenty-eight years after the annihilation in battle of the Japanese Army there in July 1944.

Yokoi's discovery took the nation by storm. 'Weird former Japanese soldier discovered after twenty-eight years'; 'Guam: weird former Japanese soldier survives for twenty-eight years' announced the headlines of the *Asahi* and the *Yomiuri* in unison, supplementing their accounts of Yokoi's arrest with the same portrait of him as a young soldier in uniform and maps and photos of Guam.² The matching headlines and layouts of that day's front pages symbolised the universality of Yokoi's impact: in every area of national life his discovery provided shock, incomprehension, a considerable amount of interest and, ultimately, a deep awareness that he represented a part of Japan's history.

The headlines that greeted the news of Yokoi's discovery marked the beginning of a fascination with him that was to last for weeks, even years. More than a decade had passed since stragglers had last been found, and the news that hit Japan and the world that day early in 1972 presaged a bout of media frenzy and public attention that would soon be referred to in the national media as the 'Yokoi boom' or the 'Yokoi panic' (*panikku*). From his discovery to his hospitalisation on Guam, his relocation to the First National Hospital in Tokyo, his convalescence and return to his home town, hardly a day went by without some mention of him in the papers. In contrast with those of earlier stragglers, Yokoi's return provoked long and varied analyses as well as much discussing, soul-searching, explaining, suspecting, surmising, comparing and exclaiming in

the press, and certainly also quite a bit of inventing and imagining. Interest in Yokoi's experience, in his return and in Japan's reaction to him reached such a degree of intensity that it spilled out into all kinds of publications: serious, intellectual and analytical monthly magazines, weekly news magazines, magazines for women and teenage girls, tabloid and sensational magazines and more. Each tried to outdo one another in presenting more and better scoops: on Yokoi, his family, his dead comrades; on the reactions of young people, older people, famous people, people in the street, ex-soldiers and other stragglers; on the reactions to Yokoi's discovery in China, England, the United States, Holland, Australia; on the location of Guam, Talofofo, Aguana, Yokoi's home city of Nagoya and the very street where Yokoi had grown up; and eventually on the media frenzy itself. Indeed, the stampede of Japanese journalists and reporters to Guam reached such proportions and occurred at such a speed that the island's inhabitants started referring to Japanese reporters as 'kamikaze pressmen'.³

The press hysteria that followed Yokoi's discovery, and the scope and depth of the discussions he provoked, provide a clear indication of the impact of this straggler on early 1970s Japan. What is initially most striking is the contrast between his reception and that of earlier stragglers. Compared to Yokoi, the stragglers of the early 1950s had barely been noticed, and even Minagawa and Itō, those hailed in 1960 as supposedly the last soldiers of the Imperial Army, had encountered what can only be seen as a bland, uniform and rather short-lived reception in comparison to the multiplicity of comment that exploded into the public sphere at the time of Yokoi's discovery. It can hardly be the case that the 'Yokoi boom' reached such proportions because of the sheer length – almost three decades – of Yokoi's endurance. True, he had set a new 'record', almost doubling that of Itō and Minagawa, who had spent sixteen years on the same island, but the enormity of this new straggler's impact had less to do with the individual in question than with the way Japan itself had changed. Yokoi's impact was so great, ultimately, because his homeland had added another decade and a half to the distance between itself and the defeat, and because the generation that had come of age at the time of the arrival of the last stragglers in 1960 had itself come to share the negotiation of the past with a new generation, one with no personal experience of the war.

This generational distance strongly informed reactions to Yokoi, and was consciously explored in the media. It was recognised that the shock of Yokoi's discovery was universal, but also appreciated that he was shocking for a variety of reasons. After all, by the early 1970s the Japanese population consisted of generations with widely differing experiences. Those in their late forties and fifties were likely to have experienced the war, most probably, in the case of the men, as soldiers themselves. Those in their late thirties and early forties had been children and teenagers at the time of the defeat. They might remember the poverty of the war years and early years of the Occupation, and the return of demobilised soldiers, but they had spent the past three decades contributing to the rebuilding of the economy and the 1960s consumer boom. Those in their thirties might have known little of the poverty experienced by

their parents: the Japan they knew was comfortable, ‘middle-class’ and generally peaceful, although members of that generation may well have been frightened by the international tensions of the late 1950s and early 1960s and perhaps even have been involved in the unrest of the 1960 Security Treaty crisis. Those in their twenties had only known relative affluence, and were blissfully unaware – as far as the older generation was concerned – of the origins of their comfortable lifestyle. There were representatives of all the adult generations amongst the plethora of reporters, writers and interviewees who expressed an opinion on Yokoi; and the sensational return of this living relic of the war, in that sense, provides a window on the coexistence of the wartime and post-war generations, on the frictions, misunderstandings and divergent interests of various segments of Japanese society at that time.

Yokoi’s return brought into focus the tension between the past as personal memory and the past as more or less impersonal history. He came back at a time when for some the war was a distant memory, while for others his return provided an opportunity to insert their own experience of war into the public arena. For some, Yokoi’s survival was a fascinating adventure; for others it was a reminder of their own, often terrible, wartime experiences. Nothing symbolises the polarity of these views on Yokoi’s significance better than the first page of a special issue of the *Shūkan sankei*, one of Japan’s biggest weekly magazines (see Fig. 6.1). The table of contents is on the left-hand page, and opposite it is an advertisement. This is for the Tōyō Cruise Ship Company, and entices potential customers to ‘a cruise to the islands of history, Saipan and Guam’ aboard the ‘luxurious passenger ship the *Oriental Queen*’. On the facing page, the table of contents contains amongst others the following titles: ‘Unique reportage: extreme war experiences’, ‘I ate human flesh after defeat in Luzon’, ‘Suicide battles of the South Pacific’ and ‘Rescued by native cannibals!’. The war by now encompassed both the consumable, impersonal ‘history’ visited on holidays aboard a cruise ship and the dark and terrifying personal experiences that were perhaps exorcised or mitigated by their public exposition in the pages of the magazine. The personal experiences of some became consumable for others; and there was a palpable tension between the commercial, impersonal and occasionally light-hearted treatment of Yokoi and the personal, mournful and often guilt-ridden memories of those who had taken part in the war.

Such tension produced varied and ambiguous views on Yokoi, the war, and the place of the past in the present. Importantly, discourses about Yokoi were contained within wider frameworks, in which ‘victim consciousness’ is clearly visible, again providing evidence of a significant departure from reactions to earlier stragglers and pointing to a new stage in the formation of memories of the war. The wider discourses in turn reflected the same phenomenon: that is, a representation of the war that transcended personal memory. This collective discourse or memory of the past was not unambiguous, but it did provide a common frame of reference for the discourses on Yokoi. In this, the war took on a foreign and distant quality because by now it had become part of a past that



Figure 6.1 Title page of the *Shūkan sankei*, with an advertisement for the Yōyō Yūsen company.

Source: *Shūkan sankei*, 26 February 1972, pp. 4–5.

demanded explanation. The reactions to Yokoi show this clearly: all the reports reveal a conscious need to make sense of the existence of this straggler, to place him both in the past, and, somehow, in the present. As we saw in earlier chapters, this need had not been apparent – indeed, had been conspicuous by its absence – in the treatment of stragglers in the 1950s, when such people were reported as isolated individuals if at all.

The broad discourse on Yokoi was further characterised by a self-consciousness that had not been apparent in reactions to earlier stragglers. This self-consciousness was reflected in the tendency in news reporting to position both an imagined ‘Japan’, and the writers themselves, in relation to Yokoi and therefore in relation to a past which was no longer implicitly understood.⁴ The self-consciously measured temporal and spatial distance from the war and the defeat was ambiguous: on the one hand it showed a need to make sense of Yokoi, to understand him, his frame of mind and the circumstances that had led him to hide for so long, while on the other it also revealed a need to keep him at arm’s length, to show how ‘weird’ he was, how unusual and indeed how unlike ‘us’. Like the stragglers of the early 1950s, Yokoi had eaten snails and lizards and lived the life of a ‘Robinson Crusoe’ while in exile. However, this was no longer

the reason he was considered ‘unlike us’: he was ‘unlike us’ because he was still ‘stuck’ in a past that was now increasingly separated from ‘us’. The self-conscious need to *explain* this point supports the idea that, nearly three decades after Japan’s defeat, the war had assumed a public, supra-individual character. It was taking shape as a limited, organic entity increasingly less reliant on personal, individual memories: it was on the way – as I will show – to becoming a disputed but nevertheless collective memory.

Yokoi’s life contained little that was out of the ordinary before he became a straggler. He was born in Aichi Prefecture in the fourth year of the Taishō era (1915), in a small village later swallowed up by the sprawl of Nagoya City. On leaving primary school he became a self-employed tailor and was drafted into the army first in 1938 and then again in August 1942. He served in North-East China for two years but was moved to Guam in February 1944 as part of a newly formed battalion designed to take part in the defence of the mid-Pacific area. There was promoted to the rank of sergeant. The Allies landed on Guam on 21 July 1944, and a month later what remained of the Japanese Army was annihilated in a desperate last stand in the island’s northern region. As we know from previous chapters, quite a few survivors went into hiding in the jungle and were repatriated much earlier than Yokoi. Sergeant Yokoi initially hid with a group of more than twenty soldiers, which by the early 1950s had dwindled to seven and included Minagawa Bunzō, one of the stragglers who returned in 1960. There was a great deal of squabbling, and the group eventually split: Yokoi found himself with two others, Shichi Mikio and Nakahata Satoshi. The three of them dug out a cave in which they were able to hide during the day, emerging only at night to find food. In 1962 Yokoi left the group after a disagreement over food rationing and dug his own hole, in which he would live for the next ten years, some 500 metres from the original cave. Contact with the others was sporadic. In 1964, the year in which Guam was buffeted by an enormous typhoon, Shichi and Nakahata passed by Yokoi’s hole and complained they were feeling ill. When he went to visit them some time later he found only their skeletons: they had died, it seems, of poisoning, presumably from eating a particular species of frog. Yokoi continued to live in his hole without contact with other human beings until his capture eight years later.

In Japan, the shock of finding someone who was to all intents and purposes stuck in a time warp translated into detailed analyses of possible explanations for his behaviour. Yokoi’s birth, his childhood, his friendships, his personality and strong and weak points (both at school and in the army) were analysed but the more wide-ranging rationalisations centred on his indoctrination through the pre-war education system and the Imperial Army which reflected, as we will see, broader discourses about who was ultimately to blame for the war. Yokoi had indicated very soon after his discovery that he had been aware since around 1952 that the war was over and that Japan had, in all likelihood, lost. But the probability that Japan had been defeated did not solve Yokoi’s dilemma: in his own view, by failing to be killed in battle he had become the equivalent of a deserter and would thus be subjected to a court martial and possibly execution

when he returned home. Moreover, he was convinced, as most other surviving soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army had been, that the enemy, whether in the form of American soldiers or Guam natives, would kill him if he were found.⁵ There was much comment on Yokoi's admission, in a press conference, of the 'shame' he felt in returning to Japan even as he spoke.⁶ The press also frequently reproduced the famous line of the wartime soldiers' manual that admonished soldiers not to 'suffer the shame of becoming a prisoner'.⁷

The perception of Yokoi as a victim of indoctrination allowed for a very negative judgement of the wartime years in which militaristic Japan was as much the enemy of the common soldiers as the 'real enemy' was. In the assessment of the monthly *Gendai no manako* (Today's View), Yokoi was at least as afraid of his compatriots as of the actual enemy.⁸ Quite detailed arguments were presented discussing the difference between the surrender of a whole army and that of individual soldiers, and showing that Yokoi was hiding because he saw himself as a deserter and thus punishable by the Imperial Army and his comrades.⁹ According to a Guam veteran, the difference between those who became prisoners of war before the surrender of the whole army and those who surrendered only on the order of their superiors continued to be acknowledged by veterans for years after the war: the Guam Veterans' Association was apparently separated into two rather distinct and antagonistic groups until the late 1960s.¹⁰

But it was not only the Imperial Army that was deemed to be at fault in producing people like Yokoi. According to the *Shūkan yomiuri*, the soldiers' fear of becoming prisoners of war had been internalised not only during military training, but from childhood onwards, through the general education system.¹¹ The *Shūkan posuto* also took up this theme, supplementing one of its articles with the reproduction of two pages of the 'morals' (*shūshin*) textbook used by Yokoi as a first-year primary school student. Both pages had large katakana writing: one showed a parade of soldiers, with the caption '*Tennō heika banzai*' (hurrah for His Majesty the Emperor), and the other told the famous story of bugler Kiguchi Kōhei, who allegedly died from enemy bullets with the trumpet still at his lips in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.¹² Also held responsible for Yokoi's fear of emerging from the jungle was the myth of Japan's invincibility, a myth fostered by standard accounts of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905.¹³ Yokoi himself occasionally explained his long exile by emphasising that he thought, at the beginning, that even if Japan had been defeated it would eventually counter-attack. Of course, Yokoi's hope faded over time, but his belief in the return of the Japanese Army was again taken as a sign that he had been thoroughly indoctrinated by both the Army and the education he had received as a child.¹⁴ As revealed by letters to the editor, the public also often commented on the 'fearsome quality' (*osorashisa*) of the pre-war education system.¹⁵

One explanation for Yokoi's behaviour, then, was that he had been a victim of a ruthless pre-war and wartime indoctrination system, a discourse which demonstrates the prevalence of *higaisha ishiki* (victim consciousness) at that time. Yokoi the individual was perceived as the victim of education, military training and an ignorance of current affairs fostered by the Imperial Army and,

similarly, blame was frequently placed on the education system, wartime censorship and wartime police repression to explain the entire Japanese population's support of the war effort and exonerate the vast majority from war guilt. In that sense reactions to him reflected a way of explaining Japan's militarism that had become common by this time. By the late 1960s, such explanations for popular Japanese support of the war were also evident in academic writing on the 1930s. Shinobu Seizaburō, for example, stated in 1967 that 'for the duration of the 15 years of war [1931–1945] the Japanese people had been entirely deprived of freedom' – an interpretation of the 1930s which depicts the Japanese people as passive victims of their government.¹⁶ Ienaga Saburō, who wrote *Taiheiyo sensō* (The Pacific War) in 1968, concentrates in the first three chapters on depicting the Japanese people as brainwashed and repressed, and military institutions as increasingly irrational and authoritarian. Such an understanding of social conditions in 1930s Japan informs his entire interpretation of the war.¹⁷

In the case of Yokoi, however, explanations that blamed the army and pre-war education were ultimately judged unsatisfactory by the press of the day despite their frequent repetition in the print media. After all, the entire Japanese Army, along with a high proportion of the population, had experienced the same indoctrination but had not, for all that, hidden in the jungles of the Pacific for nearly thirty years. Indeed, some veterans questioned such explanations for Yokoi's conduct by stating publicly that as soldiers they had pretended at the time to believe the Army's doctrines purely out of an instinct for self-preservation, thus indicating that Army indoctrination certainly need not have produced such actions as Yokoi's.¹⁸ They now distanced themselves from the military by implying that they had been 'good people' during the war because they had been 'bad soldiers', at the time only feigning loyalty to Japan's wartime aims.

Army indoctrination alone was unable to explain Yokoi, so other explanations were sought in his childhood and personality. The weekly *Shūkan sankei*, for example, made much of the fact that according to its own research he had been born a month after his mother's marriage to Mr Yokoi senior; that he was not in fact Yokoi senior's son but somebody else's; that his mother had divorced Yokoi and remarried after a period spent living as a single mother in her parents' house, and that therefore Yokoi had grown up in at least three different families, as a result of which he had been bullied at school. Readers were left to infer that this may somehow have been responsible for creating a person capable of surviving in the jungle for close on three decades, much of the time alone.¹⁹ The *Shūkan posuto* interviewed several of Yokoi's school friends and neighbours: thus readers learned that he had been a quiet child, 'nothing special'; that he had been good at making kites and at geometry; that he had occasionally been embarrassed by the fact his mother was single; and that he had been a well-behaved and serious young man who didn't have girlfriends and was impatient to enter the army.²⁰ Such austerity and dedication to one's country were again considered likely to be responsible for creating someone like Yokoi, who had been able to hide out in the jungle for twenty-eight years.

In that sense there was an interesting tension between Yokoi as a victim and Yokoi as a hero. Indeed, his ability to withstand isolation was deemed formidable, as was his dexterity in constructing his underground hideaway and in clothing and feeding himself. The various utensils, articles of clothing (including hand-made buttons, as the *Shūkan asahi* exclaimed²¹) and nets and traps for hunting he made were described in great detail and with much admiration. His ability to create meals out of frogs, mice, lizards and so on, and to avoid poisonous plants or to discover the way to remove their poison to make them edible, were other accomplishments for which Yokoi was held in awe.²² Significantly, however, if his physical survival skills, such as the ability to make nets or to turn anything into a meal, were the source of much admiration, such skills were not construed as the result of his military training. Rather, they were seen as evidence of some innate personal talent, as the product of his childhood or his training as a professional tailor, or as a consequence of the fact that in pre-war Japan such skills had been very widespread.

But if Yokoi was a hero of survivalism, he was certainly not seen as a war hero. Indeed, the idea that he should be admired as a soldier was, overall, firmly rejected. It is true that his endurance was occasionally explained by his rigid ‘military mentality’, an unbending and deeply felt loyalty to the Emperor, or the strength of his *Yamato damashii* (Japanese spirit). Although one older interviewee stated that ‘what supported him [for twenty-eight years] was, after all, probably his “military spirit”’,²³ such references to him as a soldier-hero were quite rare. In fact, most of the references to him as a ‘war hero’ were contained in statements negating that very idea. For example, the *Shūkan yomiuri* asserted that young people in particular decried the *idea* that Yokoi should be seen as a hero, saying that they would ‘not permit the trend to use Yokoi in an ideological way’ and that ‘to say that Yokoi was supported by the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors [of 1882] and that it was his strength of spirit that allowed him to survive’ was ‘artificially to beautify the issue’.²⁴ Such ideas were also supported by the prominent writer Ōka Shōhei in an interview with the *Shūkan asahi* on 11 February 1972.²⁵ When Itō and Minagawa had returned in 1960, references to the two stragglers’ patriotism were few, and while such explanations of their conduct had been dismissed, as we have seen, they were not a central point at issue. In the case of Yokoi, however, the explicit rejection of such explanations seems to have been almost disproportionate to the circumstances. Thus Yokoi could *not* be admired as a soldier. His long exile was presented as the sacrifice of a victim rather than that of a willing participant in the war. His return shows that the discursive integration of the soldier as part and parcel of Japan’s wartime aggression, rather than simply as a victim of circumstances or of an evil military, was for the most part impossible in the public arena at this stage. In that sense, his return was contained within the same discursive frameworks of ‘victim consciousness’ which simultaneously informed attitudes to fallen soldiers, whose deaths could be commemorated publicly only as the deaths of victims of the military rather than as those of willing participants in the war effort.²⁶

In any case, Yokoi was less a war hero than an instant celebrity. Enormous numbers of presents and other tokens of good wishes swamped his old home in suburban Nagoya, and the influx of reporters and tourists to his neighbourhood prompted the telecommunications company to install three public telephones in front of his family house. There were also rumours that his tombstone had gone missing, and that tourists were lining up to buy copies of his birth certificate at the town hall.²⁷ This level of interest was not generated by the fact that Yokoi had been a soldier per se; rather, it was due to the fact that Yokoi was famous. An excited neighbour commented that it was the first time this particular suburb had produced a world celebrity.²⁸

The fear that making Yokoi into a war hero would be construed as ‘bad taste’ perhaps explains the attempts to portray him as somebody ‘special’ (with all the ambiguity of the word), someone whose particular mental disposition, regardless of his military conditioning, had allowed him to live as a hermit for so many years.²⁹ There is an interesting tension between the plethora of homely information on Yokoi’s life before the war and the attempts to show the extreme nature of his experience on Guam. His experience generated empathy, yet at the same time his weirdness – the term ‘*kimyō*’ (‘curious’, ‘queer’, ‘strange’) was used constantly – kept him at arm’s length. Readers may have admired Yokoi but they may also have admitted he was a bit ‘different’. Indeed, there were occasions when he was depicted in a much less positive light, particularly when references were made to his deceased comrades Shichi and Nakahata. According to the *Shūkan sankei*, for example, other veterans and former comrades of mentioned that he had been petty and difficult to get along with. The *Shūkan sankei* surmised that his separation from Shichi and Nakahata, because of squabbling and distrust, was due in no small measure to the personality of Yokoi himself, even leaving readers with the impression that the death by poisoning of the two other stragglers might not have been entirely accidental. Minagawa Bunzō, for example, who had known the other two men, was quoted as saying he found it rather difficult to believe they had accidentally poisoned themselves because he remembered them being particularly careful about what they ate.³⁰ Similarly, the *Shūkan gendai* described how Yokoi was plagued, while hospitalised on Guam, by visions of the ghosts of his former comrades asking him if he was going to take them home too. The *Shūkan gendai* did not discourage inferences regarding the reasons for Yokoi’s nightmares.³¹ Yokoi, then, was both wonderful and awful – and, in that sense, truly ‘other’.

The fascination with Yokoi’s personality can certainly be explained, at one level, by the necessity for the press to ‘cash in’ on the story and to fill pages with fresh, unique, and, ideally for the reader, interesting material. But the emphasis on Yokoi’s childhood and youth, and the interest in the strained relations among the stragglers, marks a great shift in reactions to these returned soldiers. Previous chapters have shown that the stragglers of the early 1950s were described only in terms of their otherness. The emphasis was on their difference, and so their childhood – the time when they had been similar to everyone else in Japan – was not of interest to the newspapers, presumably because most people were able to

identify with their background. In the case of the stragglers of the mid-1950s, little mention was made of the unavoidable tensions amongst them brought about by the exigencies of their lives in hiding; rather, these tensions were ignored in favour of comments on comradeship and the benevolence of officers. In the case of Yokoi, however, it seemed safe to ‘get personal’. The distance was already there. By that time most people had only a dim understanding of pre-war lifestyles, and Yokoi’s early life and experience as a soldier seemed completely different and completely alien. This attempt to ‘get to know’ Yokoi, to understand his childhood, his character, his strong and weak points, underlines the fact that the fascination exerted by him was due in no small part to a widespread inability to comprehend his behaviour.

Many explanations were thus put forward to make sense of the fact that a soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army had been found on Guam nearly thirty years after the end of the war, including those that made reference to Yokoi’s childhood and personality and his training at school and in the army. When they were found unsatisfactory, explanations were sought ultimately in the Japanese ‘national character’ itself. Was Yokoi a reflection of the Japanese people? Or, in other words, was there something terribly wrong with Japan if it could produce people like Yokoi? The *Shūkan posuto*, for example, headed one of its articles on Yokoi with the phrase ‘the character of the Japanese: shrouded in mystery once more’. Taking its cue from American anthropologist Ruth Benedict’s famous wartime analysis of the Japanese culture as one based on ‘shame’ (*haji*),³² the *Shūkan posuto* analysed Yokoi and *his* sense of shame as a distillation of the Japanese character itself. Its analysis concluded, however, that the Japanese character was once more proved to be completely beyond understanding by the discovery of someone who, by rights, according to Benedict’s analysis of the Japanese character, should have killed himself.³³

Such explorations of Yokoi’s experience as a reflection of national identity highlight the degree to which *Nihonjinron* (discourses on the Japanese) permeated public discourse in the early 1970s. Peter Dale, Yoshino Kosaku and others have shown that such discourses, which emphasise the alleged uniqueness of the Japanese and give them a set of distinctive national characteristics such as inscrutability and a penchant towards harmony and consensus, were increasingly prominent during this period.³⁴ Newspapers describing Yokoi’s return faithfully reflected this broader cultural trend, attempting to understand Yokoi through the characteristics he may have inherited with his ‘Japanese blood’. Such nationality-bound analysis also relied strongly on close examination of the treatment of the Yokoi story in foreign newspapers, a process aiding what Iwabuchi Kōichi has termed ‘self-orientalism’, in which Japanese observers have at times shared in reflecting the ‘orientalist’ perceptions of Japan that originated in the West.³⁵ The excerpts from the foreign press quoted by Japanese newspapers in fact described Yokoi mainly as a victim of propaganda and of militarism, with little reference to national character. The *Shūkan posuto*, however, as one example, closed a report declaring: ‘and the Japanese, whom the foreign journalists had thought they *understood* [underlined in the original],

moved once more beyond comprehension'.³⁶ Similarly, a special edition of the *Shūkan yomiuri*, devoted entirely to Yokoi, contained a section on reactions overseas, heading the article with the words: 'Overseas, the topic of discussion is, once more, "the Japanese"', with a subsection entitled: 'The Japanese are a mysterious race'.³⁷ Admittedly, such approaches did nothing to elucidate the Yokoi mystery, but they at least placed him within established boundaries of discourses on national identity.

Even if Yokoi's long years of isolation had somehow reduced him to the quintessence of Japanesehood, the attitude towards what was therefore seen as quintessentially Japanese remained ambiguous. The perceived relation between Yokoi and post-war Japan, and particularly the Japan of the 1970s, was a critical factor in reactions to his return. Comparisons between Yokoi and other Japanese, and between the wartime years and the 1970s, provided countless opportunities to explore the distance between 'Japan as it is now' and 'Japan as it was then'. The intrusion of the past, in the form of Yokoi, into the present, provoked much soul-searching on whether, and to what degree, Japan had improved, or indeed worsened, in the intervening years. It also set the stage for a discussion of the legacies of the war and the ways in which Japan had dealt with them. It would be no exaggeration to say that public reaction to Yokoi's return was actually less about Yokoi and the past than it was about the present and the ways it had grown out of or been severed from that past.

Comparisons between Yokoi and the average Japanese did not always work out in favour of the latter. The *Shūkan asahi*, for example, as part of a 'special' on Yokoi, published a sizeable article by a reporter who had spent an entire night alone in the jungle next to Yokoi's erstwhile quarters to enable readers to get a glimpse of the life he may have led. Entitled 'Stranded in the Jungle', the article took its readers through the experience of a night in Yokoi's environment, an experience which proved, for the reporter, extremely unpleasant and uncomfortable. Readers were told of his constant harassment by insects; his fear of snakes, rats, and wild pigs; the eerie sounds of the wind through the bamboo; his longing for a bed and a good meal; and, obviously, his admiration for Yokoi, who had put up with all the nights of twenty-eight years in these conditions. The light from a nearby village that was visible from a small rise near Yokoi's hole, signalling human habitation, reassured the reporter, readers were told, but he reminded them that the same light would have filled Yokoi with fear as it apparently spoke of the nearby presence of the enemy.³⁸ Yokoi's twenty-eight years on Guam were reinvented as a time of utter isolation: Shichi and Nakahata's presence in the vicinity until 1964 was forgotten, and Yokoi's survival took on the character of a superhuman feat of fortitude in the face of fear and loneliness. This was partly why Yokoi was, at times, considered so admirable: he had endured for twenty-eight years something that could be borne only with difficulty for one night by a contemporary Japanese.

The *Shūkan yomiuri* also made a very obvious comparison of Yokoi and the contemporary *sarariman* (male office worker). As part of a series of articles on Yokoi, it presented a test entitled: 'If it were you, would you be able to survive

for as long?''³⁹ The 'Yes', 'No' or 'Maybe' answers corresponded to a number of points, which, when added up, judged the likelihood of one's survival: a score of 160 points, for example, indicated that one had the ability to rival Yokoi in endurance and could spend years alone in the jungle, while a score of less than 130 meant there was very little likelihood of one spending more than three nights in isolation. The questions are revealing. They asked, for example: 'Do you always check that you have turned the gas off before you leave home?'; 'On the station platform, do you always make sure that you stay behind the white line?'; 'Can you let your mind drift when you are stuck on a crowded train?'. 'Yes' to these questions netted five points each, while 'yes' answers to 'Have you ever thought of committing suicide?' or 'Do you change jobs if you don't like your present position?'; 'Do you smoke tobacco or drink alcohol?' gave zero points. This was obviously a light-hearted attempt to provide grounds for comparison between the average Japanese urbanite and a Second World War straggler, and make a link, however tenuous, between Yokoi's life and that of the average reader. Even so, one could guess that the average *sarariman* would not have scored well in a test directed so obviously at the stresses of daily urban life.

Much of the reflection on Japan in the midst of the 'Yokoi boom' was, in fact, negative in character. Amongst the descriptions of Yokoi as a latter-day 'Robinson Crusoe' and the attempted explanations of his behaviour, amongst the incredulity, admiration, and soul-searching, there was certainly also a sense that Yokoi was a casualty of post-war Japan's uncaring society. These discourses centred on the idea that the Japanese population had moved almost thoughtlessly through its post-war years, while Yokoi had been abandoned to cling on to life as best he could for nearly three decades. And the Japan that had left him to rot while it was enriching itself was now cannibalising him, through its media, for commercial purposes while at the same time proposing to give him only a small amount of compensation, as we will see below. Worst of all, post-war Japan had failed to transmit to its children its terrible experience of the war in any meaningful way, and had produced a generation for whom Yokoi's sacrifice had no meaning.

The post-war state had failed Yokoi in numerous ways, according to this analysis, but the most obvious failing was that it had ignored the possibility that he might still be alive. According to former Lieutenant Colonel Takeda Hideyoshi, the highest-ranking survivor of the battle of Guam, the 1,200 Japanese survivors (out of a force of 20,810) repatriated shortly after the defeat had managed to account for the whereabouts of all but seventeen of the Japanese soldiers who had been on the island in July 1944. Of the seventeen, eight came back in 1951 and confirmed that another three were dead, leaving six people unaccounted for. When Itō and Minagawa came back in 1960, that left four unaccounted for. Yokoi, and the remains of Shichi and Nakahata in the neighbouring hole, accounted for three of those, which left one possible straggler on Guam. The upshot of this, according to Takeda, was that more should have been done by the government to find Yokoi and the other two and, indeed, that a search should take place immediately in case there was yet another straggler there.⁴⁰ The widespread indignation at the Japanese government's

failure to find Yokoi, when the stragglers of twelve years before had spoken of the possibility of there being others, was also echoed elsewhere.⁴¹ The Guam Veterans' Association, meeting in Nagoya on 5 February 1972 with an attendance of about three times the usual number, moved to organise and send its own search party to the island. Composed of Association members, the party would adopt a different approach from that taken by the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, whose leaflet drops, members believed, were too reminiscent of the Allies' 1944–1945 injunctions to surrender to be successful. According to the Association, the rescuers should gain the stragglers' confidence by pretending to be stragglers themselves and trying to convince them that it was safe to emerge from the jungle. Importantly, the Association also announced that it would fund the search party privately if government funds were not forthcoming.⁴² It is not clear whether the veterans ever searched Guam, but their decision to set up their own privately funded rescue mission speaks volumes about their lack of faith in the government's ability and willingness to find stragglers.

Yokoi was also considered to be a victim of the laws governing the pay and pensions of war veterans. Although nobody questioned the fact that the government should pay the costs of Yokoi's hospitalisation both in Guam and Tokyo, there was some discussion regarding the small monetary compensation due to him for his years in the jungle. Obviously the laws regulating the amount, duration and adjustment of either pensions or compensation⁴³ did not cover Yokoi's highly unusual situation. The Ministry of Health and Welfare had first to consider the question of Yokoi's legal status. Since Yokoi had not died after all, his family should not in theory have been receiving the pension reserved for the families of those who had died on the battlefield. His long-delayed surrender also made it difficult to determine when exactly he had stopped being a soldier of the Imperial Army and whether he should automatically have been promoted over his years of 'service'. It was therefore difficult to determine exactly the amount due to him in back pay of soldiers' wages or of the pension he would have received as a demobilised soldier. While the Ministry of Health and Welfare wrestled with these questions, several magazines summed up, according to their own calculations, what was legally owed to him. According to the *Shūkan shincho*, for example, Yokoi was owed the incredibly minuscule amount of some ¥40,000 in unpaid salary, a returnee allowance of ¥10,000 and ¥128,300 a year in pensions.⁴⁴ The *Shūkan josei* calculated his back salary, at the wartime rate of nine yen a month over thirty years, to be some ¥50,000, with a pension of some ¥120,000 a year, an amount considered risible under the circumstances and in view of the cost of living in Japan in the 1970s.⁴⁵

The realisation that Yokoi was to receive only a paltry amount in return for his long years of 'duty' raised a public outcry of enormous proportions, reflecting an awareness of the prosperity enjoyed by many Japanese at that time. Things had certainly since changed the defeat, let alone since Yokoi's departure for the front in 1942. The hardship that had been a common experience in the late 1940s and early 1950s was well and truly over by 1972. By 1970, per capita income was five times what it had been in 1958.⁴⁶ Japanese families were not

only able to buy better quality food and clothing but had enough disposable income to indulge in the purchase of white goods and appliances previously considered luxuries.⁴⁷ The rapid rise of disposable income in the decade of the 1960s is also illustrated by the fact that ninety per cent of households in Japan owned a television by 1970.⁴⁸ The so-called ‘three treasures’ (refrigerator, washing machine and television) which every Japanese family was supposedly aiming to acquire in the 1960s had become sufficiently commonplace by the early 1970s to have been supplemented by a desire for the ‘Three Cs’ (an air-conditioner (cooler), a car and a colour television), in a process that Marilyn Ivy has described as ‘homogenising Japanese domestic space’ and providing the ‘standard for middle-class status’.⁴⁹ Yokoi could not fit in a nation where the great majority of the people thought of themselves as ‘middle-class’⁵⁰ if he was destitute. Concerns for Yokoi’s financial welfare thus highlight a new awareness of economic prosperity. This is an interesting contrast to the reception of the stragglers Minagawa and Itō on their return from Guam twelve years earlier. Minagawa and Itō had received the same amount of money, but in 1960 this amount was neither discussed nor condemned in the media.

The recognition that Yokoi would not be able to afford the luxuries available to a great many Japanese was distinctly uncomfortable. By comparison, the twelve-day cruise to ‘historic Saipan and Guam’ mentioned earlier cost ¥69,800 at the economy rate, and Yokoi would have had to save more than half a year’s pension to take that particular holiday. Other newspaper advertisements show that a good umbrella, for example, cost ¥850, a suit, on special, around ¥4,000, while an average pair of shoes cost ¥1,500.⁵¹ In other words, the amount that Yokoi was to receive would certainly not allow him to live comfortably in Japan – his back pay and returnee allowance might provide him, at best, with enough for a new set of clothes. He would not, however, be able to afford the many consumer goods advertised in the same magazines that informed readers of his return, a point which provoked much public disgust with the government. The *Asahi shimbun*, for example, noted that many accused the government of turning a ‘cold shoulder’ to Yokoi and his predicament,⁵² while the *Sankei shimbun* reported an opinion poll in which seventy-eight per cent of respondents felt that the government should provide Yokoi with some special compensation.⁵³ The Liberal Democratic Party, for its part, resolved to propose a new law to the Diet to provide official recognition of the nation’s duty to stragglers like Yokoi, and allow for a one-off contribution of ¥5,000,000 to ¥10,000,000 towards his ‘recuperation’.⁵⁴ Yokoi also received a great many gifts of money from the public. The *Yomiuri shimbun* reported on 5 February that so far around ¥100,000 had been sent to him.⁵⁵ A few days later, the *Shūkan shinchō* reported that he had received more than ¥8,000,000 in private donations from all over the nation.⁵⁶ By 1972, then, there was a distinct feeling that Yokoi’s long years of suffering had to be somehow compensated for, and that he could be most adequately welcomed into Japanese society if he were provided with the means of reaching the same living standard as other Japanese. When Minagawa and Itō had returned in 1960, no such concerns had been voiced.

Not everyone agreed, however, that Yokoi should be compensated. The *Shūkan gendai* presented the objections of one veteran, now a professor at Tokyo University. According to him, paying Yokoi compensation would raise all kinds of issues as well as denigrating the sacrifice of those who had died at the front and the sacrifice of their families. Furthermore, compensation for Yokoi would require compensation for all other victims of the war, and an impossible definition of criteria to differentiate among the claims. In this war veteran professor's view, it was the shock occasioned by Yokoi's discovery, coupled with the guilt felt by others for having not only survived but prospered in the post-war years, that made many people feel like throwing money at the problem.⁵⁷ The *Shūkan josei* doubted that any amount of money could ever adequately compensate for half a lifetime of pain,⁵⁸ but the number of donations sent to Yokoi attest to the widely held idea that he should have got more than the government was prepared to give him. The *Yomiuri shimbun* commented gloomily on the poignant fact that Yokoi now erroneously thought himself immensely rich, after receiving so many gifts of money, because he could not grasp the magnitude of inflation of the yen since the war.⁵⁹

Yokoi was also considered to be a victim of the altered political circumstances of the post-war period, and here the legal imbroglio provoked by his wish to meet the Emperor is particularly pertinent. Yokoi stated in a press conference on 27 January on Guam that he had stayed alive for twenty-eight years for the sake of the Emperor and that he would like to meet him and tell him about the battle of Guam. The Occupation reforms, however, had placed constitutional restraints on the role of the Emperor, preventing the palace from acquiescing to this difficult request. There is no doubt that a meeting between Yokoi and Hirohito, who had been Yokoi's ultimate superior during the war but had held a purely ceremonial role since the defeat, would have raised eyebrows in international circles. It would also have required some explanation at the domestic level. In any case, it soon became clear that there would be no meeting between Yokoi and the Emperor. Nor was Yokoi to receive an 'envelope' (containing money) from the palace because, according to a spokesman, there were no occasions on which the Emperor gave 'envelopes' to living people, though Imperial 'envelopes' were occasionally sent to funerals; and in any case the laws regulating palace expenditure were very strict.⁶⁰

The palace's treatment of Yokoi, dictated as it was by rather complex diplomatic and legal considerations, nevertheless reinforced the public perception that the government was giving him the 'cold shoulder'. While *Josei jishin* speculated on the possibility of a meeting at the Imperial couple's forthcoming garden party, the *Shūkan shinchō* not only commented that this was very unlikely to occur but also pointed out that there had been widespread disappointment that the Emperor had not been present at Haneda Airport at the time of Yokoi's arrival. That the Emperor was occupied at the time with the Winter Olympics in Sapporo was, in the eyes of many, no excuse. One teacher complained that schoolchildren in particular thought it strange that the Emperor had not welcomed Yokoi home, and that many fellow teachers were rather hard

put to explain to them why it was that Yokoi's return was less important than the Winter Olympics.⁶¹ As was the case with the question of compensation for Yokoi, the Emperor's failure to welcome him at the airport was not easily justified, and it lifted the lid on something that had by then become a can of worms: the question of the wartime Emperor's continued presence on the throne and, by extension, of his war guilt.

The continued presence on the throne of the same Emperor who had reigned during the 1930s and the war itself has been at the basis of much debate since Japan's defeat. The Allied decision not to indict the Emperor as a war criminal in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials led to much domestic as well as international criticism at the time.⁶² Questions of war guilt have continued to surface at regular intervals throughout the post-war period. Though considerable efforts were made from the earliest days of the Occupation to convert the Emperor from a symbol of militarism to a symbol of democracy,⁶³ his credentials as a marker of democracy have been deeply ambiguous ever since 1945, as Stephen Large has demonstrated. While the post-war period has also undoubtedly been marked by an increasing indifference on the subject of the Emperor, the tensions between his newly acquired 'democratic' image and older nationalistic associations surfaced at regular intervals throughout the 1950s and 1960s. His image thus remained ambiguous: neither those who hoped to see him regain his central position of authority nor those who were committed to his purely symbolic position were ultimately satisfied.⁶⁴ Moreover, the Emperor's tour of Europe in October 1971, closely followed in the press in Japan, had raised the issue of war guilt overseas. In Denmark, Holland and Britain his visits were marked by public protests objecting to the visit of the former head of the Japanese wartime government. His failure to apologise for the nation's wartime activities was also criticised in the European press.⁶⁵ It was thus particularly noticeable at that time that the Emperor's image had not been cleared of the stigma of wartime authority, and, indeed, questions surrounding his connections with the wartime state have continued to arise, even since his death in 1989.⁶⁶

The return of Yokoi highlights the sensitivity that surrounded these issues in the spring of 1972; after all, the Japanese public had only recently been confronted with press reports of European ambivalence towards the Emperor on the occasion of his overseas tour. Yokoi's return allowed both right- and left-wing voices to be heard on the position of the Emperor. The *Shūkan shinchō* devoted an entire article to the question of the palace's decision against a face-to-face meeting. The head of the right-wing Greater Japan Patriotic Party (Dai Nihon aikokutō), for example, recited the pre-war familist doctrine that the Emperor was the father of the people, maintaining that if one of his 'children' had fought the enemy and had come back alive after so many years, it was natural that he should be happy and want to meet this particular subject. The *Shūkan shinchō* also reported the words of a Dutch journalist, who was surprised that although Yokoi had gone to war in the name of the Emperor, the latter was now seemingly not prepared to meet him. He further questioned the fact that the Emperor had never apologised to his own people. The Japanese newspaper

judged that should the Emperor fail to meet Yokoi, he would be extremely unpopular.⁶⁷

And yet there were also those who thought that there was no reason for the Emperor to meet Yokoi and who questioned Yokoi's statement that he had fought for the sake of the Emperor. Many were veterans who remembered clearly 'being bad soldiers', that is to say, soldiers who had not been prepared to die for the Emperor and who had thought surrendering might well be a better option. In their view, a meeting between the Emperor and Yokoi was completely unnecessary.⁶⁸ While some demanded, essentially, that the Emperor resume the function of head of state and welcome home a soldier whom he had, as commanding officer, sent to the war more than three decades earlier, there was certainly also a feeling of discomfort with the idea of a tête-à-tête between the Emperor and a 'soldier'. In fact, this is one of the few instances in which Yokoi was consistently referred to, in quotation marks, as a 'soldier' (*heishi*). On the question of his meeting with the Emperor, his status as a soldier could not be ignored as it had been when his survival skills were being admired.

A dispute arose in the media regarding the origin of Yokoi's statement that he wished to meet the Emperor in the first place. In the eyes of several critics, Yokoi's statement that he desired the meeting was clear evidence of his manipulation by the press. Prominent writer, war storyteller and former prisoner of war Ōka Shōhei, in particular, maintained that a Second World War soldier would never have presumed to express a wish to meet the Emperor and that a soldier who was so loyal to the Emperor would have chosen death over life in the final battle.⁶⁹ In other words, according to Ōka and other commentators, Yokoi had probably been 'put up' to his statement by a question (such as, perhaps, 'Would you like to meet the Emperor?') from a journalist who had had no experience of the war. This raises an interesting question about the ownership of history, that is, in this case, the ownership of Yokoi. Members of the wartime generation (Ōka included) maintained that they understood Yokoi better than others did, that his alleged wish for a personal audience with the Emperor was not what one expected of a wartime soldier, and that Yokoi would not have expressed this wish without being prompted by a journalist (although, as Ōka pointed out, a wartime soldier would most probably not express a *refusal* to see the Emperor if asked whether he would like to meet him).

If Ōka was correct in this instance, and Yokoi had been prompted by a journalist to express a wish for such a meeting, then the journalist's supposed question would suggest that for a section of the population at least Yokoi came from a time when all soldiers were the 'Emperor's soldiers', when they apparently fought, and died, with the Emperor's name on their lips. Ōka understood Yokoi as a contemporary; in contrast, a journalist belonging to a younger generation would view him as emerging from a 'historical' past in which all soldiers had allegedly fought for the Emperor. Members of the wartime generation, as we have seen, reminded others that not all soldiers had blindly accepted the Imperial Army's doctrine, and that many had perhaps only made a show of accepting it.⁷⁰ Others, including those who maintained that the Emperor should meet Yokoi,

understood – as a historical ‘fact’ – that soldiers of the Imperial Army had been truly fighting for the Emperor, which would indicate the solidification of a particular collective, retrospective view of the war effort. Whether Yokoi’s wish to meet the Emperor was actually spontaneous and his own idea or came as a response to a journalist’s question is not known. But the fact that members of the wartime generation, Ōka included, chose to repossess history in this way – by emphasising that no one but themselves understood Yokoi – makes a telling comment on the tensions between personal and collective memories.

The question of the media’s interference in Yokoi’s wishes brings us to another important aspect of his perceived ‘victimisation’ by post-war Japan, this time specifically by a rapacious press criticised for having commercial interests as its only motivation. Yokoi’s own recognition of the media’s self-interest, as opposed to any concern for his well-being, and his statement on arrival at the hospital in Tokyo that he no longer wished to have any media contact, were an indictment of journalists more concerned with churning out stories than letting him rest and recover.⁷¹ And the media at times turned on itself, portraying competitors as greedy and hypocritical: the *Shūkan gendai*, for example, described a carefully orchestrated live coverage of Yokoi’s neighbourhood in Nagoya as people gathered to watch the television coverage of him emerging from the aeroplane at Haneda Airport in Tokyo. It also detailed the competition between two rival television crews, and the distribution of ‘thanks’ (of the cash kind) in envelopes at the end of filming.⁷² That Yokoi had become the centre of an important commercial venture is clear: he was an object of consumption. This unbridled consumption, however, was itself self-consciously criticised as another way in which post-war Japan was failing Yokoi. His hounding by a rapacious press became symptomatic of what Japan had allegedly become: spiritually empty and motivated solely by money; at peace but yet to face the ghosts of the war; rich yet unable or unwilling to care for the victims of the war; rich, at peace *and* ungrateful to those who had sacrificed their lives. The mirror that Yokoi was holding up to post-war Japan was not, in the view of many, very flattering.

Yokoi was the first of the stragglers to return to a Japan that was conscious of its economic success, but his return also highlights the ambivalence with which many there viewed prosperity and peace. Certainly, living standards had risen enormously since Yokoi had last been in Japan, and a high proportion of the population enjoyed enough financial security to be able to afford the many consumer goods that were flooding the market. But the fact that this prosperity had been achieved at a price had also become increasingly obvious. As Ann Waswo observes, newspapers in the late 1960s were carrying reports not only of healthy trade figures but of an unhealthy environment. Indeed, in the two years preceding Yokoi’s return, Tokyo had become dangerously polluted, with one ‘white smog’ (industrial and car pollution) incident in 1970 affecting the health of some 4,000 people.⁷³ Environmental and urban planning problems were compounding insecurities regarding unequal income distribution. The ‘oil shocks’ of 1973 still lay in the future; but the unannounced devaluation of the

US currency against the yen in 1971 had fuelled anxiety about economic prosperity. Furthermore, anxiety about Japan's place in the world had been exacerbated in the summer of 1971 by the American President Richard Nixon's announcement that he intended to visit the People's Republic of China, a country Japan had been unable to contemplate recognising since adopting the hitherto hardline American anti-Communism as a guide to its own foreign policy.⁷⁴ At a more grass-roots level, the urban sprawl coming in the wake of the economic miracle had also fostered a keen sense of loss of community and traditions. As Marilyn Ivy has argued, feelings of disconnection with 'traditional' roots – homelessness in a sense – have been pervasive in post-high-growth Japanese society. She has shown, in particular, that such feelings were successfully exploited in the early 1970s by advertising campaigns for rail travel that promised urban Japanese the chance to reconnect with rural and 'traditional' Japan.⁷⁵

The disillusionment that many felt with the present state of the Japanese nation and Japanese society is also palpable in reactions to Yokoi. Indeed, a recurring comment on Yokoi among young people was that he would be better off returning to his life of jungle isolation: Japan was too horrible a place to return to.⁷⁶ Media reports were also permeated by concern over whether and how Yokoi would adapt to a Japan that was widely accepted as being 'another world' compared to Guam, and not a particularly nice one at that.⁷⁷ Yokoi himself seemed to have some difficulty at first in grasping the extent of the changes that had come over his homeland since his departure. He pronounced a verdict on the state of Japan three days after arriving in Tokyo, and according to him the country was a far poorer one than Guam, with fewer aeroplanes, only about a third of the cars, and much dirtier houses, a mistaken impression which the *Shūkan shincho* attributed to Yokoi's perceptions being 'out of focus' (*pinboke*).⁷⁸ But while such claims were shown as the ravings of somebody 'weird' (*kimyō*), there were other aspects of Yokoi's disappointment with Japan that were not dismissed quite as easily. He was dismayed, for example, at the willingness of both magazines and television to discuss the Emperor freely and to show him in civilian clothes. Such press coverage bespoke, for him, a deplorable lack of respect towards the Emperor on the part of the Japanese population.⁷⁹

Yokoi's negative reaction to the presentation of the post-war Emperor was again explained by the magazines as the result of his pre-war and wartime indoctrination, but it was not, this time, dismissed as something 'out of focus'; rather, it was taken up as a proper indictment of a somewhat cavalier public attitude to the Emperor. Unlike expressions of admiration for Yokoi as a soldier, such a view was not taken as dangerous evidence of a resurgence in 'ultranationalist fanaticism' because it suggested an outdated respect towards the Imperial institution. In fact, acceptance of Yokoi's dismay about the Emperor's appearance spoke of a pervasive uneasiness throughout the media with the state of society in general. The lack of respect towards the Emperor, which Yokoi was adamant about, was not in itself necessarily disquieting; but it was symptomatic of a society which lacked direction, or which, indeed, had as

its new direction ‘leisure’, ‘consumption’ and ‘materialism’.⁸⁰ The return of Yokoi certainly highlights the ‘growing suspicion about the fruits of the high-growth period’.⁸¹ Criticisms of Japan in the midst of the ‘Yokoi boom’ abounded, but a particularly apt one is provided in the cartoon here (see Fig. 6.2), which plays on contemporary disquiet about consumption and ‘materialism’. Referring to Yokoi’s diet, it shows a dining couple, the man chewing on a live and affronted-looking mouse while his kimono-clad companion tries unsuccessfully to shove a huge, wriggling lizard into her mouth with a fork. A hovering waiter carries suspicious-looking drinks in which bones take the place of straws. The caption has the male diner saying contentedly, ‘Hmm, this will do just fine.’

Adding to the perception that Japan had changed completely since the war was the realisation that Yokoi completely mystified many of Japan’s younger generation. An opinion poll conducted by the *Sankei shimbun* (Table 6.1) clearly illustrated the vast difference in world view between the wartime and post-war generations. While the vast majority of respondents aged in their forties and fifties claimed that they knew what Yokoi had meant when he said he had fought for the Emperor, those in their twenties and thirties, let alone those in their teens, were much less certain. And the fact that Yokoi had been found on an island to which by then many young Japanese were already going on holiday or for their




Figure 6.2 Cartoon by Iwamoto Kyūsoku. ‘Hmm, this will do just fine’.

Source: *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 February 1972, p. 27.

Table 6.1 Opinion poll published by *Sankei shimbun*, 1 February 1972. What do you think about Yokoi's loyal feelings towards the Emperor? ('*Tennō Heika no tame ni . . . To iu kimochi o . . .*')

Reaction	Cannot understand it at all (mattaku rikai dekinai)	Cannot understand it very well (amarri rikai dekinai)	Understand it somewhat (ikura ka rikai dekiru)	Understand it very well (yoku rikai dekiru)
Age group				
10–20	31.1%	22.2%	28.1%	15.6%
20–30	26.0%	22.1%	27.9%	21.4%
30–40	5.8%	19.6%	36.3%	35.4%
40–50	0.0%	6.5%	23.5%	69.4%
50–60	2.2%	10.4%	18.5%	65.9%
60–70	4.8%	4.8%	6.3%	84.1%

Translated and adapted from figures provided from the *Sankei shimbun*. Normal statistical deviations probably account for the fact that rows do not add up exactly to 100%.

honeymoon was an irony that was not lost on commentators.⁸² From the viewpoint of one observer, the reason why Yokoi's loyalty, endurance and self-sacrifice fascinated the nation so much was that these qualities provided a great contrast to the 'spiritual starvation' (*seishinteki kiga*) of contemporary Japanese.⁸³ For another interviewee the post-war generation's lack of understanding of Yokoi constituted also a lack of gratitude. His qualities of endurance and self-sacrifice were shared by the pre-war and wartime generation, it was asserted, and it was the *kusomajime* (deadly serious) people of Yokoi's generation who had created the economic miracle and indeed made possible the young people's leisure, materialism and – one is left to infer – somewhat carefree attitude in the first place.⁸⁴ William Kelly has noted the emergence in the early 1970s of a generation whose 'lack of enthusiasm for everything, work and home' was causing a great deal of despair to the generation that had witnessed and produced Japan's recovery from the defeat.⁸⁵ Yokoi's return highlighted this gulf, and he himself came to represent a time that, for all its faults, had at least produced people prepared to believe in something, and to act selflessly – a quality that, many believed, the younger generation might well learn to its advantage. A cartoon (see Fig. 6.3) implying that Yokoi was a good example to the young portrays one young man's vain efforts to entice a friend to come out for a night on the town. His friend pushes him and his temptations away and returns home to swot for his exams. Above his desk we see a portrait of Yokoi, among signs saying: 'Patience!', 'Endurance!', 'Do not be defeated by loneliness!'.

But beyond highlighting tensions between the apparently 'selfless' wartime period and the 'selfish' 1970s, Yokoi's return also prompted more fundamental reflection on the place of the war in the minds of the Japanese people. Again, the generation gap was strongly in evidence, and again the judgement rendered on present-day Japan was, in the main, negative. Young people were reported to



Figure 6.3 Cartoon by Akiyoshi Kaoru. ‘Todoroki Sensei’.

Source: *Yomiuri shimbun*, 27 January 1972.

be thinking about what their own fathers (*oyaji*) had been doing for the last twenty-eight years, and condemning the wartime generation for producing people like Yokoi.⁸⁶ The war itself was, not surprisingly, represented as a terrible thing, and descriptions of the Japanese Army’s annihilation on Guam, with photographs of the aftermath of the battle, including dead soldiers sprawled over tanks, reinforced the condemnation of the pre-war and wartime education and training system mentioned above.⁸⁷ At the same time there was also a degree of condemnation for the way in which the war had been remembered or, indeed, forgotten, although this theme emerged unevenly and inconsistently. A university lecturer, Kamishima Jirō, commented in one of the weekly magazines:

When Minagawa and Itō came out, we showed them sympathy, and said ‘we are glad you made it back’, that was all. But this time, it has made the people (*kokumin*) think about whether the kind of life they have been leading in post-war times allows them to be proud of Yokoi. That is the difference. In other words, Yokoi, returning from the jungle, has shocked us into wondering whether Japan is going in the right direction, because he has made us remember our determination, at the end of the war, to make a new start, to build a peaceful Japan. The people have realized that Yokoi has wasted half of his life because of a warped history.⁸⁸

Yokoi’s return, then, became a barometer for judging not only the war itself but whether the experience of it had been adequately integrated into the rebuilt society. A young interviewee complained, in the *Shūkan asahi*, that nobody had taught him about the reality of pre-war and wartime training: he now felt bad that he had laughed at a scene in a war film where young recruits were beaten by their comrades.⁸⁹ A member of the editorial committee of the *Asahi shimbun* compared Yokoi to a fossil, somebody who, through some quirk of nature, had remained fixed in time but had now broken out of his time capsule; and this fossil was now asking to meet the Emperor, inadvertently raising the question of the Emperor’s war guilt and pointing out the fact that there had been no Japanese-instigated war crimes trials. The author concluded: ‘We didn’t put ourselves on trial. We are still not putting ourselves on trial. What will this fossil think of us?’⁹⁰

Yokoi’s message to post-war Japan, then, was not only about selflessness. According to part of the population at least, he also showed that not enough had been said about the war. ‘Victim consciousness’, though it provided much of the discursive framework for the analysis of Yokoi in the press, did not remain unchallenged. His return thus also provided an opportunity to rethink and question the paradigms about the past that were perceived to be dominant, and highlights the contested nature of memory. Challenges to dominant discourses concerning the past are constant; and while they may not always succeed in reshaping collective interpretations of it, their presence should nevertheless be acknowledged. Indeed, mainstream representations of the past have been regularly challenged in Japan, often through small groups operating at grass-roots level. Those challenging the status quo have done so from numerous perspectives: in 1987, in just one example among many, a group of women forming the Society to Question our History (Watashitachi no rekishi o tsuzuru kai) published a critical analysis of women’s support of national aims in the 1930s, thus questioning one of the basic premises of ‘victim consciousness’.⁹¹ More recent groups such as the Liberal Education League have adopted a stance that is critical of ‘victim consciousness’ – or what they call ‘masochistic’ history – from another angle entirely, maintaining that some pride must be recovered from the national history of the 1930s and 1940s. While the latter groups became particularly vocal in the late 1990s, the ideas they espoused were certainly also in existence at the time of Yokoi’s return in 1972. Nevertheless, while such

discourses became prominent enough to be at the centre of public debate in the 1990s, they were certainly not espoused in press reactions to Yokoi, nor were they particularly visible beyond certain relatively restricted circles.

Yokoi's return, finally, reminded the population that there were people within Japan who were still dealing with the practical legacies of the war. It prompted the *Asahi shimbun*, for example, to report on a group of some 400 bereaved families who still refused to accept the government's judgement that their husbands, sons or brothers had died during the war and continued to challenge the government on that issue, demanding that more be done to find their 'missing' relatives.⁹² Obviously the return of Yokoi, twenty-eight years after his family had received his death notice, not only served to bring this issue to the fore but also confirmed many of these families' beliefs that their husband or brother might, too, one day be found alive. One article, entitled 'A different "30 years"' (*mō hitotsu no '30-nenkan'*), described the feelings of war veterans, permanently disabled either in battle or by firebombs on the home front: they too, like Yokoi, had been forgotten. Unlike Yokoi, however, they could not look forward to a new 'tomorrow' but would just waste away.⁹³ The comparison between the treatment of Yokoi as a media celebrity and the general lack of interest in those victims of the war who were quietly living their lives in Japan, possibly in reduced circumstances, was again unflattering for post-war Japan.

The remains of the stragglers Shichi and Nakahata, whose skeletons had been discovered by Yokoi eight years before on Guam, were repatriated at the same time as Yokoi himself, and were in fact solemnly brought out of the specially chartered plane before he made his own appearance. These representatives of the war dead and their families, however, received comparatively little media attention. They were mentioned in the course of the story of Yokoi's survival, and there were occasional outraged demands for a quieter and less festive welcome for Yokoi as a show of consideration for the feelings of the families of Shichi and Nakahata. But although these were stragglers who had themselves survived in the jungle for twenty years, the attention they did receive mostly centred on their imagined relationship with Yokoi and with each other, and on speculation regarding the circumstances of their deaths. It seems to be the case then, also in the early 1970s, that stragglers were of interest only if they were alive.

Yokoi was now part of history for many Japanese, as has been shown in this chapter. As such he was also the first straggler to be set consciously in a historical perspective. He was presented as the 'last' in a long line of stragglers, with Minagawa and Itō, who had returned from Guam in 1960, figuring prominently in narratives about him and the background to his return. Minagawa had hidden with Yokoi in the early years after the war, and both Minagawa and Itō had flown to Guam when he was found, publicly recalling their own fears when they had been captured, and eager to reassure Yokoi that he was not going to be killed. They were also frequently asked for their views on why Yokoi had not given himself up earlier, in reply highlighting the strength of the military indoctrination they themselves had experienced. This trend in reporting stands in

sharp contrast with the 1950s, when there was only rare mention of other stragglers and no attempt to place the stragglers in a wider perspective.

With Yokoi's return, earlier cases were sought out and comparisons made between the reception of the different groups. The *Shūkan gendai*, for example, ran a story that followed the return home of many of the stragglers mentioned in this book, including, for example, the 'Queen of Anatahan', a returnee from Mindoro who had become a school principal and was now living quietly in Okinawa, and one of the New Guinea four, who had returned to Japan via Australia in 1955 and was now reported to be a very conscientious, loyal and trustworthy company employee.⁹⁴ But the stories about earlier repatriates ultimately led to comparisons with the way in which they had been welcomed: it was often remarked that Minagawa and Itō, for example, had been given 10,000 yen each, a lunch voucher and the train fare home, and that there had been neither calls for compensation nor a demand that they should be honoured by the Emperor at the time of their return.⁹⁵ Both Minagawa and Itō also mentioned the vast difference between their own treatment by the media and that of Yokoi, Itō asserting without elaboration that this difference was due to their having returned in different eras.⁹⁶

Yokoi married in November 1972 and lived out his life quietly in Nagoya. In 1974, he campaigned for a seat in the Lower House elections and was unsuccessful. He continued to be a relatively visible public figure, often appearing on television chat shows and in newspapers and magazines. He died in 1997 at the age of 82. Although he was suffering from Parkinson's disease, it is widely believed that he starved himself to death, not wanting to be a burden to his wife who had herself just suffered an accident.⁹⁷

In 1972, Yokoi's return provided the Japanese people with an opportunity for conscious self-reflection on the road they had travelled since the end of the war and the way they were coping not only with Yokoi himself but also with the nation's post-defeat transformation. As we have seen here, the return of a living relic of the war almost thirty years after its end, and twelve years after the previous such repatriation, provided an arena for comments about the war, the place of the war in Japan's present and – very importantly – the shape and quality of that present. Yokoi's return shows that, if the war was readily discussed as an overwhelmingly negative and horrific experience, the wartime period was nevertheless presented as having been less hypocritical and less selfish than the 1970s. Significantly, however, the return of Yokoi produced a need to explain, self-consciously, what it was that had produced a person such as him. The tensions between the generations that 'knew' the war and those that didn't, as we have seen, highlight the process of negotiation and transformation that was occurring regarding the place of the war in the consciousness of the Japanese population. The war was now 'history' to the young generation: it had become a past that was either ignored or that demanded explanation.

7 ‘In the jungle, the war was still going on’

Kozuka Kinshichi, Onoda Hirō and the last of Lubang, 1972–1974

In October 1972, Japan was recovering from the shock of Yokoi’s discovery and affectionately congratulating him on the news of his impending marriage to forty-four-year-old Hatashin Mihoko, when a cable from the Japanese Embassy in Manila brought the island of Lubang once more to the front pages of the daily newspapers and to the consciousness of the Japanese population. If the shock of Yokoi’s discovery, nine months earlier, had been tempered by the hope that he could, from now on, begin to make up for his twenty-eight years of suffering, the news that came from Lubang on 19 October 1972 precluded hopes of a happy ending this time around. There had been a shoot-out between police and stragglers: one straggler, wounded, had managed to escape, but the other had been killed.

So began one of the final episodes in the story of the stragglers of Lubang, a story that would end with the surrender of the last straggler from that island less than a year and a half later, in March 1974. These were the stragglers who, according to the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare’s 1959 judgement, had been dead since 1954. Now it was no longer necessary to rely on the word of Lubang villagers for evidence of the stragglers’ existence. With a body laid out in the Royal Memorial Chapel in Manila, there was tangible proof that Onoda and Kozuka had been alive all the time. Their re-emergence was no less shocking because of the proximity of Yokoi’s discovery. Just as photographs of the dead soldier, shortly to be identified as Kozuka Kinshichi, could not hide evidence of his brutal death, the descriptions of the shoot-out, of the dead straggler’s fatal injuries, of trails of blood leading back into the jungle, of the fear felt by Lubang residents, and of the danger posed by the stragglers, led to an inescapable conclusion: on Lubang, the Pacific War was still going on. The Lubang stragglers were not ex-soldiers but soldiers still at war; and that war was impinging on Japan’s post-war peace in a disturbingly tangible way. As a result, although many of the responses prompted by Yokoi’s return resurfaced with the Lubang stragglers, they were now much more ambiguous. It was difficult to define these particular stragglers, engaged as they still were in offensive warfare, as victims. This was particularly the case when the last Lubang straggler, Onoda Hirō, formally ‘surrendered’ in 1974: the negotiations leading to his surrender, his carefully tended rifle and sword, his uniform, his rigid stance and his articulate

explanation that he had been following orders for the past three decades, all made Onoda into a caricature of the dedicated, almost fanatical, wartime soldier, and rendered him admirable only in the most acutely uncomfortable way.

The stragglers on Lubang, by dint of more than twenty years of exposure in the press, had by the 1970s assumed almost mythical qualities, and the denouement of the saga, with Onoda's surrender in 1974, provoked unprecedented media coverage. Indeed, Onoda, though not actually the last straggler, has come to symbolise all stragglers in the public mind. Today, mention of the topic will almost automatically elicit his name, only occasionally accompanied by that of Yokoi. Should the words *ikinokori heitai* ('surviving soldiers') or *zanryūsha* ('left-behind person') be difficult to understand without context, mention of Onoda's name will bring a light of recognition even to the eyes of those Japanese who had not yet been born in the early 1970s. The fact that he, more than any other straggler, has become cemented in the Japanese collective memory is no doubt due to the fact that it took such a long time to ferret him out and that he had remained so shockingly military in demeanour. Nevertheless, it is also striking that Onoda's companion, Japan's 'last war dead', Kozuka Kinshichi, seems to have disappeared from memory entirely. Although his death in 1972 was a widely reported event, as this chapter will show, and a very saddening one for the majority of the population, it is undeniable that the focus quickly moved to the survivor, as it had after the death of Shimada in 1954. Onoda's return in 1974 completely eclipsed the death of his companion of twenty-seven years. If, today, many people remember Onoda, only very few remember Kozuka, or the fact that Onoda's thirty years on Lubang were a lone crusade only in their last few months. That Kozuka has disappeared from memory is something that has also struck Wakaichi Kōji, whose 1986 book *Saigo no senshisha* (The Last War Dead)¹ attempts to redress this imbalance. The reasons for Kozuka's disappearance from public memory will be considered in the last part of this chapter.

Kozuka was shot in the early morning of 5 October 1972 in the vicinity of the village of Tilik on the northern shore of Lubang, on a rise afterwards renamed 'Japanese Hill'. It was the harvest season, and Onoda and Kozuka had come upon the field camps of the farmers who were just getting ready for work. The stragglers found the harvest season particularly fruitful in their perennial search for supplies, and it seems that Lubang farmers were not entirely taken by surprise when they appeared. The stragglers set fire to a field to keep the farmers' attention away from them while they looted their bags for provisions, but they were spotted. According to Wakaichi, the farmers he interviewed in 1986 remembered seeing the two figures, then hearing shots and fleeing.² Onoda remembers that as they were approaching the farmers they took the opportunity to test bullets from a suspect batch, firing into the air to scare the farmers away. The first three bullets misfired, but the fourth was good. Onoda and Kozuka, who had carried out such raids before, usually reckoned on a fifteen-minute delay before the arrival of police, and quickly set about going through the farmers' supplies.³ This time, however, they had only five minutes:

one of the farmers had run to Tilik to alert the police as soon as he heard the first shot. Armed with rifles and an automatic pistol, three policemen reached the burning field in time to corner the stragglers who were helping themselves to the farmers' provisions. Who fired the first shot in the fatal shoot-out remains unclear. Onoda managed to take cover, but Kozuka was hit, first in the arm then fatally in the chest and head. Onoda states that when he crawled up to Kozuka he was already dead. Reports from Filipino witnesses at the scene, however, and later from the pathologist who found swallowed blood in Kozuka's stomach indicate that he had probably died while being transported to Tilik.⁴ In any case, Onoda managed to disappear into the jungle while the policemen cautiously approached the dead or dying straggler.

On 20 October, the evening editions of all the major newspapers in Japan carried the news of the shoot-out as a front-page item. That the stragglers were Onoda and Kozuka was readily understood, and although the identity of the dead straggler was not officially known at that stage, the assumption that the survivor was Onoda was immediately made and widely shared, as the headlines of that day show.⁵ A veteran who had known both men in the Philippines claimed that he had known Kozuka was dead as soon as he had heard the news of the shoot-out; in his recollection, Onoda was the careful one but Kozuka was impulsive and aggressive.⁶ The same assessments of the stragglers' respective characters informed the newspapers' increasingly confident statements that the dead straggler must be Kozuka Kinshichi.

Nevertheless, formal identification took some time and involved a process that was of great interest to the press. The first photographs sent to Tokyo and shown to the Kozuka and Onoda families had been taken right after the shooting, and the damaged and bloody face in the photo was not one that was readily recognizable, especially after twenty-eight years of separation.⁷ Representatives of the stragglers' families, in this case Onoda's older brother, Toshio, and Kozuka's younger brother Fukuji, had immediately made their way to Manila after the news of the shoot-out, viewing the body on 22 October. While Onoda Toshio apparently realised immediately that this was not his brother Hirō, Kozuka Fukuji took some time to identify the body formally as that of his brother Kinshichi, possibly, as the press implied, because it was so heartbreakingly difficult to think that his brother had died after all those years on Lubang. However, by five p.m. on 22 October the journalists gathered for a press conference at the Royal Memorial Chapel in Manila were able to send home the news that the dead straggler had been identified as Kozuka and that the straggler who had escaped and was believed wounded must, therefore, be Onoda.⁸

The immediate reaction to Kozuka's death was, as with Yokoi, overwhelming shock. Thereafter, however, media attention almost immediately moved from the death of Kozuka to Onoda's vanishing act. The recognition that Lubang was, in a sense, a war zone, and that therefore Kozuka had been 'killed in action', made for a rather different treatment from that accorded to Yokoi. Yokoi's successful repatriation had not warranted the solemnity that the existence of a newly bereaved family demanded in October 1972. The Kozuka family's confrontation

with its son and brother's long-delayed 'war death' was poignant and treated with a great deal of compassion, as numerous phone-in comments and letters to the editor testify.⁹ The reaction at the Kozuka and Onoda homes to the news of the shoot-out was also well documented. The hope shining out of the smiling faces of Onoda's parents in the photographs published in newspapers and magazines contrasted sharply with and made even more distressing the quiet resignation of Kozuka's. Pictures that were often reprinted included one of Kozuka's father, now eighty-one, standing at his son's grave; of his mother, seventy-seven, closing the door on journalists or standing alone in an empty courtyard. The fact that such photographs were reproduced so regularly draws attention again to the sense of tragedy associated with the news of Kozuka's death. Kozuka senior's initial refusal to talk to journalists ('we had had our hopes raised so many times in the past, please leave us alone') and his mother's complaint that it was the third time that 'they had killed her son' were also recurring reminders of the tragic ramifications of the shoot-out in Lubang.¹⁰ As Kozuka's body was not to be repatriated, his elderly parents made the trip to Manila to view his remains and take part in a funeral ceremony before cremation – again, an occasion that provided much opportunity for readers to empathise with the family.¹¹

Kozuka's death demanded an explanation, and here the public criticism of those perceived responsible for his killing was sharp and focused. A few people, such as one forty-four-year-old housewife, pointed the finger directly at the Philippines police: 'even if the two shot first, there was no need to shoot straight back'.¹² On the whole, however, such comments were exceptional. Shortly after the shooting, the Japanese embassy in Manila issued a statement saying that although it was not clear who had fired the first shot, police in the Philippines often had trouble with groups of armed civilians and might well have shot at the figures without knowing that they were Japanese (implying that they certainly would not have shot had they known these were stragglers).¹³ This kind of justification for the police's actions was only necessary in the short term if at all. Blame was quickly shifted away from those who had shot Kozuka, partly because the damage inflicted by the stragglers on Lubang was quite visible, but more importantly because blame was attached immediately to the Japanese government instead and in particular to the shortcomings of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare.

Although the wartime regime and the pre-war education system were again criticised, as they had been with Yokoi, for producing the kind of mentality that had brought Kozuka to his death, the sharpest and most sustained condemnations were reserved for the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare and post-war Japanese governments.¹⁴ Not only had the Bureau failed to find these stragglers in time to prevent Kozuka's death, but it had also neglected to search for a number of other 'missing, presumed dead' soldiers. The appearance of the Lubang stragglers soon after Yokoi's discovery made the possibility all the more real that there might be others still 'waiting for rescue' – and that the Bureau could not be trusted to find them. This was a recurring theme in letters to the editor,

interviews and press comments.¹⁵ As we saw in a previous chapter, at the end of 1959 the Japanese government had officially declared that the Lubang stragglers must have died five years earlier. With the death of Kozuka, the Japanese public was made aware that from 1959 onwards the authorities had refused to investigate any further rumours regarding stragglers on Lubang. The *Asahi* was particularly accusatory: in an article entitled ‘Negligence over Reports Provokes Regret’, it stated that after the failed searches of 1959, the Japanese government had deliberately ignored two international press syndicate reports, in 1960 and 1962, which attributed murder and physical assault on Lubang to stragglers.¹⁶ Author Ōka Shōhei wrote a similarly scathing assessment of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare. ‘This is a sad country we live in,’ he stated, referring to the Japanese government’s joint announcement with the government of the Philippines in 1959 that they would disregard any further reports of the Lubang stragglers.¹⁷

The government’s decision to ignore Lubang from 1959 onwards was based on the understanding that rumours of the presence of Japanese stragglers were sometimes fabricated. Unavoidably, the arrival of a Japanese search party heralded valuable opportunities for local inhabitants to earn money. Ōka and other commentators recognised that Japanese journalists were especially generous in exchange for information, and that they may have been provided, on occasion, with what they wanted to hear rather than actual facts.¹⁸ Indeed, a member of the editorial staff of the *Asahi* wrote that during a trip to the Philippines he had met a young Filipino on Mindanao who claimed that his father was a Japanese straggler and that from time to time the father came out of hiding for a visit.¹⁹ While this journalist was convinced he had found evidence of another straggler, it does not seem unlikely, in retrospect, that the story of a straggler’s sporadic paternal visits was made up for the benefit of an eager and generous journalist. Nevertheless, the recognition that some of the rumours had been groundless did not let the Japanese government off the hook. The Bureau of Repatriate Welfare was to be roundly condemned for having disregarded numerous reports that stragglers were still active on Lubang, and even though, according to Ōka, it had noticeably changed its stance since public pressure had forced it to give more than the bare minimum pension to Yokoi, its callousness was nevertheless ultimately responsible for the death of Kozuka.²⁰ For the journalist who had apparently found a straggler’s son on Mindanao, it was evidence of the carelessness of the Ministry of Health and Welfare that the attempts to find Japanese soldiers were left to journalists, veterans and the families of the missing.

The perceived negligence over the death of Kozuka of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, and by extension of the entire Japanese government, also brought back into the public arena the experiences of those Japanese who were still searching for their ‘missing’ relatives. Readers of the leading newspapers and magazines were confronted with this reality time and time again. A letter to the editor published in the *Mainichi shimbun* on 24 October described the painful experience of its author, a forty-eight-year-old former army sergeant, whose father had died ten years earlier doubting to the end that his other son,

missing in the war, had indeed died.²¹ An *Asahi shimbun* article on the publication in English of Ogawa Tetsuo's memoir of his experiences as a soldier on Luzon, *Terraced Hell*,²² also noted the experience of seventy-two-year-old Terada Yoshi, who had made regular visits to the Philippines for some years now looking for his son who was supposed to have died on Luzon. It also reported that thirty-four-year-old Yokota Kōchi, who had lost his father on Luzon, was getting precious little help from the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare to locate and repatriate his father's remains.²³ Similarly, the *Shūkan bunshun* described seventy-year-old Nagata Tamashi's conviction, despite receiving a death notice from the government during the war, that his son was still alive somewhere in New Guinea: he had gone searching for him in 1961 and again in 1971, but without success.²⁴ In that sense, then, Kozuka's death, after nearly three decades in hiding, confirmed the worst fears of a suddenly conspicuous proportion of the Japanese population: what if there were others likely to die without knowing the war was over because of the negligence of the Japanese government?

But if Kozuka's death brought these neglected legacies of the war to the consciousness of the population, it also showed that, on Lubang, the war was still going on in a much more immediate sense. The people of Lubang were, overall, exonerated from responsibility for Kozuka's death because of the shocked realisation that what was for Japan a link to an often forgotten or ignored past could, for them, be a matter of life and death. Here, attempted comparisons with Yokoi were proven superficial. Newspapers reported that the people of Guam had, in retrospect, shown the greatest affection for Yokoi and treated him warmly when he was found – but then, Yokoi had not attacked the population of Guam at regular intervals over a period of nearly thirty years.²⁵ The realisation that the stragglers had murdered more than thirty people on Lubang since 1945, and had injured countless more, not to mention depriving them of their livelihoods on a regular basis, was shocking, and the subject of much commentary.²⁶ The stragglers were dangerous: journalists on location in Lubang reported how they had found traces of blood, how damaged the fields had been by the fire lit by stragglers, how uneasily they kept looking back over their shoulders towards the jungle. 'If this is not war, what is it?' a young Filipino guide asked a writer for the *Shūkan asahi*. The writer explained to readers that he himself had found it difficult to believe that the stragglers could be so dangerous, but that he had come to realise that Lubang was indeed a war zone if its farmers were unable to grow their food safely, or if even its boldest men were afraid of entering the jungle.²⁷ This war zone, in which Kozuka had been killed, was not a matter of the past, of history: it was very much in the 'here and now'. As a thirty-three-year-old *sarariman* (office worker) said in a phone-in comment, the term 'former Japanese soldiers' (*moto Nihonhei*) was hardly applicable: the war was not a 'former' problem but a current one, both for the soldiers and for the people of Lubang. Another comment, from a concerned thirty-seven-year-old *sarariman*, also emphasised the need to consider the effects of the presence of stragglers on the population of Lubang.²⁸ Others called for the government to provide compensation for the losses sustained in Lubang.²⁹

The sudden proximity of the war also made post-war Japanese society look very superficial, as it had with Yokoi's return. Under the title 'When I was born, Onoda was already hiding in the jungle', the weekly *Josei jishin* commented that 'the "now", in the jungle of that little island, is the same "now" in which we, members of the generation that doesn't know the war, crowd the ski-gear bargain sales areas of department stores ...'.³⁰ Such comments again indicate an awareness of the consumerist nature of Japanese society in the 1970s, with the mention of the ski-gear implying leisure as well as luxury, consumption and a high standard of living. The peaceful, materialist present in which people were preparing for holidays at the snowfields was thus limited to Japan itself: somewhere else, in Lubang, such a present had little meaning because the war was still impinging on daily life in very tangible ways.

Nevertheless, there remained only minimal reflection on the actual war itself. The people of Lubang had certainly suffered from the presence of Kozuka and Onoda, but there were few references to the effects of the presence of the Imperial Army in the Philippines during the war years, or to the reasons that the Imperial Army might have been there in the first place. The problem of war guilt was not raised in the pages of the newspapers and magazines, except on rare occasions when letters to the editor or interviewees raised the topic. The few people who did raise it pointed out that loud protestations of concern about Kozuka's 'war death' and references to the Lubang residents' hatred and fear of the stragglers ignored a more fundamental problem: the fact that Kozuka had been part of an army which had committed numerous atrocities in the Philippines. A thirty-one-year-old priest, for example, wrote in an angry letter to the *Asahi*:

I am getting annoyed with constant references to the fact that people in the Philippines don't like the Japanese. No one would deny that Japan committed terrible acts of cruelty to Filipinos. It is time to apologise, and to compensate. We should not leave this to the government: it only has in its sight the rescue of one of our troublesome compatriots (*hitazura dōbōnin*).

The writer then apologised in strong terms on behalf of the people of Japan for the invasion of the Philippines and the atrocities committed there by the Imperial Army.³¹ Author Noma Hiroshi told the *Mainichi* that the Japanese government had the responsibility not only of rescuing stragglers but also of investigating war crimes committed by the Japanese Army in the Philippines, hinting that if it had done so at the earliest opportunity it might have found the stragglers in the process.³² But such reflective comments on the impact of Japan's invasion on the people of the Philippines were, as mentioned earlier, comparatively rare: Kozuka's death, though often labelled a 'war death' (*senshi*), was, in the final analysis, unconnected in most people's minds to a past war of aggression. It was connected only to a war that had inflicted suffering on the Japanese people: Kozuka was 'one of the many unfortunate people who were unwillingly

embroiled in that war'.³³ The death of a Japanese soldier in the Philippines, nearly three decades after the end of the war, in effect provided an opportunity to explore the significance of the war for the region, and a few individuals did seize the opportunity to challenge the overwhelming silence on the topic in the public arena. Ultimately, however, this challenge was not successful.

Whether Kozuka's death was really that of a soldier or a civilian remained a hazy issue. It was mostly referred to as a 'war death' in the press, often without quotation marks, and with relatively little self-consciousness. But officially and legally, of course, Kozuka had not died in a war, and the Ministry of Health and Welfare's 1972 notification of his death to his family avoided the term. As Wakaichi shows, the law on pensions defined the latest 'war dead' to be those who had died in battle or of battle wounds in field hospitals or other such facilities by 2 September 1945. Therefore, Kozuka (and all other stragglers who had died after the war) could not be classed as one of the war dead. But there were nevertheless a number of legal and financial problems attached to the fact that he had died in 1972 rather than 1954, the date of his death as recorded by the government in 1959. According to Wakaichi, the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare (which was also responsible for pensions) claimed that under the law Kozuka's family should reimburse the government for the pension it had been receiving since Kozuka's 1954 'death' as he had actually died much later. But having in mind the precedent of Yokoi and the great public outcry that the question of his pension had provoked, the Bureau eventually decided to make an exception to this rule and did not demand to be reimbursed. It even supplemented the family's pension with Kozuka's back pay, which was counted as the sum of twenty-eight years and five months of service and amounted to ¥287,323, and provided ¥16,000 for his funeral, together with ¥3,500 for the repatriation of his remains. In other words, as Wakaichi shows, although the government did not recognize Kozuka's death as a war death, it actually paid him as a soldier until the moment of his death in 1972.³⁴ For Wakaichi, whose aim is certainly to show Kozuka as a victim, the government's refusal to consider him as one of the war dead proved that it felt, ultimately, neither responsibility nor any particular interest in his death.³⁵

In any case, although the death of Kozuka provoked a great deal of mourning and sadness, the focus in fact moved very rapidly away from him to centre on the searches for Onoda. Each issue of the major daily newspapers in the days following followed the shoot-out devoted several articles, sometimes spreading over more than two pages, to the attempts to find Onoda on Lubang. Members of the public wrote to newspapers about the best way to get him to surrender, and at least two people phoned the *Asahi* to suggest that the only foolproof method consisted of respectfully asking the Emperor to record himself saying 'The war is over' and playing this recording over and over on Lubang.³⁶ Yokoi, busy with the preparations for his wedding, told the *Shūkan asahi* that the only way to capture Onoda was to use helicopters to spray the entire island with sleeping gas.³⁷ As Fig. 7.1 shows, other suggested methods included staging the fictional return of the Japanese Army to the Philippines.




Figure 7.1 Cartoon by Satō Sanpei. ‘*Fuji Santarō*’.

Source: *Asahi shimbun*, 23 October 1972.

Onoda’s father was reported as stating angrily his son Onoda was not likely to come out now that he had been given proof, with Kozuka’s death, that he would be shot if he did so.³⁸

Indeed, the photographs that reached Japanese readers through the medium of the press were strongly reminiscent of war scenes featuring uniformed Filipinos, big Alsatian dogs, helicopters and improvised headquarters lit by petrol lamps.³⁹ Although, as the *Yomiuri* reported, dogs were soon withdrawn from the search effort for fear of driving the remaining straggler to suicide, over the days following the shoot-out new methods were devised to convince the straggler the war was over, including the use of an advertising balloon.⁴⁰ Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei announced in the Diet on 24 October 1972 that all necessary funds and effort would be expended in order to find not only the Lubang

straggler but also all other as yet unrepatriated citizens, including those still in China.⁴¹ The news of Kozuka's death, meanwhile, disappeared amid the mass of articles that accompanied the increasing realisation that Onoda had apparently vanished into thin air.

The searches, which were initially the subject of reports in the press on a daily basis, were conducted on an unprecedented scale, starting from three different locations on Lubang and taking place in shifts. The search parties consisted of members of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, troops from the Philippines Army, local policemen and of course members of Onoda's family. His elder brother, Toshio, who had gone to Manila immediately after the news of the shoot-out to identify the body, was familiar with Lubang, having been there searching for his brother both in 1954 and in 1959. He reached Lubang less than a week after the shoot-out, and for the third time took up the loudspeaker and begged his brother to come out. Onoda's sister, Chie, also came to Lubang to look for him. Other searchers included Lubang veterans, Onoda's former immediate superior Taniguchi Yoshimi, and ultimately also Onoda's father, Jirō, who made the trip at the age of eighty-three. But, as the *Asahi* remarked six days after the shoot-out, Onoda had vanished 'like a ghost': some of the searchers believed he was hiding in a hole like Yokoi's; others that he was literally running rings around the searchers; and there were also those who believed that he had committed suicide.⁴² A day later the *Asahi*'s report on the searches included the remark of a Lubang resident that there were by then so many searchers on the island that the arrival of the entire Japanese Army must surely be imminent.⁴³ Psychiatrists commented in print on their understanding of Onoda's probable frame of mind. Such comments, however, were soon made irrelevant, in the eyes of journalists at least, by the discovery that he was an intelligence officer trained at the illustrious Nakano School. The Nakano School had become a training ground for Army officers in 1940 and specialised in the instruction of guerrilla and shock warfare tactics as well as espionage and intelligence-gathering. Because of its nature it had remained shrouded in secrecy throughout the war, and few outside the Army had known of its existence until the post-war period.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the press told readers that graduates of the Nakano School, in contrast to other soldiers of the Imperial Army, were forbidden to commit suicide and that Onoda had in fact received specific orders, in 1945, to continue guerrilla warfare on Lubang.⁴⁵ The man's image changed quickly from that of a mistaken soldier running scared to that of an intelligence officer playing cat and mouse with the search parties. Neither loudspeakers nor leaflets dropped from helicopters nor yet the presence of his family convinced Onoda to surrender, although he was certainly aware of the search parties.⁴⁶

Public interest, initially whipped up by the certainty that another straggler would shortly be found, gradually waned with the lack of results. Nevertheless, the searches continued for six months. In the end it was Onoda's father who asked the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare to bring the searches to a halt on 13 April 1973. This time when announcing the end of the searches the Bureau was cautious: it did not say it believed Onoda had died from wounds received in the

shoot-out that killed Kozuka, only that there was no sign of him alive or dead. The major daily papers devoted only a small article to the announcement that searches on Lubang were to be abandoned, and those who had condemned the Bureau at the time of Kozuka's death did not write letters to the press in protest.⁴⁷

Onoda was convinced to return less than a year later, in March 1974, causing an enormous sensation in Japan and indeed in the whole world. The circumstances of his 'surrender' lent themselves particularly well to melodramatic exposition, and also strongly affected the reactions to his return. First, Onoda was found by one of the *musenka*, the 'generation that doesn't know the war', a twenty-four-year-old 'drop out' by the name of Suzuki Norio, who found Onoda within five days, and on a shoestring budget – in marked contrast, needless to say, to the amount of time and money that had been expended by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in its ineffective searches of Lubang. Second, in order to surrender Onoda insisted on a planned meeting with his former superior, Taniguchi Yoshimi, in which he was formally ordered to cease operations. The formality of Onoda's 'surrender' stood in stark contrast to the rescue of Yokoi, who had been 'captured', as the last chapter has shown, by Guam residents. The extent to which Onoda was stuck in the past, as symbolised by his strict adherence to military codes, and also by his tattered but recognisable army uniform, his well-maintained gun and his stilted speech, made him the most unavoidably military of all the stragglers and as a result also the most uncomfortable for contemporary Japanese. The resulting sense of unease tinged his reception with an ambiguity much greater than that which had characterised the return of Yokoi two years earlier. While Onoda was undoubtedly made into a hero in some circles – even at times, explicitly a war hero – such descriptions provoked fierce criticism elsewhere, centring on the idea that admiration for him entailed admiration for what he represented: namely the former Imperial Army, militarism and the kind of nationalism that had accompanied the militarisation of politics and society in the 1930s and early 1940s.

Suzuki Norio, who had already spent a great part of his brief adulthood travelling around the world, arrived on Lubang early in February 1974. He saw himself as an adventurer and had gone roaming, as he told his friends upon leaving Japan, to find a panda, a yeti, or Onoda.⁴⁸ The fact that he went looking for stragglers – as well as a near-extinct animal and the mythical 'bigfoot' – gives an indication of the status of Onoda as a legendary figure in Japanese consciousness at the time. In any case, Suzuki unsuccessfully chased rumours of Japanese stragglers in central Mindoro before arriving on Lubang. He spent a few days listening to the stories of Lubang residents before making his way to so-called 'Wakayama Point' (named after Onoda's home prefecture), near the town of Brol on the south-eastern side of Lubang. He pitched his tent there on 15 February.

It was on the evening of 20 February, while he was cooking dinner, that Suzuki suddenly heard someone say 'Hey!' He recalls that at first he had been unable to quite believe the sight that greeted him when he turned round: an 'old'

man in tattered clothing, holding a rifle, was standing on a rise about ten metres away. Realising that this must be Onoda, Suzuki's first terrified thoughts were: 'That's it, I'm dead, he's going to shoot me.' According to the story, Suzuki then said: 'I'm Japanese', to which Onoda replied: 'I'm Onoda'; Suzuki said: 'The war is over,' to which Onoda replied: 'It isn't over for me.' Suzuki asked Onoda to stay and talk. Onoda agreed as long as they moved to a less exposed position. That night they shared a meal (Onoda refusing any of Suzuki's canned offerings until Suzuki had partaken of them himself) and talked into the small hours. Suzuki was surprised to see Onoda pull a transistor radio from his knapsack and hear him talk knowledgeably on a wide range of topics including the discovery of Yokoi. Onoda had, it seems, been reading the newspapers left behind by the search parties. He posed for numerous photographs and let Suzuki handle his rifle. As dawn came he told Suzuki that he would surrender only if he received in person the orders of his immediate superior, Taniguchi. Suzuki said that he would come back to the same spot as soon as possible. (Newspapers later reported that a meeting had been set up for 10 March, but Suzuki said it was not such a precise arrangement.) In the morning of 21 February, Suzuki hurried towards Manila and the Japanese Embassy with his news.⁴⁹

On 27 February 1974, the news that the young man claimed to have met Onoda was spread over the front pages of the newspapers in Japan; in the evening editions, these claims were supported by photographs.⁵⁰ Over the next few days the suspense was tangible. Taniguchi Yoshimi, Onoda's former superior, Onoda's brother Toshio and the head of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare flew to Lubang. While the others stayed in Brol, Taniguchi and Suzuki set up camp on 4 March at the location where Suzuki had first met Onoda, and waited, wondering whether Onoda would keep his word, and come to the meeting. On 9 March Onoda appeared and stood to attention while Taniguchi transmitted formal orders for him to surrender. The surrender ceremony over, Taniguchi and Onoda sat down for a long talk. In Brol, the head of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare hurried to make preparations for Onoda's repatriation.⁵¹

The performance was beginning. On the morning of 10 March, Onoda was about to have a wash and a shave in preparation for his return to society, but Taniguchi stopped him: President Ferdinand Marcos was looking forward to meeting him 'as is' and having a formal surrender ceremony take place in Manila. This ceremony was duly held, and photographs of Onoda, unshaven and still in tattered uniform, ceremonially handing President Marcos his sword, would be plastered all over newspapers and magazines during the weeks to follow. On that occasion, Marcos also gave Onoda his pardon for all the crimes he had committed on Lubang during the previous thirty years. On 12 March, Onoda flew back to Japan in an aeroplane chartered for the occasion by the Japanese government.

Onoda's impact on Japan cannot be overestimated. His discovery and return displaced all other news stories from the front page. As had been the case with Yokoi, Onoda stayed in the news for months and his entire life came under scrutiny: his childhood, his young adulthood, his training as an intelligence

officer, his life on Lubang, his feelings upon coming home, his comments on Japan, his state of health; the smallest aspects of the Onoda character were dissected and analysed. As had been the case with Yokoi, the impact in Japan of this soldier's return was in itself also the subject of self-conscious reflection. If Yokoi had become consumable, Onoda was even more so. Magazines competed for exclusive rights to his story, and Wakaichi reports rumours that a news group had offered Onoda eighty million yen for sole rights. The successful bidder in the end, for an undisclosed sum, was the Kōdansha group and its weekly magazine *Shūkan gendai*, whose sales rocketed with the serialised publication of his memoirs over three months beginning in May 1974.⁵² The commercialism surrounding Onoda is exemplified by a series of advertisements in which Yazaki, a company selling central air-conditioning systems, used him to bring attention to the benefits of its machines (see Fig. 7.2). It did so by drawing the most tenuous links between Onoda's experience and its own, emphasising, for example, the fact that just as no one had expected Onoda's return, no one had expected that such wonderful air conditioners as Yazaki's could exist.

There are numerous reasons why Onoda was so consumable. The lengthy history of the Lubang searches, brought to the fore less than two years earlier with Kozuka's death, itself coming close on the heels of the discovery of Yokoi, certainly helped to foster the 'Onoda boom' of the spring of 1974. Also important, no doubt, was the fact that Onoda's family had been publicly very articulate regarding the need to bring him home, successfully publicising the issue both in 1959, as we have seen, and again in the early 1970s. Wakaichi



Figure 7.2 Advertisements for the Yazaki Corporation.

Source: *Bungei shunjū*, special edition, vol. 52, no. 6 (May 1974), pp. 137, 141, 145, 151.

points out that the Onoda family, while not particularly wealthy, had connections both to the political world and press circles since his father before retirement had been a member of the Wakayama Prefectural Diet and a journalist.⁵³ But a crucial part of Onoda's success was Onoda himself. At the time of his return he proved himself a natural actor, a shrewd businessman and very comfortable as a public figure, much more so than Yokoi. If the media manipulated Yokoi, Onoda manipulated the media, using it very much to his advantage, playing thoroughly the role of the tough, dedicated, rigid intelligence officer of the Nakano School, the 'paragon of military virtue' that seemed so fascinating to the Japan of the 1970s.

Onoda became incredibly famous in 1974, and it is important to take into account the way in which his public persona was constructed. The commercialism surrounding his reception contributed to the way in which his story was told, and there was a high degree of theatrical performance involved in the public depiction of his return. The protagonists in this drama were numerous and included not only Onoda himself but also his brothers, his parents, his former superior Taniguchi, other Lubang veterans – and, of course, the young man who found him. All these people spent months telling and retelling the story of his surrender and recasting their own characters and experience in the light of the narratives of his thirty years on Lubang. In the period between his discovery and his surrender in particular, Onoda's image as a virtuous and selfless officer was polished by many hands, a process that reached an apogee during his repatriation. And he himself, if initially surprised by his reception, did little to impair this image. But the way in which he adroitly managed his sudden celebrity would become a source of disillusionment for others over time, as will be shown below. Once the excitement of his return wore off, Onoda's image as a paragon of military virtue began to crack. And his was not the only drama that was constantly reinvented. The life of twenty-four-year-old Suzuki Norio, who first found Onoda, was also carefully narrated, in the light of his sudden fame, as that of a 'devil-may-care' adventurer on the margins of Japanese society.⁵⁴ Suzuki's (at least partly) constructed character, like that of all other protagonists in this drama, would inevitably suffer during his long exposure to public scrutiny: he was sometimes also portrayed as a boaster and an opportunist.⁵⁵

In any case, the initial meeting of two such seemingly opposite characters – the wartime soldier strictly bound by his duty and the young man choosing to live outside the constraints of his society – provided a fantastic story. The 'selfless wartime' and 'selfish 1970s' had spent a night talking around the fire; the 'selfish 1970s' had known how to rescue the 'selfless wartime'; the 'selfish 1970s' had managed to convince the 'selfless wartime' that it was time to stop fighting. For the sake of this story the characters of the protagonists were squeezed, for the time being, into such moulds. The importance that these constructed images assumed in Onoda's repatriation illuminates the presence of discursive frameworks which encouraged a contrast between the wartime and post-war generations that constituted Japan's population. These discursive frameworks had been used, and indeed partly created, to cope with the return of Yokoi two

years earlier. The contrast between the different generations that supported these discursive frameworks underlined, in a sense, Japan's symbolic distance from the war and the defeat, a distance so great that the returned soldier could only be integrated into contemporary society with difficulty, hence the ambivalence that greeted the return of both Yokoi and Onoda.

While Onoda's story lent itself particularly well to dramatic narratives, the unease and dissatisfaction which permeated much of Japan's image of itself at that time, as noted in the previous chapter, was also crucial to his commercial success. If Yokoi's return had thrown into relief the 'materialism' and 'lack of spiritual direction' from which Japan was allegedly suffering, Onoda's did so even more. His loyalty to his duty, his refusal to surrender until he had received the direct orders of his commander, his 'command' of the island (as opposed to Yokoi's hiding in a hole) bespoke a 'professionalism' that could only highlight how 'amateurish' Japan had become.⁵⁶ 'Compared to us', as someone exclaimed, 'Onoda is wonderful'.⁵⁷

Such anxiety about Japan's 'materialism' had been apparent at the time of Yokoi's return, but new developments had added powerfully to doubts about the state of Japan's society and its place in the world. Economic anxiety had been greatly exacerbated by the 'oil shocks' of 1973, when the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) suddenly quadrupled the price of crude oil on which the Japanese economy was strongly reliant. The rise in prices and the beginning of the country's worst recession since the beginning of the 'economic miracle' made the population keenly aware of the precariousness of Japan's new economic prosperity. The popularity of Komatsu Sakyō's best-selling science-fiction novel *Nihon chinbotsu* (Japan Sinks), published in 1973 and depicting the Japanese islands' inexorable progress towards a geological fault about to engulf and destroy them altogether, reflects much of this anxiety about Japan's precarious position.⁵⁸ The country's vulnerability in the face of international events over which it seemingly had little or no control was also the cause of great anxiety. This vulnerability had already been highlighted by the 'Nixon shocks' of 1971, especially United States President Richard Nixon's sudden announcement that he would visit Beijing in an official capacity. The 'oil shocks' of 1973 only added to such feelings of vulnerability in the face of external developments.⁵⁹

In addition, the Japanese population was also becoming increasingly aware of the 'money politics' that seemed to dominate the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the apparent corruption of some of the nation's political leaders, leading some commentators to predict massive losses for that party in the elections of July 1974.⁶⁰ Indeed, it was less than a year after Onoda's return that prime minister Tanaka Kakuei was forced to resign from office, battling charges of corruption and bribery. Public disgust about the financial links between big business and politics was sufficient to prompt the implementation of reforms in the laws regulating political donations in 1975.⁶¹ Two years later, critic Kitazawa Masakuni linked the same sense of 'spiritual emptiness' that had been brought to the fore at the time of Yokoi's return with unbridled consumption, and the kind of greed that

had prompted politicians to accept money in return for commercial and political favours and so to become embroiled in the Lockheed Scandal, in which high government officials along with senior businessmen were found to have accepted money as an inducement to authorise the purchase of American Tristar aircraft.⁶² In this context, Onoda seemed all the more admirable because the society to which he had returned was so insecure about its own accomplishments.⁶³

Yet it was also recognised that Onoda's image was constructed to a degree. Fig. 7.3 shows an artisan busily attaching samurai armour to Onoda's tattered uniform, making a point about the unashamed construction of Onoda as a nostalgic, purely Japanese and overwhelmingly military symbol of valour and strength.



Figure 7.3 Cartoon by Katō Yoshirō. 'A doll maker: please let me make a samurai armour for Onoda'.

Source: *Shūkan asahi*, 22 March 1974.

But possibly the strongest attacks on his image as the ‘paragon of a soldier’ came from other veterans and particularly the members of the Lubang Association, a group of around fifty soldiers, forty of whom had not surrendered until March 1946, who had lent their support to rescue attempts over the years. Wakaichi shows that as Onoda’s memoirs took form in the series published weekly in the *Shūkan gendai*, his description of himself and of his thirty years on Lubang provoked the ire of the members of the Association. According to Wakaichi, they felt that Onoda had sanitised his own experience, and slandered other officers and their men: he had said, for example, that the group of forty who surrendered in March 1946 had done so because they were hungry rather than, as the latter remembered, because they realised that the war was over. Furthermore, they were angry that he kept calling Akatsu, the straggler who surrendered on Lubang in 1950, a deserter and that he was quite dismissive of Shimada, the straggler killed in 1954.

The anger of other Lubang war veterans spilled over publicly at the launch of Onoda’s memoirs the following autumn at the prestigious Hotel New Otani in Tokyo. There were several hundred guests at the launch; though Onoda circulated amongst them, it seems he studiously avoided the table where the veterans were sitting. When they walked up to the front of the hall to confront him, Onoda angrily dismissed them, but the veterans persisted, loudly questioning his account of the crucial battles on Lubang and accusing him of concocting a pack of lies, upon which the staff of the New Otani threw them out. One bitter veteran remarked that to explain Onoda’s behaviour as the result of the training he had received at the Nakano School ignored the fact that there were plenty of other Nakano graduates who had surrendered at the appropriate time. Furthermore, there was no need to act like a great general: Lubang had seen only little fighting, and none of it had been terribly important. He added dryly that Onoda must have been a terrible intelligence officer if it had taken him thirty years to figure out that the war was over.⁶⁴ Two years later, the ghostwriter of Onoda’s memoirs, Ikeda Shin, published an account of his impressions of Onoda entitled, tellingly enough, *Fantasy Hero*, in which Ikeda said that he felt it his responsibility to tell the public that from his perspective the real Onoda was not a hero nor a soldier nor a brave man.⁶⁵ The questions surrounding Onoda’s ‘true’ character also resonated with public unease over the degree of his responsibility for the deaths of Shimada and Kozuka. He had been their superior officer, after all, and it was his ‘error of judgement’ in failing to recognize the end of the war that had kept them in the jungle. These doubts were countered on the other hand by Onoda’s obvious sadness as he recounted their deaths, taken as a sign of his benevolence as a superior officer, and his apology to the Japanese people for having made this ‘error of judgement’.⁶⁶ The first apparent ambiguity in Onoda’s character, then, resided in the tension between ‘truth’ and ‘fiction’ in his image as a shining example of military virtue.

The second ambiguity resided in the argument surrounding the degree or quality of his heroism. One of the most immediately apparent aspects of Onoda’s case was that he did not lend himself very well to the role of victim. It must have

been much easier to pity Yokoi, who had lived in a hole for most of his time in hiding and was pale, sick, hirsute and plagued by nightmares when he was found. Yokoi had said that he had been ashamed to come back to Japan alive. Onoda, in comparison, was neat and relatively well shaven, had kept his guns and ammunition in working order and, in the words of one reporter, had spent his exile running through the jungle of Lubang ‘like a leopard’ and jumping across ravines ‘like an antelope’.⁶⁷ That Kozuka had been painted as a victim, particularly of the failure of the Japanese government to find him before the Lubang police shot him, has been shown in the first part of this chapter. Onoda, on the other hand, had evaded the attempts to find him because, as he saw it, he had to be loyal to his duty and was permitted to surrender officially only on receiving the orders of his immediate superior. Onoda, then, had had a degree of control over his repatriation which the others had not. This was also strongly illustrated by the first photographs of him to hit Japan, in which he was shown either sitting cross-legged, straight-backed, gun laid across his lap or standing to attention with the gun at his side and with one hand raised in a rigid military salute.⁶⁸ Onoda’s return is thus particularly significant because he confronted Japan very bluntly with its military past.

Wakaichi considers that Onoda was overwhelmingly cast as a hero; Charles S. Terry, who translated Onoda’s book into English, introduces it as the work of Japan’s first ‘war hero’.⁶⁹ I would argue that, even in the heady days following his surrender, Onoda’s image was much more ambivalent and much more contested than these verdicts suggest. That he was made a hero in some quarters is undeniable, but it is also undeniable that this trend was itself the subject of much criticism. The combination of admiration and uneasiness was difficult, if not impossible, to resolve publicly. If Onoda was admirable for his tenacity, his endurance and his rigid adherence to his orders, he also represented the generally reviled values of militarism and expansionist nationalism. If he was admirable because he was healthier than the average fifty-year-old, because his gun was shiny, his sword polished and because he had survived for so long, he was also a willing adherent of the Army’s dogma, which only two years before had been condemned for producing someone like Yokoi and for ultimate responsibility in the death of Kozuka. Such ambivalence was expressed in a variety of ways. Onoda’s older brother, for example, confessed in an interview that he didn’t know whether to congratulate his brother or to call him an idiot.⁷⁰ Street interviews showed that people did ‘end up admiring him’ even while wondering whether Onoda was ‘what you would call a nationalist’,⁷¹ or felt confused because ‘he impressed me ... I thought he was the paragon of a soldier ... then I noticed I was admiring militarism’, or because they thought ‘he was a splendid figure’ and yet had absolutely ‘no redeeming features’.⁷²

When Onoda was openly treated as a hero, his heroism was only rarely connected explicitly with the war. He was admired for a number of reasons, including the degree of his self-sufficiency; the presence of Shimada and Kozuka for nine and twenty-seven years respectively at Onoda’s side was only rarely acknowledged. Specifically military themes were certainly not present in the

material on Onoda in the press, although they do occasionally shine through in the comments of individuals, in letters to the editor, street interviews or other such material. According to Onoda's father, between thirty and fifty admiring letters had reached the family home every day even before his son's repatriation, 'praising the greatness of one who did his duty for the nation'.⁷³ One letter to the editor complained that the pension Onoda would receive was too low considering that he, unlike other soldiers, had not surrendered or fled at the end of the war.⁷⁴ Certainly, Onoda himself believed that he was treated like a 'triumphant general' on his return.⁷⁵ In fact he later revealed, in a conversation with his three brothers staged for an interview, that he had originally expected people 'to throw stones at me saying, how about that idiot, coming home so late ...'.⁷⁶

Direct references to Onoda as a patriot or war hero were, overall, quite rare in public discourses. There were certainly occasions when the meaning of the designation as 'hero' remained ambiguous: the *Shūkan bunshun* put Onoda in the ranks of 'the most beautiful (*utsukushii*) men of the post-war period', and rhetorically asked: 'if he is not a hero, who is?'⁷⁷ It did not, however, make it explicit whether he was admired because he had displayed a better or longer-lasting amount of patriotism than his compatriots. Furthermore, there must have been a variety of reasons that drew more than seven thousand people to Haneda Airport to greet Onoda on his return, and that made them break out in cheers when, having stepped out of the plane, and still at the top of the stairs leading down to the tarmac, he smiled and raised his arm in greeting.⁷⁸ Onoda's mother and father, waiting at the bottom of the steps to greet their son, were pushed aside by politicians eager to press their name cards into his hand, to the indignation of the press and the public.⁷⁹ Prime minister Tanaka Kakuei's meeting with the Onoda family on 13 March, where thanks and congratulations were exchanged on all sides, was surely more a matter of public relations and publicity than of official support for Onoda's refusal to surrender.⁸⁰ But even if admiration for the man's patriotism or refusal to surrender was part of what drew the crowds to Haneda or what possessed some politicians to push his parents aside, surely simple curiosity, or the proximity of someone who was already a great celebrity, were just as important as ingredients of the Onoda boom and had little to do with admiration for his military training and demeanour.

Significantly, however, there was a very strong emphasis in the media on the necessity *not* to make him into a war hero or to admire him as a soldier, especially in editorial material rather than contributions to the press from the public. This particular public voice rejected the image of him as a hero using three main arguments. The first was that positive images of Onoda could only come from a twisted recollection of the war. The war had brought only suffering and pain to Japan (all other countries were ignored), and nothing positive had emerged from it, not even in the shape of Onoda. The second argument was that rather than being a hero Onoda should be seen as a victim of military indoctrination in the same way as the rest of the population had been victimised until the end of the war. The third argument emphasised the danger inherent in glorifying Onoda, insisting that such glorification would undermine efforts to

transmit the truth about the war to younger generations. In other words, making Onoda into a hero would encourage the misrepresentation of the past. There are numerous examples of such arguments. A *Yomiuri shimbun* editorial stated that ‘it would be a mistake to talk lightly of the “military spirit” [often upheld as a factor in Onoda’s ability to survive] without thinking of the damage caused by war’.⁸¹ Similarly, an *Asahi* editorial urged that rather than being seen as a hero, ‘Onoda should be treated as a messenger warning us about the road we once took’.⁸² Commentaries in both the *Asahi* and the *Yomiuri* warned that it would be wrong to think of the war as the ‘good old days’, or to connect Onoda’s behaviour with healthy nationalism or patriotism.⁸³ An *Asahi* editorial drew these threads together on 12 March, the day of his return:

We think that we have thoroughly discussed the war, but can we really say we have? Haven’t we left something out? We might have discussed various fearful experiences, but can we say we discussed thoroughly the driving force behind the war, imperialism? Have we sufficiently discussed the organisation of power by which the Japanese were bound hand and foot? Can the youth of today visualise those young soldiers, sent off to die? Onoda must be seen as a victim, produced by a country that robbed the people of their freedom of thought and actions, and that walked the path of its own destruction.⁸⁴

The interpretative framework upon which this editorial rests is a familiar one, that of ‘victim consciousness’. In this editorial, the population, and Onoda, had been the unwitting victims of an ‘organisation of power’, in this case nameless but usually referred to as ‘militarists’. Another hallmark of this discourse of victimhood is that destruction caused by the war was implicitly restricted to Japan. Although the editorial used the word ‘imperialism’ (*teikokushugi*), it did not in fact mention other countries: it ended with the comment that Japan ‘walked the path of its own destruction’, not anyone else’s. There were few references in the press generally to the suffering of the people of Lubang since 1945, and even fewer references to the reasons for the Japanese Army’s presence in the Philippines before that.

But if Onoda was one victim of a pre-war education that was ‘spine-chillingly atrocious’ or an army that was ‘inhuman’, ‘cruel’ and ‘absurd’,⁸⁵ then the tendency to treat him as a hero constituted, to some, alarming evidence that these characteristics of the wartime society and government had been forgotten. The same fears that the war and its true character had been forgotten had also surfaced at the time of Yokoi’s return two years before. And just as Yokoi had drawn attention to the chasm that separated the wartime and the post-war generations, Onoda’s return showed that those who ‘knew’ the war and those who didn’t had completely different understandings of his significance. For some members of the older generation, his return provided an opportunity to publicly exorcise their own war guilt, an opportunity taken, for example, by some former teachers, who pondered on their culpability in hammering into the heads of

innocent students ideas that probably killed them when they got to the front.⁸⁶ Others reflected on the tenacity of such ideas, commenting that they themselves still immediately came to attention and clicked their heels if they heard the words ‘His Majesty the Emperor’.⁸⁷ But for the younger generation, Onoda had little personal significance, and, perhaps as a result, was a less ambivalent figure. He was often described as ‘great’ (*erai, rippa*), just as frequently as ‘pitiful’ (*kawaisō*), and sometimes as nothing but a ‘crumbly old man’ (*oyaji*), even a bit of an ‘idiot’ (*bakagete iru*), who might be better off if he had stayed in the jungle.⁸⁸ The disparity among such reactions only confirmed the gulf between generations, a gulf that might have been bridged, as the *Asahi* editorial above suggests, had ‘true’ history been transmitted more successfully to the younger generation.

But while there was a great degree of self-consciousness in the discomfort with Onoda’s heroic image and with the values he appeared to represent, there is also evidence that the same values actually informed part of the very discourse on Onoda, especially when he was compared with other stragglers. Rather than explaining disparities in the ‘lifestyles’ of the stragglers with reference to differences in personal character, opportunity, or their respective hiding places, such comparisons lent weight instead to distinctions of military rank as the core explanation for different methods of survival. It is in the continuing existence of such values that the central clue can be found to explain the disappearance from memory of Private Kozuka Kinshichi, Onoda’s companion of twenty-seven years, as will be explained below. Although references to Kozuka’s death formed only a small part of the discourses surrounding Onoda, the much more prominent comparisons between Lieutenant Onoda and Sergeant Yokoi, who had returned from Guam in 1972, also support the idea that the stragglers’ respective military ranks were important reference points in the construction of their identities. Onoda’s return in fact provoked a comprehensive reassessment of Yokoi’s experience and character.

Onoda had been an officer of the illustrious Nakano School, an exclusive training ground for intelligence officers; Yokoi had been a sergeant, and Kozuka a mere private. These were distinctions that were ultimately accorded a great deal of significance in the way in which the three soldiers were received on their return. Although there were some amongst the many voices that condemned Onoda’s status as a hero who did so out of consideration for the families of those who had not come back,⁸⁹ Kozuka’s death only two years before, let alone Shimada’s death in 1954, were events that were mentioned only rarely. As pointed out earlier, there were occasions when Onoda’s responsibility for his comrades’ death was hinted at, a responsibility hinging on the fact that it was the superior officer Onoda’s mistaken understanding of post-1945 conditions that had prevented the earlier surrender of Shimada and Kozuka. On the other hand, although this is difficult to ascertain definitively, it is not improbable that Kozuka and Shimada were as convinced as Onoda that the war was still going on. But although the question of Onoda’s responsibility for the other deaths was certainly raised by disillusioned Lubang veterans, as mentioned above, in mainstream

reportage, the deaths of Kozuka and Shimada were ultimately portrayed as part of Onoda's drama and not as central events in their own.

A particularly glaring example of this is found in a *Shūkan josei jishin* special, which began with eight pages of the most memorable photographs of Onoda's return – including his surrender ceremony with President Marcos (with Imelda Marcos in the background), his famous smiling exit from the plane, his mother's crying face as she beheld him for the first time in more than thirty years, his arrival at a Tokyo hospital in a fashion reminiscent of the arrival of famous actors at the Oscars, complete with crowd-control measures and the flashes of photographers' cameras, and a portrait of a solemn Onoda staring into the distance. There followed two pages on 'another returned soldier' (*mō hitori no kikanhei*). Here, a photo of Kozuka's father at his son's open casket, and of his mother and father praying at Kozuka's grave, provided a stark contrast to the previous pages. Nevertheless, in the accompanying commentary, Kozuka's father, readers were told, expressed his relief at seeing Onoda come home safely, even though 'it would have been better if they had both come out earlier ...'. Readers were further told that Kozuka's father had attempted to assuage his wife's grief by saying it had perhaps been their son's duty to die so that Onoda could come home safely. The commentary ended with the remark that, with Onoda's return, Kozuka's parents' 'long post-war' had finally ended.⁹⁰ The joyous reception of Onoda was thus, in a sense, given the blessing of Kozuka's family by the press. This agreeable if poignant image is, however, contested by Wakaichi, who maintains that when after his stay in hospital Onoda visited Kozuka's family, his father angrily accused him of responsibility for his son's death.⁹¹ But in the eyes of the public at least, Onoda's safe return was much more important than Kozuka's death.

Wakaichi maintains that the lack of public interest in Kozuka stemmed from the fact that Onoda was an officer and Kozuka a private.⁹² Indeed, references to Onoda as an officer abounded, and there was much speculation on when, if ever, 'the officer's glint in his eyes' would disappear.⁹³ That the respective rank of the stragglers was an important aspect of reactions to their return is also supported by the way in which Yokoi's image changed with Onoda's return. Comparisons between Yokoi and Onoda could not be, and were not, avoided, and Yokoi fared rather badly. It was his 'shame' that had kept him on Guam, not his 'devotion to his duty'; he had lived in a hole, Onoda had taken command of the island; Yokoi had been dirty and sick, Onoda healthier than the average fifty-year-old Japanese; Yokoi's gun had become useless, Onoda had kept his polished and in working order. Here, 'tailor' Yokoi, who, as we have seen, initially elicited a great deal of admiration for his survival skills, suddenly looked like an amateur. As the *Shūkan sankei* put it, although Yokoi had been quite busy just keeping himself alive, Onoda had managed to combine the daily business of finding enough to eat with his duty as an intelligence officer, roaming the island, keeping an eye on the population (occasionally killing them) and gathering information.⁹⁴

The comparisons were endless; but interestingly such differences were ultimately not attributed to anything other than the respective military ranks of

the two soldiers – and this mostly unselfconsciously. Even when a number of other factors were taken into account, such as character, family history, topographical differences in the islands of Lubang and Guam, difference in training and so on, in the end, it was ‘the age-old difference between samurai and commoner’ that apparently made Yokoi’s and Onoda’s experiences as stragglers so different.⁹⁵ It was only after Onoda’s return that Yokoi was referred to as a ‘defeated soldier’ or described as having a ‘dropout’ mentality.⁹⁶ Ultimately Onoda, the officer, was the more admirable. It was because he was an officer that he was so devoted to his duty; Yokoi had merely fled, if not actually deserted, in the face of the enemy. If this was how Yokoi’s image changed with Onoda’s return, it is no surprise that Kozuka completely disappeared except as a small, relatively unimportant part of the Onoda story. Even though the Nakano School was condemned for imbuing its graduate Onoda with the kind of training that made it difficult for him to understand that the war was over for thirty years, it nevertheless provoked a degree of admiration that was directly related to the status that officer schools held during the wartime years. The retrospective assessment of Yokoi as a ‘mere’ sergeant, a ‘commoner’, is testament to the fact that such values still had currency in the 1970s.

The journalist and critic Wakaichi’s 1986 attempt to rescue Private Kozuka from collective amnesia was apparently prompted by the sight in 1985 on a busy Osaka street of a begging war veteran, and his subsequent discussion with a friend about the end of the war. Had it really taken place on 15 August 1945, or did the war end the day the last soldier fell? Confronted with this question, Wakaichi decided to trace the last of the war dead. His friend discouraged him, saying it would be impossible to find exactly at which point the last shot had been fired in Burma or New Guinea, even a few months after the war. But the next day Wakaichi vaguely remembered the news about the shoot-out in Lubang, although he wasn’t quite able to remember Kozuka Kinshichi’s name. It was when he was asking journalist friends for the name that he realised Kozuka had disappeared not only from his own memory but from those of many of his contemporaries who, for all that, were perfectly familiar with the name of Onoda.⁹⁷ The only other book that deals specifically with Kozuka is a memorial tome produced in 1973 by the City of Hachiōji, Kozuka’s home town, in which members of his family describe their efforts to find him and the citizens of Hachiōji leave heart-rending testimonies of their feelings of loss and sadness at his death.⁹⁸ Compared to the frenzy of publication that accompanied Onoda’s return – a frenzy that extended throughout the world – Kozuka’s experience, as has been shown in this chapter, slipped quickly from memory.⁹⁹

Onoda moved to Brazil less than a year after his return from Lubang. After the publication of his book, he went to the United States on a lecture tour. He announced his decision to migrate to Brazil (where his younger brother lived) while there, and left Japan on 8 April 1975.¹⁰⁰ He told the *Asahi* he was leaving partly because he felt that he had been treated like a ‘panda’, but also because he thought that ‘people don’t respect the ways of the past any more’.¹⁰¹ Pandas were topical animals at the time, Japan having been given two of the rare animals on

the occasion of the normalisation of relations between China and Japan in 1972. But pandas were also thought in the early 1970s to be extinct, hence the celebration surrounding the existence of those in captivity. Onoda's reference to being treated like a 'panda' must be taken in that context, apparently signifying that he felt like a prized animal in a zoo. In addition, according to his father, Onoda 'was strongly dissatisfied with the attitude of the Japanese towards the war dead, and deplored the fact that they did not pay enough respect to the Yasukuni Shrine'.¹⁰² Ironically, he was levelling at Japan the same criticisms that Japan had levelled at itself at the time of Yokoi's return: Japan was obsessed with commercialism and had lost the values of the past.

When Onoda came home in 1974, there were those who warned that here was the last chance to make amends with the past and to confront the war. Yokoi and Onoda (and, to a lesser extent, Kozuka) had provided an opportunity to reflect on the place of the war in Japan's present. Nevertheless, as the return of Yokoi, the death of Kozuka, and the 'surrender' of Onoda show, such reflection remained ambiguous. There is strong evidence of the dominance of the discursive framework of 'victim consciousness' in the press reporting on the return of the stragglers in the 1970s, so that these soldiers were interpreted as victims of the wartime period and of military indoctrination. As has been shown here, this victim consciousness made the assimilation of the military aspect of the stragglers very difficult, since military demeanour implied aggression. This was particularly revealing in the discomfort that greeted any description of Onoda as a war hero or as a paragon of military virtue, a discomfort due partly to the conviction that the war had been forgotten and that its significance had not been transmitted in any meaningful way to the succeeding generation. Given these tensions and ambiguities, the events of 1972 and 1974 produced no sense of closure as far as understandings of the war were concerned.

Ultimately, however, the discomfort produced by Onoda's return was not related to any consideration of the impact of the war outside Japan. Memories of the war were Japan-centric, and the 'national' boundaries of memory, even when briefly opened with Kozuka's death to include the experience of the people of Lubang at the hands of the stragglers, proved to be dominant. There was at best minimal consideration of the suffering Onoda and his comrades had inflicted on the people of Lubang, let alone any examination of the impact of the fighting during the war itself. In the final analysis, then, at the time of Onoda's return, the war had significance only for Japan as far as public opinion was concerned.

In any event, Onoda was not to be the straggler who provided the last chance to make amends with the past. A few months later, in December 1974, the very last known soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army was found on Morotai, in Indonesia. And this time, Japan was forced to look beyond itself to understand him: the last soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army was an indigenous Taiwanese.

8 Nakamura Teruo

The last straggler and the issue of imperialism

Early in the morning of 18 December 1974, in a remote part of the island of Morotai in Indonesia, a small troop of Indonesian soldiers surrounded a clearing containing a hut and a small field. A naked man emerged from the hut. The soldiers advanced out of the jungle singing *Kimigayo*, the Japanese national anthem, and surrounded the painfully thin and clearly terrified figure. He stood stock-still and did not resist ‘arrest’. At eight-fifteen that morning the leader of the group radioed his superiors and announced: ‘Mission accomplished’. This is how the *Sandee mainichi* described, a month later, the apprehension of the last known straggler of the Japanese Imperial Army.¹ Nakamura Teruo, aged fifty-five, had arrived on Morotai some months before the Allies first attacked the island on 15 September 1944. By the time he was discovered he had not encountered another human being for twenty years, having last seen fellow stragglers around 1953–1954. At the time of his ‘arrest’ Nakamura did not seem to know that the war was over, and he remained in fear of his life for the next few days.

Nakamura’s emergence into the post-war world, coming close on the heels of Onoda’s surrender on Lubang, might have been absorbed into the wake of the shock caused by earlier stragglers had it not been for the fact that he was an indigenous Taiwanese taken into the Japanese Imperial Army in Taiwan some thirty-one years before. His ethnicity was a central determinant of his impact, and it provided the basis for all discussions regarding his repatriation. Nakamura thus inescapably brought into the public sphere the legacies of Japanese imperialism and war outside of Japan. As such, his discovery and repatriation provide a unique opportunity to chart the tensions in the 1970s regarding interpretations of Japan’s colonial past.

That Nakamura was found at all was due to the enormous amount of public interest in stragglers sparked by Yokoi’s repatriation from Guam in 1972 and the return of Onoda from Lubang early in 1974. The public attacks that the Ministry of Health and Welfare, and especially its Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, had sustained at the time of Yokoi’s discovery and Kozuka’s death had made it much more receptive to rumours of the existence of more Japanese soldiers. While stories regarding Japanese stragglers were not uncommon on Morotai, they never reached the degree of intensity of those on Lubang because Nakamura had

completely avoided contact with other human beings and was not seen as often as Kozuka and Onoda had been. Rumours of stragglers were largely contained within an Indonesian air force base on Morotai: over the years the occasional pilot had reported noticing, during flights over the jungle, signs of habitation in very unlikely areas. Around the middle of 1974 a pilot reported that he had spotted a naked man, a small hut and what looked like a vegetable field in a clearing some sixty kilometres inland of Pilowo on the south-western coast of Morotai.

In November 1974, this information reached officials accompanying one of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare's 'bone-collecting' missions, which happened to be passing through Morotai. With the examples of Guam and Lubang in mind, the Bureau contacted the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta, which in turn requested and gained the cooperation of the Indonesian government in taking steps to find out whether this was a Japanese straggler. As a result, the Morotai air force base was ordered to conduct a search. The location of the clearing was ascertained from the air, and after a three-day trek through thick jungle, a group of eleven Indonesian soldiers surrounded and 'arrested' Nakamura in the morning of 18 December 1974. He was flown to the base by helicopter, where he told his captors his name and admitted he was a soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army. He was flown to Jakarta a few days later and hospitalised.²

Nakamura's hiding place, renamed 'Nakamura City' by the *Sandee mainichi*, consisted of a three-metre-square hut in a cultivated field of twenty by thirty metres fenced off with bamboo. Nakamura's vegetable patch contained red peppers, pawpaw and taro amongst other vegetables and was hidden in a valley surrounded by dense jungle and protected on two sides by steep cliffs.³ 'Nakamura City' was too inaccessible for Japanese journalists to visit, and they had to be content with descriptions gleaned from those who had seen it, but the *Sandee mainichi* presented readers with a drawing of the 'city' showing the inside, as well as the position of the hut in a small valley (see Fig. 8.1).

According to those who had found him, Nakamura had been naked, painfully thin, and had not resisted 'arrest', although it might be fairer to say that he was too petrified to move. The preparations of the Indonesian soldiers for their mission, according to the *Sandee mainichi*, had included learning the Japanese anthem, *Kimigayo*, and some old Japanese army songs, and taking with them a Japanese flag and a photo of a geisha. One can only guess at Nakamura's confusion when he was surrounded by Indonesian soldiers singing the Japanese national anthem, but the *Mainichi*, at least, seems to have been as convinced of the effectiveness of this method as the Indonesian soldiers, reminding its readers that *Kimigayo* and old army songs were designed to awaken in the listener feelings of patriotism and familiarity.⁴ Recollections of the effort it took to get Onoda to surrender must have been influential in these preparations.

Nakamura had become a soldier of the Japanese Imperial Army in November 1943 and was sent to Morotai early in 1944 (whether he was a willing or unwilling conscript is a question to which we will return). Japanese troops were decimated in the battles that followed the landing of Allied troops on the island




Figure 8.1 Artist's impression of 'Nakamura City, in the Garo Mountains'.

Source: *Sandee mainichi*, 19 January 1975, p. 21.

on 15 September 1944. According to the reminiscences of one of Nakamura's former officers, in the first few days of 1945 the Japanese commanders had ordered the remaining troops to enter the jungle, become self-sufficient and carry on guerrilla warfare.⁵ As we have seen in an earlier chapter, this was one of the strategies of the Imperial Army that made it impossible to account with certainty for each soldier after the war. In such circumstances, deaths from hunger or disease were often impossible to record with precision. Nakamura himself was declared 'missing, presumed dead' on 15 March 1945, but he had in fact joined one of the many groups of soldiers that went deep into the jungle,

partly to avoid enemy troops and partly to find food. The composition of the groups of survivors fluctuated. Nakamura had apparently gone off by himself some time in 1946–1947, but had joined up with other stragglers again by 1950. The group he joined then was the one, discussed in an earlier chapter, which was repatriated early in 1956. But by the time those soldiers were found in December 1955, Nakamura had gone off by himself again. When he was found in 1974, he explained his decision to leave the other stragglers – some time in the early 1950s – by saying that they had threatened him and that he had been in fear of his life, an allegation that veterans of the 1956 group vehemently denied. The latter explained that they had not been particularly worried when he took off as it was not unusual for members of the group to go ‘absent without leave’, sometimes for several days. When he failed to return, they assumed he had died somewhere in the jungle. But Nakamura had actually gone off to construct ‘Nakamura City’, eventually achieving self-sufficiency by growing vegetables and catching fish in a nearby river. Although he had a rifle, he did not use it for hunting. The shot, he thought, would attract attention to his existence.⁶

Beyond any other aspect of his character, it was the question of Nakamura’s ‘citizenship’ or national identity that immediately became the focal point of the reports on his discovery and repatriation. In Japan, the very first reports of his existence, which hit the news-stands on 27 December 1974, tentatively identified the straggler as ‘the Taiwanese Nakamura’.⁷ The focus on his nationality overrode even initial considerations of lifestyle – his nakedness, and his skill at growing food – and the fact that he was unable to speak Japanese or, rather, that it seemed he was unable to speak at all. It was also immediately surmised that Nakamura had originally been part of the group of stragglers who had surrendered on Morotai in 1956, two-thirds of whom had been Taiwanese. But while in 1956, as we have seen in a previous chapter, there was little mention of their nationality, by 1975 the question of Nakamura’s nationality immediately and centrally defined his relationship to the war, and post-war Japan’s relationship to him.

The question of Nakamura’s nationality was particularly sensitive because Japan’s relations with China had been topical for some time. In the late 1960s, the status and possible Japanese recognition of the People’s Republic of China had been at the centre of much debate within Japanese institutions. With the surprise announcement of the American President Richard Nixon’s plan to visit China in 1971, the question of revision of Japan’s China policy had become a highly public matter. Prime minister Tanaka Kakuei had paid a formal visit to Beijing in 1972, conversely making relations with Taiwan problematic.⁸ But preparations for the normalisation of Japan’s relations with the People’s Republic of China also raised the issue of war guilt. Journalist Honda Katsuichi was allowed to visit China in 1971, and to conduct interviews with survivors of the Nanking Massacre of 1937–1938. Between 1971 and 1975 this sparked heated debate on the true nature of the episode, and on Japanese atrocities in China more generally.⁹ The weekly magazine *Shūkan bunshun*, which will be encountered again in this chapter, was particularly conspicuous in attempting

to deny the truth of Honda's investigations.¹⁰ In that sense, then, Nakamura's return to Taiwan was complicated by the complex presence of China in Japanese consciousness, and by widespread debates about war atrocities.

Nakamura's national identity was a matter of some confusion, rendered even more problematic by Nakamura's own perception of himself as a subject of the Japanese empire. To the surprise of many in Japan, Nakamura's interpretation of his own citizenship was very fluid. Having spent thirty years in hiding, he was both unaware of the political and international changes that had swept over his former homeland and completely uninterested in the topic: he just wanted to go home. Ethnically, Nakamura was a member of Taiwan's Ami minority group. He claimed that it didn't really matter to him whether his home was currently under a Japanese or a Chinese government, an attitude to nationality startling to many observers in Japan. In an interview at the hospital in Jakarta, he was asked if he understood that Taiwan was no longer Japanese but Chinese. Nakamura answered: 'I've been Japanese for a long time. It can't be helped that Taiwan has become a different country'.¹¹ That he seemed completely uninterested in the question of his 'actual' nationality was, for the *Shūkan posuto* at least, surprising: after all, he was choosing between two very different political systems. His lack of concern with the issue was regarded as a sign of his 'lack of civilisation', although this was not necessarily viewed in a negative sense, since there was widespread ambivalence about the achievements of a 'civilised' nation of Japan.¹²

His many names also revealed his fluid national identity. As well as his Japanese name Nakamura had names in his native Ami language: he was occasionally referred to as Shiniyuwu or Attun Palalin in the Japanese press.¹³ In Taiwan, Nakamura was officially known by his posthumous name, Li Kuang-Hwei, received when the Nationalist government of Taiwan forced indigenous ethnic minorities to take Chinese names in a policy of assimilation which is now contested.¹⁴ Nakamura learnt that his name was Li Kuang-Hwei only after he returned to Taiwan in 1975. The name was doubly unfamiliar to him because he did not speak Chinese. In the Japanese press, Nakamura's self-perception was constantly explored: he was asked his name over and over again, and always confirmed that he thought of himself as Nakamura first and foremost and that speaking Japanese was easier for him than speaking even his native Ami language.¹⁵

When he was brought out of the jungle of Morotai, Nakamura was in fact a stateless person. He was no longer a citizen of the Japanese empire, since the country had been stripped of its colonial possessions on its defeat. Because he had been declared dead in March 1945, he had never existed for Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government on Taiwan either, except as a dead person. His statelessness preoccupied the newspapers as much as it did the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta and the representative of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare who was sent there to deal with his repatriation.¹⁶ As far as the Indonesian authorities were concerned Nakamura was a Japanese citizen, and they expected the Japanese Embassy to deal with his case. After all, this situation, while

unusual, was not entirely unfamiliar in a country like Indonesia, which since the war had become home to a number of Japanese who had originally arrived there as soldiers of the Imperial Army.¹⁷

The situation was complicated, however, by uncertainty regarding the destination of Nakamura's repatriation. While Japanese representatives insisted that Nakamura was welcome to come and live in Japan, they also pointed out that some measure of diplomatic negotiation would be necessary should he decide to go to Taiwan, since Japan had just recently recognised the People's Republic of China. Direct communication with Taiwan over the repatriation of Nakamura, according to the *Asahi* at least, could well have consequences for relations with the People's Republic of China, unless of course any complications were overlooked because of the humanitarian aspects of the matter.¹⁸ There is certainly no evidence that Nakamura's repatriation to Taiwan proceeded anything but smoothly, or created any difficulties in Japan's diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, yet in the first few days following Nakamura's discovery it was a prominent topic of discussion and seemed to add even more difficulty to what was, for Nakamura, already a very unfortunate situation.

Even more problematic than his nationality for many in Japan was his decision to bypass their country entirely on his way to Taiwan. Initially, Nakamura was quite incoherent and it was difficult to ascertain where he wanted to go. Like most other stragglers before him, Nakamura had been convinced, for the thirty years he spent in the jungle, that he would be killed if he was found. This fear was not easily overcome, and he was still unsure of his safety even during his first press conference in Jakarta.¹⁹ He was also very confused by his sudden confrontation with an entirely changed world. But once he had spent a few days in hospital in Jakarta (he was relatively healthy considering his lifestyle for the past three decades but had suffered from bouts of malaria), he became increasingly articulate in his desire to be repatriated directly to Taiwan.

Nakamura's decision to go straight home to Taiwan was, for many in Japan, an issue of some magnitude and one for which the Japanese government was again to blame. Although Japanese bureaucrats in Jakarta emphasised to Japanese journalists that the choice of destination was Nakamura's to make and that this was the most humanitarian way to proceed, many in Japan immediately criticised this stance as an example of the heartlessness of the Japanese government.²⁰ Nakamura's direct repatriation to Taiwan was thus not recognised as his own choice but as an instance of discrimination. For example, on 27 December 1974, the *Yomiuri* article on Nakamura bore the headline: 'Let's greet Nakamura as a Japanese! He is just like Onoda', reporting also that the Association of Friends of Taiwan (Taiwan kyōyū sōrēngō) was sharply critical of the Ministry of Health and Welfare's apparently cold-hearted attitude towards Nakamura.²¹ An organisation created with the news of the discovery of Nakamura, the Nakamura Teruo san o atataku mukaeru kai (Association for the Warm Welcome of Nakamura Teruo), presented the government with a formal demand that Nakamura be taken first to Japan. The document asserted that he

had fought as a Japanese for thirty years in complete isolation and that a change in international relations was no reason to take a ‘cool’ attitude to his repatriation.²² Similarly, two letters to the editor, published by the *Asahi* a few days later, accused the Japanese government of cruelty, hypocrisy and insincerity for sending Nakamura directly home to Taiwan without the benefit of a period of convalescence in Japan. One of the writers expressed doubt that this was in fact Nakamura’s own decision and suspected that the Japanese authorities were merely seeking to avoid trouble by sending him directly to Taiwan.²³ The repeated assertion that Nakamura saw himself predominantly as Japanese reinforced the argument that he should have gone to Japan first.²⁴

Nakamura’s decision to go straight home to Taiwan was thus resented not as his own decision but as an allegedly discriminatory measure taken by the Japanese government against a Taiwanese soldier. His repatriation to Taiwan was constructed as a high-handed denial of his Japanese citizenship. Interestingly, the past was in this case evidently crucial in the determination of national identity – more so than the imagined ties of ‘blood’ which analyses of *Nihonjinron* have emphasised.²⁵ It was clearly implied that Nakamura, by dint of having fought in the war as a Japanese, should now be included as a member of that nation and thus be ‘taken home’ to Japan. Commenting, in the weekly *Shūkan posuto* some two weeks later, on the disappointment that had greeted news that Nakamura would be repatriated straight to Taiwan, the critic Shimizu Hayao explicitly linked the public’s desire to include Nakamura in the Japanese nation with memories of the war:

I think that this [the war and the defeat] has a lot of influence on the post-war Japanese mentality. Among Japanese people, the memories of being completely defeated, after having created colonies and invaded other countries, are still very harsh (*koppidoku*). Therefore, when a former Japanese soldier is found, people wish even more strongly that he should be returned to the homeland (*hōmuguroundo*) of the four islands of Japan.²⁶

Nakamura belonged to the Japanese nation because he shared a past with the Japanese population, an attitude that illuminates the strength of the ties between collective memory and perceived national identity. Importantly, however, such a perception also makes the point that the war had only happened to Japan: if Nakamura had shared the Japanese experience of war, then he *must be* Japanese.

Nevertheless, Japan’s colonial past and its post-war attitudes to and treatment of Asian victims of the war became unavoidable issues with Nakamura’s discovery. As we have seen, connection of previous stragglers with Japan’s pre-war and wartime expansion and invasion had on the whole been ignored; the stragglers had had significance only for Japan, except in some rare cases such as that of Kozuka’s death, when the impact of the stragglers on Lubang’s population had needed to be taken into account. But with Nakamura’s return, questions surrounding the circumstances of his enrolment in the Imperial Army, or uncertainty over his eligibility for a pension, served as forceful reminders of the

fact that the Imperial Army had drawn a number of its soldiers from Japan's colonies and that these individuals' willing or unwilling contribution to the war effort had gone completely unrecognised by most Japanese in the post-war period.

The question of compensation for non-Japanese veterans, and more broadly, the legacies of Japanese colonialism and war, were suddenly put in the spotlight: the Japanese population was confronted by the fact that non-Japanese veterans of the Imperial Army and their families were denied the right to pensions because they had lost their Japanese nationality in the post-war settlement.²⁷ For Nakamura this might have had dire consequences. If the back pay of salary and pension had seemed, to the Japanese population, minimal for the years of service put in by both Yokoi and Onoda, the realisation that Nakamura was to receive next to nothing from the Japanese government came as a great shock. While Nakamura was still in Jakarta, the *Asahi* announced, on 31 December, that the Ministry of Health and Welfare had calculated that he was due ¥68,000, of which ¥38,279 was back pay of his soldier's wages (counted from December 1944 to July 1953, when the laws regarding pensions, for which Nakamura was not eligible, were changed), and the remaining ¥30,000 was a 'coming-home allowance', which was not usually paid out unless the person was repatriated to Japan, but which would be given to Nakamura nonetheless because of the particularity of his circumstances.²⁸

Not surprisingly, this sum was immediately criticised as paltry. The Association of Taiwanese Residents of Japan (Zainichi Taiwan dōkyōkai) loudly condemned what it saw as an attempt by the government to avoid, by bending the law slightly to accommodate Nakamura only, the question of compensation for Taiwanese veterans, victims of the war, and their families.²⁹ It was reported that the editorials of all the major Taiwanese newspapers had angrily condemned Japan for its meanness.³⁰ On 4 January, the government decided in a Cabinet meeting to present Nakamura with 'comfort money' (*mimaikin*). As had been the case with Yokoi and Onoda, money was collected from all levels of the government, totalling ¥1,500,000, to which the government added ¥2,000,000.³¹ This sum, supplemented by ¥750,000 donated by the public, was presented to Nakamura in Jakarta by a special envoy of the Japanese government, who also conveyed a formal message of goodwill and welcome to Japan should he wish to go there.³² Representatives of the Association for the Warm Welcome of Nakamura Teruo intercepted Nakamura on his way through Hong Kong and accompanied him to Taiwan, carrying a further ¥1,000,000 in donations, as well as a message assuring him of a cordial welcome should he ever decide to come to Japan.³³ But although Nakamura himself became relatively wealthy overnight, the ad hoc nature of the government's funding, and its failure to amend the laws regulating pensions or compensation, still left other non-Japanese veterans out in the cold.

This point was highlighted when Nakamura's case, let alone that of Yokoi or Onoda, was compared with the experience of earlier indigenous Taiwanese stragglers. Four members of the group repatriated in 1956 who had elected to

stay in Japan after their return were interviewed frequently after Nakamura's discovery, though Nakamura himself steadfastly refused to have anything to do with his erstwhile companions. The earlier stragglers rejoiced in his discovery and, at the same time, expressed their deep distress that they had gone home without him in 1956. To their surprise, however, and to the delight of reporters in search of a scoop, Nakamura said his former comrades had bullied and threatened him, and hinted darkly that he had left them because they were about to murder him.³⁴ Nakamura would say no more; his former companions denied ever having threatened him. While this left the field open for a great deal of speculation, the intrigue put the focus on the former returnees, and this also inevitably led to a renewed interest in their lives since their discovery.

Over several interviews, the 1956 returnees made clear that, in comparison with the welcome that Yokoi, Onoda and Nakamura had received, theirs had been minimal, and that the years after their return had been very lean and difficult ones. They had received some back pay and an allowance, but although they were sick and needed hospitalisation, they had been left to pay their own bills. In the period after their return, the four of them eked out a living as labourers on a road construction project near Osaka, and were then employed in a factory owned by the younger brother of one of the stragglers until the business failed. As stragglers, and indigenous Taiwanese ones at that, they were not entitled to the same kind of assistance as other repatriates, as one of them recalled. They remembered the early years after their repatriation with bitterness: they were often out of work and were often hungry. While some at least did not feel that the population of Japan had discriminated against them, they certainly felt that the Japanese government had treated them badly.³⁵ As one of the 1956 stragglers, Yoshida Jirō, put it:

During the war, Taiwan was Japanese territory, and we fought in the Emperor's army. But because Japan lost, we are discriminated against. Isn't that strange. Even if we only got half of what Yokoi got, that would be great. It would be good if the Japanese government thought about us Yokoi and Onoda were met by the Prime Minister Although we too had been working for the Japanese nation, when those who come out are Japanese, they get a big welcome from the government ... [and we didn't].³⁶

Furthermore, the four of them drew attention to the fact that the Japanese soldiers who had been with them might not have survived without them:

It was really good for the Japanese soldiers that we were there. We were good at catching eels, and growing vegetables. When they were out of food, we helped them over and over again. But when we got back to Japan, everyone was quite unfriendly. We really got done over, didn't we?³⁷

These feelings were echoed elsewhere. Whether one spent ten or thirty years in the jungle, as one Japanese veteran put it, there was little difference for the

person concerned. He didn't mind the fact that a lot of public money had been spent on Yokoi's and Onoda's repatriations, but he thought that money had been distributed very unevenly and unfairly. Those who came back in the mid-1950s had, he argued, returned too late to be able to profit from Japan's post-war recovery: they had already been in their mid- to late thirties at the time of their return and had little or no work experience, as opposed to those who had been repatriated immediately after the war, who had had more opportunity to find a niche in the workplace during Japan's initial period of recovery.³⁸ The comparison between the lavish treatment of Yokoi and Onoda and the miserly treatment of Nakamura (especially since he would not have the benefit of a sojourn in a Japanese hospital, unlike both Yokoi and Onoda) was a recurring theme in the criticism directed at the Japanese government.³⁹

Nakamura's discovery, then, brought the reality of the situation of Taiwanese veterans into the public consciousness. It was also the catalyst for a concerted attempt to rectify the situation. Over the next few months and indeed years, Japanese citizens were reminded, to an unprecedented degree, of the discrimination suffered by Taiwanese veterans. For example, on 16 March 1975, a group of twenty such veterans, including two of the 1956 repatriates, gathered in front of Shibuya Railway Station bearing placards demanding equality in pensions for Japanese and Taiwanese veterans.⁴⁰ Nakamura's discovery also prompted a movement spearheaded by lawyers and academics to force the Japanese government to change its laws regarding compensation. The Association for the Warm Welcome of Nakamura Teruo grew into the Association for Compensation for Taiwanese Veterans of the Imperial Army (Taiwanjin moto Nihonhei no hoshō o kangaeru kai), located until 1992 in a lawyer's office in Nishi Ginza in Tokyo. The Association had more than a thousand members and included a number of former Japanese residents in Taiwan and Japanese veterans of the Imperial Army. In April 1976 it lodged its first action against the Japanese government over the question of compensation for Taiwanese veterans and their families.⁴¹ The action eventually had a measure of success. In 1987, a law was implemented forcing the Japanese government to pay ¥2,000,000 to each Taiwanese veteran or each bereaved family. As a result the Japanese government paid out ¥600 billion to 30,000 Taiwanese individuals, and the Association disbanded in 1992. Some Taiwanese veterans missed out, however, because under the new law applications for compensation had to be lodged between 1988 and 1994. According to the *Taipei Times*, 659 indigenous Taiwanese failed to lodge an application because, living in remote areas, they were not made aware of their right to apply. Furthermore, many were unable to provide the information needed to apply for compensation. As a result, many indigenous Taiwanese veterans of the Japanese Imperial Army were still pushing to receive compensation in 2000.⁴²

Public reaction in Japan to Nakamura's discovery and consideration of the question of his post-war compensation both centred to a large extent on an exploration of his motivations as a soldier of the Imperial Army and as a straggler. While some form of answer, however unsatisfactory, had been provided

to the question of why Onoda had stayed in the jungle – his training at the Nakano School, and his obedience to his orders – Nakamura's motivations were very hard for post-war Japanese to understand. Here, again, Nakamura's nationality assumed a central position. The choice he made to be repatriated to Taiwan made it doubly necessary to revisit the reasons for the presence of a non-Japanese in the Imperial Army in the first place. Nakamura had been part of a battalion of 'Special Volunteer Soldiers' (*tokubetsu shigan hei* – soldiers allegedly having asked to join the Army) deployed as commando units in the South-West Pacific in the last two years of the war. The Imperial Army put the 'Special Volunteer Soldier' recruitment system in place in Taiwan on 1 April 1942, with the Navy following suit on 1 August 1943. One thousand applicants between the ages of seventeen and thirty were given military training, and half of them went into active service. In 1943, roughly 500 and in 1944, 800 men from minority groups (*Takasagozoku* in Japanese) joined the armed forces under this recruitment system. According to Katō Yōko, members of the minority groups seem to have been valued as strong, courageous soldiers.⁴³ In Yoshida Yutaka's assessment, however, there was little that had been voluntary about joining the 'Special Volunteer Forces', either in Korea or Taiwan.⁴⁴ The Japanese government had also implemented a conscription system in Taiwan in April 1944. By January 1945, a total of 45,726 Taiwanese had been inspected for conscription. In total, 8,433 Taiwanese were conscripted, of whom 2,146 died.⁴⁵

At the time of Nakamura's return, the basis of his service in the Imperial Army was widely debated. Had Nakamura been effectively conscripted into the 'Special Volunteer Forces', or had he indeed truly volunteered? According to one writer who had visited an indigenous Taiwanese village in the 1950s, none of the veterans he met there admitted to having been conscripted. They all insisted that they had volunteered, and when asked for reasons they explained that joining the 'Special Volunteer Forces' had given them a great deal of status at the time, raising them to an equal, and perhaps even superior, status compared to Taiwanese of Chinese ethnicity.⁴⁶ Other voices, however, disagreed strongly: a letter from a Taiwanese research scholar residing in Japan and published in the *Asahi shimbun* in December 1974, for instance, insisted that Nakamura had been a victim of Japanese imperialism and that indigenous Taiwanese had lived peaceful lives until they were forced to join the Japanese Army. The letter concluded that the idea that Nakamura and others had volunteered of their own free will was nothing but a myth designed to keep hidden the truth about Japan's colonialism.⁴⁷

Although most arguments remained polarized along relatively simple lines ('he volunteered' versus 'he was conscripted'), a few articles explored the issue in more detail. Their aim was not usually to exonerate the wartime Japanese government, but indeed to damn it further. The *Shūkan yomiuri*, which carried by far the longest and most historically informed reportage on Nakamura, contained a number of articles showing that the indigenous Taiwanese who joined the Japanese Army had been discriminated against and also sent on the most difficult and dangerous missions. Common beliefs regarding the

indigenous Taiwanese people's 'native' ability to move extremely fast in the jungle and to see in the dark were debunked to show that such myths justified savings on weapons as well as the shoes and shirts that were in increasingly short supply, leaving those soldiers inadequately equipped. According to one article, some indigenous Taiwanese did volunteer while a greater number were 'strongly encouraged to volunteer', but the important point was to recognize that indigenous Taiwanese were, ultimately, cannon fodder employed in some of the harshest battlefields of the war, particularly New Guinea and Morotai.⁴⁸

Nakamura himself did little to clarify these issues. His lack of interest shows that if the distinction between being conscripted and volunteering was important in 1975, it had not been in 1943 when he had joined the Army. He was asked over and over again why he had enlisted, but refused to enter into the argument on either side. His answers remained ambiguous, just as they had been when he was asked about his nationality. Nakamura said he was Japanese, that he had wanted to fight for Japan, that everyone had, that it was normal, and that in any case it was not an atmosphere in which one questioned one's orders. On one occasion he said that at the time the possibility of not going to the war had not arisen: 'if you were told to go, you did' (*shussei saretara, mina iku*). While he used the word *shussei* (departure to the front), he did not use the word '*shōshū*', the meaning of which is closer to 'conscription'. However, the *Shūkan bunshun*, for one, decided that by '*shussei*' Nakamura had actually meant 'conscription' (*shōshū*).⁴⁹ Nakamura often reiterated that he had willingly fought for his country: that is, Japan. When asked how he felt about having wasted thirty years of his life, he angrily replied that he hadn't been wasting his time at all, that he had been fighting for his country.⁵⁰ When pressed to say whether he had fought for the Emperor, he replied that he had obeyed his superior officer or, more vaguely, that 'the orders came from the Foreign Ministry, because Tōjō himself knew nothing about the front'.⁵¹ Wherever he thought the orders came from, Nakamura did not, as far as Japanese readers were told, question his own commitment to the Japanese Army. Other interviewees among indigenous Taiwanese veterans similarly refused to enter the debate on conscription, saying that at the time 'it was normal to want to die for the Emperor'.⁵² The question of whether he had volunteered or not remained unresolved.

Nakamura's candid assertions of his own patriotism, loyalty to the Army, dedication to the Emperor and willingness to defend what he saw as his country provoked little discomfort in Japan. His identity as a 'colonial' soldier removed much of the ambivalence that had been evident in discussions of Yokoi's and Onoda's 'patriotism' or 'devotion to duty' in the three preceding years. As we have seen, admiration for Onoda, in contrast, was often either rejected or qualified so as to deny any attraction to either militarism or expansionist nationalism. Discussions regarding the problematic 'hero' treatment of Onoda had occupied many writers and commentators only a few months earlier, yet the same phenomenon did not occur when Nakamura was repatriated. Nakamura had an uncomplicated perception of himself as a soldier of the Japanese empire, and he was vocal in defending his feelings of duty to the Japanese Army. His

patriotism was recognized as being even greater than that of Japanese soldiers: as Yokoi put it when he was interviewed on Nakamura's return, Japanese soldiers like him had had no choice but to go, whereas non-Japanese people like Nakamura must have been even more devoted to fighting for Japan. They were thus doubly admirable.⁵³ When Yokoi had said on his own return that he had fought for the Emperor, his declaration had been taken as a sad example of the cruelty of pre-war education, as we have seen in a previous chapter, but this was not the case when Nakamura said the same thing.⁵⁴ Nakamura's origins from outside Japan cancelled out any discomfort felt in admiring him: it was only with Japanese stragglers that patriotism was worrisome.

Despite his patriotic fervour Nakamura was portrayed in the media overwhelmingly as a victim, both of pre-war and post-war Japan. The overarching framework in which discussion of the war could take place in the 1970s, then, was one in which Japanese soldiers could not be openly admired but in which Nakamura, as an Asian victim of the war, must be. This was possibly why there was so much interest in resolving the question of whether he had joined the Army against his will, a question Nakamura himself was unable to answer in a satisfactory way, saying in the same breath that he had had no choice but that he had wanted to go anyway. The dichotomy between 'victim' and 'aggressor' was, for once, muddled, because Nakamura could not be both a 'reviled militarist' and an 'Asian victim of the war'. The *Shūkan bunshun* attempted to collapse this dichotomy by presenting the testimony of one indigenous Taiwanese veteran who insisted that, if he had been slapped and beaten up by his officers, it was not because he was not Japanese, but because he was a useless soldier.⁵⁵

On a broader scale, the return of Nakamura was no different from the return of Onoda or Yokoi in the way it brought out memories of the war in which everyone, whether Japanese or indigenous Taiwanese, conscript or volunteer, was seen to have been a victim. Even in the *Shūkan yomiuri*, which devoted more space than most others to describing soldiers' experiences, the war was hardly presented as a heroic endeavour. Prominent themes included hunger, illness, being hit by 'friendly fire', being expected to survive on military spirit alone, without food or weapons; such themes were supplemented in one instance by a photo of emaciated Japanese soldiers after capture.⁵⁶ The description of the Army as cruel and barbaric stands in marked contrast to the description of the war in the mid-1950s, when military training, as we have seen, was presented in positive terms and as an important factor in the survival of stragglers. But now all soldiers were represented as victims. Though a variety of grass-roots movements undoubtedly took it upon themselves to examine Japan's war record from a more critical perspective, in the mainstream public arena, by contrast, 'victim consciousness' was now a virtually unchallenged discursive framework.

Considering the disappointment that was expressed at Nakamura's decision to be repatriated directly to Taiwan, it is hardly surprising that his arrival home, and the nature of Taiwan's welcome, should have been the focus of much attention in Japan. Nakamura arrived in Taipei on the evening of 8 January 1975, but his reception, as far as the Japanese press was concerned, was remarkably subdued.

According to the *Japan Times*, the Taiwanese government had discouraged the press from devoting too much attention to Nakamura, and a press conference that was to have been held by Ami people had been cancelled.⁵⁷ Seeking explanations for the cancellation from the Taiwanese national news bureau, the *Shūkan bunshun* was told that ‘Li was a soldier of Japan. While there is probably some empathy among the people of Japan, the government here doesn’t want to give him special treatment’, and that since he had spent thirty years on his own, he should be welcomed quietly in any case. The *Shūkan bunshun* added that the name Nakamura, with its connotations of Japanese colonialism, was ‘taboo’ in Taiwan, and that he was always referred to by his Chinese name.⁵⁸

That Nakamura’s image in Taiwan was quite different from the one he had in Japan is hardly surprising: after all, he had been a collaborator with the former enemy, even if an unwilling one. The only way for the Taiwanese press to make Nakamura acceptable was by explaining his long exile with reference to his fear of the Japanese Army. The *Shūkan bunshun* reported that he was described in Taiwanese papers as a runaway soldier, a deserter hiding not from the enemy but from the Japanese Army.⁵⁹ As Chen Yingzhen has illustrated, the post-war life of Taiwanese veterans of the Imperial Army was made particularly difficult by the rapidly changing political and international environments. Those who, through a series of complicated circumstances, stayed on the Chinese mainland after the war were often the targets of anti-rightist Communist criticisms; but those who made it back to their homeland of Taiwan were hardly better off. They complain that they were ‘treated with negligence and prejudice’ by the Taiwanese government well into the 1980s.⁶⁰

The ambivalence of Nakamura’s reception at home in Taipei also provided grounds for Japanese comparisons between contemporary Taiwan and colonial Taiwan. Indeed, critiques of Japan’s treatment of Taiwanese veterans competed with denigrations of the Taiwanese government and of its treatment of Nakamura. And where they were the loudest, such denigrations implicitly endorsed a positive interpretation of Japanese colonial rule, by contrasting the distrust of indigenous Taiwanese minority groups towards their government with their allegedly fond memories of Japanese rule. A number of magazines implied that the ties that bound Japan and the indigenous population of Taiwan were still strong and that Japan was for the most part viewed positively amongst indigenous Taiwanese. Here, particular attention will be paid to the way in which one particular weekly magazine, the *Shūkan bunshun* – also infamous in the early 1970s for questioning the veracity of the Nanking Massacre of 1937–1938 – constructed this positive image of Japanese colonial rule.

The *Shūkan bunshun* was not alone among Japanese papers in making this point, but it was certainly exceptionally insistent and explicit on the feelings of loyalty to Japan that it allegedly found amongst members of indigenous groups in Taiwan. It juxtaposed official Taiwanese interpretations of Nakamura as a deserter terrified of the Japanese Army with numerous examples suggesting quite different assessments of his behaviour. For example, it produced, in the same article that discussed the subdued reception of Nakamura in Taipei, an

interview with a woman in her late forties who remembered sending off with great enthusiasm Nakamura specifically, and other soldiers, at the railway station when they left for the front. She said: 'every one was doing his best as a member of the Emperor's Army'.⁶¹ At the request of the reporter, another member of the Ami group demonstrated that she remembered old army songs by singing a few lines, stopping abruptly when a plainclothes policeman approached. In fact, according to the *Shūkan bunshun*, plainclothes officers were everywhere, which did not stop one woman from assuring the reporter that many indigenous Taiwanese still felt a great deal of loyalty to the Emperor.⁶²

The *Shūkan bunshun*'s insistence on the courageous defiance by members of minority groups of the threat posed by the police of the Taiwanese majority, simply in order to confide to a Japanese journalist their everlasting loyalty to the Japanese Emperor, seems exaggerated. Certainly, the magazine's revelation that Taiwanese newspapers had been ordered to tell readers that Nakamura could recognize a photo of Chiang Kai-shek more readily than a photo of the Emperor says much about the image of Taiwan that the magazine was producing for its readers.⁶³ But similar, if more subdued, assessments were made in a number of other magazines, emphasising the fact that Japanese was still used as a lingua franca amongst indigenous groups in Taiwan (whose languages are often mutually incomprehensible) and that there was little feeling of hatred towards Japan. On the contrary, it was reported, Japanese journalists were welcomed and treated to recitals of old army songs.⁶⁴ The feeling that there were special ties between indigenous groups and their former colonial masters was further reinforced by constant reference to Nakamura's own insistence that he was Japanese and that it was easier for him to speak Japanese than his mother tongue, the Ami language.

But while for the *Shūkan bunshun* Taiwan's treatment of Nakamura and the lack of feelings of hostility towards Japan amongst minority groups suggested a positive assessment of Japan's colonial rule, other publications emphatically rejected such a conclusion. Indeed, for many commentators the apparent lack of bitterness towards Japan on the part of indigenous Taiwanese people, despite the fact that they had received neither recognition nor compensation for their suffering during the colonial period and the war, provoked discomfort. As the title of one article pleaded: 'Please hate Japan more!'⁶⁵ It was not as if indigenous Taiwanese veterans did not want compensation: they did wonder why, although Japan was a very rich nation, they had been entirely forgotten, but according to this article what made the shame of the Japanese nation even more intense was the fact that in the main attitudes in Taiwan towards Japan were positive.⁶⁶ In contrast to the *Shūkan bunshun*, then, the apparent lack of hatred towards Japan amongst indigenous Taiwanese was here turned into a condemnation of Japan rather than a positive assessment of the colonial period. Japan, while rich, was morally bankrupt: a causal connection was drawn between Japan's unwillingness to pay compensation and the loss of spiritual qualities brought about by material prosperity and 'leisure' – condemnations of Japan that had also appeared at the time of the return of Yokoi and Onoda, as we have

noted.⁶⁷ And while the *Shūkan bunshun* produced interviews with people who had fond memories of joyously sending soldiers off to war, other magazines found some who remembered that there had been more weeping than shouting of ‘banzai’ at the railway stations when the soldiers left.⁶⁸

The discrepancies among interpretations of the legacies of Japan’s colonial past highlight the tensions that in the 1970s underlay Japan’s relationship with the rest of Asia and particularly its former colony Taiwan, ruled in the post-war period by Japan’s wartime enemy the Chinese Nationalist government. Accordingly, some reactions to Nakamura’s return suggest a consciousness of the history of Japan as one of aggression, while others ignore it. The *Shūkan bunshun*, which in 1971 had insisted that the Nanking Massacre had been a fabrication, portrayed the Taiwanese government negatively and so implied that indigenous Taiwanese had been better off under Japanese rule. A number of other magazines, however, highlighted the many ways in which wartime and post-war Japan had victimized indigenous Taiwanese. The return of Nakamura thus provides a crucial index of the variety of public attitudes in the 1970s to Japan’s colonial and wartime past. The fact that the *Shūkan bunshun* was relatively isolated in its stance also indicates that a substantial portion of public discourse was actually prepared to confront these sensitive issues to some degree. Japanese memories of the war, then, were clearly diverse and contested, never forming a monolithic whole or universally conforming to a set pattern. Though ‘victim consciousness’ was well established, it competed with other, variant versions of Japan’s past, at least some of which were capable of acknowledging the impact the country’s expansionist aggression had had on neighbouring countries.

In the wake of one death on Lubang, and successful repatriations from Guam, Lubang and Morotai respectively over a period of slightly less than three years, it is hardly surprising that post-war Japan was loath to affirm once again, as it had in 1960, that here, finally, was the last soldier of the Imperial Army. Indeed, Nakamura’s return provoked renewed attacks on the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare on the grounds that there might be yet more stragglers. After all, the Bureau had known in 1956 that none of the Morotai repatriates had actually witnessed Nakamura’s death or seen his body. The *Shūkan asahi* presented its readers with a complicated diagram of Nakamura’s battalion and of the mergers and break ups that had occurred amongst groups of stragglers between 1945 and 1956, showing precisely how Nakamura had got lost. It also reminded readers that a detailed interview with those who returned in 1956 had failed to suggest that Nakamura was dead: one day he was with the group, the next he simply wasn’t. If he had walked away, as his comrades had suggested, the possibility should have occurred to the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare in 1956 that he might still be alive somewhere on Morotai.⁶⁹

Nakamura’s return again reaffirmed the possibility that there might yet be other stragglers: there was a soldier by the name of Tanaka Heihachi whom no one remembered seeing die, and the possibility that he might still be hiding on Morotai became a prominent part of the reportage on Nakamura. The Bureau

of Repatriate Welfare's official who had alerted the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta to the rumours about 'Nakamura City' during its November 1974 bone-collecting mission had also heard stories about two stragglers asking local villagers for food only four years before, and since Nakamura made it clear that he had had no human contact for more than twenty years it was considered highly likely that Tanaka had been one of them.⁷⁰ A few days later, however, the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare announced that there had been a mistake in the translation of these rumours, that it was convinced there were no further stragglers on Morotai, and that therefore it would not be conducting further searches of the island.⁷¹ The *Shūkan asahi* suggested that the previous record of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare was hardly reassuring in this matter, and that the news of Tanaka's discovery might well one day hit Japan 'like thunder out of a clear sky', as had the news of the discovery of Nakamura.⁷² The implications were not pleasant. As one woman had said at the time of Onoda's return: 'I wish they would stop finding these stragglers ... so we can get on with our lives'.⁷³

Nakamura got on with his own life as best he could. At Taipei Airport on 8 January 1975, he was reunited with his wife and with a son he had never met, born after his father's departure for the front. Nakamura's anger on learning that his wife had remarried some ten years after he himself had been officially declared dead, his deafness to his wife's explanations for her decision to remarry and the second husband's graceful proposal that Nakamura take his place were the subject of many articles. The difficulties facing their family were reminiscent of the troubles that had rocked many other Japanese marriages with the repatriation of a 'dead' husband, and they were ultimately integrated into uncomplicated discourses on the 'tragedy of war'.⁷⁴ Nakamura himself refused to speak to his wife for some time and went to live with a daughter. This came as temporary relief to the second husband who, at seventy-two, was much older than Nakamura and would certainly have missed the help of a wife and the children he had raised had they rejoined 'the previous old man' (*mae no oyaji*).⁷⁵ Two months later, however, in March 1975, the *Asahi shimbun* announced in a brief article that Nakamura and his wife had renewed their vows in a low-key ceremony and moved to another town. This was the end of Nakamura's life as a public figure.⁷⁶ He died of lung cancer in 1979.⁷⁷

But during the time he was a public figure in Japan Nakamura had effectively placed the focus on the Taiwanese war experience and the discrimination shown by the Imperial Army against indigenous Taiwanese veterans. In that sense, he provided an opportunity to explore the legacies of the war outside Japan. Diverse challenges to Japan-centric memories ensued. As we have seen, the 1956 repatriates were given the chance, nineteen years after their return, to share their experiences of post-war Japan's discrimination against them. The Association for the Warm Welcome of Nakamura Teruo was established and soon grew into a movement that forced the Japanese government to pay some compensation to Taiwanese veterans and their families. Letters to the editor also challenged Japan-centric understandings of the legacies of the war. Nakamura's case suddenly gave a voice in the Japanese press to indigenous Taiwanese veterans in

Taiwan. Finally, in this case the focus inevitably moved beyond the borders of Japan because Taiwanese newspapers were examined for comments on Nakamura's return. Nakamura's return thus provided opportunities to consider the record of Japanese imperialism and to begin to repair, admittedly more symbolically than pragmatically, the lack of recognition in Japan of the contributions made by these colonial subjects to the nation's war effort.

Nevertheless, there is no escape from the fact that Nakamura's case brought only a limited and short-lived revision of the usual discourses. While the voices of indigenous Taiwanese veterans were heard in the public domain in Japan in the wake of Nakamura's discovery, other Taiwanese and Korean conscripts remained unheard beyond generalised comments on the amnesia, where Japan's imperialism was concerned, that characterised prosperous post-war Japan.⁷⁸ Nakamura provoked an examination of the past to a degree, but the boundaries of that examination were quite rigid both geographically and temporally. They were geographically rigid because they focused only on the indigenous people of Taiwan, and they were limited, temporally, to the period of Nakamura's newsworthiness. They were also, obviously, limited to soldiers. The Japan-centrism of war remembrance in general continues to limit the amount of recognition that non-Japanese members of the Japanese Imperial Army have received in post-war years. It also limits the amount of recognition given to victims of that Army. The continuing attempts by former so-called 'comfort women', most of whom are Korean, to secure an official apology and adequate compensation (supported by legal reform rather than 'unofficial' and extra-governmental funds) is a well-known example of such limitations.⁷⁹ Nakamura's case, as we have seen, thus did not in the end provide the grounds for a wider and more sustained exploration of the impact of Japanese imperialism and aggression on the people of Asia.

Ultimately, the fact that the last straggler of the Imperial Army was an indigenous Taiwanese was quickly, and entirely, forgotten in the public arena. The day that the news of Nakamura's discovery hit Japan, the front page of the *Yomiuri* carried, next to the headline 'Former Japanese soldier on Morotai', a rundown of the ten most important news items of 1974. More than 45,000 people voted in this 'top ten': 90.3 per cent rated the recent dismissal of the Tanaka Cabinet as the most important news item of the year, but 90 percent placed the return of Onoda second, even though it had occurred some ten months earlier.⁸⁰ Nakamura achieved no such lasting prominence: he disappeared from memory as fast, if not faster, than Kozuka, Japan's 'last war dead'. That the very last known straggler of the Japanese Imperial Army was Taiwanese is something not mentioned even by Wakaichi Kōji, who in 1986 was so concerned about the forgetting of Kozuka. Indeed, it is Onoda who usually receives the title of the 'last soldier' to return.⁸¹ If the names Yokoi and Onoda represent the concept of the straggler and immediately bring their stories to the mind of most Japanese even today, a mention of Nakamura does not, even though he provided impetus to a tenacious movement for compensation that lasted well into the 1990s. It remains an uncomfortable possibility that Nakamura has disappeared from

public memory principally because he was from Taiwan. Amnesia about Nakamura underlines again the extent to which boundaries of Japanese war remembrance are nationally, and narrowly, defined. The experience of the rest of Asia remains mostly beyond these boundaries.

Conclusion

In an episode of the 1990s Canadian television series *Northern Exposure*, two of the central characters are exploring an Aleutian island. Suddenly an armed Japanese appears, and at first he does not seem to understand them when they speak to him. One of the central characters edgily asks him whether he has been living here since the war, and whether he realises that the war is over. But the ‘straggler’ turns out to be an English-speaking, highly educated and very hospitable former executive from a big Japanese company who has ‘dropped out’ of corporate urban life to lead a more or less self-sufficient life in nature. As for the adventurers, their relief at being out of danger is mixed with a degree of disappointment that their host is not, after all, a straggler of the Japanese Imperial Army.¹ The straggler turns out to be a postmodern ‘dropout’ – but the comic aspect of this part of the episode hinges on the assumption that the audience will understand the reference to Japanese stragglers. The stragglers, as ‘fanatical hold-outs’, seem to have achieved a solid footing in the popular consciousness of the West.² They have entered the annals of the weird and fantastic: their stories often appear in timelines of bizarre events of the twentieth century. In most cases, the stories of the stragglers are used to illustrate the apparent loyalty and fanaticism of Japanese soldiers during World War II, and the strength of their indoctrination.

Reactions to their return in Japan were necessarily more complex, as we saw in the preceding chapters, even if by the 1970s their existence proved completely mystifying to some young people. In Japan, the past out of which the stragglers emerged could not be explained in uncomplicated and uncontested terms, as it evidently could be in the West: after all, the stragglers represented Japanese participation in an aggressive and unsuccessful war.

Reactions to the return of stragglers clearly expose changing discourses about soldiers, about the Second World War and about the place of the military and the war in the present. Two important characteristics of these discourses are evident. First, they changed markedly over time, both in quality and in quantity, highlighting the fluidity of collective memories of the war. Second, no single discourse was ever uncontested. As we have seen, broadly shared understandings of the significance of the stragglers were more clearly visible by the 1970s, suggesting that collective memory of the war had crystallised to a degree by that time. The generation that had not lived through the war relied on shared

representations of the past rather than on personal understandings based on individual experience to make sense of the stragglers, and this generation was gaining an increasing share of public debate. Yet even such shared representations were contested, as we have seen, and counter-discourses that explicitly rejected broadly based representations of the war occupied their own part of public space. The extent of the dispute on how exactly to remember the past highlights the importance, even in 1970s public consciousness, of the war as a defining moment in Japan's past.

As we have seen, the impact of the stragglers varied significantly over time. It did not, however, change evenly or in a linear fashion. Some discourses about the past had more currency at certain times than at others, but they were never the only discourses about the war. The interpretations of the past that sections of the Japanese political elite and members of the Occupation forces constructed in the first few years following Japan's defeat were undoubtedly important building blocks for public discourses about the war, as a number of writers have shown. However, it would be rash to assume that these interpretations were readily and exclusively accepted as the 'truth' about the past among all sections of the population. Certainly, war weariness and the shock of the defeat, combined with Allied propaganda regarding the guilt of the Japanese military, resulted in ambivalent feelings towards returned soldiers during the Occupation. But if negative feelings towards soldiers during the Occupation existed, such feelings were not a consistent aspect of reactions to stragglers throughout the 1950s, nor were they unchallenged or uncomplicated by the 1970s. Furthermore, attitudes towards returned soldiers both during the Occupation and beyond were not completely untainted by mindsets dating from the pre-war and wartime periods. In other words, we should be wary of perceiving straight, unbroken lines when tracing the way in which collective memories of the war developed between 1945 and the coming of age of the first post-war generation, that is, between the time when interpretations of the past fostered during the Occupation period were prevalent and that which saw the firm establishment of the 'victim consciousness' for which Japan is so famous.

It is certainly the case that in the early 1950s there was nothing particularly positive about the image of returning stragglers. This was a time when thousands of families were still grieving for their dead, asking to know the fate of the missing, demanding that war criminals be released from prison, and awaiting the repatriation of remains of the dead from the battlefields. In that context, reference in the press to the return of stragglers was apparently warranted only because they were more exotic than the mass of other Japanese whose repatriation was either taking place or was still awaited. The stragglers were thus depicted as exotic and 'foreign', and the emphasis on their 'otherness' clearly reflected, in part, ambivalent attitudes towards demobilised soldiers in general. The war and Japan's defeat were hardly very distant in time as yet, and in the early 1950s stragglers came back to be confronted with complex and paradoxical legacies of the war – grief for missing and dead soldiers coexisted with a degree of indifference, if not contempt, for returning soldiers.

Similarly, attitudes towards the war in the mid-1950s must be considered in a context broader than that suggested by the development of pacifist and anti-nuclear movements and discourses. Popular pressure to speed up the progress of repatriation was still strong, and governmental missions to collect the remains of the war dead were frequent. Grieving families attempted to make sense of their relatives' deaths in many ways, but partly by demanding that a public monument commemorate their sacrifice. While the attempts of some of them to have the Yasukuni Shrine returned to the aegis of the state were ultimately unsuccessful, the movement resulted in the erection of a new, secular monument to the war dead at Chidorigafuchi in Tokyo.³ Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of veterans had returned to civilian life with comparatively little difficulty. They might occasionally have revisited their war experiences by reading the great many memoirs and war stories so eminently publishable in the mid-1950s. Those who wrote such stories and memoirs were engaged in an attempt not only to entertain but also to retrieve the past, and not all that they found was negative.

Similarly, when stragglers returned from Indonesia, New Guinea and the Philippines in the mid-1950s, the press viewed them in a mostly positive light. While there was little glorification of the war as such, the soldiers/stragglers themselves were not condemned and nor was their military training. As we have seen, it was their military spirit and the alleged benevolence of their officers that had helped them survive, as far as the press was concerned. Reactions to the return of these 'living spirits of the war dead' draw attention to the complexity of attitudes to the war in the mid-1950s. Certainly, there was much discussion about the meaning of the war and the nature of war guilt amongst intellectuals and social critics, and pacifist discourses were becoming widespread, as a number of studies show. For many others, however, the experience of the war was not easily translated into such abstract discourses. They were still mourning their dead, or attempting to make sense of their own experiences of the war, sometimes finding in the death of their family member or in their own experience moments of courage, sacrifice and heroism as well as pain and loss. In the 1950s the immediate legacies of the war were still keenly felt; the conflict was remembered in a variety of ways, resulting in complex and sometimes paradoxical discourses.

By the end of the decade, when the existence of stragglers on Lubang was once more suspected and when, in the midst of a major domestic crisis centring on the revision of the United States–Japan Security Treaty, two stragglers were repatriated from Guam, there was a degree of consensus in the press on what these stragglers represented. However, this consensus centred less on the stragglers' experience as soldiers than on the fact that as Japanese people they belonged to the Japanese nation. The adoption of the problem of the Lubang stragglers by the government laid particular emphasis on the citizenship which the stragglers shared with all other Japanese, just as, less than a year later, the rejection of descriptions of stragglers as 'gorillas' or 'primitive' beings stressed the humanity they shared with others.

In tandem with the adoption of the stragglers as members of the nation came a clearer definition of them as victims. Itō Masashi, who returned from Guam in

1960, saw himself as a victim of the wartime military; his understanding of his situation was accepted without comment in the press. Indeed, it was those who thanked Itō for his patriotism who were described by the press as ‘out of touch’ with the times, as we have seen. By 1959 and 1960, there were no respectful references to the stragglers as ‘living spirits of the war dead’; they were not considered heroic; they had apparently not benefited from their military training but suffered its consequences. In a matter of less than five years the discursive framework in the press surrounding the stragglers had changed dramatically, highlighting the fluidity of these frameworks. Letters to newspaper editors equated the duty of the nation to rescue and care for the stragglers with a duty of pacifism. The prominence in public consciousness of debates about national identity, and the future of the nation in a world divided by the Cold War, had been instrumental in firmly establishing interpretations of the stragglers as victims and marginalising interpretations of them as patriotic heroes.

By the time the next straggler was discovered and repatriated in 1972, Japan had changed dramatically. For a start, the population had increasingly benefited from the ‘economic miracle’ of the previous decade. A large number of the population was able to enjoy the fruits of this new prosperity, acquiring items which a decade before would have constituted a great luxury. Secondly, a generation had come of age that had not experienced the war personally. The war and the defeat seemed particularly distant when Yokoi Shōichi emerged from Guam, hence the ‘panic’ that accompanied his discovery. The dominance of ‘victim consciousness’ is revealed in the presentation of his story by the press: Yokoi was described predominantly as a victim of the military and the pre-war education system, and his return opened up a space in the public arena for other veterans to revisit their own, frequently horrendous, experiences. Yet such experiences were not considered heroic, for that would imply admiration for ‘militarism’, a possibility strongly decried in the press.

Yokoi’s return, however, provoked much more than a revisiting of the past: the public ‘panic’ centred more clearly on the place of that past in the present, and on the present itself. Yokoi’s return highlighted the massive gulf separating the wartime and the post-war generations, that is, separating those who could understand Yokoi at least to a degree and those who simply could not. Commentators advanced the idea that he had suddenly forced the wartime generation to recognise that it had failed to teach the younger generation anything about the war, hence the discomfort caused by awareness of the generation gap. But more than that, reactions to his return illustrate a pervasive ambivalence about the state of Japan itself. Yokoi’s ‘dedication’ contrasted with the perceived ‘spiritual emptiness’ of post-war Japan, raising questions for many about the value of the nation’s material prosperity.

The death of Kozuka Kinshichi on Lubang in 1972 and the ‘surrender’ of Onoda Hirō in 1974 raised many of the same questions, but while Yokoi had fitted into the mould of ‘victim’ relatively easily, the image of the Lubang stragglers was much more ambiguous. In their cases the war had a much more tangible presence both because of the violent nature of Kozuka’s death and the

apparent loyalty of Onoda to his wartime orders – to the point where he refused to leave the jungle unless specifically ordered to do so by his superior officer. While the death of Kozuka was a great shock, attention in Japan turned quickly to Onoda, who had evaded searchers for so long. When he did eventually reveal his presence – and to a member of the ‘uncaring’ younger generation at that – his explanation that loyalty to his orders and his mission had prevented him from coming out earlier was, paradoxically, considered both admirable and disgusting. Onoda’s attitude was viewed as admirable because he returned to a society that was increasingly discouraged by the perceived precariousness of its own situation and apparent lack of lasting spiritual values. Yet at the same time his attitude provoked disgust because it meant he could not be typecast as a victim and thus had to be acknowledged as a dedicated member of the reviled wartime military.

The conscious and explicit rejection, in the majority of newspapers, of Onoda’s self-image as a ‘war hero’ reveals a degree of consensus in the printed media at least on the necessity to consider the damage caused by war. Although it was possible to admire Onoda as an individual, readers were told, that was not the same thing as admiring militarism, and his return should be taken above all as an opportunity to reflect on the horrors of war. Generally, however, the extent of the damage wrought by Japan in other countries was not considered, and the dominance in the mainstream press of a consciousness of the whole nation as a ‘victim’ was clearly visible. Nevertheless there were also constant challenges to such limited discursive frameworks, particularly in letters to the editor, where readers were reminded of the fact that the horrors of war had not been purely domestic and Japanese aggression had in fact caused considerable damage to neighbouring countries.

The discovery of the last straggler, Taiwanese-born Nakamura Teruo, on Morotai late in 1974 raised to an unprecedented degree the problems of imperialism, the experiences of Japanese colonial subjects, and post-war governments’ treatment of non-Japanese victims of the war. Nakamura’s return directly to Taiwan rather than via Japan forced Japanese readers to remember their country’s colonialism and the degree of willingness or otherwise with which colonial subjects had participated in the war effort. If the apparent dedication of previous stragglers to Japan’s war had been viewed ambiguously, the patriotism of Nakamura, as an indigenous Taiwanese, was now the source of much admiration. Nevertheless, his return to Taiwan rather than Japan also confronted readers with the realisation that the pensions available to Japanese veterans were not available to Nakamura or other former soldiers of the Japanese Army who were now Taiwanese. A grass-roots movement that began in reaction to his return grew large enough to challenge the Japanese government, with a degree of success, on the question of compensation for non-Japanese participants in the war. Ultimately, however, it was not successful in changing the dominant, Japan-centric public memories of the war. Onoda, and not Nakamura, is remembered as the last straggler of the Japanese Army, and in the end for most people the latter’s return raised only the question of the indigenous Taiwanese people’s unrewarded

participation in the war. Broader questions concerning Japan's colonial past rarely impinged on the discussion.

The material examined here makes it clear that Japanese memories of the war from 1945 to the mid-1970s were complex, fluid and contested. In fact, the interpretation of soldiers' experiences has presented difficulties throughout the post-war period. There was a time in the 1950s at least where the military itself and the soldiers' sacrifices could be seen to have had positive aspects as has been shown here. The decline of such perceptions suggests that the integration of veterans and soldiers into mainstream national representations of the past and of the nation became more problematic only from the late 1950s onwards: that is, once the discourses that associated the nation with a pacifist ideal had become widespread.

Responses to the return of stragglers in the early and mid-1970s reveal the presence of a generation for whom the war was part of history rather than of personal experience and which viewed it with limited understanding and interest. The war's declining importance in the minds of the younger generations has continued to be viewed with much distress by the older one. In 1980, sociology professor Hidaka Rokurō wrote of the difficulties he as a teacher faced in communicating his personal experiences of the war to students whose knowledge of the events of the 1930s and 1940s was patchy at best.⁴ When the Shōwa Emperor died in 1989, television channels showed nothing but commentary on him and retrospective analyses of the Shōwa period. This period, however, was also marked by record numbers of video rentals, prompting Carol Gluck to comment that the viewers' decision to 'turn off the [television set] ... was a question of how much of someone else's history one could be expected to endure'.⁵

But while the 1980s and 1990s witnessed an increasing indifference towards the war and war issues on the part of some sections of the Japanese population, this indifference certainly did not extend to the people as a whole. Indeed, a number of groups and individuals continued actively to promote a heightened awareness of war issues and war guilt. Not only did new information about Japanese war crimes – especially the biological warfare research unit, Unit 731 – come to light in the mid-1980s,⁶ but the question of the war guilt of the population as a whole, and its apparent failure to address this issue, was raised at regular intervals from a variety of platforms. There were teachers who actively promoted the study of war crimes during their classes, filling in the perceived gaps in the textbooks recommended by the Ministry of Education.⁷ 'Remembering' was also fostered by authors such as Yoshinaga Haruko and Shimizu Mitsuo, writing about forgotten shell-shocked soldiers living out their lives in institutions,⁸ or Wakaichi Kōji, who was first prompted to write about the last of the Japanese war dead by the sight of a veteran begging next to Osaka station in 1985, and by his shocked realisation that he was apparently the only person who had noticed his presence.⁹ Various privately funded and spontaneously formed self-study groups raised questions about the extent and nature of popular participation in the nation's pre-war and wartime projects.¹⁰

Thus the perceived ‘indifference’ to the war of the younger generations was itself questioned throughout the 1980s, and tendencies to ‘forget’ were continually challenged within the Japanese population.

Tendencies to ‘forget’ were also challenged in the 1990s, for example, with the rise to prominence of the issue of ‘comfort women’, but to these challenges has been added a dimension that was never quite so visible in the 1970s and 1980s. In the last few years, the ‘Japanese Society for Textbook Reform’ has been increasingly loud in its condemnation of the Ministry of Education, not for its failure to address war crimes in school textbooks but for its failure to remove references to war crimes entirely, arguing that ‘masochistic’ views of history have annihilated any patriotic pride in young Japanese people. At the same time, literature attempting to glorify, or at least exonerate, veterans and fallen soldiers in relation to their actions in the war has recently been popular, as the high sales of Kobayashi Yoshinori’s manga have shown. Indeed, there are signs that ‘pacifist’ discourses are on the wane: according to recent news, the Japanese population was evenly divided over support for Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in August 2001. Nevertheless, indifference to these issues amongst young people in Japan remains widespread, perhaps a sign that the coming of age of yet another post-war (or post-post-war?) generation has further lessened the importance of the war as a defining moment in national identity.

As the episode of the *Northern Exposure* television series mentioned earlier so aptly illustrates, the figure of the Japanese wartime straggler has become a ready referent in Western understandings of Japan, representing the strength of wartime indoctrination, and – within orientalist frameworks – often also representing an allegedly particular quirk of the national character. There is no doubt that the quantity of stragglers produced by the Japanese army during the Second World War is unparalleled, owing as it did much to the particular ethos of the Imperial forces and to the particular circumstances in which they were ‘lost’, as we saw in Chapter 2.

Although it is not difficult to imagine other places and times where soldiers might have become separated from their units and chosen to hide rather than take a chance with surrender, there are few famous examples of non-Japanese stragglers. One story that has a number of parallels with Japanese Army stragglers is the case of Liu Lianren, a celebrity in China though less well known in the West. Liu was kidnapped from Shandong Province, brought to Japan as a forced labourer in 1944 and set to work in a coal mine in Hokkaido. In July 1945, just before the Japanese surrender, he escaped from the mine. He spent the next thirteen years hiding in the mountains, unaware of the end of the war. He was found and repatriated in 1958, but at the height of the Cold War the Japanese government was highly suspicious of Liu’s story, though it stopped short of accusing him of spying for the People’s Republic of China. At home Liu became a hero of resistance, while in Japan few remembered his story, though he was briefly mentioned at the time of Yokoi’s return in 1972, when it was implied that surviving in Hokkaido’s sub-zero temperatures had been

much more of a feat than surviving on Guam.¹¹ From 1996 to his death at eighty-seven in 2000, Liu led a protracted fight to receive compensation from the Japanese government. Success came only posthumously, with the government being ordered to award Liu's family twenty million yen in July 2001. The government later appealed against the decision.¹²

Though there are few examples of actual stragglers in other armies, the case of those in Japan provides a striking contrast to the 'imagined survival', in the United States, of the POW/MIAs (prisoner of war/missing in action) of the Vietnam War. As Bruce Franklin has shown, the POW/MIA movement is an enduring legacy of the Vietnam War in the United States: it centres on the notion that some of the American soldiers and pilots who disappeared during that conflict actually became prisoners of war of the Vietcong, that some of them might indeed still be alive and that relations with Vietnam should not be normalised until each of the POW/MIAs has been accounted for. Franklin shows clearly that there is in fact little evidence to prove that the missing actually survived in the first place or that there would be any reason for the Vietnamese government to continue holding Americans prisoner. He goes on to discuss evidence which undoubtedly suggests the alleged number of POW/MIA around which the movement centres is erroneous, and he proves that most, if not all, of those listed as POW/MIA must actually already have been dead at the time they were listed as 'missing in action'. Despite the amount of evidence to the contrary, however, as many as two out of three Americans still believe there are American POWs in Vietnam, leading Franklin to suggest that the POW/MIA movement has such strong mythical components that it should be seen as a 'religious movement'.¹³ Indeed, the issue has such presence in the American cultural landscape that numerous famous action films are based on the premise of 'saving American prisoners', such as *Rambo: First Blood, Part II*.¹⁴

In the United States, then, both government and civilian efforts and resources have been expended to find soldiers who, in all likelihood, never survived in the first place. In Japan after the Second World War, the government tended to ignore the possibility of surviving soldiers, certainly in the years of mass repatriation in the mid- to late 1940s, but also after the 1959 searches on Lubang despite repeated reports of sightings from the Philippines. The evidence in Japan pointing to the existence of stragglers was as patchy as that for the existence of POW/MIAs in the United States. And yet the issue of non-repatriated soldiers has undoubtedly different significance in the two countries. The POW/MIA issue in the United States might have reached prominence initially partly because it was a useful diplomatic leverage tool, allowing President Richard Nixon to extend the United States' involvement in Vietnam despite being elected on an 'End the war' platform.¹⁵ It is doubtful whether Japan could have used diplomatic leverage to the same effect even if it had expected to find stragglers. Under current circumstances, the more important issue is that the POW/MIA movement clearly reveals the deep-seated ambivalence with which the Vietnam War is seen in the United States, and continuing attempts among some parts of the population to retrieve some heroism from a conflict that was

questioned even at the time. In this sense at least, there is perhaps a parallel between victim consciousness as represented by the POW/MIA issue in the United States and Japanese post-war victim consciousness.

Another issue that both Japanese stragglers and the American POW/MIA bring to the fore in relation to post-war recriminations is the difficulty of accounting for the missing and dead in the wake of conflict. While the increasing reliance on unmanned weapons might well reduce the number of casualties in the future (for those armies able to afford them), a measure of uncertainty regarding the fate of missing soldiers is undoubtedly a universal legacy of the wars of the twentieth century, a legacy that has affected the recovery from war in various nations. The uncertainty provoked by stragglers in Japan is only the most spectacular example. The POW/MIA issue in the United States is another. Australia provides yet others. Margaret Reeson, for instance, has traced the long-running attempts by some families to find information about the loss, some time early in 1942, of a father or husband in New Guinea. Though the Australian government notified these families in 1945 that their father or husband had died when the *Montevideo Maru*, a prison ship of the Japanese, was sunk off the coast of New Guinea on 1 July 1941, the reports of the loss of over one thousand civilians contained so many inconsistencies that many families were unable to accept the government's verdict and are still searching for answers.¹⁶ One is reminded of some Japanese families' fruitless searches for sons, brothers or fathers in New Guinea and the Philippines mentioned in Chapter 7.

As well as sharing uncertainty regarding missing soldiers and civilians, combatant countries have all had relative difficulty in reintegrating former servicemen into civilian life. There may well be scope for a comparison of the experience of returning soldiers as it applies to defeated countries: again, the case of veterans of the Vietnam War has some parallels with that of Japan. Though some maintain that it is a myth that Vietnam veterans in the United States suffer more discrimination than those of other wars,¹⁷ there is a general consensus that Vietnam veterans have found it especially difficult to re-integrate into civilian society. This is the case in Australia as well. Stephen Garton shows that the angry reception of Vietnam veterans has become fixed in Australian collective memory, though much of the evidence actually suggests that the majority of Australians felt well disposed towards the servicemen returning from that war, and welcomed them warmly.¹⁸ There are echoes, in the apparently ambivalent reception of Vietnam veterans in Australia and the United States, of the weariness and exasperation that greeted returning Japanese soldiers in the early years of the Occupation.

Ultimately, it is also worth considering whether there is much separating the experiences of soldiers returning to a defeated nation from those returning to a victorious nation. It might be easier to treat soldiers as heroes if the purpose and outcome of the war can easily be justified: as Gaines Foster has shown, veterans of the American Civil War were celebrated in the South even though the war had been lost, because the effort poured into the Civil War, it was believed, would eventually bear fruit in different ways. Foster suggests that it is precisely because

the ultimate significance of the Vietnam War and the reasons for the defeat have remained unclear that it has been difficult to place the veterans' experience within discursive frameworks that validate their experience.¹⁹ In the case of Japan, advocates of the legality of the 1937 invasion of China and the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 would be part of an insignificant and marginal minority. The difficult integration of soldiers into post-war society is due not to disputes about whether or not Japan was justified in her invasion of Asia but to disagreements on the meaning of war guilt and of the cooperation of the population in the war effort during the 1930s and early 1940s.

In this sense, then, it is not the case that defeat automatically ensures the scorning of veterans, just as victory does not always bring with it an appreciation of those who fought. In Australia, in the aftermath of the First World War, when soldiers came home ultimately victorious despite the famous loss at Gallipoli, there were quite a few who found the reception less cordial than they might have hoped. Many at home were, at the time, wary of the trouble these returned soldiers might cause. It was only later that the ANZACs became central symbols of Australian national identity. After the Second World War as well, those who came home after fighting against Japan often expressed their frustration with their difficult reintegration into the civilian world.²⁰ Michael McKernan has also recently described the difficult assimilation into post-Second World War society of the Australians who had been prisoners of war of the Japanese. Though the returning POWs were much admired and loved, the incomprehension that separated them from the general population, and the understanding that the sooner they were reintegrated into the civilian population the better, meant that many returning POWs felt strongly and painfully alienated from their families and their society.²¹

Japan experienced an abject defeat in 1945. During the Occupation, the blame for the war was placed on the 'military'. The degree of enthusiasm with which the population had supported the war was not examined: the population was left out of equations of war guilt. The guilty 'military' encompassed those who would be condemned to death or imprisonment at the end of the War Crimes Trials, but it also, of course, included those who had fought for the 'militarists' as part of the armed forces. Soldiers in the process of demobilisation were thus both, and contradictorily, part of the guilty military and part of the blameless population. This has left veterans and fallen soldiers in an ambiguous position in Japan. Except by right-wing patriots, their sacrifices at the front are considered to have been at best useless and mistaken and at worst despicable. There is no way out, for to admit to the uselessness of the sacrifice is to denigrate the dead, and to seek for it to be recognised is construed as an attempt to extricate 'the military' from its war guilt. At the personal level, such a conundrum can be resolved by a variety of means within the private spheres of individual families. At the public level, however, the integration of the experiences of soldiers into existing discourses about the war has remained difficult.

As mentioned in the Introduction, the stragglers were not the only tangible reminders of the war to return to Japan in the post-war period. There were, and

are, others, including people left behind in China as children of escaping Japanese colonists, and Japanese men and women who remained in the northern part of Korea after the war, who return when possible to Japan to search for long-lost relatives. Nevertheless, it was only the stragglers who confronted Japan unavoidably and extensively with reminders of those who had enlisted and fought for the Imperial Army. As this book has shown, fallen soldiers and veterans hold a critical place in post-war memories of the conflict, and it is only with recognition of their position that we can reach a true understanding of the place of the war in Japan's present.

Appendix

Number and provenance of repatriates to
Japan, 1945–1995¹

Region	Soviet Union	Kuriles, Sakhalin	Manchuria	Liaodong Peninsula	China	Hong Kong	North Korea	South Korea	Taiwan	Japanese islands	Okinawa	Dutch Indonesia	French Indochina	Pacific Islands	Philippines, South-East Asia	Hawaii	Australia	New Zealand	Total	
Year																				
Up to	5,000	200,744	1,010,837	6,126	1,492,397	19,050	304,469	591,765	473,316	62,389	64,396	0	31,583	130,795	132,303	623,909	3,411	138,167	797	5,096,323
1946																				
1947	200,744	168,111	29,714	212,053	3,758	147	16,779	1,425	4,958	0	3,484	14,841	286	103	457	86,379	1	487	0	743,757
1948	169,619	114,156	4,970	4,914	4,401	14	1,295	1,150	775	0	996	637	123	4	116	346	100	8	0	303,624
1949	87,416	4,710	4	2,861	702	11	3	1,041	255	0	490	112	45	4	41	51	80	18	0	97,844
1950	7,547	0	0	0	151	6	2	264	118	0	45	0	52	3	11	141	8	12	0	8,360
1951	8	1	0	0	92	45	0	263	35	0	4	2	31	28	30	170	59	34	0	802
1952	0	0	0	0	214	45	0	197	32	0	0	0	17	9	11	181	0	23	0	729
1953	798	0	0	0	26,051	11	2	107	27	0	1	0	38	2	102	34	0	32	0	27,205
1954	419	1	0	0	1,118	1	0	50	7	0	0	0	4	5	16	80	0	2	0	1,703
1955	164	0	0	0	1,850	6	0	32	4	0	0	0	4	7	22	88	0	5	0	2,182
1956	1,189	0	0	0	1,284	4	35	48	10	0	0	0	2	4	9	118	0	52	0	2,755
1957	0	173	0	0	97	2	0	18	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	5	0	3	0	303
1958	1	526	0	0	2,157	1	0	18	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	2,710
1959	0	67	0	0	10	2	0	23	0	0	0	0	43	0	0	1	0	0	0	146
1960	1	1	0	0	41	2	0	25	2	0	0	0	70	3	0	0	0	0	0	145
1961	1	0	0	0	42	0	0	28	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	77
1962	0	0	0	0	56	0	0	91	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	147
1963	0	4	0	0	59	0	0	49	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	112
1964	0	14	0	0	110	0	0	80	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	204
1965	0	74	0	0	103	0	0	70	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	247
1966	0	12	0	0	85	0	0	46	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	143
1967	0	7	0	0	77	0	0	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	121
1968	0	8	0	0	5	0	0	448	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	61
1969	2	0	0	0	6	0	0	59	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	67
1970	0	3	0	0	96	0	0	143	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	242

continued ...

Region	Soviet Union	Kuriles, Sakhalin	Manchuria Liaodong Peninsula	China	Hong Kong	North Korea	South Korea	Taiwan islands	Japanese Okinawa	Dutch Indonesia	French Indochina	Pacific islands	Philippines South-East Asia	Hawaii	Australia	New Zealand	Total			
Year																				
1971	1	0	0	0	31	0	0	63	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	95			
1972	0	1	0	0	37	0	0	39	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	78			
1973	1	2	0	0	61	0	0	52	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	241			
1974	0	2	0	0	206	0	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	241			
1975	1	2	0	0	218	0	0	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	236			
1976	0	3	0	0	122	0	0	24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	149			
1977	0	0	0	0	107	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	118			
1978	0	0	0	0	89	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	93			
1979	0	0	0	0	117	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	117			
1980	0	0	0	0	196	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	196			
1981	0	0	0	0	173	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	173			
1982	0	0	0	0	180	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	181			
1983	0	0	0	0	184	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	184			
1984	0	0	0	0	150	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	150			
1985	0	0	0	0	168	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	168			
1986	0	0	0	0	216	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	216			
1987	0	0	0	0	357	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	357			
1988	0	0	0	0	378	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	378			
1989	0	0	0	0	348	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	348			
1990	0	0	0	0	314	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	315			
1991	0	1	0	0	315	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	316			
1992	0	1	0	0	251	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	252			
1993	1	0	0	0	303	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	304			
1994	2	3	0	0	331	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	336			
1995	0	0	0	0	369	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	369			
Total	472,945	293,496	1,045,525	225,954	1,540,183	19,347	322,585	597,390	479,544	62,389	69,416	15,593	32,303	130,968	133,123	711,507	3,659	138,843	797	6,295,496

Notes

Introduction

- 1 The material for this book was first collected for a dissertation entitled: ‘Unexpected Returns: Stragglers of the Imperial Army and Memories of the War in Japan, 1950–1975’, submitted to Murdoch University on 15 September 2001 and formally accepted on 30 January 2002.
- 2 For individual memoirs, see Maruyama Michirō, *Anatahan no kokuhaku*, Tokyo: Tōwasha, 1952. This book was published in English under the title *Anatahan* (translated by Younghill Kang), London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954; Yamamoto Shigeichi, *Janguru no seikatsu 12-nen: Mindoro-tō no Nihonhei*, Osaka: Ōsaka kōbunsha, 1957; Itō Masashi, *The Emperor’s Last Soldiers*, London: Souvenir Press, 1967. See also Minagawa Bunzō, *Guamu-tō jūrokunen*, Tokyo: Chōbunsha, 1972; Yokoi Shōichi, *Asu e no michi*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1974; Onoda Hirō, *No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War* (translated by Charles S. Terry), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1974, reprinted by United States Naval Institute, 1999. For memoirs by relatives, see Onoda Bonji, *Kaisō no Rubangu*, Tokyo: Rōman, 1974; Onoda Tanejirō, *Rubangu no fu: Hirō o sagashitsuzukete 30-nen*, Tokyo: Shio shuppansha, 1974; Kozuka Kinshichi, tsuitō iinkai, *Koe wa todoite ita no ni: tsuitō Rubangu-tō no Kozuka Kinshichi*, Hachiōji: Hachiōji shiyakusho, 1973; Toyoda Jo, *Onoda moto shōi no haha*, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1974. For media collections, see Asahi shimbunsha, *Guamu ni ikita nijūhachi nen: Yokoi Shōichi-san no kiroku*, Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1972; Asahi shimbunsha, *28 Years in the Guam Jungle: Sergeant Yokoi Home From World War II*, Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1972. See also Sangyō keizai shimbun, *Rikugun gochō Yokoi Shōichi*, Tokyo: Sankei shimbunsha shuppankyoku, 1972; Sankei shimbun, Fuji terebi, *The Last Japanese Soldier: Corporal [sic] Yokoi’s 28 Incredible Years in the Guam Jungle* (translated by Ruri Corley-Smith), London: Tom Stacey, 1972.
- 3 E.J. Kahn, *The Stragglers*, New York: Random House, 1962; Gérard Chenu and Bernard Cendron, *Onoda, 30 ans seul en guerre*, Paris: Arthaud, 1974; Jean-Marc Pottiez, *Les Vainqueurs de la défaite*, Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1975.
- 4 Wakaichi Kōji, *Saigo no senshisha: rikugun ittōhei Kozuka Kinshichi*, Tokyo: Kawade shobōshinsha, 1986.
- 5 Yoshikuni Igarashi, ‘Yokoi Shōichi: When a Soldier finally returns Home’, in Anne Walthall (ed.), *The Human Tradition in Modern Japan*, Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2002, pp. 197–212.
- 6 ‘War amnesia’ became an especially prominent topic of discussion after the death of the Shōwa Emperor in 1989 and in the lead-up to the fiftieth anniversary of the Japanese defeat in 1995. In English, see, for example, Ian Buruma, *Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*, New York: Vintage, 1995; Haruko Cook and Theodore F. Cook (eds), *Japan at War: An Oral History*, New York: New Press, 1992;

Norma Field, 'War and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After', *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 1–50; Norma Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century's End*, New York: Vintage, 1993; Frank Gibney (ed.), *Sensō: the Japanese Remember the Pacific War: Letters to the Editor of the Asahi Shimbun*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995; Carol Gluck and Stephen Graubard (eds), *Shōwa: the Japan of Hirohito*, New York: W. W. Norton and Co, 1992; Carol Gluck, 'The Past in the Present', in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 64–95; whole issue of *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 27, no. 2 (April–June 1995); George Hicks, *The Comfort Women*, Tokyo: Yenbooks, 1995; Gavan McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996, chapter 6; Michael Hogan (ed.), *Hiroshima in Memory and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Laura Hein and Mark Selden (eds), *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany and the United States*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000; T. Fujitani, Geoffrey White, Lisa Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories: the Asia-Pacific War(s)*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001. This list is by no means exhaustive.

- 7 Rohan D. Rivett, *Behind Bamboo: An Inside Story of the Japanese Prison Camps*, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1946; Hank Nelson, *Prisoners of War: Australians Under Nippon*, Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1985; Gavan McCormack and Hank Nelson (eds), *The Burma-Thailand Railway: Memory and History*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993; Charlie Johnstone, *To Sandakan: the Diaries of Charlie Johnstone, Prisoner of War 1942–45* (edited by Christopher Dawson), Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995; Don Wall, *Sandakan under Nippon: the Last March*, Mona Vale, N.S.W.: D. Wall, 1997; Richard Reid, *Laden, Fevered, Starved: the POWs of Sandakan, North Borneo, 1945*, Canberra: Department of Veterans' Affairs, 1999.
- 8 P. Lim Pui Huen and Diana Wong (eds), *War and memory in Malaysia and Singapore*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000.
- 9 The issue of comfort women has been examined in a variety of works. Yuki Tanaka, *Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996; Hogan (ed.), *Hiroshima in History and Memory*; Hicks, *The Comfort Women*; whole issue of *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 27, no. 2 (April–June 1995); whole issue of *Positions*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Winter 1997); whole issue of *Positions*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997); Chungmoo Choi, 'The Politics of War Memories toward Healing', in Fujitani, White and Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories*, pp. 395–409. The most famous textbook issue centres on the legal battles of historian Ienaga Saburō, who between 1965 and 1997 used the Japanese courts to challenge the Ministry of Education's practice of amending 'undesirable' references to war atrocities or use of the word 'aggression' in school textbooks dealing with the war. Nozaki Yoshiko and Inokuchi Hiromitsu, 'Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburō's Textbook Lawsuits', in Hein and Selden (eds), *Censoring History*, pp. 96–126. More recently, much attention has also been directed at the efforts of the 'Liberal Education League', a group headed by Fujioka Nobukatsu, a Professor of Education at the University of Tokyo: to promote a more positive view of Japan's war in school textbooks. Others have seen the popularity of cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori's manga *Sensōron*, which aims to restore pride in Japan's wartime deeds, as evidence that amnesia regarding aggression and war crimes is spreading, rather than shrinking. Kobayashi Yoshinori, *Sensōron*, Tokyo: Gentōsha, 1998. Kobayashi was recently banned from entering Taiwan because of his controversial depictions of Japan's wartime actions. See, for example, 'Entry Ban on Cartoonist may be Lifted', *Taiwan Headlines*, 23 March 2001 (<http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20010323/20010323p6.html>) (19 July 2001). Domestic and international concerns over official visits to the Shrine, which many consider to be illegal under the 1947 Constitution's separation of church and state, are widely reported. Prime Minister Nakasone

- Yasuhiro's official visit to the shrine on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Japan's defeat in 1985 was greeted with tremendous outrage both in Japan and in neighbouring countries. See, for example, Eric Seizelet, *Monarchie et démocratie dans le Japon d'après-guerre*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1990, p. 246. The 1937 Nanking Massacre, and the debates that have accompanied the matter in Japan, have been the subject of a number of studies. See for example Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, 'The Nanking 100-Man Killing Contest Debate: War Guilt Among Fabricated Illusions, 1971–1975', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 26, no. 2 (2000), pp. 307–340; Honda Katsuichi, *The Nanking Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame* (edited by Frank Gibney and translated by Karen Sandness), New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999; Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, Melbourne: Penguin, 1998; Erwin Wickert (ed.), *The Good German of Nanking: The Diaries of John Rabe* (translated by John E. Woods), London: Little, Brown and Company, 1998; Daqing Yang, 'The Malleable and the Contested: The Nanjing Massacre in Postwar China and Japan', in Fujitani, White and Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories*, pp. 50–86; Fei Fei Li, Robert Sabella and David Liu (eds), *Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002. For contrasting views on the war guilt of the Emperor, see Stephen S. Large, *Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A Political Biography*, London: Routledge, 1992; Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, New York: HarperCollins, 2000.
- 10 Beatrice Trefalt, 'War, Commemoration and National Identity in Japan, 1868–1975', in Sandra Wilson (ed.), *Nation and Nationalism in Japan*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, pp. 115–134.
- 11 Nitta Mitsuko, 'Eirei to senyūkai', in Takahashi Saburō (ed.), *Kyōdō kenkyū: senyūkai*, Tokyo: Tabata shoten, 1983, pp. 222–224, quoted in Takahashi Saburō, *Senkimono o yomu: sensō taiken to sengo Nihon shakai*, Kyoto, Akademia, 1988, pp. 149–152.
- 12 For a more detailed discussion of the problem surrounding the commemoration of fallen soldiers, see Trefalt, 'War, Commemoration and National Identity'.
- 13 Kobayashi, *Sensōron*, p. 64.
- 14 Namikawa Eita, 'The Iniquities of History Education in Japan during the Postwar Period', in The Japanese Society For Textbook Reform, *The Restoration of A National History*, pamphlet distributed by the Japanese Society for Textbook Reform, 1997, p. 15.
- 15 Katō Norihiro, *Haisengoron*, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1997; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 'Unquiet Graves: Katō Norihiro and the Politics of Mourning', *Japanese Studies*, vol. 18, no. 1 (1998), pp. 21–30.
- 16 Yūi Daizaburō, 'Between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima/Nagasaki: A Psychological Vicious Circle' (translated by Laura Hein), *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 27, no. 2 (1995), p. 54.
- 17 Important works in this area include McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, pp. 225–284; Michael Weiner, 'The Representation of Absence and the Absence of Representation: Korean Victims of the Atomic Bomb', in Michael Weiner (ed.), *Japan's Minorities: the Illusion of Homogeneity*, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 79–107; Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space and the Dialectics of Memory*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Mariko Asano Tamanoi, 'War Responsibility and Japanese Civilian Victims of Japanese Biological Warfare in China', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 32, no. 3 (2000), pp. 13–22; *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997); Fujitani, White and Yoneyama (eds), 'Introduction', in *Perilous Memories*, pp. 1–29; Laura Hein (Guest Editor), *Critical Asian Studies*, vol. 33, no. 2 (June 2001).
- 18 See, for example, Suzuki Yūko, *Feminizumu to sensō: fujin undōka no sensō kyōryoku*, Tokyo: Marujusha, 1986; Kano Mikyo, *Onnatachi no 'jūgo'*, Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1987; Ishizuki Shizue, '1930 nendai no musan fujin undō', in

- Joseishi sōgō kenkyūkai (ed.), *Nihon joseishi 5: gendai*, Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1982, pp. 193–226.
- 19 Asada Teruhiko, *The Night of a Thousand Suicides: the Japanese Outbreak at Cowra* (translated by Ray Cowan), Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1970; Charlotte Carr-Gregg, *Japanese Prisoners of War in Revolt: the Outbreaks at Featherston and Cowra during WWII*, Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1978; Harry Gordon, *Die like the Carp! The Story of the Greatest Prison Escape Ever...*, Stanmore, N.S.W.: Cassell Australia, 1978.
- 20 Kazuko Tsurumi, *Social Change and the Individual: Japan before and after Defeat in World War II*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- 21 See, for example, Utsumi Aiko, ‘Korean “Imperial” Soldiers: Remembering Colonialism and Crimes against Allied POWs’, in Fujitani, White and Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories*, pp. 199–217; or Chen Yingzhen’s analysis of Taiwanese soldiers of the Japanese Imperial Army in ‘Imperial Army Betrayed’, in Fujitani, White and Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories*, pp. 181–198.
- 22 Yoshida Yutaka, *Nihonjin no sensōkan: rekishi no naka no henyō*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995.
- 23 Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945–1970*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- 24 James Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001.
- 25 Paula Hamilton, ‘The Knife Edge: Debates about Memory and History’, in Kate Darian-Smith and Paula Hamilton (eds), *Memory and History in Twentieth Century Australia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 9–32.
- 26 George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990; Darian-Smith and Hamilton (eds), *Memory and History in Twentieth Century Australia*; Emmanuel Sivan and Jay Winter (eds), *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Alistair Thomson, *Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994; Ken Inglis, *Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape*, Melbourne: Miegunyah Press, 1998; John R. Gillis (ed.), *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994; Martin Evans and Karen Lunn (eds), *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Berg, 1998.
- 27 Thomson, *Anzac Memories*, p. 8; Graham Dawson, Bob West, ‘“Our Finest Hour”? The Popular Memory of World War Two and the Struggles over National Identity’, in Geoff Hurd (ed.), *National Fictions, World War Two in British Film and Television*, London: BFI Publishing, 1984, pp. 10–11, quoted in Thomson, *Anzac Memories*, pp. 8–9. As Paul Connerton states, ‘the narrative of one life is part of an interconnecting set of narratives; it is embedded in the story of those groups from which individuals derive their identity’. Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 21.
- 28 Hamilton shows that while the concept of collective memory first emerged as the result of research in oral history, an equally well-established trend now explores the negotiation of ‘popular memory’ within national frameworks, and does not rely so much on oral history as on material forms of remembering. Hamilton, ‘the Knife Edge’, p. 17
- 29 Ann Waswo, ‘The Pacific War in the Public Memory of America’, Unpublished paper, 1995.
- 30 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, revised edition, 1991.
- 31 Barbie Zelizer has described in detail how the press came to portray itself and be seen as the purveyor of ‘truth’ in the case of the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963: Barbie Zelizer, *Covering the Body: the Kennedy Assassination, the Media and the*

- Shaping of Collective Memory*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. See also Glasgow University Media Group, *Getting the Message: News, Truth, Power*, London: Routledge, 1993.
- 32 Simon Partner, *Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p. 140.
 - 33 Mikiso Hane, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, p. 397.

1 The shared past

- 1 Carol Gluck, 'The Idea of Shōwa', in Carol Gluck and Steven Graubard (eds), *Shōwa: The Japan of Hirohito*, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1992, pp. 1–26. Kazuko Tsurumi has also underlined the influence of wartime socialisation in the post-war period, in *Social Change and the Individual: Japan before and after Defeat in World War II*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. More recently, John W. Dower has considered the impact of defeat on Japan, and the continuities between the wartime and post-war period in more detail in *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1999.
- 2 Yasushi Yamanouchi, J. Victor Koschmann, and Ryuichi Narita, 'Total War' and Modernization, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- 3 Richard Smethurst, *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: the Army and the Rural Community*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974; Eguchi Keiichi, *Nihon teikokushugiron: Manshū jihen zengo*, Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1975, esp. chapters 5 and 6; Awaya Kentarō, 'Fasshoka to minshū ishiki', in Eguchi Keiichi (ed.), *Taikei. Nihon gendaishi*, vol. 1: *Nihon fashizumu no keisei*, Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1978, pp. 252–301; Yui Masaomi, 'Gunbu to kokumin tōgō', in Tōkyō daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyūjo (ed.), *Fashizumu no kokka to shakai*, vol. 1: *Shōwa kyōkō*, Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1978, pp. 149–195; Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998, pp. 55–114.
- 4 Miyasaki Masayoshi, *Tōa renmei ron*, 1936, excerpt quoted in Joyce C. Lebra (ed.), *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 5.
- 5 Prime minister Konoe Fumimaro, quoted in Ōzaki Hotsumi, 'The Concept of the Tōa Kyōdōtai and the Objective Bases for its Establishment', *Chūō kōron*, vol. 16, January 1939, in Lebra, *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, p. 10.
- 6 'Imperial Rescript Declaring War', in Richard Minear (ed.), *Through Japanese Eyes*, New York: Praeger, 1974, pp. 91–93.
- 7 Carol Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985, pp. 42–44.
- 8 Okubō Riken et al. (eds), *Shiryō ni yoru Nihon no ayumi, kindaihen*, Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1951, pp. 233–234, quoted in Kazuko Tsurumi, 'Japan and Holy War', *Institute of International Relations Research Papers*, Tokyo: Sophia University, 1993, p. 5.
- 9 Quoted in John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, New York, Pantheon Books, 1986, p. 217.
- 10 Quoted in Ben-Ami Shillony, *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981, p. 136.
- 11 For contrasting views on the Emperor's role during the war, see Stephen S. Large, *Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A Political Biography*, London: Routledge, 1992 and Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, New York: HarperCollins, 2000.
- 12 Jeffrey Ruoff and Kenneth Ruoff, *The Emperor's Naked Army Marches On: Yukiyukite Shingun*, Trowbridge: Flicks Books, 1998, pp. 20–21.

- 13 Elise Tipton, *The Japanese Police-State: The Tokkō in Interwar Japan*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990, p. 16.
- 14 Shillony, *Politics and Culture*, pp. 13–15. Also see Richard H. Mitchell, *Censorship in Imperial Japan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983, p. 363; Tipton, *The Japanese Police-State*, p. 151.
- 15 Eugene Soviak (ed.), *A Diary of Darkness: The Wartime Diary of Kiyosawa Kiyoshi* (translated by Eugene Soviak and Kamiyama Tamie), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- 16 For a range of attitudes towards the war effort see the testimonies collected in Tessa Morris-Suzuki (ed.), *Shōwa: An Inside History of Hirohito's Japan*, London: Athlone Press, 1984; Haruko T. Cook and Theodore F. Cook (eds), *Japan at War: An Oral History*, London: Phoenix Press, 2000; Frank Gibney (ed.), *Sensō: The Japanese Remember the Pacific War: Letters to the Editor of the Asahi Shimbun*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995.
- 17 Tipton, *The Japanese Police-State*, p. 151.
- 18 Mitchell, *Censorship in Imperial Japan*, p. xi.
- 19 Ienaga Saburō, *Japan's Last War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945*, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979, pp. 13–15.
- 20 Sandra Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931–33*, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 40.
- 21 Tsurumi shows that in 1935, 82.1% of the population had had elementary schooling: *Social Change and the Individual*, pp. 112–113.
- 22 Harold G. Wray, ‘A Study in Contrasts: Japanese School Textbooks of 1903 and 1941–45’, *Monumenta Nipponica*, vol. 28, no. 1 (1978), pp. 69–86.
- 23 Ienaga, *Japan's Last War*, p. 28.
- 24 Smethurst, *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism*, p. xiv.
- 25 Smethurst, *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism*, p. xiv.
- 26 Sandra Wilson, ‘Mobilizing Women in Inter-War Japan: The National Defence Women’s Association and the Manchurian Crisis’, *Gender and History*, vol. 7, no. 2 (August 1995), p. 305.
- 27 Wilson, ‘Mobilizing Women’, p. 302.
- 28 Wilson, ‘Mobilizing Women’, p. 305.
- 29 Sheldon Garon, ‘Women’s Groups and the Japanese State: Contending Approaches to Political Integration, 1890–1945’, *Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 19, no. 1 (1993), p. 9.
- 30 Kenneth B. Pyle, ‘The Technology of Japanese Nationalism: The Local Improvement Movement, 1900–1918’, *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 23, no. 1 (November 1973), pp. 52–53.
- 31 Kerry Smith, *A Time of Crisis: Japan, the Great Depression, and Rural Revitalization*, Cambridge, Harvard University Asia Center, 2001.
- 32 Nishida Yoshiaki, *Shōwa kyōkōka no nōson shakai undō: yōsanchi ni okeru tenkai to kiketsu*, Tokyo, Ochanomizu shobō, 1978, p. 439.
- 33 Smethurst, *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism*, p. 17.
- 34 Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis*, p. 53.
- 35 Wilson, *The Manchurian Crisis*, p. 140.
- 36 Mitchell, *Censorship in Imperial Japan*, p. 326.
- 37 Thomas R. H. Havens, *Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War II*, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1978, pp. 12–14, 75.
- 38 Havens, *Valley of Darkness*, p. 75.
- 39 Havens, *Valley of Darkness*, p. 188.
- 40 Sandra Wilson, ‘The “New Paradise”: Japanese Emigration to Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s’, *International History Review*, vol. 17, no. 2 (May 1995), p. 257.
- 41 Tsurumi, *Social Change*, p. 114.
- 42 Tsurumi, *Social Change*, p. 119.

- 43 Tsurumi, *Social Change*, p. 121.
- 44 Tsurumi shows that in 1935 only 1.6 percent of the population had received tertiary education. For data on the differences between how student soldiers and peasant soldiers viewed their Army life, see *Social Change*, table 10, p. 127.
- 45 Morris-Suzuki, *Shōwa*, p. 115.
- 46 Ienaga, *Japan's Last War*, p. 186.
- 47 Ienaga, *Japan's Last War*, p. 49. See also Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, pp. 75–77.
- 48 Quoted in Cook and Cook (eds), *Japan at War*, p. 264.
- 49 Dower, *War without Mercy*, pp. 66–67.
- 50 ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Service) Research Report no. 76 (4 April 1944), Australian War Memorial. Also Charlotte Carr-Gregg, *Japanese Prisoners of War in Revolt: the Outbreaks at Featherston and Cowra during WWII*, Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 1978, pp. 201–203.
- 51 Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, Boston, Houghton and Mifflin Co., 1946, p. 23.
- 52 *Fujo shimbun*, 6 March 1932, p. 2; 16 April 1932, p. 2; 20 March 1932; 2 April 1932, p. 2.
- 53 Havens, *Valley of Darkness*, p. 188.
- 54 Havens, *Valley of Darkness*, p. 188.
- 55 Dower, *War Without Mercy*, p. 45.
- 56 Dower, *War Without Mercy*, p. 45.
- 57 Cook and Cook (eds), *An Oral History*, p. 364.

2 Creating stragglers

- 1 Wakatsuki Yasuo, *Sengo hikiage no kiroku*, Tokyo: Jiji tsūshinsha, 1995 (first published 1991), p. 11.
- 2 Kōseishō shakai engokyoku engo gojūnenshi henshū iinkai, *Engo gojūnen shi*, Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997 (hereafter referred to as *Engo gojūnen shi*), pp. 10, 17–18.
- 3 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 23.
- 4 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 11.
- 5 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 11.
- 6 Wakatsumi, *Sengo hikiage no kiroku*, p. 254.
- 7 S. Woodburn Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1969, p. 505.
- 8 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 14.
- 9 *Japan Times Weekly International Edition*, 30 March 1998.
- 10 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 2.
- 11 *Engo gojūnen shi*, pp. 2–3.
- 12 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 3.
- 13 Kōseishō engo kyoku (ed.), *Hikiage to engo 30-nen no ayumi*, Tokyo: Kōseishō, 1977; Kōseishō shakai engokyoku engo gojūnenshi henshū iinkai, *Engo gojūnen shi*, Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997.
- 14 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 726. (The table is translated and reproduced in the Appendix.)
- 15 *Engo gojūnen shi*, pp. 55–58.
- 16 *Engo gojūnen shi*, pp. 68–71.
- 17 *Engo gojūnen shi*, pp. 69–70, 75.
- 18 *Engo gojūnen shi*, pp. 72–73.
- 19 *Engo gojūnen shi*, pp. 72–73.
- 20 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 70. The revised law in question is paragraph 89 of the *Kosekihō*.
- 21 Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS), 'M' report no. 31 (16 March 1944), p. 1; ATIS Interrogation Report no. 122 (19 April 1945), p. 10; see Beatrice Trefalt, 'Living Dead: Japanese Prisoners of War in the Southwest Pacific', *New Zealand Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1995), pp. 113–125.

- 22 *Nippon Times*, 17 February 1956.
- 23 *Engo 30-nen no ayumi*, p. 173.
- 24 *Engo gojūnen shi*, pp. 71, 73.
- 25 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 72.
- 26 Kirby, *The War Against Japan*, p. 254. For Japanese reminiscences of the battles in Burma, see also Tamayama Kazuo and John Nunneley, *Tales by Japanese Soldiers, of the Burma Campaign 1942–1943*, London: Cassell, 2000.
- 27 Christopher Goscha, ‘Belated Allies: The Technical Contributions of Japanese Deserters to the Viet Minh (1945–1950)’, in Marilyn Young and Robert Buzzanco (eds), *Blackwell Companion to the Vietnam War*, London: Blackwell, 2002.
- 28 Chō Yohirō, *Kaeranakatta Nihonhei*, Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1994.
- 29 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 130.
- 30 Meirion Harries and Susie Harries, *Soldiers of the Sun: the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1868–1945*, London: Heinemann, 1991, p. 391.
- 31 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 22.
- 32 John Toland, *The Rising Sun: the Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945*, New York: Random House, 1970, pp. 727–737.
- 33 Onoda Hirō, *No Surrender: My Thirty-year War* (translated by Charles Terry), London: André Deutsch, 1974, pp. 74–76.
- 34 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 14.
- 35 Onoda, *No Surrender*. See, for example, p. 160.
- 36 Asahi shimbun, *28 Years in the Guam Jungle: Sergeant Yokoi Home from World War II*, Tokyo: Japan Publications Inc., 1972, pp. 44–45.
- 37 The existence of these families is mentioned at the time of Yokoi Shōichi’s return in 1972. At that time, they were reported to number around 400. *Asahi shimbun*, 8 February 1972.
- 38 Haruko Taya Cook and Theodore F. Cook (eds), *Japan at War: An Oral History*, New York: New Press, 1992, p. 439.
- 39 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 337. After Yokoi’s return, ‘bone-collections’ took place over three years from 1973 to 1976 in most areas of the Southwest Pacific, but also Burma and India. The last ceremony for the war dead on Iwo Jima took place on 14 March 2000: *Asahi shimbun*, 15 March 2000.
- 40 Tessa Morris-Suzuki (ed.), *Shōwa: an Inside History of Hirohito’s Japan*, London: Athlone Press, 1984, p. 196; John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1999, p. 89.
- 41 Katō Shūichi, *A Sheep’s Song: a Writer’s Reminiscences of Japan and the World* (translated and annotated by Chia-ning Chang), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, pp. 203–204.
- 42 These ambiguous feelings are found in numerous memoirs, but see, for example, Tetsuo Ogawa, *Terraced Hell: a Japanese Memoir of Defeat and Death in Northern Luzon, Philippines*, Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1972, p. 191.
- 43 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*. See also Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary*, Tokyo: Tuttle, 1981; Walt Sheldon, *The Honorable Conquerors: The Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952*, New York: Macmillan, 1965; Otis Cary (ed.), *From a Ruined Empire: Letters – Japan, China, Korea, 1945–46*, Tokyo: Tuttle, 1984, previously published as *War-wasted Asia: Letters 1945–1946*, Tokyo: Kodansha, 1975.
- 44 Jules Henry, ‘Initial Reactions to the Americans’, *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 2, no. 3 (August 1946), p. 20.
- 45 Harold G. Noble, ‘Japs [sic] Hate their Heroes’, *Saturday Evening Post*, 218 (12 October 1949), pp. 18–19, 143–144.
- 46 W. F. Warner, ‘Repatriate Organisations in Japan’, *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 22 (September 1949), p. 276.
- 47 William P. Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–1952 and Japanese Religions*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972, p. 148.

- 48 ‘Letter from Hisashi Kubota in Osaka to Don Keene in Tsingtao’, in Cary (ed.), *From a Ruined Empire*, p. 194.
- 49 Keishichō, jōhōka, *Machi no koe*, 1–15 September 1945, quoted in Kimura Takuji, ‘Shūsen chokugo no guntai to shakai: “kyūgunjin gurūpu” no keisei o megutte’, Unpublished Master’s thesis, Hitotsubashi University, 1997, p. 34.
- 50 Keishichō, jōhōka, *Machi no koe*, 5–15 September 1945, in Awaya Kentarō (ed.), *Shiryō Nihon gendai shi*, vol. 2: *haisengo no seiji to shakai*, Tokyo: Ōtsuki shoten, 1980, p. 221.
- 51 Naimushō, keihōkyoku, keizai hōanka, *Gunju busshi hōshutsu jōhō*, 24 September 1945, quoted in Kimura, ‘Shūsen chokugo no guntai to shakai’, p. 34.
- 52 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 59.
- 53 ‘Rikugun fukuin chian jōhō’, Report no. 47, 20 September 1945.
- 54 ATIS ‘M’ report no. 31 (16 March 1944), p. 1; ATIS Interrogation Report no. 122 (19 April 1945), p. 10.
- 55 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 58–59.
- 56 Kimura, ‘Shūsen chokugo no guntai to shakai’, p. 25.
- 57 ATIS Interrogation Reports no. 291 (15 May 1944), p. 6; no. 565 (10 December 1944), p. 5.
- 58 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 60.
- 59 *Mainichi shimbun*, 7 October 1945, quoted in Kimura, ‘Shūsen chokugo no guntai to shakai’, p. 44.
- 60 *Rikugun fukuin chian jōhō*, no. 29, 22 September 1945, quoted in Kimura, ‘Shūsen chokugo no guntai to shakai’, p. 46.
- 61 Wakayama Prefecture, 14 September 1945, quoted in Kimura, ‘Shūsen chokugo no guntai to shakai’, p. 46.
- 62 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 60.
- 63 See, for example, item 24 in *Machi no koe*, in which an unidentified person complains that if the Government had admitted that it could not win this war earlier, nobody would have had to go through the bombing raids. Keishichō, jōhōka, *Machi no koe*, 5–15 September 1945, in Awaya (ed.), *Shiryō nihon gendai shi*, vol. 2, p. 221.
- 64 Hagomoro Society of Kamikaze Divine Thunderbolt Corps Survivors, *The Cherry Blossom Squadrons: Born to Die*, Los Angeles: Ohara Publications, 1973, pp. 58–59.
- 65 ATIS Research Report no. 76 (4 April 1944). Also Charlotte Carr-Gregg, *Japanese Prisoners of War in Revolt: the Outbreaks at Featherston and Cowra during WWII*, Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1978, p. 201–203.
- 66 ‘From Otis Cary in Tokyo to Don Keene in Tsingtao, November 25, 1945’, in Cary (ed.), *From a Ruined Empire*, p. 217.
- 67 Cary (ed.), *From a Ruined Empire*, p. 227.
- 68 Asada Teruhiko, *The Night of a Thousand Suicides: the Japanese Outbreak at Cowra* (translated by Ray Cowan), Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1970, pp. 123–124.
- 69 *Shūkan josei jishin*, 19 February 1972, p. 53.
- 70 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 247. See also Yoshiko Kurachi Dower’s reminiscences in Studs Terkel (ed.), ‘The Good War’: *an Oral History of World War II*, New York: Pantheon, 1984, pp. 227–231.
- 71 Meirion Harries and Susie Harries, *Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarisation of Japan*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987, pp. 66–68; Gayn, *Japan Diary*, pp. 6–7; Yoshida Yutaka, *Nihonjin no sensōkan: rekishi no naka no henyō*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995, p. 31.
- 72 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 411.
- 73 For discussion of these issues see Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, pp. 449–454; Richard Minear, *Victor’s Justice: the Tokyo War Crimes Trial*, Tokyo: Tuttle, 1972; Solis Horwitz, ‘The Tokyo Trial’, *International Conciliation*, no. 465 (November 1950), pp. 473–584.
- 74 Yoshida, *Nihonjin no sensōkan*, p. 36.

- 75 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 468; see also Minear, *Victor's Justice*.
- 76 R. John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide (eds), *The Tokyo War Crimes Trials* (Transcripts of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East), New York: Garland Publishing, 1981, vol. 19, p. 47,275.
- 77 Yoshida, *Nihonjin no sensōkan*, pp. 39–40.
- 78 Kenneth Ruoff also highlights the ambiguous position of the Emperor in the constitution from the moment it was created. Kenneth Ruoff, *The People's Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945–1995*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- 79 George Mosse has illustrated how the Allies showed similar interests in remodelling monuments during the Occupation of Germany. George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 212–213.
- 80 Moriya Hidesuke, *Yasukuni jinja hyakunenshi: jireki nenpyō*, Tokyo: Yasukuni jinja, 1987, pp. 119–121.
- 81 Woodard, *Allied Occupation*, p. 148.
- 82 Moriya, *Yasukuni*, pp. 144–145. See also Hijikata Yoshio, *Yasukuni jinja: kokka Shintō wa yomigaeru ka*, Tokyo: Hyōronsha, 1985, p. 21.
- 83 Woodard, *Allied Occupation*, p. 148.
- 84 Woodard, *Allied Occupation*, p. 161.
- 85 Woodard, *Allied Occupation*, pp. 155–156.
- 86 See, for example, Yasukuni mondai kenkyūkai (ed.), *Han Yasukuni ronshū*, Tokyo: Shinchi heisha, 1987, p. 3; Eric Seizelet, *Monarchie et démocratie dans le Japon d'après-guerre*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1990, pp. 245–246.
- 87 Woodard, *Allied Occupation*, p. 156.
- 88 *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 244.
- 89 Beatrice Trefalt, 'War, Commemoration and National Identity in Japan, 1868–1975', in Sandra Wilson (ed.), *Nation and Nationalism in Japan*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, 115–134.

3 'Five years on mice and potatoes'

- 1 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 24 July 1951.
- 2 'Waga ko o sodatete... ikinuku sensō mibōjin no shuki', *Sandee mainichi*, 10 February 1952, pp. 4–11.
- 3 'Iwojima no hora ana o saguru; ah mieta! Hakkotsu', *Asahi shimbun*, 31 January 1952.
- 4 *Asahi shimbun*, 11 February 1952.
- 5 See 'Yattsu noshima', *Asahi shimbun*, 27 November – 3 December 1952.
- 6 Kōseishō engo kyoku, *Engo gojūnen shi*, Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997, p. 43.
- 7 *Asahi shimbun*, 15 February 1952.
- 8 *Asahi shimbun*, 8 March 1952.
- 9 *Asahi shimbun*, 31 March 1952.
- 10 See, for example, Maruyama Michirō, *Anatahan no kokuhaku*, Tokyo: Tōwasha, 1952, in which the author describes the throng of reporters that awaited him on his return in 1951, pp. 237–238. See also Fukami Teiji, Wilbur Cross, *The Lost Men of Anatahan*, New York: Paperback Library, 1969, p. 143.
- 11 *Mainichi shimbun*, 14 February 1950.
- 12 'Janguru no urashima kaeru; imo to nezumi de gonen kan: Nyūginia de Taazan seikatsu', *Mainichi shimbun*, 14 February 1950.
- 13 *Mainichi shimbun*, 14 February 1950.
- 14 E. J. Kahn maintains that he survived the war and was reunited with his wife in Okinawa on her return: *The Stragglers*, New York: Random House, 1962, p. 87. I have been unable to find evidence in support of that assertion. Considering the interest of

- the media in Hika's personal life in 1951, if Kahn's assertion were true, I would have expected to see some mention of her reunion with her husband. Perhaps it took place later. In 1972, journalists from the *Shūkan gendai* traced the 'Queen of Anatahan' to Okinawa, where she was living quietly with her two children. The *Shūkan gendai* mentioned that Hika had remarried on Okinawa, but that her husband had died in the meantime. She refused to talk to any journalists in 1972. *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, p. 35.
- 15 *Mainichi shimbun*, 3 July 1951, 7 July 1951.
- 16 *Mainichi shimbun*, 22 July 1951.
- 17 *Mainichi shimbun*, 22 July 1951.
- 18 *Mainichi shimbun*, 7 July 1951.
- 19 Maruyama, *Anatahan*; Michirō Maruyama, *Anatahan* (translated by Younghill Kang), London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954.
- 20 Kimura Hiroshi, 'Jikokujima Anatahan', *Kaisō*, vol. 32, no. 9 (August 1951), pp. 8–9.
- 21 *Mainichi shimbun*, 26 May 1951.
- 22 *Asahi shimbun*, 7 July 1951.
- 23 *Asahi shimbun*, 29 September 1951.
- 24 *Asahi shimbun*, 9 October 1951.
- 25 *Asahi shimbun*, 9 October 1951; *Mainichi shimbun*, 9 October 1951.
- 26 *Mainichi shimbun*, 14 January 1952.
- 27 *Mainichi shimbun*, 24 February 1952.
- 28 *Mainichi shimbun*, 17 January 1952.
- 29 *Asahi shimbun*, 9 March 1952.
- 30 Kahn, *The Stragglers*, pp. 156–57.
- 31 *Mainichi shimbun*, 19 February 1952.
- 32 *Mainichi shimbun*, 17 January 1952.
- 33 See also *Asahi shimbun*, 29 March 1952, which confirms that Japanese prisoners of war awaiting the death penalty at Fort Mackinlay were employed in the training of army dogs, which were used against Huk terrorists.
- 34 'Nihonken mo sōsa ni kyōryoku!', *Mainichi shimbun*, 19 February 1952.
- 35 *Mainichi shimbun*, 21 February 1952.
- 36 *Mainichi shimbun*, 2 February 1952.
- 37 Yoshida Yutaka, *Nihonjin no sensōkan: rekishi no naka no henyō*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995, p. 101.
- 38 *Mainichi shimbun*, 14 January 1952.
- 39 Lawrence Olson, *Japan in Postwar Asia*, New York: Praeger, 1970, p. 17.
- 40 *Mainichi shimbun*, 19 February 1952.
- 41 *Asahi shimbun*, 5 February 1952.
- 42 *Asahi shimbun*, 6 February 1952.
- 43 *Asahi shimbun*, 7 February 1952. Leaflets urging surrender were again dropped from planes over areas where stragglers were thought to be hiding.
- 44 *Asahi shimbun*, 6 April 1952.
- 45 *Asahi shimbun*, 15 September 1952.
- 46 *Asahi shimbun*, 25 June 1952.
- 47 *Asahi shimbun*, 25 June 1952.
- 48 *Eigo gojūnen shi*, pp. 120–121.
- 49 *Asahi shimbun*, 25 June 1952.
- 50 *Asahi shimbun*, 22 June 1952.
- 51 *Asahi shimbun*, 25 June 1952.
- 52 *Asahi shimbun*, 25 June 1952.
- 53 *Asahi shimbun*, 28 November 1952.
- 54 *Asahi shimbun*, 6 April 1952.
- 55 *Asahi shimbun*, 12 June 1952.
- 56 *Asahi shimbun*, 12 June 1952.

- 57 *Mainichi shimbun*, 14 February 1952.
- 58 *Asahi shimbun*, 31 January 1952.
- 59 *Asahi shimbun*, 27 November 1952. According to the records of the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, the first mission, covering the eight islands described by the *Asahi shimbun*, took place between 31 January and 19 March 1953. *Engo gojūnen shi*, p. 134.
- 60 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 486.
- 61 Consider for example the relaxation of the rules concerning the commemoration of war dead by 1951. See William P. Woodard, *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–1952 and Japanese Religions*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972, p. 152.
- 62 Yoshida, *Nihonjin no sensōkan*, pp. 78–81.
- 63 Yoshida, *Nihonjin no sensōkan*, pp. 82–84.
- 64 Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 513.
- 65 *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, p. 34.

4 ‘Living spirits of the war dead’, 1954–1956

- 1 Wakaichi Kōji, *Saigo no senshisha:rikugun ittōhei Kozuka Kinshichi*, Tokyo: Kawade shobōshinsha, 1986, p. 143.
- 2 Gomikawa Junpei, *Ningen no jōken*, vols 1–6, Tokyo: San’ichi shinsha, 1956–1958.
- 3 Sandra Wilson, ‘Rethinking the 1930s and the “15-Year War” in Japan’, *Japanese Studies*, vol. 21, no. 2 (September 2001), pp. 155–164.
- 4 Yoshida Yutaka, *Nihonjin no sensōkan: rekishi no naka no henyō*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995, pp. 91–97.
- 5 Fujiwara Akira, Imai Seiichi and Tōyama Shigeki, *Shōwa shi*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1955.
- 6 Yoshikuni Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945–1970*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, pp. 73–130; James Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001.
- 7 Takahashi Saburō, ‘*Senkimono’ o yomu: sensō taiken to sengo Nihon shakai*’, Kyoto: Akademia shuppankai, 1988, p. 36.
- 8 Ōka Shōhei, *Furyoki*, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1952; Nihon senbotsu gakusei shuki henshū iinkai, *Kike wadatsumi no koe*, Tokyo: Tōdai kyōdō kumiai shuppansha, 1949; Tagagi Toshirō, *Imphal*, Tokyo: Yūkeisha, 1949.
- 9 Takahashi, ‘*Senkimono*’, p. 36.
- 10 Tsuji Masanobu, *Jūgo tai ichi: Biruma no shitō*, Tokyo: Kantōsha, 1950; *Senkō sanzenri*, Tokyo: Kawade shobōsha, 1951; Yoshida, *Nihonjin no sensōkan*, p. 86; see also Takahashi, ‘*Senkimono*’, pp. 34–36.
- 11 Takahashi, ‘*Senkimono*’, appendix 4, p. 195.
- 12 Takahashi, ‘*Senkimono*’, pp. 48–51.
- 13 Yoshida, *Nihonjin no sensōkan*, pp. 92–93.
- 14 Kobayashi Yoshinori, *Sensōron*, Tokyo: Gentōsha, 1998, p. 73.
- 15 Iwamoto Hiromitsu, ‘Japanese Images of the Air War’, Unpublished paper presented at Remembering the War in New Guinea Symposium, Canberra, October 2000.
- 16 Yoshida, *Nihonjin no sensōkan*, pp. 92–93.
- 17 *Mainichi shimbun*, 7 December 1956.
- 18 Harry Harootunian, ‘Memory, Mourning and National Morality: Yasukuni Shrine and the Reunion of State and Religion in Postwar Japan’, in Peter Van Der Veer, Hartmut Lehmann (eds), *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 155–156; Beatrice Trefalt, ‘War, Commemoration and National Identity in Japan, 1868–1975’, in Sandra Wilson (ed.), *Nation and Nationalism in Japan*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, pp. 115–134.
- 19 Wakaichi, *Saigo no senshisha*, p. 143.

- 20 Onoda Hirō, *No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War* (translated by Charles S. Terry), Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1974, pp. 101–108.
- 21 Onoda Hirō, *No Surrender*, p. 108.
- 22 *Asahi shimbun*, 9 May 1954.
- 23 *Asahi shimbun*, 18 May 1954.
- 24 *Mainichi shimbun*, 18 May 1954.
- 25 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 19 May 1954.
- 26 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 6 June 1954.
- 27 Wakaichi, *Saigo no senshisha*, pp. 144–145.
- 28 See, for example, *Mainichi shimbun*, evening edition, 23 May 1954; *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 9 June 1954.
- 29 Wakaichi, *Saigo no senshisha*, pp. 134–135.
- 30 *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 23 May 1954; *Mainichi shimbun*, evening edition, 23 June 1954.
- 31 *Mainichi shimbun*, evening edition, 23 June 1954.
- 32 *Mainichi shimbun*, 20 May 1954.
- 33 *Asahi shimbun*, 9 June 1954.
- 34 Onoda, *No Surrender*, pp. 109–128.
- 35 See, for example, *Mainichi shimbun*, evening edition, 18 May 1954.
- 36 Katō Norihiro, *Haisengoron*, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1997, quoted in Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ‘Unquiet Graves: Katō Norihiro and the Politics of Mourning’, *Japanese Studies*, vol. 18, no. 1 (1998), pp. 21–30.
- 37 Kobayashi, *Sensōron*.
- 38 *Asahi shimbun*, 2 March 1955; see also *Sydney Sun Herald*, 27 February 1955.
- 39 ‘Four “Dead” Japs’, *Sydney Sun Herald*, 27 February 1955; ‘Mitsurin ikinokori no Nihonhei’, *Asahi shimbun*, 2 March 1955.
- 40 *Shūkan asahi*, 3 April 1955, pp. 80–81.
- 41 *Shūkan asahi*, 3 April 1955, pp. 80–81. According to the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare, this particular mission for the repatriation of remains of the war dead took place over slightly more than two months, from 12 January to 19 March 1955, and covered New Britain, Guadalcanal, Eastern New Guinea and various islands of Micronesia. The Bureau does not mention in its history that on that occasion the mission repatriated some living soldiers, as well as the remains of thousands of dead. Kōseishō engo kyoku, *Engo gojūnen shi*, Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997, p. 134.
- 42 *Asahi shimbun*, 2 March 1955.
- 43 *Shūkan asahi*, 3 April 1955, p. 80.
- 44 ‘Yonin no heitai: “tsukare” de sannin nyūin’, *Mainichi shimbun*, evening edition, 28 April 1955.
- 45 *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 21 March 1955.
- 46 *Mainichi shimbun*, evening edition, 28 April 1955.
- 47 *Mainichi shimbun*, evening edition, 28 April 1955.
- 48 Yaegashi received one such proposal, for example, from a dried cuttlefish producer in Hokkaidō, but it is not known whether he accepted it. *Mainichi shimbun*, evening edition, 28 April 1955.
- 49 ‘Kyūjin no Nihonhei tōkō’, *Asahi shimbun*, 21 January 1956.
- 50 *Asahi shimbun*, 9 February 1956, 11 February 1956.
- 51 ‘Jūnineme no “kotai sōkan”: Morotai-jima ni ikite ita moto Nihonhei’, *Shūkan asahi*, 26 February 1956, pp. 16–17.
- 52 *Shūkan asahi*, 26 February 1956, p. 17.
- 53 *Shūkan asahi*, 26 February 1956, p. 17.
- 54 *Shūkan asahi*, 26 February 1956, p. 17.
- 55 *Asahi shimbun*, 10 October 1956.
- 56 *Asahi shimbun*, 16 October 1956.
- 57 *Asahi shimbun*, 31 October 1956.

- 58 *Asahi shimbun*, 29 November 1956.
- 59 *Asahi shimbun*, 10 October 1956.
- 60 *Asahi shimbun*, 29 November 1956.
- 61 *Shūkan sankei*, 16 December 1956, p. 4; *Asahi shimbun*, 29 November 1956.
- 62 *Asahi shimbun*, 29 November 1956; *Shūkan sankei*, 16 December 1956, pp. 4–5.
- 63 *Shūkan sankei*, 16 December 1956, p. 4.
- 64 *Asahi shimbun*, 29 November 1956.
- 65 *Asahi shimbun*, 29 November 1956; ‘Eirei tachi wa masani ikite ita’, *Shūkan sankei*, 16 December 1956, p. 4.
- 66 *Shūkan sankei*, 16 December 1956, p. 4.
- 67 Yoshida, *Nihonjin no sensōkan*, p. 39.
- 68 *Shūkan sankei*, 16 December 1956, pp. 4–5.
- 69 *Asahi shimbun*, 29 November 1956.
- 70 Itō Kentarō, *Rengō kantai no saigo*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū shinsha, 1956; Yoshida, *Nihonjin no sensōkan*, pp. 100–101.

5 ‘But they are not gorillas’, 1959–1960

- 1 James Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001, pp. 36–70; Lisa Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space and the Dialectics of Memory*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 191–202.
- 2 J.A.A. Stockwin, *Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy*, Oxford: Blackwell, third edition, 1999, p. 52.
- 3 For a more detailed discussion of the Security Treaty Crisis, see George R. Packard, *Protest in Tokyo: the Security Treaty Crisis of 1960*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- 4 The Bureau’s records detail the areas that were combed by the mission without mentioning Lubang by name, although it could possibly be included in ‘the various islands between Luzon and Mindanao’ (Kōseishō engo kyoku, *Engo gojūnen shi*, Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997, p. 139). However, the Bureau’s records also indicate that this particular mission did not conduct investigations to find stragglers (*Engo gojūnen shi*, appendix 2, p. 528.). The *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 24 February 1959, claims that Lubang was investigated at that time. The limited time-frame of the search (roughly six weeks) might well have precluded lengthy investigation, but according to the report by the head of the Bureau in 1959, three rounds of leaflets were dropped on Lubang from the air at the time.
- 5 A more detailed summary of the communications from the Philippines was presented to a parliamentary Special Committee on 25 February 1959. *Shūgiin giroku, kaigai dōbō hikiage oyobi ikazoku engo ni kansuru tokubetsu iinkai*, Session 4, 25 February 1959, in Shūgiin jimukyoku (ed.), *Shūgiin iinkai giroku*, Tokyo: Nozokawa shoten, 1993, pp. 72–74.
- 6 Onoda Hirō, *No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War* (translated by Charles S. Terry), London: André Deutsch, 1974, p. 115.
- 7 ‘Kondo wa satsujin!’, *Asahi shimbun*, 4 February 1959.
- 8 ‘Rubangu no Nihonhei araware; Nichi-Hi kyūjotai ni happō; bussō keikan no ōsha de mitsurin e’, *Mainichi shimbun*, 17 March 1959.
- 9 Onoda, *No Surrender*, p. 115.
- 10 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 24 March 1959; *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 24 March 1959.
- 11 *Shūkan asahi*, 3 December 1959, p. 14.
- 12 E. J. Kahn, *The Stragglers*, New York: Random House, 1962, p. 173.
- 13 *Shūkan asahi*, 3 December 1959, p. 16.
- 14 *Asahi shimbun*, 4 February 1959.
- 15 *Asahi shimbun*, 24 February 1959; see also *Yomiuri shimbun*, 24 February 1959.

- 16 Wakaichi Kōji, *Saigo no senshisha: rikugun ittōhei Kozuka Kin'shichi*, Tokyo: Kawade shobōshinsha, 1986, p. 154.
- 17 Kahn, *The Stragglers*, p. 164.
- 18 Wakaichi, *Saigo no senshisha*, pp. 154–155.
- 19 *Mainichi shimbun*, 20 February 1959.
- 20 *Asahi shimbun*, 24 February 1959.
- 21 *Mainichi shimbun*, 20 February 1959.
- 22 *Mainichi shimbun*, 20 March 1959.
- 23 Letter to the editor, *Asahi shimbun*, 23 February 1959.
- 24 *Mainichi shimbun*, 5 February 1959.
- 25 *Shūgiin giroku, kaigai dōbō hikiage oyobi ikazoku engo ni kansuru tokubetsu iinkai*, 1949–1959.
- 26 *Kaigai dōbō hikiage tokubetsu iinkai*, Session 3, 30 January 1959. As we will see in a later chapter, there is evidence that even in the early 1970s, a number of families had not accepted the government's decision, and declined pensions on those grounds.
- 27 *Kaigai dōbō hikiage tokubetsu iinkai*, Session 4, 25 February 1959, including special hearing of 20 February 1959.
- 28 *Kaigai dōbō hikiage tokubetsu iinkai*, Session 4, 25 February 1959, p. 4.
- 29 *Kaigai dōbō hikiage tokubetsu iinkai*, Session 4, 25 February 1959, p. 5.
- 30 *Kaigai dōbō hikiage tokubetsu iinkai*, Session 4, 25 February 1959, p. 5.
- 31 *Kaigai dōbō hikiage tokubetsu iinkai*, Session 4, 25 February 1959, p. 5.
- 32 Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, p. 92.
- 33 *Kaigai dōbō hikiage tokubetsu iinkai*, Session 4, 25 February 1959, pp. 7–9.
- 34 *Kaigai dōbō hikiage tokubetsu iinkai*, Session 4, 25 February 1959, p. 10.
- 35 *Kaigai dōbō hikiage tokubetsu iinkai*, Session 4, 25 February 1959, p. 11.
- 36 *Mainichi shimbun*, evening edition, 27 February 1959; see also *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 27 February 1959; *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 27 February 1959.
- 37 *Mainichi shimbun*, 21 February 1959; see also *Asahi shimbun*, 21 February 1959; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 21 February 1959.
- 38 Harry Harootunian, 'Memory, Mourning and National Morality: Yasukuni Shrine and the Reunion of State and Religion in Postwar Japan', in Peter Van Der Veer, Hartmut Lehmann (eds), *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 144–160; Beatrice Trefalt, 'War, Commemoration and National Identity in Japan, 1868–1975', in Sandra Wilson (ed.), *Nation and Nationalism in Japan*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, pp. 115–134.
- 39 Arita Takeo, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Kaigai dōbō hikiage tokubetsu iinkai*, Session 4, 25 February 1959, p. 9.
- 40 Yoneyama, *Hiroshima Traces*, p. 14.
- 41 *Asahi shimbun*, 23 February 1959.
- 42 A detailed description of these stragglers' survival in the jungle can be found in Itō Masashi, *Guamutō: 16-nen no kiroku*, Tokyo: Niken shobō, 1960; Minagawa Bunzō, *Guam-tō jūrokunen*, Tokyo: Chōbunsha, 1972. Itō Masashi's book has been published in English as *The Emperor's Last Soldiers* (translated by Roger Clifton), London: Souvenir Press, 1967.
- 43 *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 21 May 1960.
- 44 *Asahi shimbun*, 28 May 1960. According to Kahn, the car that eventually picked them up was driven by a friend of Minagawa's captors: *The Stragglers*, p. 25.
- 45 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 22 May 1960; *Asahi shimbun*, 22 May 1960.
- 46 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 24 May 1960; *Asahi shimbun*, 24 May 1960.
- 47 See, for example, *Yomiuri shimbun*, 24 May 1960; *Asahi shimbun*, 21 May 1960.
- 48 *Asahi shimbun*, 2–25 June 1960.
- 49 *Sandee mainichi*, 12 June 1960, p. 16.

- 50 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 June 1960, p. 7.
- 51 ‘Watashi wa kōshite ikite ita!’, *Shūkan sankei*, 13 June 1960, p. 18.
- 52 In addition to *Shūkan sankei*, 13 June 1960, pp. 16–20, see *Shūkan asahi*, 12 June 1960, pp. 16–19; *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 June 1960, pp. 4–9.
- 53 *Sandee mainichi*, 12 June 1960, pp. 16–18; *Shūkan sankei*, 13 June 1960, pp. 16–20; *Shūkan asahi*, 12 June 1960, pp. 16–19; *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 June 1960, pp. 4–9.
- 54 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 June 1960, p. 8.
- 55 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 June 1960, p. 9.
- 56 According to Kahn, this was a sojourn that the *Asahi* paid for, but there is no other evidence for this. *The Stragglers*, New York: Ace Books, 1972, revised edition, pp. 72–73.
- 57 *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 27 May 1960.
- 58 *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 28 May 1960.
- 59 See, for example, *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 27 May 1960.
- 60 *Asahi shimbun*, 28 May 1960.
- 61 On the debates about naming the war, and the introduction of the alternative term ‘15-Year War’, see Sandra Wilson, ‘Rethinking the 1930s and the “15-Year War” in Japan’, *Japanese Studies*, vol. 21, no. 2 (September 2001), pp. 155–164; also Kisaka Jun’ichirō, ‘Jūgonen sensō no koshō ni tsuite’, in Inoue Kiyoshi and Eto Shinkichi (eds), *Nitchū sensō to Nitchū kankei*, Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1988, pp. 77–92.
- 62 See, for example, *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 28 May 1960; *Shūkan asahi*, 12 June 1960, p. 17.
- 63 See, for example, *Asahi shimbun*, 27 May 1960; *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 27 May 1960; *Sandee mainichi*, 12 June 1960, p. 17.
- 64 See, for example, *Shūkan sankei*, 13 June 1960, p. 20; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 29 May 1960.
- 65 See, for example, *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 27 May 1960.
- 66 *Asahi shimbun*, 27 May 1960.
- 67 See, for example, *Shūkan asahi*, 12 June 1960, p. 16.
- 68 *Asahi shimbun*, 28 May 1960.
- 69 *Sandee mainichi*, 12 June 1960, p. 17.
- 70 *Shūkan sankei*, 13 June 1960, p. 20.
- 71 *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 28 May 1960.
- 72 *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 28 May 1960.
- 73 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 29 May 1960; *Asahi shimbun*, 29 May 1960; *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 June 1960, p. 7.
- 74 *Shūkan asahi*, 12 June 1960, p. 16.
- 75 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 June 1960, p. 7; *Shūkan asahi*, 12 June 1960, p. 17.
- 76 See, for example, *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 June 1960, pp. 4, 8; *Asahi shimbun*, 18 June 1960.
- 77 *Shūkan sankei*, 13 June 1960, p. 20; *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 27 June 1960.
- 78 Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, p. 141.

6 The past in the present

- 1 *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 25 January 1972.
- 2 ‘Kimiyo no moto Nihonhei, 28-nen-buri hakken’, *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 25 January 1972; ‘Guamu-jima: kimyo no moto Nihonhei 28-nen o ikinuku’, *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 25 January 1972.
- 3 *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, p. 26; *Josei jishin*, 19 February 1972, p. 34.
- 4 I use ‘imagined’ here as Benedict Anderson has used it. The ‘imagined community’ of the nation represents an abstract cultural construct rather than an entity with finite geographical boundaries. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, revised edition, 1991.

- 5 See, for example, *Shūkan posuto*, 11 February 1972, p. 25, and Yokoi's interview in *Gekkan shakaitō*, no. 182 (April 1972), p. 129; *Shūkan shincho*, 19 February 1972, p. 32. As argued in the first chapter of this book, such fears were relatively widespread amongst soldiers, as revealed by the mindset of Japanese prisoners of war during the war. See, for example, the figures provided in ATIS (Australian Translator and Interpreter Service) Research Report no. 76 (4 April 1944).
- 6 See, for example, *Asahi shimbun*, 26 January 1972.
- 7 'Ikite ryoshū no hazukashime o ukezu ...'. See, for example, *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 February 1972, p. 41; *Shūkan shincho*, 5 February 1972, p. 116; *Shūkan posuto*, 11 February 1972, p. 25.
- 8 *Gendai no manako*, vol. 13, no. 3 (March 1972), p. 29.
- 9 Yamamoto Shichihei, 'Naze tōkō shinakatta no ka', *Bungei shunjū*, vol. 50, no. 4 (April 1974), p. 266.
- 10 *Shūkan josei jishin*, 19 February 1972, p. 53.
- 11 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 February 1972, p. 40.
- 12 *Shūkan posuto*, 11 February 1972, pp. 20–22. For the story of Kiguchi Kōhei, see Donald Keene, 'The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and its Cultural Effects in Japan', in Donald H. Shively (ed.), *Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 150–151. Harold Wray has shown that military images were increasingly prevalent in the Japanese curriculum of the 1920s and 1930s, even if they co-existed, particularly in the early 1920s when Yokoi went to school, with more liberal trends. Harold G. Wray, 'A Study in Contrasts: Japanese School Textbooks of 1903 and 1941–45', *Monumenta Nipponica*, vol. 28, no. 1 (1978), pp. 69–86.
- 13 Sandra Wilson, 'The Russo-Japanese War and Japan: Politics, Nationalism and Historical Memory', in David Wells and Sandra Wilson (eds), *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904–1905*, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 182–188.
- 14 See, for example, *Shūkan gendai*, 10 February 1972, p. 24.
- 15 See, for example, the phone-in comment published in *Asahi shimbun*, 3 February 1972.
- 16 Shinobu Seizaburō, 'From Party Politics to Military Dictatorship', *Developing Economies*, vol. 4 (1967), p. 684, quoted in Sandra Wilson, 'Rethinking the 1930s and the "15-Year War" in Japan', *Japanese Studies*, vol. 21, no. 2 (September 2001), p. 162.
- 17 Ienaga Saburō, *Taiheiyo sensō*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1968, published in English as *Japan's Last War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978, esp. pp. 13–54.
- 18 See, for example, the discussion by former veterans in the *Shūkan shincho*, 12 February 1972, pp. 34–35, 38–39.
- 19 *Shūkan sankei*, 17 February 1972, p. 30.
- 20 *Shūkan posuto*, 11 February 1972, pp. 22–23.
- 21 *Shūkan asahi*, 11 February 1972, p. 22.
- 22 See, for example, *Shūkan asahi*, 11 February 1972, p. 22; *Shūkan gendai*, 10 February 1972, p. 24; *Shūkan josei*, 12 February 1972, p. 36; *Josei jishin*, 12 February 1972, p. 31; *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 February 1972, pp. 18–19; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 26 January 1972; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 27 January 1972.
- 23 *Shūkan shincho*, 5 February 1972, p. 116. See also *Shūkan yomiuri*, special edition, 18 February 1972, p. 54.
- 24 *Shūkan yomiuri*, special edition, 18 February 1972, p. 54.
- 25 *Shūkan asahi*, 11 February 1972, p. 22.
- 26 For a discussion of post-war attitudes to fallen soldiers, see Beatrice Trefalt, 'War, Memory and National Identity in Post-war Japan, 1868–1975', in Sandra Wilson (ed.), *Nation and Nationalism in Japan*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, pp. 115–134.

- 27 Regulations regarding the indiscriminate distribution of what could be seen as private information were less strict than they are now. See *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, pp. 26–29.
- 28 *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, p. 27.
- 29 See Ōka Shōhei, ‘Tōbun, hotto ite agetai’, *Shūkan asahi*, 11 February 1972, p. 22; *Shūkan posuto*, 11 February 1972, p. 26.
- 30 *Shūkan sankei*, 25 February 1972, pp. 20–23.
- 31 *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, p. 22.
- 32 Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946.
- 33 *Shūkan posuto*, 11 February 1972, p. 20.
- 34 Peter Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, London: Routledge, 1988; Befu Harumi and Manabe Kazufumi, ‘Empirical Status of Nihonjinron: How Real is the Myth?’, in Adriana Boscaro et al. (eds), *Rethinking Japan: Volume II – Social Sciences, Ideology and Thought*, Sandgate, Folkestone: Japan Library Ltd, 1990, pp. 124–133; Kosaku Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: a Sociological Enquiry*, London: Routledge, 1992; Kosaku Yoshino, ‘The Discourse on Blood and Racial Identity in Contemporary Japan’, in Frank Dikötter (ed.), *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, London: Hurst and Company, 1997, pp. 199–211; Kosaku Yoshino, ‘Rethinking Theories of Nationalism: Japan’s Nationalism in a Marketplace Perspective’, in Kosaku Yoshino (ed.), *Consuming Ethnicity and Nationalism: Asian Experiences*, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999, pp. 8–28.
- 35 Iwabuchi Kōichi, ‘Complicit Exoticism: Japan and its Others’, *Continuum*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1994), pp. 49–82.
- 36 *Shūkan posuto*, 11 February 1972, p. 22.
- 37 *Shūkan yomiuri*, special edition, 18 February 1972, pp. 56–57.
- 38 ‘Guamu no Janguru ni komoru’ *Shūkan asahi*, 11 February 1972, pp. 23–26.
- 39 ‘Tesuto: anata nara, dōnen ikirareru ka’, *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 February 1972, pp. 26–28.
- 40 *Shūkan posuto*, 11 February 1972, p. 56.
- 41 *Gendai no manako*, vol. 13, no. 3 (March 1972), p. 29; *Shūkan asahi*, 18 February 1972, p. 24.
- 42 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 6 February 1972.
- 43 Kōseishō engo kyoku, *Engo gojūnen shi*, Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997, Appendix 4, pp. 621–661.
- 44 *Shūkan shincho*, 5 February 1972, p. 119.
- 45 *Shūkan josei*, 12 February 1972, p. 38.
- 46 Mikiso Hane, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, p. 366.
- 47 W.G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change since 1850* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, third edition, 2000, p. 259; Gary D. Allinson, *Japan’s Postwar History*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997, p. 118; Charles Yuji Horioka, ‘Consuming and Saving’, in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 259–292.
- 48 Simon Partner, *Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p. 140.
- 49 Marilyn Ivy, ‘Formations of Mass Culture’, in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, p. 249.
- 50 Takafusa Nakamura shows that by the late 1960s, close to ninety per cent of Japanese people considered themselves to be part of the middle class: *A History of Shōwa Japan, 1926–1989* (translated by Edwin Whentmouth), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998, p. 365.

- 51 These prices are quoted out of the advertisements of major department stores in the newspapers of January/February 1972.
- 52 *Asahi shimbun*, 26 January 1972.
- 53 *Sankei shimbun*, 1 February 1972.
- 54 *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, p. 29.
- 55 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 5 February 1972.
- 56 *Shūkan shincho*, 19 February 1972, p. 35.
- 57 *Shūkan shincho*, 5 February 1972, p. 119.
- 58 *Shūkan josei*, 12 February 1972, p. 38.
- 59 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 5 February 1972.
- 60 *Shūkan shincho*, 12 February 1972, p. 33. Kenneth J. Ruoff, *The People's Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945–1995*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 145–147.
- 61 *Shūkan shincho*, 12 February 1972, p. 32.
- 62 Takeda Kiyoko, *The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor*, London: Macmillan, 1988, p. 59.
- 63 Stephen S. Large, *Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A Political Biography*, London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 147–155; Takahashi Hiroshi, ‘Kaisetsu: Shōwa tennō to “sokkin nisshi”’, in Kinoshita Michio, *Sokkin nisshi*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1990, pp. 336–339; Takahashi Hiroshi, *Shōchō Tennō*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1987; Yoshida Yutaka, *Shōwa tennō no shūsenshi*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1992; Kenneth Ruoff, *The People's Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945–1995*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- 64 Large, *Emperor Hirohito*, p. 177.
- 65 Large, *Emperor Hirohito*, pp. 183–186.
- 66 Irokawa Daikichi, *The Age of Hirohito: In Search of Modern Japan* (translated by Mikiso Hane and John K. Urda), New York: Free Press, 1995, p. 114; Carol Gluck, ‘The Past in the Present’, in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, p. 90.
- 67 *Shūkan shincho*, 12 February 1972, pp. 34–35.
- 68 *Shūkan shincho*, 12 February 1972, pp. 38–39. See also *Shūkan asahi*, 18 February 1972, pp. 20–21.
- 69 Ōka Shōhei, ‘Tōbun, hotto ite agetai’, *Shūkan asahi*, 11 February 1972, p. 22.
- 70 See, for example, *Shūkan shincho*, 12 February 1972, p. 39.
- 71 See, for example, *Josei jishin*, 19 February 1972, p. 35; *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, p. 26.
- 72 *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, p. 26.
- 73 Ann Waswo, *Modern Japanese Society, 1868–1994*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 119–121; Kōji Taira, ‘Dialectics of Economic Growth’, in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, pp. 174–175. See also Uchino Tatsurō, *Japan's Postwar Economy*, Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1983, p. 165.
- 74 Laura Hein, ‘Growth versus Success: Japan's Economic Policy in Historical Perspective’, in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, p. 116.
- 75 Marilyn Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 29–65.
- 76 See, for example, *Asahi shimbun*, 26 January 1972.
- 77 See, for example, *Shūkan yomiuri*, special edition, 18 February 1972, p. 55; *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 26 January 1972; *Shūkan gendai*, 10 February 1972, p. 21; Kusayanagi Daizō, ‘“Tennō no shitateya” Yokoi Shōichi’, *Bungei shunjū*, vol. 50, no. 4 (April 1972), p. 254.
- 78 *Shūkan shincho*, 19 February 1972, pp. 32–33.
- 79 See, for example, *Gekkan shakaitō*, vol. 182 (April 1972), p. 130; *Shūkan shincho*, 19 February 1972, p. 32; *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, pp. 24–25; *Shūkan yomiuri*, 12 February 1972, p. 23.
- 80 See, for example, *Shūkan shincho*, 12 February 1972, p. 37.

- 81 Ivy, 'Formations of Mass Culture', p. 251.
- 82 See, for example, *Shūkan yomiuri*, special edition, 18 February 1972, p. 52.
- 83 Kusayanagi, "Tennō no shitateya" Yokoi Shōichi', p. 244.
- 84 *Shūkan shincho*, 5 February 1972, p. 117.
- 85 William H. Kelly, 'Finding a Place in Metropolitan Japan: Ideologies, Institutions, and Everyday Life', in Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, p. 198.
- 86 *Asahi shimbun*, 26 January 1972.
- 87 See, for example, *Shūkan posuto*, 11 February 1972, pp. 57–59.
- 88 *Shūkan posuto*, 11 February 1972, p. 27.
- 89 *Shūkan asahi*, 18 February 1972, p. 19.
- 90 *Shūkan asahi*, 11 February 1972, pp. 24–25.
- 91 Watashitachi no rekishi o tsuzuru kai, *Fujin zasshi kara mita 1930 nendai*, Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 1987.
- 92 *Asahi shimbun*, 8 February 1972.
- 93 *Asahi shimbun*, 13 February 1972.
- 94 *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, p. 33.
- 95 *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 26 January 1972.
- 96 *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, p. 29.
- 97 Utsumi Toshiaki, 'Shoichi Yokoi (1915–97): A three-decade nightmare of starvation' (19 March 2000) <http://vikingphoenix.com/public/rongstad/bio-obit/asahiobit-yokoi.htm> (21 August 2001).

7 'In the jungle, the war was still going on'

- 1 Wakaichi Kōji, *Saigo no senshisha: rikugun ittōhei Kozuka Kinshichi*, Tokyo: Kawade shobōshinsha, 1986.
- 2 Wakaichi, *Saigo no senshisha*, p. 167.
- 3 Onoda Hirō, *No Surrender: My Thirty-year War* (translated by Charles S. Terry), Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1974, pp. 175–176.
- 4 Wakaichi, *Saigo no senshisha*, pp. 167–178.
- 5 *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 20 October 1972; *Mainichi shimbun*, evening edition, 20 October 1972; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 20 October 1972.
- 6 *Shūkan sankei*, 10 November 1972, p. 15.
- 7 See, for example, *Asahi shimbun*, 22 October 1972; *Mainichi shimbun*, 22 October 1972; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 22 October 1972.
- 8 *Asahi shimbun*, 23 October 1972; *Mainichi shimbun*, 23 October 1972; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 23 October 1972.
- 9 *Asahi shimbun*, 23 October 1972, 24 October 1972, *Mainichi shimbun*, 24 October 1972.
- 10 See, for example, *Shūkan akaboshi*, 5 November 1972, pp. 219–221; *Shūkan josei jishin*, 4 November 1972, p. 27.
- 11 See, for example, *Asahi shimbun*, 28 October 1972; evening edition, 28 October 1972; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 28 October 1972; evening edition, 28 October 1972; *Mainichi shimbun*, 28 October 1972; evening edition, 28 October 1972.
- 12 *Asahi shimbun*, 21 October 1972.
- 13 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 21 October 1972.
- 14 See, for example, letter by twenty-three-year-old student in *Asahi shimbun*, 24 October 1972; by twenty-one-year-old driver, *Asahi shimbun*, 23 October 1972.
- 15 See, for example, letters to the editor in *Asahi shimbun*, 23 October 1972; *Mainichi shimbun*, 24 October 1972; interviews with writers Ōka Shōhei and Ezaki Shichi, *Mainichi shimbun*, 21 October 1972.
- 16 'Kuinokosu jōhō keishi', *Asahi shimbun*, 21 October 1972.
- 17 Ōka Shōhei, 'Rubangu shima no heishitachi', *Asahi jānaru*, 3 November 1972, p. 91.
- 18 See, for example, *Shūkan bunshun*, 13 November 1972, p. 41.

- 19 *Shūkan asahi*, 3 November 1972, p. 24.
- 20 Ōka, ‘Rubangu shima no heishitachi’, p. 92.
- 21 *Mainichi shimbun*, 24 October 1972.
- 22 Tetsuo Ogawa, *Terraced Hell: A Japanese Memoir of Defeat and Death in Northern Luzon, Philippines*, Tokyo: Tuttle, 1972.
- 23 *Asahi shimbun*, 21 October 1972.
- 24 *Shūkan bunshun*, 13 November 1972, pp. 38–39.
- 25 *Asahi shimbun*, 26 October 1972.
- 26 See, for example, *Yomiuri shimbun*, 22 October 1972; *Shūkan asahi*, 3 November 1972, p. 20; *Shūkan sankei*, 10 November 1972, p. 13.
- 27 *Shūkan asahi*, 3 November 1972, p. 20.
- 28 *Asahi shimbun*, 21 October 1972.
- 29 See letter to the editor of retired seventy-two-year-old in *Mainichi shimbun*, 24 October 1972.
- 30 *Shūkan josei jishin*, 11 November 1972, pp. 22–23.
- 31 *Asahi shimbun*, 23 October 1972.
- 32 *Mainichi shimbun*, 21 October 1972.
- 33 *Asahi shimbun*, 23 October 1972.
- 34 Wakaichi *Saigo no senshisha*, pp. 189–190.
- 35 Wakaichi *Saigo no senshisha*, p. 189.
- 36 *Asahi shimbun*, 21 October 1972.
- 37 *Shūkan asahi*, 3 November 1972, p. 26.
- 38 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 21 October 1972.
- 39 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 21 October 1972; *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 24 October 1972.
- 40 *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 21 October 1972; *Asahi shimbun*, 31 October 1972.
- 41 *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 24 October 1972.
- 42 *Asahi shimbun*, 25 October 1972.
- 43 *Asahi shimbun*, 26 October 1972.
- 44 Itō Takashi and Momose Takashi (eds), *Jiten: Shōwa senzenki no Nihon: seidō to jittai*, Tokyo: Furukawa kōbunkan, 1990, p. 341.
- 45 Assessments by psychiatrists were outweighed in the news in the early days after the shoot-out by explorations of the nature of the training received at the Nakano School. See for example *Asahi shimbun*, 21 October 1972; *Shūkan sankei*, 10 November 1972, pp. 16–20; *Shūkan bunshun*, 13 November 1972, pp. 162–165; *Shūkan asahi*, 3 November 1972, pp. 24–25. According to Wakaichi, the Bureau of Repatriate Welfare continued to employ psychiatrists as consultants in the searches for Onoda. Wakaichi, *Saigo no senshisha*, pp. 192–194.
- 46 Onoda, *No Surrender*, pp. 186–187.
- 47 For reports on the Bureau’s announcement that the searches would not continue, see *Asahi shimbun*, 14 April 1973; *Mainichi shimbun*, 14 April 1973; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 14 April 1973.
- 48 *Shūkan sankei*, 29 March 1974, p. 11.
- 49 Suzuki told the details of his meeting with Onoda in ‘Onoda shōjō hakken no tabi’, *Bungei shunjū*, special edition, vol. 52, no. 6 (May 1974), pp. 132–172.
- 50 See, for example, *Asahi shimbun*, 27 February 1974; *Mainichi shimbun*, 27 February 1974; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 27 February 1974; morning and evening editions.
- 51 News of Onoda’s surrender reached the Japanese press on 10 March, and was reported in detail and with photographs.
- 52 Onoda’s serialised memoir was published under the title: ‘Tatakatta, ikita – Rubangu jima sanjūnen no zenkirok’ (I fought, I lived – the complete record of 30 years on Lubang Island); Wakaichi, *Saigo no senshisha*, p. 208.
- 53 Wakaichi, *Saigo no senshisha*, p. 154.

- 54 In 1974, Suzuki wrote a book on his travels in which he portrayed himself as a footloose and bold adventurer in search of freedom, contrasting his life with that in a serious, boring and unimaginative Japan. Suzuki Norio, *Daihōrō*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1974.
- 55 See, for example, an article entitled 'I stand to make ¥1,500,000 out of my Onoda story' ('Boku no "Onoda ron" wa 150-man en no kachi ga aru'), *Shūkan posuto*, 29 March 1974, pp. 28–29.
- 56 *Shūkan shincho*, 21 March 1974, p. 129.
- 57 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 58 Komatsu Sakyō, *Nihon chinbotsu*, Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1973.
- 59 Peter Duus, *Modern Japan*, Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, second edition, 1998, p. 326.
- 60 Richard H. Mitchell, *Political Bribery in Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996, pp. 118–119; James Babb, *Tanaka: the Making of Post-war Japan*, Harlow: Longman, 2000, pp. 93–97.
- 61 Masaru Kohno, *Japan's Postwar Party Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 105.
- 62 Kitazawa Masakuni, 'The Lockheed Incident and Japanese Culture', *Japan Interpreter*, vol. 11, no. 2 (Autumn 1976), pp. 219–223.
- 63 Critic Murakami Hyōe also considered this one of the two main factors explaining why Onoda had such an impact at the time (the other main reason being the mystery of what had prompted him to stay behind): 'Onoda shōjō no guchi?', *Jiyū*, vol. 16, no. 7 (July 1974), p. 167.
- 64 Wakaichi, *Saigo no senshisha*, pp. 209–211.
- 65 Ikeda Shin, *Gensō no eiyū*, Tokyo: Toshō shuppansha, 1976, quoted in Wakaichi, *Saigo no senshisha*, p. 212.
- 66 *Asahi shimbun*, 11 March 1974, 12 March 1974.
- 67 *Asahi shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 68 Such photographs were reproduced with great regularity in most of the articles that dealt with Onoda. See, for example, *Shūkan josei jishin*, 30 March 1974; *Shūkan shincho*, 21 March 1974; *Shūkan posuto*, 22 March 1974.
- 69 Charles S. Terry, 'Introduction', in Onoda, *No Surrender*, p. 7.
- 70 *Asahi shimbun*, 13 March 1974.
- 71 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 72 *Asahi shimbun*, 12–13 March 1974.
- 73 *Asahi shimbun*, 7 March 1974.
- 74 *Asahi shimbun*, 12 March 1974.
- 75 *Asahi shimbun*, 13 March 1974.
- 76 Onoda Hirō, 'Waga Rubangu no sanjūnen sensō', *Bungei shunjū*, vol. 52, no. 7 (June 1974), pp. 228–252.
- 77 *Shūkan bunshun*, 25 March 1974, p. 136.
- 78 See, for example, *Shūkan sankei*, 29 March 1974; *Josei seben*, 27 March 1974.
- 79 *Asahi shimbun*, 13 March 1974.
- 80 *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 13 March 1974.
- 81 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 82 *Asahi shimbun*, 12 March 1974.
- 83 *Asahi shimbun*, 11 March 1974; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 13 March 1974.
- 84 *Asahi shimbun*, 12 March 1974.
- 85 *Shukan gendai*, 11 March 1974, p. 20; *Asahi shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 86 See, for example, *Josei seben*, 27 March 1974, p. 28; *Asahi shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 87 *Asahi shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 88 *Asahi shimbun*, 11 March 1974; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 89 See, for example, the round-table discussion in *Asahi shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 90 *Shūkan josei jishin*, 30 March 1974, pp. 11–21.

- 91 Wakaichi, *Saigo no sensisha*, p. 203.
- 92 Wakaichi, *Saigo no sensisha*, p. 156.
- 93 *Asahi shimbun*, 16 March 1974.
- 94 *Shūkan sankei*, 29 March 1974, p. 15.
- 95 *Asahi shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 96 *Asahi shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 97 Wakaichi, *Saigo no sensisha*, pp. 7–18.
- 98 Kozuka Kinshichi tsuitō iinkai, *Koe wa todoite ita no ni: tsuitō Rubangu-tō no Kozuka Kinshichi*, Hachiōji: Hachiōji shiyakusho shuppan, 1973.
- 99 The news of Onoda's return also provoked some interest in Europe. Gérard Chenu and Bernard Cendron, *Onoda, 30 ans seul en guerre*, Paris: Arthaud, 1974; Jean-Marc Pottiez, *Les Vainqueurs de la défaite*, Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1975.
- 100 *Asahi shimbun*, 8 April 1975.
- 101 *Asahi shimbun*, 12 November 1974.
- 102 *Japan Times International*, 30 October 1974.

8 Nakamura Teruo

- 1 *Sandee mainichi*, 19 January 1975, p. 21.
- 2 Kōseishō engo kyoku, *Engo gojūnen shi*, Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997, p. 265; see also *Sandee mainichi*, 19 January 1975.
- 3 *Sandee mainichi*, 19 January 1975, p. 21.
- 4 *Sandee mainichi*, 19 January 1975, p. 21.
- 5 Interview with leader of commando unit, Kawashima Takekami, *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, p. 34.
- 6 This is compiled from a number of sources, but see, for example, the *Shūkan asahi*, 17 January 1975, p. 22; *Shūkan bunshun*, 29 January 1975, p. 33; *Shūkan posuto*, 17 January 1975, p. 22.
- 7 See, for example, 'Taiwan shusshin no Nakamura Teruo?' *Yomiuri shimbun*, 27 December 1975.
- 8 Walter LaFeber, *The Clash: U.S.–Japanese Relations throughout History*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1997, pp. 356–357; Fukui Haruhiro, 'Tanaka Goes to Peking: A Case Study in Foreign Policy Making', in T. J. Pempel (ed.), *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977, pp. 60–102.
- 9 Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, 'The Nanking 100-Man Killing Contest Debate: War Guilt Amid Fabricated Illusions, 1971–1975', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 26, no. 2 (2000), pp. 307–340.
- 10 Honda's work has recently been made available in English. Honda Katsuichi, *The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame* (edited by Frank Gibney and translated by Karen Sandness), Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.
- 11 *Asahi shimbun*, 31 December 1975.
- 12 *Shūkan posuto*, 17 January 1975, p. 23.
- 13 See, for example, *Japan Times*, 9 January 1975.
- 14 The Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines addressed the Working Group on Indigenous Populations of the United Nations on this issue, in 1993. <http://free.freespeech.org/taiwanfns/tfn/UNReport.htm> (19 June 2001).
- 15 See, for example, *Sandee mainichi*, 19 January 1975, p. 25; *Shūkan bunshun*, 22 January 1975, p. 29.
- 16 See, for example, *Yomiuri shimbun*, 27–28 December 1974; *Asahi shimbun*, 27–28 December 1974; *Mainichi shimbun*, 27–28 December 1974.
- 17 See, for example, Chō Yohirō, *Kaeranakatta Nihonhei*, Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1994.
- 18 *Asahi shimbun*, 30 December 1974.

- 19 Transcripts of interviews with Nakamura in *Asahi shimbun*, 30 December 1974; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 30 December 1974; *Mainichi shimbun*, 30 December 1974.
- 20 See, for example, *Yomiuri shimbun*, 1 January 1975; *Asahi shimbun*, 31 December 1974, 1 January 1975.
- 21 'Nakamura-san Nihonjin toshite mukaete! Onoda-san to onaji da', *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 27 December 1974.
- 22 *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 4 January 1974.
- 23 *Asahi shimbun*, 8 January 1975.
- 24 *Shūkan posuto*, 17 January 1975, p. 23; see also *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, pp. 39–40.
- 25 Kosaku Yoshino, 'The Discourse on Blood and Racial Identity in Contemporary Japan', in Frank Dikötter (ed.), *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, London: Hurst and Company, 1997, pp. 199–211.
- 26 *Shūkan posuto*, 17 January 1975, p. 23.
- 27 This issue continues to provoke debate. Taiwanese veterans regularly put their case to the Japanese government, which regularly finds a reason not to accede to their demands. See, for example, Gavan McCormack, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996, pp. 261–262; see also *Taipei Times*, 2 March 2000, 10 August 2000.
- 28 *Asahi shimbun*, 31 December 1974; see also *Mainichi shimbun*, 31 December 1974; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 31 December 1974.
- 29 *Asahi shimbun*, 1 January 1975.
- 30 *Asahi shimbun*, 4 January 1975.
- 31 *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 4 January 1975; *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 4 January 1975.
- 32 *Asahi shimbun*, 6 January 1975; *Yomiuri shimbun*, 6 January 1975.
- 33 *Asahi shimbun*, 7 January 1975.
- 34 See, for example, *Shūkan gendai*, 30 January 1975, p. 34; *Asahi shimbun*, 30 December 1974, 31 December 1974.
- 35 See, for example, *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, pp. 41–42; *Sandee mainichi*, 19 January 1975, pp. 24–25.
- 36 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, p. 42.
- 37 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, p. 42; see also *Shūkan asahi*, 17 January 1975, p. 21.
- 38 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, p. 37.
- 39 See also, for example, *Yomiuri shimbun*, evening edition, 27 December 1974; *Sandee mainichi*, 19 January 1975, p. 25; *Asahi shimbun*, 30 December 1974.
- 40 *Asahi shimbun*, 17 March 1975.
- 41 Taiwanjin moto Nihonhei no hoshō o kangaeru kai, *Taiwanjin moto Nihonhei senshi-shō hoshō mondai shiryō shūgō satsu: Taiwan – hoshō – tsūkon*, Tokyo: Taiwanjin moto Nihonhei no hoshō o kangaeru kai, 1993.
- 42 *Taipei Times*, 10 August 2000.
- 43 Katō Yōko, *Chōheisei to kindai Nihon, 1868–1945*, Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1996, pp. 254–255.
- 44 Yoshida Yutaka, *Chōheisei, sono rekishi to nerai*, Tokyo: Gakushū bunkan, 1981, pp. 138–139.
- 45 Katō, *Chōheisei*, p. 254.
- 46 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, pp. 38–39.
- 47 *Asahi shimbun*, 30 December 1974.
- 48 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, pp. 48–49.
- 49 *Shūkan bunshun*, 29 January 1975, p. 31.
- 50 *Shūkan bunshun*, 29 January 1975, p. 31.
- 51 *Sandee mainichi*, 19 January 1975, p. 26.

- 52 *Shūkan bunshun*, 29 January 1975, p. 34.
- 53 *Asahi shimbun*, 31 December 1974.
- 54 See, for example, *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, p. 40.
- 55 *Shūkan bunshun*, 29 January 1975, p. 34.
- 56 See, for example, *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, p. 36.
- 57 *Japan Times*, 9 January 1975.
- 58 *Shūkan bunshun*, 22 January 1975, p. 26.
- 59 *Shūkan bunshun*, 22 January 1975, p. 27.
- 60 Chen Yingzhen, 'Imperial Army Betrayed', in T. Fujitani, Geoffrey White and Lisa Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, Durham: Duke University, 2001, pp. 191–192; see also Jackie Chen, 'Voices from a Buried History: The Takasago Volunteers', <http://www.sinorama.com.tw/en/1999/199903/803078e1.html> (16 July 2001).
- 61 *Shūkan bunshun*, 22 January 1975, p. 27.
- 62 *Shūkan bunshun*, 22 January 1975, p. 27.
- 63 *Shūkan bunshun*, 22 January 1975, p. 29.
- 64 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, p. 38; *Sandee mainichi*, 19 January 1975, p. 26; *Shūkan gendai*, 30 January 1975, p. 35.
- 65 'Motto Nihon o urande kure', *Sandee mainichi*, 19 January 1975, p. 26; see also article by same author in *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, p. 38.
- 66 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, p. 39.
- 67 *Shūkan yomiuri*, 25 January 1975, p. 40.
- 68 *Shūkan gendai*, 23 January 1975, p. 21.
- 69 *Shūkan asahi*, 17 January 1975, p. 22.
- 70 See, for example, *Yomiuri shimbun*, 28 December 1974; *Asahi shimbun*, evening edition, 28 December 1974; *Shūkan asahi*, 17 January 1975, pp. 20–22.
- 71 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 9 January 1975.
- 72 *Shūkan asahi*, 17 January 1975, p. 22.
- 73 *Asahi shimbun*, 11 March 1974.
- 74 See, for example, *Shūkan bunshun*, 22 January 1975; *Shūkan gendai*, 23 January 1975; *Shūkan bunshun*, 29 January 1975; *Josei seben*, 29 January 1975; *Shūkan posuto*, 31 January 1975.
- 75 *Shūkan gendai*, 23 January 1975, p. 19; see also *Shūkan bunshun*, 29 January 1975, p. 35.
- 76 *Asahi shimbun*, 8 March 1975.
- 77 Personal correspondence with Hashiba Hayao (a lawyer involved in the lawsuits to compensate veterans), 20 February 2001.
- 78 *Asahi shimbun*, 30 December 1974.
- 79 See, for example, various contributions to *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique* (Special issue: 'The Comfort Women: Colonialism, War, and Sex'), vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997).
- 80 *Yomiuri shimbun*, 27 December 1974.
- 81 See, for example, the caption ('the last soldier returns') accompanying a photo of Onoda in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, illustration 19.

Conclusion

- 1 *Northern Exposure*, 'The Quest', written by Andrew Scheider and Dianne Frolov, directed by Michael Vittes (series 6, episode 15, 1995).
- 2 See also, for example, Richard Wiley, *Soldiers in Hiding*, London: Picador, 1987.
- 3 Beatrice Trefalt, 'War, Commemoration and National Identity in Japan, 1868–1975', in Sandra Wilson (ed.), *Nation and Nationalism in Japan*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, pp. 115–134.

- 4 Hidaka Rokurō, *The Price of Affluence: Dilemmas of Contemporary Japan*, Melbourne: Penguin Books, 1980, pp. 35–47.
- 5 Carol Gluck, ‘The Idea of Shōwa’, in Carol Gluck and Stephen Graubard (eds), *Shōwa: The Japan of Hirohito*, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1992, p. 21.
- 6 Yuki Tanaka, *Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996, p. 135.
- 7 Ian Buruma, *The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*, New York: Vintage, 1995, p. 113.
- 8 Yoshinaga Haruko, *Sasurai no ‘mifukuin’*, Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1987; Shimizu Mitsuo, *Saigo no nōgun heishi*, Tokyo: Hyōronsha, 1985.
- 9 Wakaichi Kōji, *Saigo no senshisha: rikugun ittōhei Kozuka Kinshichi*, Tokyo: Kawade shōbōshinsha, 1986, p. 7.
- 10 For example, Watashitachi no rekishi o tsuzuru kai, *Fujin zasshi kara mita 1930 nendai*, Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 1987.
- 11 *Shūkan asahi*, 18 February 1972, p. 21; *Shūkan gendai*, 17 February 1972, p. 29.
- 12 See for example, ‘Japan: Compensation for Wartime Laborer Appealed’, http://www.ahrchk.net/news/mainfile.php/ahrnews_200107/941/ (10 January 2003), ‘Japan Ordered to Pay Family of Forced Laborer Liu Lianren’, english.peopledaily.com.cn/english/200107/13/eng20010713_74860.html (10 January 2003).
- 13 Bruce Franklin, *M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America: How and Why Belief in Live POWS has Possessed a Nation*, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1993, see in particular reference to 1993 *Wall Street Journal* survey, p. 197.
- 14 *Rambo: First Blood, part II*, directed by George P. Cosmatos, 1985.
- 15 Franklin, *M.I.A.*, pp. 57–60, 122–126.
- 16 Margaret Reeson, *A Very Long War: the Families who Waited*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2000.
- 17 Eric T. Dean, ‘The Myth of the Troubled and Scorned Vietnam Veteran’, in Walter L. Hixson (ed.), *The United States and the Vietnam War: Significant Scholarly Articles*, New York: Garland Publishing, 2000, pp. 211–227.
- 18 Stephen Garton, *The Cost of War: Australians Return*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 230–231.
- 19 Gaines M. Foster, ‘Coming to Terms with Defeat: Post-Vietnam America and the Post-Civil War South’, in Hixson (ed.), *The United States and the Vietnam War*, p. 255.
- 20 Garton, *The Cost of War*, see for example pp. 87, 138.
- 21 Michael McKernan, *This War Never Ends: The Pain of Separation and Return*, Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2001.

Appendix

- 1 Table translated and adapted from Kōseishō engo kyoku, *Engo gojūnen shi*, Tokyo, Gyōsei, 1997, pp. 729–730.

Bibliography

Newspapers

- Asahi shimbun*, 1950–1975
Australian, 2000–2001
Chiba shimbun, 1951
Chūnichi shimbun, 1972
Fukushima minpō, 1951
Iwate nichijō, 1955
Japan Times and Advertiser, 1942
Japan Times, 1972–1975
Kii minpō, 1956
Mainichi shimbun, 1950–1975
Manila Times, 1952
Nagasaki nichi nichi shimbun, 1950
Niigata nippō, 1951–1952
Niigata shimbun, 1960
Nikkō nichi nichi shimbun, 1955
Nippon Times, 1956
Okinawa Times, 1951
San'yō shimbun, 1955
Sankei shimbun, 1972–1975
Sydney Sun Herald, 1955
Taipei Times, 1974–1975
Tōoku nichijō, 1951
Wakayama kainan shimbun, 1974
Yamagata shimbun, 1950, 1956
Yamanashi nichi nichi shimbun, 1960
Yamato taimuzu, 1956
Yomiuri shimbun, 1950–1975

Weekly and monthly magazines

- Asahi jānaru*, 1972–1975
Bungei shunjū, 1950–1975
Chūō kōron, 1950–1975

Fujo shimbun, 1932
Gekkan shakaitō, 1972
Gendai no manako, 1972
Jiyū, 1974
Josei seben, 1972–1975
Kaizō, 1951
Sandee mainichi, 1960–1975
Shūkan akaboshi, 1974
Shūkan asahi, 1954–1975
Shūkan bunshun, 1972–1975
Shūkan gendai, 1972–1975
Shūkan heibon, 1972–1975
Shūkan josei jishin, 1972–1975
Shūkan posuto, 1972–1975
Shūkan sankei, 1956–1975
Shūkan shincho, 1972–1975
Shūkan yomiuri, 1960–1975

Government records

Allied Translator and Interpreter Service Records, Australian War Memorial, 1944.
Fukushimaken hikiagesha rengōkai, *Koke no musu to mo: hikiageshatachi no kiroku*, Kōriyama: Kōriyama shiyakusho, 1979.
Kōseishō engo kyoku, *Engo gojūnen shi*, Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997.
Kōseishō engo kyoku, *Hikiage to engo 30-nen no ayumi*, Tokyo: Kōseishō, 1977.
Maizurushi, *Kaigai hikiage 40-nen kinenshi: hikiagekō Maizuru no kiroku*, Maizuru: Maizurushi, 1988.
Rikugun fukuin jian jōhō (1945), Library of the Self-Defence Forces, Tokyo
Shūgiin jimu kyoku (ed.), *Kokkai shūgiin iinkai kiroku*, Tokyo: Nozokawa shoten, 1993.
Taiwan Headlines (<http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw>)

Unpublished theses and papers

Higuchi, Wakako, *Remembering the War Years on Guam: A Japanese Perspective*, report presented to the War in the Pacific National Historical Park, National Park Service, Department of the Interior, United States, April 26, 2001.
Iwamoto, Hiromitsu, ‘Japanese Images of the Air War’, Unpublished paper presented at Remembering the War in New Guinea Symposium, Canberra, October 2000.
Kimura Takuji, ‘Shūsen chokugo no guntai to shakai: “kyūgunjin gurūpu” no keisei o megutte’, Unpublished Master’s thesis, Hitotsubashi University, 1997.
Waswo, Ann, ‘The Pacific War in the Public Memory of America’, Unpublished paper, 1995.

Books and articles

Allinson, Gary D., *Japan’s Postwar History*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997.

- Alperowitz, Gar, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965.
- Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, revised edition, 1991.
- Angst, Linda Hisako, 'The Sacrifice of a Schoolgirl: the 1995 Rape Case, Discourses of Power, and Women's Lives in Okinawa', *Critical Asian Studies*, vol. 33, no. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 243–266.
- Aoki, Michiko and Margaret Dardess (eds), *As the Japanese See it: Past and Present*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1981.
- Arai, Shin'ichi, *Sensōsekinin ron: gendaishi kara no toi*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995.
- Asada, Sadao, 'The Mushroom Cloud and National Psyches: Japanese and American Perceptions of the A-Bomb', in Edward R. Beauchamp (ed.), *History of Contemporary Japan, 1945–1988*, New York: Garland Publishing, 1998, pp. 133–154.
- Asada, Teruhiko, *The Night of a Thousand Suicides: the Japanese Outbreak at Cowra* (translated by Ray Cowan), Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1970.
- Asahi shimbun, *28 Years in the Guam Jungle: Sergeant Yokoi Home from World War II*, Tokyo: Japan Publications Inc., 1972.
- *Guamu ni ikita njūhachinen*, Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1972.
- Awaya Kentarō, 'Fasshoka to minshū ishiki', in Eguchi Keiichi (ed.), *Taikei. Nihon gendaishi*, vol. 1: *Nihon fashizumu no keisei*, Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1978, pp. 252–302.
- (ed.), *Shiryō Nihon gendaishi*, 8 vols, Tokyo: Otsuki shoten, 1980.
- and Nakashima Takamine (eds), *Haisenji zenkoku jian jōhō*, Tokyo: Nihon tosho sentaa, 1994.
- Babb, James, *Tanaka: the Making of Post-war Japan*, Harlow, Longman, 2000.
- Beasley, W.G., *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change since 1850*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, third edition, 2000.
- Beauchamp, Edward R. (ed.), *History of Contemporary Japan, 1945–1988*, New York: Garland Publishing, 1998.
- Befu, Harumi and Manabe Kazufumi, 'Empirical Status of Nihonjinron: how Real is the Myth?', in Adriana Boscaro *et al.* (eds), *Rethinking Japan: Volume II – Social Sciences, Ideology and Thought*, Sandgate, Folkestone: Japan Library Ltd, 1990, pp. 124–133.
- Benedict, Ruth, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, 1946.
- Bix, Herbert P., *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, New York: HarperCollins, 2000.
- Boltho, Andrea, *Japan: An Economic Survey, 1953–1973*, London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Boscaro, Adriana, *et al.* (eds), *Rethinking Japan: Volume II – Social Sciences, Ideology and Thought*, Sandgate, Folkestone: Japan Library Ltd, 1990.
- Bosworth, Richard, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War, 1945–1990*, London: Routledge, 1993.
- Bourguet, Marie-Noelle, Lucette Valensi and Nathan Wachtel (eds), *Between Memory and History*, Chur: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1990.
- Buruma, Ian, *Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan*, New York: Vintage, 1995.

- Butler, Thomas (ed.), *Memory: History, Culture, and the Mind*, New York: Blackwell, 1989.
- Campbell, John Creighton, 'Compensation for Repatriates: a Case Study of Interest-Group Politics and Party-Government Negotiations in Japan', in T. J. Pempel (ed.), *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977, pp. 103–142.
- Carr-Gregg, Charlotte, *Japanese Prisoners of War in Revolt: the Outbreaks at Featherston and Cowra during WWII*, Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1978.
- Cary, Otis (ed.), *From a Ruined Empire: Letters – Japan, China, Korea, 1945–46*, Tokyo: Tuttle, 1984, previously published as *War-wasted Asia: Letters 1945–1946*, Tokyo: Kodansha, 1975.
- Chang, Iris, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II*, Melbourne: Penguin, 1998.
- Chen, Jackie, 'Voices from a Buried History: The Takasago Volunteers', <http://www.sinorama.com.tw/en/1999/199903/803078e1.html> (16 July 2001).
- Chen, Yingzhen, 'Imperial Army Betrayed', in T. Fujitani, Geoffrey White and Lisa Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, Durham: Duke University, 2001, pp. 181–198.
- Chenu, Gérard and Bernard Cendron, *Onoda, 30 ans seul en guerre*, Paris: Arthaud, 1974.
- Chō Yohirō, *Kaeranakatta Nihonhei*, Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1994.
- Choi, Chungmoo, 'The Politics of War Memories toward Healing' in T. Fujitani, Geoffrey White and Lisa Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, pp. 395–409.
- Chung, Chin Sung, 'The Origin and Development of the Military Sexual Slavery Problem in Imperial Japan', *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 219–254.
- Connerton, Paul, *How Societies Remember*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Cook, Haruko Taya, 'The Many Lives of Living Soldiers: Ishikawa Tatsuzō and Japan's War in Asia', in Marlene J. Mayo and J. Thomas Rimer (eds), *War, Occupation, and Creativity: Japan and East Asia, 1920–1960*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001, pp. 149–175.
- and Theodore F. Cook (eds), *Japan at War: An Oral History*, New York: New Press, 1992.
- Dale, Peter, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, London: Routledge, 1988.
- Damousi, Joy, *The Labour of Loss: Mourning, Memory and Wartime Bereavement in Australia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Darian-Smith, Kate and Paula Hamilton (eds), *Memory and History in Twentieth Century Australia*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Dean, Eric T. 'The Myth of the Troubled and Scorned Vietnam Veteran', in Walter L. Hixson, *The United States and the Vietnam War: Significant Scholarly Articles*, New York: Garland Publishing, 2000, pp. 211–227.
- Dikötter, Frank (ed.), *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, London: Hurst and Company, 1997.
- Dower, John W., *War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1986.
- *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1999.

- Duus, Peter, *The Abacus and the Sword: the Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895–1910*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- Modern Japan, Boston: Houghton and Mifflin, second edition, 1998.
- Eguchi Keiichi, *Nihon teikokushugiron: manshū jihen zengo*, Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1975.
- (ed.), *Taikei. Nihon gendaishi*, vol. 1: *Nihon fashizumu no keisei*, Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1978.
- Evans, Martin and Karen Lunn (eds), *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Berg, 1998.
- Feis, Herbert, *The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Fenrich, Lane, ‘The Enola Gay and the Politics of Representation’, *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 27, no. 2 (1995), pp. 26–36.
- Fentress, James, *Social Memory*, Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992.
- Field, Norma, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor: Japan at Century's End*, New York: Vintage, 1993.
- ‘War and Apology: Japan, Asia, the Fiftieth, and After’, *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 1–50.
- Figal, Gerald, ‘Historical Sense and Commemorative Sensibility at Okinawa’s Cornerstone of Peace’, in *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Winter 1997), pp. 747–778.
- Finn, Richard B., *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
- Foster, Gaines M., ‘Coming to Terms with Defeat: Post-Vietnam America and the Post-Civil War South’, in Walter L. Hixson, *The United States and the Vietnam War: Significant Scholarly Articles*, New York: Garland Publishing, 2000, pp. 251–269.
- Franklin, Bruce, *M.I.A. or Mythmaking in America: How and Why Belief in Live POWS Has Possessed a Nation*, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1993.
- Fujitani, T., Geoffrey White and Lisa Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001.
- Fujiwara Akira, Imai Seiichi and Tōyama Shigeki, *Shōwa shi*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1955.
- Fukami Teiji and Wilbur Cross, *The Lost Men of Anatahan*, New York: Paperback Library, 1969.
- Fukiura Tadayoshi, *Kikikaki: Nihonjin horyū*, Tokyo: Toshō shuppan, 1987.
- Fukui, Haruhiro, ‘Tanaka goes to Peking: A Case Study in Foreign Policy Making’, in T. J. Pempel (ed.), *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977, pp. 60–102.
- Fussell, Paul, *The Great War and Modern Memory*, London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Garon, Sheldon, ‘Women’s Groups and the Japanese State: Contending Approaches to Political Integration, 1890–1945’, *Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 19, no. 1 (1993), pp. 5–41.
- *Molding Japanese Minds: the State in Everyday Life*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Gayn, Mark, *Japan Diary*, Tokyo: Tuttle, 1981.
- Gibney, Frank (ed.), *Sensō: the Japanese Remember the Pacific War: Letters to the Editor of the Asahi Shimbun*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1995.
- Gillis, John R. (ed.), *Commemorations: the Politics of National Identity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

- Glasgow University Media Group, *Getting the Message: News, Truth, Power*, London: Routledge, 1993.
- Gluck, Carol, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- 'The Past in the Present', in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 64–95.
- 'The Idea of Shōwa', in Carol Gluck and Stephen Graubard (eds), *Shōwa: the Japan of Hirohito*, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1992, pp. 1–26.
- and Stephen Graubard (eds), *Shōwa: the Japan of Hirohito*, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1992.
- Gomikawa Jumpei, *Ningen no jōken*, vols 1–6, Tokyo: San'ichi shinsha, 1956–1958.
- Gordon, Andrew (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Gordon, Harry, *Die like the Carp! The Story of the Greatest Prison Ever ...*, Stanmore: Cassell Australia, 1978.
- Goscha, Christopher, 'Belated Allies: The Technical Contributions of Japanese Deserters to the Viet Minh (1945–1950)', in Marilyn Young and Robert Buzzanco (eds), *Blackwell Companion to the Vietnam War*, London: Blackwell, 2002.
- Hagomoro Society of Kamikaze Divine Thunderbolt Corps Survivors, *The Cherry-Blossom Squadrons: Born to Die*, Los Angeles: Ohara Publications, 1973.
- Hamilton, Paula, 'The Knife Edge: Debates about Memory and History', in Kate Darian-Smith and Paula Hamilton (eds), *Memory and History in Twentieth-Century Australia*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 9–32.
- Hammond, Ellen, 'Politics of the War and Public History: Japan's Own Museum Controversy', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 27, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 56–59.
- Hane, Mikiso, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.
- *Eastern Phoenix: Japan Since 1945*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.
- Harootunian, Harry, 'Memory, Mourning and National Morality: Yasukuni Shrine and the Reunion of State and Religion in Postwar Japan', in Peter Van Der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 144–160.
- Harries, Meirion and Susie Harries, *Sheathing the Sword: the Demilitarisation of Japan*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987.
- *Soldiers of the Sun: the Rise and Fall of the Japanese Empire*, London: Heinemann, 1991.
- Hasegawa Shin, *Nihon horyo shi*, 2 vols, Tokyo: Jiji tsūshinsha, 1962.
- Hashimoto, Akiko, 'Japanese and German Projects of Moral Recovery: Toward a New Understanding of War Memories in Defeated Nations', *Occasional Papers in Japanese Studies*, Harvard University, Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, March 1999.
- Havens, Thomas R. H., *Valley of Darkness: the Japanese People and World War II*, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978.
- Hein, Laura, 'Growth versus Success: Japan's Economic Policy in Historical Perspective', in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 99–122.
- 'Introduction: The Bomb as Public History and Transnational Memory', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 27, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 3–15.
- and Mark Selden (eds), *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany and the United States*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000.

- (guest editor) ‘Introduction: The Territory of Identity and Remembrance in Okinawa’, *Critical Asian Studies*, vol. 22, no. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 209–210.
- Henry, Jules, ‘Initial Reactions to the Americans’, *Journal of Social Issues*, vol. 2, no. 3 (August 1946), pp. 19–25.
- Hicks, George, *The Comfort Women*, Tokyo: Yenbooks, 1995.
- Hidaka, Rokurō, *The Price of Affluence: Dilemmas of Contemporary Japan*, Melbourne: Penguin Books, 1980.
- Hijikata Yoshio, *Yasukuni jinja: kokka Shintō wa yomigaeru ka*, Tokyo: Hyōronsha, 1985.
- Hogan, Michael (ed.), *Hiroshima in Memory and History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Honda, Katsuichi, *The Nanking Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National Shame* (edited by Frank Gibney and translated by Karen Sandness), New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999.
- Horioka, Charles Yuji, ‘Consuming and Saving’, in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 259–292.
- Horwitz, Solis, ‘The Tokyo Trial’, *International Conciliation*, no. 465 (November 1950), pp. 473–584.
- Hsu, Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, *History of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945)*, Taipei: Chung Wu Publishing, 1971.
- Hynes, Samuel, *A War Imagined: The First World War and English Culture*, New York: Atheneum, 1991.
- Ichikawa Itsuko, *Mumei senbotsushatachi no koe: Chidorigafuchi to Shōwa*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1989.
- Ienaga, Saburō, *Japan’s Last War: World War II and the Japanese, 1931–1945*, Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1979.
- Igarashi, Yoshikuni *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945–1970*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- ‘Yokoi Shōichi: When a Soldier Finally Returns Home’, in Anne Walthall, *The Human Tradition in Modern Japan*, Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2002, pp. 197–213.
- Iida Susumu, *Nyū-Ginia sen chinkonfū owarinaki sengo: umoreta kiroku e no tabi*, Tokyo: Ōshisha, 1987.
- Ikeda Shin, *Gensō no eiyū*, Tokyo: Toshō shuppansha, 1976.
- Inglis, Ken, *Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape*, Melbourne: Miegunyah Press, 1998.
- ‘Monuments and Ceremonies as Evidence for Historians’, in Craig Wilcox (ed.), *Observing Australia*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1999, pp. 115–133.
- Inoue Kiyoshi and Etō Shinkichi (eds), *Nitchū sensō to Nitchū kankei*, Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1988.
- Irokawa, Daikichi, *The Age of Hirohito: In Search of Modern Japan* (translated by Mikiso Hane and John K. Urda), New York: Free Press, 1995.
- Ishizuki Shizue, ‘1930 nendai no musan fujin undō’, in Joseishi sōgō kenkyūkai (ed.), *Nihon joseishi 5: gendai*, Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1982, pp. 193–226.
- Itō Kentarō, *Rengō kantai no saigo*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū shinsha, 1956.
- Itō Masashi, *Guamutō: 16-nen no kiroku*, Tokyo: Niken shobō, 1960.
- *The Emperor’s Last Soldiers* (translated by Roger Clifton), London: Souvenir Press, 1967.
- Itō Tadahiko, *Nihonjin sono sei to shi*, Tokyo: Nichigei shuppan, 1972.

- Itō Takashi and Momose Takashi (eds), *Jiten: Shōwa senzenki no Nihon: seido to jittai*, Tokyo: Furukawa kōbunkan, 1990.
- Ivy, Marilyn, ‘Formations of Mass Culture’, in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 239–258.
- *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- Iwabuchi, Kōichi, ‘Complicit Exoticism: Japan and its Others’, *Continuum*, vol. 8, no. 2 (1994), pp. 49–82.
- Jansen, Marius B., *Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894–1972*, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975.
- Japanese Society for Textbook Reform, *The Restoration of a National History*, Tokyo: Japanese Society for Textbook Reform, 1997.
- Johnson, Richard, Gregor McLennan, Bill Schwartz and David Sutten (eds), *Making Histories: Studies in History Writing and Politics*, London: Hutchinson, 1982.
- Johnstone, Charlie, *To Sandakan: the Diaries of Charlie Johnstone, Prisoner of War 1942–45* (edited by Christopher Dawson), Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995.
- Jones, Don, *Oba: the Last Samurai, Saipan, 1944–45*, Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1986.
- Joseishi sōgō kenkyūkai (ed.), *Nihon joseishi 5: gendai*, Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1982.
- Kahn, E. J., *The Stragglers*, New York: Random House, 1962.
- *The Stragglers*, New York: Ace Books, revised edition, 1972.
- Kamiko Sayoshi, *Ware Reite ni shinazu*, Tokyo: Hayakawa bunkō, 1988.
- Kano Mikiyo, *Onnatachi no ‘jūgo’*, Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1987.
- Katō Norihiro, *Haisengoron*, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1997.
- Katō, Shūichi, *A Sheep’s Song: a Writer’s Reminiscences of Japan and the World* (translated and annotated by Chia-ning Chang), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
- Katō Yōko, *Chōheisei to kindai Nihon, 1868–1945*, Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1996.
- Keene, Donald, ‘The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and its Cultural Effects in Japan’, in Donald H. Shively (ed.), *Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 121–180.
- Kelly, William H., ‘Finding a Place in Metropolitan Japan: Ideologies, Institutions, and Everyday Life’, in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 189–238.
- Kersten, Rikki, *Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the Search for Autonomy*, London: Routledge, 1996.
- Kim, Hyun Sook, ‘History and Memory: The “Comfort Women” Controversy’, *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 73–106.
- Kimura Hiroshi, ‘Jikokujima Anatahan’, *Kaisō*, vol. 32, no. 9 (August 1951), pp. 8–9.
- King, Alex, *Memorials of the Great War in Britain: Symbolism and Politics of Remembrance*, Oxford: Berg, 1998.
- Kinoshita Michio, *Sokkin nisshi*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1990.
- Kirby, S. Woodburn, *The War Against Japan*, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1969.
- Kisaka Jun’ichirō, ‘Jūgonen sensō kōshō ni tsuite’, in Inoue Kiyoshi and Etō Shinkichi (eds), *Nitchū sensō to Nitchū kansei*, Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1988, pp. 77–92.
- Kitazawa, Masakuni, ‘The Lockheed Incident and Japanese Culture’, *Japan Interpreter*, vol. 11, no. 2 (Autumn 1976), pp. 219–223.
- Kobayashi Yoshinori, *Sensōron*, Tokyo: Gentōsha, 1997.

- Kodama, Yoshio, *I was Defeated*, London: Robert Booth and Taro Fukuda, 1951.
- Kohno, Masaru, *Japan's Postwar Party Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Kojima Noboru, *Shikikan*, 2 vols, Tokyo: Bungei bunkō, 1974.
- *Tennō to sensō sekinin*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1988.
- Kokusaijin kenkyūkai (ed.), *Ianfu – kyōsei renkō: sekinin to tsugunai: Nihon no sengo hoshō e no kokusaihō to Kokuren no taiō*, Tokyo: Niizumisha, 1993.
- Komatsu, Sakyō, *Nihon chinbotsu*, Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1973.
- Koyanagi Tsuguichi and Ishikawa Yasumasa, *Jūgun kameraman no sensō*, Tokyo: Shinchō shuppan, 1993.
- Kozuka Kinshichi tsuitō iinkai, *Koe wa todoite ita no ni: tsuitō Rubangu-tō no Kozuka Kinshichi*, Hachiōji: Hachiōji shiyakusho shuppan, 1973.
- Kusayanagi Daizō, “‘Tennō no shitateya’ Yokoi Shōichi”, *Bungei shunjū*, vol. 50, no. 4 (April 1972), pp. 242–254.
- Kyōtofu rusu kazoku dōmei, *Kyotofu rusu kazoku dōmei hikiage undō no kiroku*, Kyōto: Kyōtofu rusu kazoku dōmei, 1962.
- Lafeber, Walter, *The Clash: U.S.–Japanese Relations throughout History*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.
- Large, Stephen S., *Emperor Hirohito and Shōwa Japan: A Political Biography*, London: Routledge, 1992.
- Lebra, Joyce C. (ed.), *Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents*, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1975.
- Lee Hyoung Cheol, *Gunbu no Shōwashi*, 2 vols, Tokyo: Nihon hōsō shuppan kyōkai, 1987.
- Lehmann, Jean-Pierre, *The Image of Japan: from Feudal Isolation to World Power 1850–1905*, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978.
- Linenthal, Edward T., ‘Between History and Memory: The Enola Gay Controversy at the National Air and Space Museum’, *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 27, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 16–25.
- McCormack, Gavan, *The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996.
- ‘The Japanese Movement to Correct History’, in Laura Hein and Mark Seldon (eds), *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany and the United States*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2000, pp. 53–73.
- and Yoshio Sugimoto (eds), *Democracy in Contemporary Japan*, Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1986.
- and Hank Nelson (eds), *The Burma–Thailand Railway: Memory and History*, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1993.
- McKernan, Michael, *This War Never Ends: The Pain of Separation and Return*, Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2001.
- Maruyama Michirō, *Anatahan no kokuhaku*, Tokyo: Tōwasha, 1952.
- *Anatahan* (translated by Younghill Kang), London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954.
- Matsushita Yoshio, *Nihon gunjishi shizatsuwa*, Tokyo: Tsuchiya shobō, 1969.
- Mayo, Marlene J. and J. Thomas Rimer (eds), *War Occupation and Creativity: Japan and East Asia, 1920–1960*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001.
- Middleton, David and Derek Edwards (eds), *Collective Remembering*, London: Sage Publications, 1990.
- Minagawa Bunzō, *Guamu-tō jūrokunen*, Tokyo: Chōbunsha, 1972.
- Minear, Richard, *Victor's Justice: the Tokyo War Crimes Trial*, Tokyo: Tuttle, 1972.

- (ed.), *Through Japanese Eyes*, New York: Praeger, 1974.
- Mitchell, Richard H., *Censorship in Imperial Japan*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
- *Political Bribery in Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1996.
- Miura Nagamitsu, *Sensō giseisha to Nihon no sensō sekinin*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995.
- Morioka-Todeschini, Maya, *Hiroshima 50 ans: Japon-Amérique, mémoires au nucléaire*, Paris: Autrement, 1995.
- Morisaki Minato, *Isho: kaigun yobi gakusei*, Tokyo: Toshō shuppan, 1971.
- Moriya Hidesuke, *Yasukuni jinja hyakunenshi: jireki nenpō*, Tokyo: Yasukuni jinja, 1987.
- Morris-Suzuki, Tessa, *Shōwa: an Inside History of Hirohito's Japan*, London: Athlone Press, 1984.
- *Re-Inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998.
- 'Unquiet Graves: Katō Norihiro and the Politics of Mourning', *Japanese Studies*, vol. 18, no. 1 (1998), pp. 21–30.
- Mosse, George L., *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Murakami Hyōe, 'Onoda shōjō no gūchi?', *Jiyū*, vol. 16, no. 7 (July 1974), pp. 167–173.
- Nakagawa Hisao, *Fukuin toshite yonjūnen*, Takahama: private publication, 1988.
- Nakamura, Takafusa, *A History of Shōwa Japan, 1926–1989* (translated by Edwin Whemouth), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1998.
- Nakayama Masao, *Ichi gunkoku shugisha no chokugen*, Tokyo: Masu shobo, 1956.
- Namikawa, Eita, 'The Iniquities of History Education in Japan during the Postwar Period', in The Japanese Society for Textbook Reform, *The Restoration of a National History*, pamphlet distributed by the Japanese Society for Textbook Reform, 1997, pp. 12–15.
- Nanmeikai (ed.), *Waga mumei senshitachi: uchi Nanyō Shichitō/Iwojima chōsadan no kiroku*, Tokyo: Kagaku shinkōsha, 1953.
- Nelson, Hank, *Prisoners of War: Australians Under Nippon*, Sydney: Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 1985.
- Nihon senbotsu gakusei shuki henshū iinkai, *Kike wadatsumi no koe*, Tokyo: Tōdai kyōdō kumiai shuppansha, 1949.
- Nishida Yoshiaki, *Shōwa kyōkōka no nōson shakai undō: yōsanchi ni okeru tenkai to ikiketsu*, Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 1978.
- Noble, Harold G., 'Japs Hate their Heroes', *Saturday Evening Post*, 218 (12 October 1949), pp. 18–19, 143–144.
- Nozaki, Yoshiko and Inokuchi Hiromitsu, 'Japanese Education, Nationalism, and Ienaga Saburō's Textbook Lawsuits', in Laura Hein and Mark Selden (eds), *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany and the United States*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2000, pp. 96–126.
- Ōe Shinobu, *Chōheisei*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1981.
- Ogawa Masatsugu, *Kyokugen no naka no ningen: shi noshima Nyū-Ginia*, Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1983.
- Ogawa, Tetsuo, *Terraced Hell: a Japanese Memoir of Defeat and Death in Northern Luzon, Philippines*, Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1972.
- Ōka Shōhei, *Furyoki*, Tokyo: Kuramoto, 1952.
- *Mindoro-jima futatabi*, Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1969.
- 'Rubangu-jima no heishitachi', *Asahi jānaru*, vol. 14, no. 45 (3 November 1972), pp. 91–94.

- *Waga fukuin, waga sengo*, Tokyo: Gendaishi shuppankai, 1978.
- Okubō Riken et al. (eds), *Shiryō ni yoru Nihon no ayumi, kindaihen*, Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1951.
- Olson, Lawrence, *Japan in Postwar Asia*, New York: Praeger, 1970.
- Onoda Bonji, *Kaisō no Rubangu: Hirō o matta 30-nen*, Tokyo: Rōman, 1974.
- Onoda Hirō, ‘Waga rubangu no sanjūnen sensō’, *Bungei shunjū*, vol. 52, no. 7 (June 1974), pp. 228–252.
- *No Surrender: My Thirty-Year War* (translated by Charles S. Terry), Tokyo: Kodansha, 1974; reprinted in 1999 by United States Naval Institute, 1999.
- *Harukami sokoku wo kataru*, Tokyo: Jiji tsūshinsha, 1977.
- *Waga Burajiru jinsei*, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1982.
- *Waga kaisō no Rubantō: jōhō shoko no ososugita kikan*, Tokyo: Asahi shimbunsha, 1988.
- Onoda Tanejirō, *Rubangu no fu: Hirō o sagashitsutsukete 30-nen*, Tokyo: Shio shuppansha, 1974.
- Orr, James, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001.
- Osaragi, Jirō, *Homecoming* (translated by Brewster Horwitz), Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1954.
- Packard, George R., *Protest in Tokyo: the Security Treaty Crisis of 1960*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.
- Park, Won Soon, ‘Japanese Reparations Policies and the “Comfort Women” Question’, *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 107–134.
- Partner, Simon, *Assembled in Japan: Electrical Goods and the Making of the Japanese Consumer*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
- Pempel, T. J. (ed.), *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- Popular Memory Group, ‘Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method’, in Richard Johnson, Gregor McLennan, Bill Schwartz and David Sutten (eds), *Making Histories: Studies in History Writing and Politics*, London: Hutchinson, 1982, pp. 205–252.
- Pottiez, Jean-Marc, *Les Vainqueurs de la défaite*, Paris: Presses de la Cité, 1975.
- Pritchard, John R. and Sonia Magbanua Zaide (eds), *The Tokyo War Crimes Trials*, New York: Garland Publishing, 1981.
- Pyle, Kenneth B., ‘The Technology of Japanese Nationalism: The Local Improvement Movement, 1900–1918’, *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 23, no. 1 (November 1973), pp. 51–65.
- Reeson, Margaret, *A Very Long War: the Families who Waited*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2000.
- Reid, Richard, *Laden, Fevered, Starved: the POWs of Sandakan, North Borneo, 1945*, Canberra: Department of Veterans' Affairs, 1999.
- Rekishi tankentai, 50-nen me no ‘Nihon rikugun’ nyūmon, Tokyo: Bungei bunkō, 1991.
- Rekishigaku kenkyūkai henshū iinkai (ed.), *Sawachi Hisae no shigoto o megutte*, Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1988.
- Rivett, Rohan D., *Behind Bamboo: an Inside Story of the Japanese Prison Camps*, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1946.
- Robertson, James E., ‘Uchinaa Pop: Place and Identity in Contemporary Okinawan Popular Music’, *Critical Asian Studies*, vol. 33, no. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 211–242.
- Ruoff, Jeffrey and Kenneth Ruoff, *The Emperor's Naked Army Marches On: Yukiyukite Shingun*, Trowbridge: Flicks Books, 1998.

- Ruoff, Kenneth, *The People's Emperor: Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945–1995*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Sangyō keizai shimbun, *Rikugun gochō Yokoi Shōichi*, Tokyo: Sankei shimbunsha shuppankyoku, 1972.
- Sankei shimbun, Fuji terebi, *The Last Japanese Soldier: Corporal Yokoi's 28 Incredible Years in the Guam Jungle* (translated by Ruri Corley-Smith), London: Tom Stacey, 1972.
- Scalapino, Robert A. and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- Schaller, Michael, *The American Occupation of Japan: the Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Seizelet, Eric, *Monarchie et démocratie dans le Japon d'après-guerre*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1990.
- Sheldon, Walt, *The Honorable Conquerors: the Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952*, New York: Macmillan, 1965.
- Shillony, Ben-Ami, *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.
- Shimamura Takashi, *Hiroku kaseki no heitai*, Tokyo: Banchō shobō, 1972.
- Shimizu Mitsuō, *Saigo no nōgun heishi*, Tokyo: Hyōronsha, 1985.
- Shively, Donald H. (ed.), *Tradition and Modernization in Japanese Culture*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Sivan, Emmanuel and Jay Winter (eds), *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Smethurst, Richard J., *A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: the Army and the Rural Community*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
- Smith, Kerry, *A Time of Crisis: Japan, the Great Depression, and Rural Revitalization*, Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001.
- ‘The Shōwa Hall: Memorializing Japan’s War at Home’, *The Public Historian*, vol. 24, no. 4 (Fall 2002), pp. 35–64.
- Sodei, Rinjirō, ‘Hiroshima/Nagasaki as History and Politics’, *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 27, no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 37–41.
- Song, Youn-ok, ‘Japanese Colonial Rule and State-Managed Prostitution: Korea’s Licensed Prostitutes’, *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 171–218.
- Soviak, Eugene (ed.), *A Diary of Darkness: The Wartime Diary of Kiyosawa Kiyoshi* (translated by Eugene Soviak and Kamiyama Tamie), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- Spector, Ronald H., *Eagle Against the Sun: the American War with Japan*, London: Penguin Books, 1984.
- Stockwin, J.A.A., *Governing Japan: Divided Politics in a Major Economy*, Oxford: Blackwell, third edition, 1999.
- Sturken, Marita, ‘The Wall, the Screen and the Image: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial’, *Representations*, no. 35 (Spring 1991), pp. 118–142.
- Sugamo isho henshū kai, *Seiki no isho*, Tokyo: Shinkōsha, 1953.
- Suzuki Norio, ‘Onoda shōjō hakken no tabi’, *Bungei shunjū* (special edition), vol. 52, no. 6 (May 1974), pp. 132–172.
- *Daihoro: Onoda shōi hakken no tabi*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1974.
- Suzuki Yūko, *Feminizumu to sensō: fujin undōka no sensō kyōryoku*, Tokyo: Marujusha, 1986.

- Tachibana, Seiitsu, 'The Quest for a Peace Culture: the A-Bomb Survivors' Long Struggle and the New Movement for Redressing Foreign Victims of Japan's War', in Michael Hogan (ed.), *Hiroshima in History and Memory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 168–186.
- Taira, Kōji, 'Dialectics of Economic Growth', in Andrew Gordon (ed.), *Postwar Japan as History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 174–175.
- 'Taiwan Aboriginal Rights', <http://free.freespeech.org/taiwanfns/tfn/UNReport.htm> (19 June 2001).
- Taiwan kyōkaihen, *Taiwan hikiage shi: Shōwa 20-nen shūsen kiroku*, Tokyo: Taiwan kyōkai, 1982.
- Taiwanjin moto Nihon heishi no hoshō mondai o kangaeru kai (ed.), *Taiwanjin moto Nihonheishi senshi kizu hoshō mondai shiryō shūgō satsu: Taiwan hoshō tsūkon*, Tokyo: Taiwanjin moto Nihon heishi no hoshō mondai o kangaeru kai, 1993.
- Takagi Toshirō, *Imphal*, Tokyo: Yūkeisha, 1949.
- Takahashi Hiroshi, *Shōchō tennō*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1987.
- 'Kaisetsu: Shōwa tennō to "sokkin nisshī"', in Kinoshita Michio, *Sokkin nisshī*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1990, pp. 336–339.
- Takahashi Saburō (ed.), *Kyōdō kenkyū: senyūkai*, Tokyo: Tabata shoten, 1983.
- 'Senkimono' o yomu: *sensō taiken to sengo Nihon shakai*, Kyoto: Akademia shuppankai, 1988.
- Takahashi Sen, *Minshū no kawa no sensō sekinin*, Tokyo: Aoki shoten, 1989.
- Takeda, Kiyoko, *The Dual-Image of the Japanese Emperor*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1988.
- Tamanoi, Mariko Asano, 'War Responsibility and Japanese Civilian Victims of Japanese Biological Warfare in China', *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 32, no. 3 (2000), pp. 13–22.
- Tamayama, Kazuo and John Nunneley, *Tales by Japanese Soldiers, of the Burma Campaign 1942–1943*, London: Cassell, 2000.
- Tanaka, Yuki, *Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.
- Terasaki Hidenari and Gwen Terasaki-Miller (eds), *Shōwa tennō dokuhakuroku – goyōgakari nikki*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1991.
- Terkel, Studs (ed.), 'The Good War': *an Oral History of World War Two*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1984.
- Thomson, Alistair, *Anzac Memories: Living with the Legend*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Tipton, Elise K., *The Japanese Police State: the Tokkō in Interwar Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1990.
- Toland, John, *The Rising Sun: the Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945*, New York: Random House, 1970.
- Toyoda Jo, *Onoda moto shōi no haha*, Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1974.
- Treat, John Whittier, 'The Enola Gay on Display: Hiroshima and American Memory', *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique*, vol. 5, no. 7 (Winter 1997), pp. 863–879.
- Trefalt, Beatrice, 'Living Dead: Japanese Prisoners of War in the Southwest Pacific', *New Zealand Journal of East Asian Studies*, vol. 3, no. 2 (1995), pp. 113–125.
- 'A Straggler Returns: Onoda Hirō and Japanese Memories of the War', *War and Society*, vol. 17, no. 2 (October 1999), pp. 111–124.
- 'Waiting Women: the Return of Stragglers and Japanese Constructions of Womanhood in Collective Memories of World War II, 1972–1974', *Intersections*:

- Gender, History and Culture in the Asian Context*, issue 5, May 2001 (<http://wwwsshe.murdoch.edu.au/intersections/issue5/beatrice.html>).
- ‘War, Commemoration and National Identity in Japan, 1868–1975’, in Sandra Wilson (ed.), *Nation and Nationalism in Japan*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, pp. 115–134.
- Tsubouchi Yūzō, *Yasukuni*, Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1999.
- Tsuji Masanobu, *Jūgo tai ichi: Biruma no shitō*, Tokyo: Kantōsha, 1950.
- *Senkō sanzenri*, Tokyo: Kawade shobōsha, 1951.
- Tsurumi, Kazuko, *Social Change and the Individual: Japan before and after Defeat in World War II*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- ‘Japan and Holy War’, *Institute of International Relations Research Papers*, Tokyo: Sophia University, 1993.
- Uchino, Tatsurō, *Japan’s Postwar Economy*, Tokyo: Kōdansha International, 1983.
- Uemae Jun’ichirō, *Taiheiyo no seikansha*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1976.
- Utsumi, Aiko, ‘Korean “Imperial” Soldiers: Remembering Colonialism and Crimes against Allied POWs’, in T. Fujitani, Geoffrey White and Lisa Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, pp. 199–217.
- Utsumi Toshiaki, ‘Shoichi Yokoi (1915–97): A Three-Decade Nightmare of Starvation’ (19 March 2000), <http://vikingphoenix.com/public/rongstad/bio-obit/asahiobit-yokoi.htm> (21 August 2001).
- Van der Veer, Peter and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), *Nation and Religion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
- Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi, ‘The Nanking 100-Man Killing Contest Debate: War Guilt Amidst Fabricated Illusions, 1971–1975’, *Journal of Japanese Studies*, vol. 26, no. 2 (2000), pp. 307–340.
- Wakaichi Kōji, *Saigo no senshisha: rikugun ittōhei Kozuka Kinshichi*, Tokyo: Kawade shobōshinsha, 1986.
- Wakatsuki Yasuo, *Nihon to sensō sekinin: saigo no sensō sedai kara*, 2 vols, Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1995.
- *Sengō hikiage no kiroku*, Tokyo: Jiji tsūshinsha, 1995.
- Walker, Samuel J., ‘The Decision to Use the Bomb: a Historiographical Update’, in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), *Hiroshima in History and Memory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 11–37.
- ‘History, Collective Memory, and the Decision to Use the Bomb’, in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), *Hiroshima in History and Memory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 187–199.
- Wall, Don, *Sandakan under Nippon: the Last March*, Mona Vale, N.S.W.: D. Wall, 1997.
- Walhall, Anne, *The Human Tradition in Modern Japan*, Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2002.
- Ward, Robert E. and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (eds), *Democratizing Japan: the Allied Occupation*, Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1987.
- Warner, W. F., ‘Repatriate Organisations in Japan’, *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 22 (September 1949), pp. 272–276.
- Waswo, Ann, *Modern Japanese Society, 1868–1994*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Watashitachi no rekishi o tsuzuru kai, *Fujin zasshi kara mita 1930 nendai*, Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 1987.
- Weiner, Michael, ‘The Representation of Absence and the Absence of Representation: Korean Victims of the Atomic Bomb’, in Michael Weiner (ed.), *Japan’s Minorities: the Illusion of Homogeneity*, London: Routledge, 1997, pp. 79–107.

- (ed.), *Japan's Minorities: the Illusion of Homogeneity*, London: Routledge, 1997.
- Wells, David and Sandra Wilson (eds), *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904–1905*, London: Macmillan, 1999.
- Wickert, Erwin (ed.), *The Good German of Nanking: the Diaries of John Rabe* (translated by John E. Woods), London: Little, Brown and Company, 1998.
- Wiley, Richard, *Soldiers in Hiding*, London: Picador, 1987.
- Wilson, Sandra, ‘The “New Paradise”: Japanese Emigration to Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s’, *International History Review*, vol. 17, no. 2 (May 1995), pp. 249–314.
- ‘Mobilizing Women in Inter-War Japan: the National Defence Women’s Association and the Manchurian Crisis’, *Gender and History*, vol. 7, no. 2 (August 1995), pp. 295–314.
- ‘The Russo-Japanese War and Japan: Politics, Nationalism and Historical Memory’, in David Wells and Sandra Wilson (eds), *The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904–1905*, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 160–193.
- ‘Rethinking the 1930s and the “15-Year War” in Japan’, *Japanese Studies*, vol. 21, no. 2 (September 2001), pp. 155–164.
- *The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931–1933*, London: Routledge, 2002.
- (ed.), *Nation and Nationalism in Japan*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002.
- Winter, Jay, *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: the Great War in European Cultural History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Woodard, William P., *The Allied Occupation of Japan 1945–1952 and Japanese Religions*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972.
- Wray, Harold G., ‘A Study in Contrasts: Japanese School Textbooks of 1903 and 1941–45’, *Monumenta Nipponica*, vol. 28, no. 1 (1978), pp. 69–86.
- Yamamoto Shichihei, ‘Naze tōkō shinakatta no ka’, *Bungei shunjū*, vol. 50, no. 4 (April 1974), pp. 54–62.
- Yamamoto Shigeichi, *Janguru no seikatsu 12-nen: Mindoro-tō no Nihonhei*, Osaka: Osaka kōbunsha, 1957.
- Yamanouchi, Yasushi, J. Victor Koschmann and Ryuichi Narita, ‘Total War’ and Modernization, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Yang, Daqing, ‘The Malleable and the Contested: the Nanjing Massacre in Postwar China and Japan’, in T. Fujitani, Geoffrey White and Lisa Yoneyama (eds), *Perilous Memories: the Asia-Pacific War(s)*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, pp. 50–86.
- Yang, Hyunah, ‘Revisiting the Issue of Korean “Military Comfort Women”: the Question of Truth and Positionality’, *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1997), pp. 51–72.
- Yasukuni mondai kenkyūkai (ed.), *Han Yasukuni ronshū*, Tokyo: Shinshi heisha, 1987.
- Yokoi Shōichi, *Asu e no michi*, Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1974.
- Yoneyama, Lisa, ‘Critical Warps: Facticity, Transformative Knowledge, and Postnationalist Criticism in the Smithsonian Controversy’, *Positions: East Asia Culture Critique*, vol. 5, no. 3 (Winter 1997), pp. 779–810.
- *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space and the Dialectics of Memory*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
- Yoshida Yutaka, *Chōheisei, sono rekishi to nerai*, Tokyo: Gakushū bunkan, 1981.
- *Shōwa tennō no shūsenshi*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1992.
- *Nihonjin no sensōkan: rekishi no naka no henyō*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995.
- Yoshinaga Haruko, *Sasurai no ‘mifukuin’*, Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1987.

- Yoshino, Kosaku, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: a Sociological Enquiry*, London: Routledge, 1992.
- ‘The Discourse on Blood and Racial Identity in Contemporary Japan’, in Frank Dikötter (ed.), *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, London: Hurst and Company, 1997, pp. 199–211.
- ‘Rethinking Theories of Nationalism: Japan’s Nationalism in a Marketplace Perspective’, in Kosaku Yoshino (ed.), *Consuming Ethnicity and Nationalism: Asian Experiences*, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1999, pp. 8–28.
- Young, Louise, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.
- Yūi, Daizaburō, ‘Between Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima/Nagasaki: a Psychological Vicious Circle’ (translated by Laura Hein), *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol. 27 no. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 42–55.
- *Nichi-Bei sensōkan no sōkoku: masatsu no shinsō shinri*, Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995
- Yūi Masaomi, ‘Gunbu to kokumin tōgō’, in Tōkyō daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyūjo (ed.), *Fasshizumu no kokka to shakai*, vol. 1: *Shōwa kyōkō*, Tokyo: Tōkyō daigaku shuppankai, 1978, pp. 149–195.
- Zelizer, Barbie, *Covering the Body: the Kennedy Assassination, the Media and the Shaping of Collective Memory*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Films and television series

- Anatahan* (a.k.a. *The Saga of Anatahan*), directed by Joseph von Sternberg (1954).
- Northern Exposure*, ‘The Quest’, written by Andrew Scheider and Dianne Frolov, directed by Michael Vittes (series 6, episode 15, 1995).
- Rambo: First Blood, Part II*, directed by George P. Cosmatos (1985).

Index

- A-bomb victims, 7
Adjustment by stragglers to post-war
 Japan, 62, 78–79, 80, 94, 106, 108,
 129
Aikoku Fujinkai, 17
Akatsu Shūichi, 56–57, 72, 152
 testifies before the Special Committee,
 94–95
Aleutians, 25, 179
Allied Translator and Interpreter Service,
 21
Anatahan, 2, 12, 52–55, 80, 85, 94
Anderson, Benedict, 10
ANZAC, 188
Association for Compensation for
 Taiwanese Veterans of the Imperial
 Army, 169, 183
Association for the Warm Welcome of
 Nakamura Teruo, 165, 167, 169, 176
Association of Bereaved Families, 7, 47,
 64, 69, 71, 97
Association of Friends of Taiwan, 165
Association of Taiwanese Residents of
 Japan, 167
Atrocities, 5–6, 40–41, 142, 163
Australia, 5, 26, 28, 113

Benedict, Ruth, 120
Borneo, 5, 26
Bureau of Repatriate Welfare
 and 1952 searches on Lubang, 55–56, 58
 and 1954 searches on Lubang, 74
 and 1959 searches Lubang, 91–92, 96,
 186
 and Anatahan, 53
 and death of Kozuka, 143
 and repatriation of Nakamura, 164–165
 and repatriation of Onoda, 147–148
 and Saipan, 61

and searches for remains, 37–38, 50, 62,
 78–79, 90, 161
condemned, 92, 98, 122, 139–140, 160,
 175–176
dropping leaflets, 90, 95–96, 123
early organisation, 24–25, 28–37
 testifies before Special committee, 94
Burma, 5, 25–26, 28, 34, 61
Bushidō, 20

Censorship, 15–16, 40, 43, 65, 117
Changi Prison, 5
Chiang Kai-shek, 27, 164, 174
Chidorigafuchi, 47, 71
China, 1, 4, 11, 14, 40, 112
 Civil War in, 27, 49
 recognition by Japan of People's
 Republic, 129, 159, 163–165
repatriation from, 25–26, 28–30, 33,
 49–50, 66, 69, 94–95, 189
straggler Liu Lianren from, 185–186
 war with, 19, 188
Civil information and Education Section,
 45
Cold War, 27, 66, 88–89, 182, 185
Colonialism, 7, 14, 166, 173, 183
 legacies of, 175
 positive assessment of, 174
Comfort Women, 5, 7, 177
Commemoration, 6, 24, 43, 45–49, 77
Compensation
 for families of the dead, 50
 for Liu Lianren, 186
 for residents of Lubang, 97, 141, 142
 for stragglers, 122–125, 135
 for Taiwanese conscripts, 167, 169, 177,
 183
Conscription of Taiwanese soldiers, 161,
 166, 170–171

- Consumerism, 112, 123–124
 condemnation of, 128, 130, 142, 174
- Cowra, NSW, 42
- Dai Nihon Aikokutō, 127
- Demobilisation, 1–2, 188
- Demobilisation ministries, 30
- Demobilised soldiers, 21, 38, 24–25
 and crime, 39
 and negative attitudes to, 40–41, 43, 67
- Desertion, 33, 36, 63, 70, 81, 85, 115–116, 152
- Diet (House of Representatives), 19, 89, 93, 124
 and Special Resolution (1959), 99
- Disease and illness among stragglers, 29, 31, 34, 38, 51–52, 54, 56, 78, 81, 83, 115–165
- Education system, 17
 condemned, 115–116, 139, 155
- Eirei, 69, 70–71, 77, 79, 83, 86, 102, 105, 181–182
- Engo kyoku, *see* Bureau of Repatriate Welfare
- Fallen soldiers, *see* war dead
- Field Service Code, 21, 84, 116
- Forced labourers, 7, 25, 185
- General Headquarters, 24, 29–30, 39, 43, 45–47
- Generation gap, 3, 13, 110, 112, 127, 131, 135, 155–156, 182–184
- Gestapo, 16
- Gluck, Carol, 13, 184
- Gomikawa Junpei, 70
- Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 14
- Greater Japan Patriotic Party, 126
- Greater Japan Youth Association, 17
- Guadalcanal, 33
- Guam, 2, 12, 31, 34–36, 43
 stragglers on, 55–56, 61, 62, 66, 90, 103–109, 181
- Guam Veterans Association, 42, 116, 123
- Guerilla
 Chinese, 19
 in the Philippines, 34, 48, 83
 warfare on Lubang, 145
 warfare on Morotai, 162
- Gyokusai (Crushing of Jewels), 22–23, 31
- Hara Kazuo, 15
- Hidaka Rokurō, 184
- Hika Kazuko, 53–55, 135
- Hikiage engo chō, *see* Bureau of Repatriate Welfare
- Hikiage engo in, *see* Bureau of Repatriate Welfare
- Hikiage engo kyoku, *see* Bureau of Repatriate Welfare
- Hikiage shimpō taikai, 79
- Hirohito, *see* Shōwa Emperor
- Hiroshima, 5
- Holland, 112, 126
- Hollandia, 77
- Holy war, 15
- Hukbalahap rebels, 48
- Hunger among stragglers, *see* starvation
- Ie no Hikari, 19
- Ienaga Saburō, 16, 117
- Illness and disease, *see* disease and illness
- Imperial Army, 1–2, 12, 13, 25, 31–33
 as cruel and barbaric, 172
 discipline problems within, 40
 ethos 4, 8, 18–20, 22–23, 35–37, 60, 153
- Military Codes, 20
- Ministry, 19, 28
- Nakamura's commitment to, 171–172
 recruitment on Taiwan, 170
 training and discipline, 14, 17–18, 36–37, 85, 89, 106–107, 116, 118, 120, 155, 172
- Imperial Military Reserve Association, 17
- Imperial Navy, 4, 25, 31–32, 53
 Navy Ministry, 19, 28
 recruitment on Taiwan, 170
- Imperial Rescript on Education (1890), 17
- Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors, 1882, 17, 118
- Indochina, French, 14, 25–26, 33
- Indoctrination, 7, 65, 115–117, 134, 154, 159, 179
- Indonesia, 2, 25, 33
 war of independence, 1, 27, 34, 61, 63
- Itō Kentarō, 86
- Itō Masashi, 103–109, 112, 118, 124, 134–135
- Iwo Jima, 25, 35, 50, 64, 76
- Japanese Embassy in Manila, 73–74, 83, 91–92, 98, 136, 147
 in Jakarta, 161, 164
- Japanese Society for Textbook Reform, 185

- Jimbō Nobuhiko, 58–60
- Kahn, E.J., 4, 58, 92
- Kamikaze, 22, 41
 pressmen, 112
- Katō Norihiro, 7, 76
- Katō Yōko, 170
- Kimigayo* (national anthem), 161
- Kishi Nobusuke, prime minister, 88–89, 104, 110
- Kiyosawa Kiyoshi, 16–17
- Kobayashi Yoshinori, 6, 71, 76, 185
- Kobukbō fujinkai, *see National Defence Women's Association*
- Koizumi Jun'ichirō, Prime Minister, 185
- Komatsu Sakyō, 150
- Korea, 25, 33, 94
 Korean War, 50, 66
 Military recruitment in, 170, 177
 North Korea, 4, 27, 189
 South Korea, 26
- Kozuka family, 69, 72, 74, 91–93, 138–139, 157
- Kozuka Kinshichi, 2, 4, 12, 56–57
 declared dead in 1959, 92, 136
 discussed in Special Committee, 96–99
 forgotten, 137, 153, 156
 shot dead, 72, 77, 136–143, 153, 182
- Kuga, Major, 21
- Kuriles, 27
- Language, stragglers', 59, 85, 163–164, 174
- League of Repatriates, 97
- Li Kuang Hwei, *see* Nakamura Teruo
- Liberal Democratic Party, 47, 88, 96–101, 124, 150
- Liberal Education League, 6–7, 133, 185
- Liu Lianren, 185–186
- living relics, 3, 66, 133
- Lockheed Scandal, 151
- Lubang, 2, 4, 12, 43, 56–60, 64, 105
 Association, 152
 considered by Special Committee, 94–99
 murders on, 64, 89, 91, 96, 99, 102, 141, 159
 searches on 69, 73–74, 89–97, 143–146, 181
- Lucky Dragon, 88
- Maizuru, 28
- Malaria, *see* illness and disease
- Malaya, 25–26
- Malnutrition, *see* starvation
- Manchuria, 19, 22, 25–26, 29, 33, 77, 94
- Manchurian Incident, 44
- Manus Island, 50–51
- Marcos, President Ferdinand, 147, 157
- Marianas, 25, 52, 61
- Marshall Islands, 25
- Maru, 71
- McKernan, Michael, 188
- Meguro, Toshimasa, 28
- Meiji period, 15–18
- Militarism, 4, 43, 47, 120, 171, 182
 as represented by Onoda, 153
- Minagawa Bunzō, 103–109, 112, 115, 118–119, 124, 134–135
- Mindoro, 57, 59–61
 stragglers from 69, 83–86, 97, 135
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30, 93, 95–98, 102
- Missing in action, 21, 49, 54, 59, 64, 67, 162, 180
 American, 186–187
 declaring dead, 95
 investigations into whereabouts, 29–33
 relatives searching for, 140–141
- Mobilisation, 13–14, 17
 of women, 18, 133
- Montevideo Maru, 187
- Mop-up operations, 35, 83, 95, 103
- Morotai, 2
 discovery of Nakamura on, 159–161,
 stragglers on, 69, 80–83, 85–86, 167,
 Taiwanese soldiers on, 171
- Nagasaki, 5
- Nagoya, 112, 123
- Nakamura Teruo, 2, 21,
 Association for the Warm Welcome of, 165, 169
 death, 177
 direct repatriation to Taiwan, 165–166
 discovered on Morotai, 159–161
 forgotten, 177–178, 183
 marriage, 176–177
 motivations, 169–170
 nationality and ethnicity, 163–166, 171
 reactions to, 82
 reception in Taiwan, 172–173,
- Nakamura Teruo san o atataku mukaeru kai, 165, 169
- Nakano School, 145, 152, 156, 170
- Nanking, Massacre of, 5, 6, 163, 173
- National Defence Women's Association, 14, 17–18

- National identity, 5, 90, 120
 and materialism, 129–130, 150
 and spiritual emptiness, 131, 150,
 182–183
 as amateurish, 150, of Nakamura,
 163–164
 as selfish in the 1970s, 131–132,
 149–150,
- Neighbourhood Associations, 19, 22
- New Guinea, 2, 12, 25–26, 31, 33, 42, 79
 inhabitants of, 51, 77–78
 stragglers in, 51, 55, 69, 77, 85–86, 135
 Taiwanese soldiers in, 171
- Nihonjinron* (discourses on the Japanese),
 120, 166
- Niigata, 104, 108
- Nitta, Mitsuko, 6
- Nixon, President Richard, 129, 150, 163,
 186
- No Surrender doctrine, 2, 20–22, 60, 66,
 116
- Northern Exposure*, 179, 185
- Occupation of Japan, 9, 23, 38, 179
 authorities *see* General headquarters
 censorship, 65
 reforms, 43–44
- Ogawa Tetsuo, 141
- Oil shocks 1973, 128, 150
- Ōka Shōhei, 71, 118, 127–128, 140
- Okinawa, 22–23, 26, 33
- Okuzaki Kenzō, 15
- Onoda family, 69, 72, 74, 91–93, 138,
 144–145, 149, 154
- Onoda Hirō, 2, 5, 12, 35–36, 43, 56–57,
 72, 82
 as hero, 152–153, 159, 171
 as professional, 150
 boom, 148, 154
 campaign to save, 92
 compared with Yokoi, 156
 declared dead in 1959, 92, 136
 discussed in Special committee, 96–99
 evading searches on Lubang, 75,
 143–146
 moves to Brazil, 158
 pardoned for crimes on, 147
 reception compared with Taiwanese
 stragglers, 167–168
 responsible for deaths of Kozuka and
 Shimada, 152
 sells story, 148
 surrenders, 136, 146–147, 182
- Orr, James, 9, 70
- Pacifism, 70, 86, 88–89, 102–103,
 109–110, 181
- Patriotic Women's Association, 17
- Patriotism, 11, 16–17, 20, 88–89, 109, 118,
 154–155, 161, 171
- Peace Preservation Law, 1925, 16
- Pensions, 49–50, 76, 95, 123, 140, 143,
 154
 and Taiwanese conscripts, 166–167,
 183
- Philippines, 2, 25–26, 31, 33, 34, 41
 Army, 58–61, 73–75, 83, 92, 96
 Embassy in Tokyo, 93
 police, 2, 56–57 72, 75, 91, 92, 138–139
- Pollution, 128
- Popular participation in the war effort, 7,
 184, 188
- Prisoners of war
 American, 186–187
 Australian, 5, 188
 Japanese, 8, 20–21, 40–42, 32, 49, 81,
 82, 116
 Russian, 20
- Propaganda, 14, 15, 19, 22–24, 32, 38, 44,
 48, 120, 180
- Rabaul, 77
- Rambo*, 186
- Reeson, Margaret, 187
- Repatriation, immediate post-war, 24–25,
 27–37
- Reservists' Association, 14, 18
- Revisionism, 7
- Robinson Crusoe, 54, 78, 105–106, 114,
 122
- Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905, 15,
 17–18, 20, 116
- Saipan, 2, 12, 22, 31, 35, 52–53, 61–63
- Sakai Saburō, 71
- Samurai, 20, 158
 armour for Onoda, 151
- Seinen kunrenjo*, *see* Young Men's Training
 Institutes
- Seinendan, *see* Young Men's Associations
- Senkimonō*, 71, 85–86
- Sensōron*, *see* Kobayashi Yoshinori
- Senyū*, war buddies, 81
- Shakai engo kyoku, *see* Bureau of
 Repatriate Welfare
- Shimada Kakuo, 77
- Shimada Shōichi, 56–57, 152
 family, 69, 74
 forgotten as Onoda's companion, 153

- mentioned in Special Committee, 95
 shooting of, 69, 72–77, 86, 90, 92, 94,
 137
- Shimizu Mitsuo, 184
- Shimonoseki, 28
- Shinobu Seizaburō, 117
- Shintō, 45–46
- Shōwa Emperor, 5, 78
 and Taiwan, 171–172, 174
 as Supreme Commander, 15, 20, 22, 39,
 128
 condemnation of, 15, 126
 death of, 184
 divine, 15
 exemption from war crimes trials, 45,
 109, 133
 helping in searches for Onoda, 143
 lack of respect for, 129
 manipulation of image of, 43–44
 refusing to meet Yokoi, 125–128
- Shōwa shi*, 70
- Siam, *see* Thailand
- Siberia, 27, 31, 33, 66
- Singapore, 5, 25, 50
- Sino-Japanese War, 1894–1895, 15, 116
- Socialist Party, 96, 98–101
- Solomon islands, 25–26
- Soviet Union, 4, 11, 26
 repatriation from, 27–30, 33, 49, 50, 66,
 69, 94–95
- Special Committee on the Repatriation of
 Citizens Overseas and Aid to
 Bereaved Families, 94–99
- Special volunteer Soldiers, 170–171
- Starvation, 51–52, 56, 62, 77, 81, 83, 104,
 162, 172
- Suicide, 20–22, 32, 35, 122, 144, 145
 group/mass suicide, 23
 on Saipan, 61
- Sunakawa case, 88–89
- Survival skills, 52, 54–56, 78, 81, 84, 118,
 153, 157, 163, 165
- Suzuki Norio, 146, 149
- Taishō, 18, 115
- Taiwan, 3, 12, 25–26, 33
 as colony, 173–174
 Japan's relationship with, 163
 minority groups, 163–165, 170, 173–175
 recruitment on, 170
 stragglers from, 81, 82, 86, 167–168
- Taiwan kyōyū sōrengō, 165
- Taiwanjin moto Nihonhei no hoshō o
 kangaeru kai, 169
- Takagi Toshirō, 71
- Takasagozoku*, *see* Taiwan minority groups
- Tanaka Kakuei, prime minister, 144
 meets Onoda, 154
 resignation, 150, 177
 visits Beijing, 163
- Taniguchi Yoshimi, 145, 147, 149
- Tarzan, 51–52
- Television, 12
- Textbooks, 5, 11, 17, 184–185
 reform during the Occupation, 43
- Thailand, 5, 25–26, 28, 34
- Thought control, 15
- Tōjō Hideki, wartime prime minister, 44,
 84–85, 98, 171
- Tokkō (Thought police), 16
- Tokubetsu shigan hei*, 170–171
- Tsuji Masanobu, 71
- Tsurumi Shunsuke, 70
- Unit 731, 5, 184
- United States–Japan Security Treaty, 70,
 88, 104, 110, 113, 181
- Veterans, 1, 6, 8, 127, 168, 185, 188
 associations, 6, 97
 begging, 158, 184
 condemn Onoda, 152, 156
 disabled, 134
 in Taiwan, 170–173, 176–177
 linked to crime, 33, 39
 of Morotai, 163
 of Vietnam War, 187–188,
see also Guam Veterans Association,
 Lubang Association
- Victim consciousness, 9, 88, 109–110,
 113, 116, 118, 133, 155, 159, 172,
 175, 180
 in the United States, 187
- Vietnam, war of independence 1, 34, 61,
 63
see also French Indochina
- Vietnam War Veterans, 186–188
- Volunteer Corps, 19, 22
- Wakaichi Kōji, 4, 74, 137, 143, 157, 177
 prompted to remember Kozuka, 158,
 184
- Wakayama, 11, 95, 98, 149
- War 'amnesia', 5, 7, 132–133, 155, 159,
 177–178
- War Crimes, 44, 142, 185 trials, 40, 44–45,
 85, 133
- War Criminals, 50–51, 56, 64, 66, 81, 180

- War dead, 6, 8, 24, 109, 118, 185, 188
ceremonies for, 39, 43, 46
classification as, 143
memorials commemorating, 37, 43,
45–47, 49, 64
remains of, 37–38, 49, 50, 64, 65, 76,
83, 90, 94, 134, 181
spirits of, *see eirei*
- War guilt, 9, 142, 155, 180, 188
Emperor's, 126, 133
- War stories and memoirs, *see senkimonō*
- War widows, 50
- Yamanashi, 11, 104, 108
- Yamanouchi, Yasushi, 13
- Yamato Damashii*, 38, 118
- Yasukuni Shrine, 5–6, 22, 45–47, 100, 181,
185
- Yokoi Shōichi, 2, 12, 36, 38, 43, 82, 103
adjustment to Japan, 129
as celebrity, 119
childhood, 117, 119–120
- compared with Onoda, 156–158
comparisons with post-war Japanese
people, 121–122
- death, 134
- donations for, 124
- marriage, 134, 136
- meeting with the Emperor, 125–128
- reception compared with Taiwanese
stragglers, 167–169
- relations with other stragglers, 119
- Yokoi panic, 111, 182
- Yoshida Yutaka, 9, 44, 60, 70–71, 84, 170
- Yoshikuni Igarashi, 5, 9, 70
- Yoshinaga Haruko, 184
- Young Men's Associations, 18
- Young Men's Training Institutes, 18
- Yūi Daizaburō, 7
- Yukiyukite Shingun*, *see Hara Kazuo*
- Zaigō gunjinkai, *see Reservists Association*
- Zainichi Taiwan dōkyōkai, 167
- Zen Nippon Izokukai, 7, 47, 64, 69, 71, 97